What’s Next After the “Palestine Papers”? Posted by Jacob Stokes

Last September when I read Charlie Kupchan’s op-ed in the International Herald Tribune telling the Palestinians that they should “just say yes” and make grand diplomatic concessions in the hopes of jumpstarting the peace process in the Middle East, I didn’t necessarily like the conclusion, but I agreed with it. Kupchan wrote:

The Palestinian Authority should make Israel an offer it can’t refuse by leapfrogging the logjam and declaring publicly that it is prepared to accept the outlines of the deal that successive Israeli governments have put on the table.

To the end of securing its main objective — statehood — the Palestinian Authority should acquiesce to major Jewish settlements in the West Bank in a swap for territory in Israel; it should give up the right of return for most Palestinian refugees and instead secure monetary compensation; it should accept effective demilitarization of a Palestinian state in order to meet Israel’s security needs; and the Palestinian Authority should aim to locate its capital in Arab East Jerusalem.

Now, if the “Palestine Papers” released today by al Jazeera aren’t debunked as a fraud – as Palestinian leaders are now claiming in a frantic effort to backpedal – it appears as though Palestinian leaders had come to much the same conclusion as Kupchan, and years before. And unfortunately, both they and Kupchan were wrong: They recognized their relatively weak bargaining position, made grand gestures and got nothing for it.

What will the release of these papers mean? Matt Duss has a good first take. He writes that the papers “seriously challenge the theory that unquestioning U.S. support for Israel is necessary to give Israel the confidence to make concessions for peace”; that the papers “reveal the massive disparity in power between the two sides” (again, Kupchan); and that they will only serve to weaken an already embattled Palestinian leadership.

The Price Being Paid Posted by Michael Cohen

In recent weeks I've been trying quite unsuccessfully to write less about Afghanistan. The reason is simple; how many times can one keep making the same argument over and over again - without seeing any sort of change in strategy - before it becomes simply exhausting. For nearly two years I have been writing about the strategy underpinning the war in Afghanistan both here at Democracy Arsenal and elsewhere - sometimes cogently, other times not.

And I have to say it has been nothing but a constant and unceasing source of frustration as assumptions continue to go untested, mistakes are repeated, missions creep in the direction of further escalation, military and political leaders obfuscate and purposely seek to inflame the public, and platitudes have taken the place of anything resembling rigorous analysis. 

Sometimes when you focus so much energy on strategy and tactics the human toll is forgotten. Then I read stories like this one in the Los Angeles Times, which recounts the devastating impact of the war on just one Marine regiment, and I realize that voices must continually raised against the war in Afghanistan and the manner in which it is being prosecuted:

When the Marines of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, deployed to the Sangin district of Afghanistan's Helmand province in late September, the British soldiers who had preceded them warned the Americans that the Taliban would be waiting nearly everywhere for a chance to kill them.

But the Marines, ordered to be more aggressive than the British had been, quickly learned that the Taliban wasn't simply waiting. In Sangin, the Taliban was coming after them. In four years there, the British had lost more than 100 soldiers, about a third of all their nation's losses in the war.

In four months, 24 Marines with the Camp Pendleton-based Three-Five have been killed. More than 140 others have been wounded, some of them catastrophically, losing limbs and the futures they had imagined for themselves. The Marines' families have been left devastated, or dreading the knock on the door.

Please read the entire article. It packs an emotional wallop; but it also tells a story that needs to be re-told - about a war that is tangential to US interests; that is being poorly prosecuted by our military leaders; that has been sold by our political leaders as though it is in this nation's vital interests when it is anything but; and that is wreaking a terrible toll on both our fighting men and women in uniform and their families.

But above all, it is a reminder that this terrible and unnecessary war that is, in reality, doing very little to keep Americans safe is ruining too many young lives, both here and in Afghanistan.

Neocons Make the Sovereignty Argument for China Posted by Jacob Stokes

Nina Hachigian of the Center for American Progress explains how American neoconservatives undermine the argument that China needs to be a responsible global stakeholder:

At base, however, Washington and Beijing have divergent ideas about how a great power should conduct itself in the 21st century. In that battle of ideas, China gets support from an unlikely corner: American neoconservatives.

China ducks international responsibility by citing its sovereignty. Neoconservatives unwittingly support that view when they insist the U.S. compromises its own sovereignty if it engages fully with today’s international institutions and abides by international laws. This sends Beijing a dangerous message: Stewardship of the international order is not the business of a great power.

She goes on:

Yet some American neoconservatives find themselves on the side of China’s Communist leaders in this debate. Though they have tended to criticize the Obama administration for not being adequately tough on Beijing, their own ideal of national sovereignty supports China’s.

John Bolton, President George W. Bush’s U.N. ambassador, lays out a current conservative view in his book, “How Barack Obama Is Endangering Our National Sovereignty.” Bolton argues that those who advocate for the U.S. to engage with international organizations to address global problems are really saying we should “cede some of our sovereignty to institutions that other nations will also influence.”

“That,” Bolton warns, “is unquestionably a formula for reducing U.S. autonomy and reducing our control over the government.”

So while China invokes a 19th-century ideal of sovereignty to justify decisions that harm U.S. interests, some neoconservatives are championing the same antiquated notions — legitimizing China’s rejection of international standards and rules.

In other words, unless America chooses to engage with and participate in international institutions and global governance, forefeiting a small amount of sovereignty and putting up with the frustrations inherent in multilateral diplomacy, there’s very little chance China will play by the rules either – and that will mean more than just little frustrations.

Is the Fuel Swap Back? Again? Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

Could it be?  Is the Zombie fuel deal back?

With the P5 + 1 talks kicking off tomorrow in Istanbul, rumors of a revived fuel swap are surfacing.  Again. 

Iran has denied claims that it intends to propose new terms for a fuel swap and the U.S. is saying that it’s open to the idea but not sure it wants to be the one to bring it up. It’s hard to remember, but despite all of the hype, the original Tehran Research Reactor deal was never intended to solve the Iranian nuclear question.  It was however, supposed to serve as a confidence building measure.  A big baby step of sorts.  If the reports are true and parties are once again considering a fuel swap, it’s possible that this time around there could be some progress on the enrichment debate. Or at least the appearance of progress. 

In December, Hillary Clinton confirmed that Iran is "entitled to the peaceful use of civil nuclear energy," if and when Iran can demonstrate that that it is complying with its international obligations. A few Iran hawks on the Hill decided they didn't agree with this and announced instead that they preferred to "continue ratcheting up" the pressure on Iran, which for the record, is ridiculous. 

The U.S. and its partners have the right to demand that Iran temporarily halt its enrichment, but Iran’s hardliners can be counted on to torpedo any agreement that advertises such a requirement.  The original TRR deal went south after Western diplomats publicly congratulated themselves for pulling a fast one on Iran and Ahmadinejad ran into trouble at home. It's hard for some to remember, but even Ahmadinejad has a base.

"China as Behemoth" Has a Military Edge Posted by Jacob Stokes

Dan Drezner has a good roundup pushing back on Forbes magazine’s random and stupid article contending that Chinese President Hu Jintao is the most powerful man in the world. (Harry Reid also made a similar mistake, calling Hu a “dictator”.) Drezner tags the “Hu as powerful dictator” line as part of bigger “China as rising hegemon” meme. I’m not sure I agree with Drezner’s argument that the scope of Hu’s power is the argument that those who want to rebut the “China as hegemon” crowd need to target.

It seems to me the more pernicious line is that China’s military is out of control. That argument contends that no matter how peaceful China’s civilian leaders seem, the military’s continual modernization and technological progress shows China’s desire to challenge American power the world over (forget the fact that the American military is still vastly superior and no one should be surprised by a rising country modernizing its military). And even if China's civilian leaders wanted to stop them, they couldn't. FPI has trumpeted this line, as does Max Boot.

That line is convenient because it hedges (and everyone knows China fear-mongerers love hedging!) against any softening of the line coming from the civilian leadership. If the line softens – and I’m not saying it will necessarily, but it could -- it’s harder to trump up China as an enemy and make the case for increased defense spending to ensure the security of American allies in the Far East.

Finally, it has the imprimatur of being intellectually aware, as there’s been widespread debate and analysis about the free-for-all going on in Beijing when it comes to conduct of Chinese foreign policy. Of course, by insisting that China’s rise cannot possibly be peaceful and therefore American power should be used to subvert its rise in all forms, peaceful or not, American conservatives are empowering the hardliners in Beijing – self-fulfilling their prophecy.

Tactics vs. Strategy in Afghanistan Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at abumuqawama and registan.net, Josh Foust and Andrew Exum have posted a rather interesting exchange that examines the tactical efforts of the US military in Afghanistan. It's a fascinating debate between two smart people and one that I highly recommend.

But, and I mean this not to be insulting to either, it's a digression even diversion from the real issues regarding the current US mission in Afghanistan. To explain check out this quote from Andrew:

U.S. counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level were some of the best I had ever seen. Caveat lector, I do not know whether or not these improved tactics will yield a strategic effect. There are too many phenomena that we cannot even observe much less measure. And we still have a lot of known pains in our asses (like Afghan governance and sanctuaries in Pakistan) that could render tactical gains ephemeral.

It's good that Andrew makes this connection (because there seem to be a lot of folks who don't) but he's dramatically downplaying it's importance. In the end, it doesn't really matter how good the US military gets at counter-insurgency and it doesn't really matter if the Arghandab Valley is more secure than it was a year ago; particularly if the larger strategic impediments to success in Afghanistan remain in place. Indeed, our fetishization of tactical "successes" has become a distraction from our abundant strategic failures in Afghanistan.

Over the 18 months we've seen no evidence that the Afghan government is seriously interested in clamping down on corruption or is able to provide more effective governance for its citizens. We've seen no evidence that Pakistan has any interest in turning against the Afghan Taliban (in fact quite the opposite). We've seen little evidence that the ANSF will be able to take over from ISAF in providing security any time soon and the same goes for the police. And on the latter point, the lack of an effective judiciary system in the country tends to demonstrate how uselss a police force we are likely creating. All of this is happening while the clock is ticking on US engagement and NATO allies are becoming increasingly wary of their commitment to the fight in Afghanistan.

In short, from a strategic perspective we've seen very little progress on our larger objectives that are (and this is rather crucial) supposed to support the tactical gains that folks in the US military love to brag about. (And if I sound like a broken record on this point . . . it's because I am).

This is elemental to the success or failure of our mission and speak to the sustainability of our current operations. Indeed, if there are no guarantees that the ANSF can take over security in the Arghandab valley any time soon or that the government can provide vital services or that the spigot of fighters from Pakistan can be turned off . . . then all we doing here is "mowing the lawn."

The worst part of this is that by believing enhanced security in the Arghandab valley or elsewhere in southern and eastern Afghanistan is a metric of success not only distracts us from our real challenges, but it allows military commanders and in turn political leaders to resist needed shifts in strategy.

So for example, the recent "success" in killing Taliban insurgents is used, in part, as a justification for not embracing a more robust political strategy of reconciliation. Why should we if the enemy is on the run? We're winning, or so the story goes, and thus it's not a good time to open up a political channel or embrace confidence-building measures that might bring the Taliban to the table.  From this perspective, believing that we are winning tactically in Afghanistan is our greatest curse; in fact, it's the root of all our problems. You see, if we recognized we weren't winning, we might shift course a la surge 2007 in Iraq, but instead we see progress where there isn't and ignore the many signs of failure.

This brings me to the final point: Andrew's evoking of the Wire (aka the best TV show in history):

I use The Wire a lot to explain everything from Lebanese politics to counterinsurgency, and I would liken the U.S. Army to the character Ellis Carver: when we meet him in Season One, all he wants to do is kick ass and take names. By Season Five, though, he’s become a much smarter police officer. He’s taken the time to get to know the people he’s trying to protect and can thus better separate the bad guys from all the people just trying to get on with their lives.

We could spend a whole week making a connection between international affairs and the Wire, but I think this misses the crucial takeaway from the Wire. Carver is not a smart police officer . . . he is a tragic figure. He doesn't realize that knowing the neighborhood better and separating the bad guys from ordinary folk does not change the fundamental nature of the Drug War, which overwhelms all efforts at effective policing. 

You bust one corner boy, another one sprouts up; you take down a package, another comes in; you arrest a drug lord, guess what another one takes his place. Unless you try to change the very strategy a la Bunny Colvin and Hamsterdam, you're just spitting against the wind.

So if there is a lesson from the Wire it is that the tactical efforts of the cops is a waste of time and resources. It doesn't matter how good they get at their jobs because ultimately the game is the game . . and the game is rigged.

Sounds like Afghanistan, doesn't it?

Wanna Tighten the Screws on China? Focus on Coalition Building Posted by Jacob Stokes

Chinese President Hu Jintao visits Washington this week amid much hang-wringing about continued obstinacy from China on a range of issues. So the question of the day is: What’s the best way to get China to play ball and become a more responsible power? One school of thought suggests the U.S. continue to ratchet up its responses to Chinese actions. But as Les Gelb points out, too much ratcheting on either side will empower the hawks in each country, leading to recriminations and a souring of relations between the two nations. That dynamic serves the interests of neither country.

In order to avoid that fate, and to more effectively pressure China, the U.S should avoid the G-2 framework which frames problems as bilateral. Instead, the U.S. should focus on doing the diplomatic spadework to build coalitions to lobby the Middle Kingdom to change its behavior. There are three reasons why this approach makes sense.

First, almost every issue cited in discussions of a U.S.-China rift affects countries beside the U.S. And those countries largely want to see the same policy solutions as the U.S. Talking currency? Engage other developing countries whose export sectors suffer from the artificially low value of the renminbi. Worried about the protection of intellectual property and indigenous innovation? Enlist our European and other Asian allies to push China to pay for licensing of software and remove regulations that force companies to release proprietary technology in order to enter the Chinese market. Feeling hot in here? Engage the Global South and other developing countries – those who will feel the effects of climate change most dramatically – to pressure China to continue to improve its environmental policies. Oceans feeling a little tense? Follow Secretary Clinton’s lead and pick up the pieces via ASEAN and other Asian regional fora when Chinese aggression spooks its neighbors; that would create a united international front, backed but not necessarily led by the U.S., against sprawling Chinese territorial claims. I could go on. But the point is: When possible, encourage others to lead the way.

On Village Razing . . . and Counter-Insurgency Posted by Michael Cohen

There's been a lot of back and forth between Paula Broadwell and Josh Foust about the issue of village razing in Afghanistan. Those who need to catch up can follow the debate here, here and here.

I won't bother to summarize the entire discussion, but it began with what I think can be charitably described as Paula's less than empathetic response to an Afghan village being destroyed. What I find most striking about this is not the rather bloodless manner in which Broadwell describes the incident (although that is notable) but rather the fascinating, and unintentional, insight into how dramatically the war in Afghanistan has shifted in opposition to the population-centric policies being espoused a year ago.

A lot of COIN advocates will tell you that kinetic action is integral to war-fighting and that even though airstrikes are up 300% and targeted killings are on the rise and more homes are being destroyed since General David Petraeus took over command . . . it's still just counter-insurgency.

But for those with long memories the operational approach of ISAF forces in Afghanistan under General McChrystal was to avoid civilian casualties and even property destruction at all costs, even at the risk of putting US troops in harm's way. (Some even argued that protecting civilians was actually more important than killing insurgents).

Indeed as Foust points out, when ISAF troops went into Marjah last February they appeared to be far more concerned about village destruction then what you are seeing in the Arghandab Valley today - and at the time went to far greater lengths to avoid bringing harm to both person and property there.

But look if you don't want to believe me; how about believing the guidance issued by General Stanley McChrystal to his troops:

Conventional military action against insurgents consumes considerable resources with little real return and is likely to alienate the people we are trying to secure. Large scale operations to kill or capture militants carry a significant risk of causing civilian casualties and collateral damage. If civilians die in a firefight, it does not matter who shot him - we still failed to protect them from harm. Destroying a home or property jeopardizes the livelihood of an entire family - and creates more insurgents. We sow the seeds of our demise.

I find myself in violent agreement with Stanley McChrystal even if I think trying to fight a war on these terms is nearly impossible. But what McChrystal says here is also in violent disagreement from what Broadwell is describing happened in the Arghandab Valley. Indeed, it's hard for me to imagine that had this occurred in Marjah or elsewhere in Afghanistan when he was commander McChrystal would have been supportive of such actions. They appear to run directly counter to his guidance to troops - and yet I haven't seen anyone from ISAF publicly criticize the methods that are being employed in the Arghandab Valley.

Indeed, look at what Broadwell says about the clearing operation that razed a village to the ground: "Clearing operations are a necessary evil to weed out the Taliban, and they often leave devastating destruction in the wake. But what Aziz [President Karzai's advisor, Mohammad Sadiq Aziz] failed to note is the tremendous effort some units, like 1-320th, have made to rebuild his country." Does anyone really believe that because the US threw some money at the villagers this just washed away the sense of anger and frustration these individuals felt toward Americans?

You don't get a mulligan because you rebuilt the town you leveled.

But it's a far cry from what COIN advocates were saying a year ago. Then US/ISAF destruction of property was a bad thing because it "creates more insurgents." Today, destroying property, not such a bad thing because we helped the people whose homes were destroyed to rebuild them i.e. building trust.

It's perhaps another example that COIN advocates tend to define COIN by whatever definition furthers their arguments at that exact moment.

Armed Social Work in Action Posted by Michael Cohen

This might be the greatest, most depressing and yet bizarrely symbolic picture depicting the US effort to stabilize and pacify Afghanistan. Here in an article from the New York Times that references a "humanitarian assistance patrol in Ghazni Province" which handed out "crank-powered radios, books, candy and drinks."

But check out the title of the book in the picture below:

That's right, US soliders are handing out English-language copies of "Chicken Soup for the Soul" for Afghan villagers.

Truly, you can't make this stuff up.

More Ideas For A Constructive Foreign Policy Debate Posted by David Shorr

I spent last weekend at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School for a conference the Stanley Foundation co-sponsored with three of our favorite colleagues. The main subject was the prospect and challenge of international cooperation amidst pervasive change, but there were a couple of nuggets for the domestic politics of foreign policy. The first came from Rich Williamson, a highly accomplished practitioner and pillar of the Republican FP establishment. Rich's comment offers a sort of truce for some of the most contentious strains of the debate, one well worth exploring:

America’s foreign policy properly is driven in the first instance by national security concerns and then by vital interests, many of which will be economic.  Yet human rights are integral to the American character.  And a world in which human rights are respected is a safer, more secure and better world.  At the very least we should speak out for voiceless victims and in behalf of human rights.  During my many diplomatic jobs I have spoken the truth to many bad actors who have done bad things, and they have never been surprised.  They know they are doing bad things.  Rather they are surprised when America does not speak up.  And when America is silent on such trespass of basic human rights it gives them more space to continue their abuse of human rights.

It sure would be nice to reach some consensus about dealing with repressive foreign leaders who present other problems for us besides their abuse of rights. The "coddling dictators" trope is classic political point-scoring. And those who argue that resolute-ness is all you need to whip bad guys into line are selling Americans unrealistic ideas about how we can achieve our aims in today's world. I know for a fact that many of my conservative friends don't believe this, and I appreciated Rich saying it.

Don't anyone worry, though, about the new civility stifling all debate and eliding all differences. For a start, I have a slight unease over how Rich's above paragraph is weighted -- it pivots pretty quickly from the acknowledgment of other policy objectives to several sentences on the upholding of human rights. Now back to my Princeton conference story. In a memo that Bruce Jentleson wrote for the conference, I was struck by the following excellent summary of the Bush and Obama administration approaches to US leadership and international legitimacy, as well as the response and results they elicited: