Rep. Mike Honda (D-CA) on Securing Afghanistan Posted by Jacob Stokes

Today, Congressman Mike Honda (D-CA), senior member of the House Appropriations Committee and Chairperson of the Afghanistan Task Force of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, delivered a speech on Afghanistan before a briefing discussion on social and humanitarian issues organized by the National Security Network and hosted by the Congressional Progressive Caucus. Here it is, presented in its entirety:

Thank you everyone for attending today’s panel discussion on Afghanistan.  Let me offer a special thanks to the National Security Network for organizing the panel. 

As Chairman of the Congressional Progressive Caucus’s Afghanistan Taskforce, I am keenly interested in hearing insights from these panelists, all of whom come with specific expertise grounded in the realities of the country. 

Before I turn over the panel to Heather Hurlburt, Executive Director of the National Security Network, who will introduce the panelists and moderate the discussion, let me offer some brief introductory remarks.

Sino-American Economic Power: A Mexican Standoff Posted by Jacob Stokes

Former IMF chief economist Simon Johnson over at Baseline Scenario has an important post that squashes the notion, which has become conventional wisdom, that China’s reserves of US debt take away American leverage in US-China relations.

“There is a perception that China’s large dollar holdings confer upon that country some economic or political power vis-à-vis the United States and, in particular, that Chinese reserves prevent us from putting pressure on that country’s authorities to revalue (i.e., appreciate) the renminbi. This view is incorrect and completely misunderstands the situation.”

Johnson goes on to explain how the US-China debt relationship—much pointed at as an example of waning US power—is a two-way street. In other words, while America needs anxious buyers like China to purchase its debt in order to do things like fund the war in Afghanistan, China needs debt to buy. That’s because China must stock up on assets in foreign currencies to keep its currency value low so that its export-driven economy can thrive. This purposeful manipulation is of course bad for the American economy, particularly the ailing US manufacturing sector.

But what options or leverage do we have? America needs to the money. 

Well yes, but China also has an export-driven economy that requires a cheap currency to thrive. In other words, in order to maintain its low currency value China needs us to issue debt as much as we need them to buy it. Even if China decides to change its mind and invest somewhere else, any option other than buying US debt, from purchasing US stock to buying foreign currencies, would help stimulate the US economy in other ways. Which would be a good thing. (Johnson explains this in more detail.) 

And if China decides to start plowing money into its domestic economy, it will force China to push up the value of its currency or have its economy overheat. This will make American exports relatively cheaper and more competitive. Johnson says in fact that this is the policy we should be aiming for.

The bottom line on this rather wonky subject is that the Sino-American relationship is not one where China is holding a debt gun to America’s head, forcing an emasculated America to do China’s bidding. It’s more like a Mexican standoff: only by slowing lowering our guns—or, in this case, rebalancing our trade and monetary postures—can we both resolve the situation in a way that benefits both parties.

In order to do this, America should do all it can to put pressure on China to slowly but steadily let its currency appreciate so that American exports can be more competitive. It should also reduce it foreign currency reserves and push its citizens to consume more. The renewed vigor in the US economy created by this rebalancing would help erase the need to sell our debt in the first place—making a measured, incremental rebalancing good for everyone.

Pay Any Price . . . Bear Any Burden Posted by Michael Cohen

I've been fighting the urge to write a rather long blog post taking down John Nagl's recent article in the National Interest on why the the war in Afghanistan is the right war for America. To be honest, the prospect simply exhausts me (plus Paul Pillar does a nice job in the back and forth with Nagl and Bernard Finel does some heavy lifting as well).

Of the many problems with Nagl's argument is that like many pro-escalation voices he seems stuck in 2001. He chooses, for whatever reason, to ignore the many pieces of evidence that suggest the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda has become far more fractured. For example, before taking pen to paper he should have taken the time to read this article by Vahid Brown that sheds some light on this issue - as well as this blog post from Jihadica. 

He wrongly conflates that Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban. As Josh Foust points out on Twitter Nagl engages in some serious tautology. He dramatically over inflates the importance of a safe haven in Afghanistan and Paskistan and al Qaeda capabilities in general. He glosses over the fact that al Qaeda is a hollow organization with a few hundred key operatives and is under constant pressure from US drone attacks. He has an outlandish proposal that the US army should be increased by 100,000 troops (I mean really) . . . and America can pay for it with a national-security tax on gasoline (aided by American flags on gas pumps). This is just a crazy idea - and even if you could pass such a tax one might think it might make more sense to put the money toward developing alternative energy sources rather than plunging even more money into our already bloated defense budget. 

And then he makes this bizarre claim, "it is well within American means to fight a troop-intensive counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan . . . while simultaneously pursuing a less costly form of counterinsurgency in Yemen and waging an information and education campaign against al-Qaeda in Europe and the United States." I just can't, for the life of me, possibly begin to understand why John Nagl believes this is true . . . or why it's even necessary. I'm not even convinced we can do one of these things effectively - no less all three at the same time. 

But here's the thing; that's not the part of this essay that left me the most frustrated. It's this:

There is no safe haven that al-Qaeda covets more than the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which present a unique opportunity for our enemies and a threat to us. Situated in rugged terrain hundreds of miles from any coastline, with weak of nonexistent governance and security services, this region provides both a home to al-Qaeda and possible access to nuclear weapons.

Which of these statements doesn't quite fit (don't worry I've bolded it for you)? You want to talk about a flight of fancy? We go from al-Qaeda having "a home" . . . to possibly having access to nuclear weapons. John Nagl must know that the chances of al Qaeda getting access to a nuclear weapon are about equal to me becoming the starting center for the Detroit Red Wings (I can't even ice skate).  

This is alarmism plain and simple; a throwaway line in an essay that is intended to infer the specter of nuclear armageddon even though the chances of al Qaeda getting a nuke, keeping it hidden and then using it against the United States are so infinitesimally small.  And folks wonder why we can't have a real debate in this country about US national interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan - or the war in terrorism in general - when folks are willy-nilly throwing around the specter of nuclear attack to distort the conversation.  What's also striking is that little consideration is given to the idea that there might be other, less intrusive ways to lessen the potential of nuclear instability in Pakistan rather than the overwhelming application of US military force.

But perhaps the most disturbing part is that it's entirely possible that for Nagl and others the minuscule possibility of al Qaeda getting a nuclear bomb is reason enough to send 100,000 troops on an open-ended mission to Afghanistan; or spend hundreds of billions of dollars in bringing 100,000 more troops into the military. All in the pursuit of security . . .

Perhaps Pillar puts it best:

NAGL IS to be commended for acknowledging that the cost of the war will be “high,” and his reference to five years for building a viable Afghan government and army is more realistic than the Obama administration’s timetable. The next appropriate step would be to acknowledge that the high cost in lives, limbs and money would do little or nothing to protect Americans from terrorism.

Good luck with that Paul.

Iraq and its Region Posted by Michael Wahid Hanna

I had a piece at World Politics Review yesterday that looked at where things stand on Iraq’s reintegration back into the region. The regional context is often cited in pro forma fashion, and I think this issue is often overlooked when thinking about Iraq’s long-term future and also how Iraq fits into the United States’ broader regional strategy following the upcoming withdrawal (and yes, I think the withdrawal as outlined in the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement is a good thing and a binding obligation- more on that later).

Normalized and productive ties with its neighbors and near-neighbors will go a long way to boosting Iraq’s feeble economy and limiting the prospects for unwanted meddling from outsiders following the impending U.S. withdrawal. Using Turkey’s pragmatic policy of engagement with Iraq as a starting point, I then go on to discuss Iraq’s relations with its region:

In many ways, Turkey's rise as a major diplomatic player on the Iraqi stage serves as a counterpoint to Iran's magnified role, with both pro-actively promoting their interests by attempting to reintegrate Iraq into the region on their own terms. That stands in stark contrast to Iraq's Arab neighbors, who have utterly failed to seriously prepare for the United States' impending withdrawal.

Iran has natural affinities with Iraq’s Shi’a-led government, although overstated at times, but Turkey and Iran have adapted to the changed geopolitical environment based on their understanding of their own national interests. The Arabs — not so much. There are legitimate Arab concerns about the government in Baghdad, but their approach has only intensified Iraqi reliance on Iran and to a lesser extent, Turkey:

Yet despite these formidable hurdles, Turkey's example should be instructive. Ankara shifted toward a pragmatic strategy of engagement to frame its bilateral affairs and magnify its influence. While Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and other Arab states have re-established diplomatic relations, their efforts to deepen relations with Iraq have not extended far beyond the bare minimum of diplomatic protocol.

The issue of regional reintegration is obviously important for Iraq but also for the United States, particularly if containment becomes the animating principle behind America’s policy on Iran (and this is where things are likely headed as long as sanity prevails). It is also relevant that those states that have not been forthcoming in their relations with post-war Iraq, Saudi Arabia chief among them, are key U.S. allies:

For the United States, the reintegration of Iraq into the Arab world should be a key plank of any post-withdrawal regional strategy seeking to establish the basis for long-term stability and limit the extent of Iran's influence in the region. Certainly, Turkey will be a significant player in this process and may serve as an important and discreet channel for mediation as the United States' role in Iraq shifts to a less obtrusive and more diplomatic one.

But regional reintegration will be lopsided without active Arab participation. While U.S. influence within Iraq has decreased, its ability to prod its Arab allies and its willingness to prioritize Arab outreach to Iraq within its bilateral relations with these countries remains an important tool to secure Iraqi goodwill and shape regional security dynamics. With the impending drawdown of U.S. troops, the Arab states' worst fears regarding an expanding Iranian sphere of influence will only be exacerbated by their own lethargy. Without a perceptible shift in approach, the Arab world will be party to a self-fulfilling prophecy.

With an obvious transition point on the horizon, the United States needs to begin sketching out how Iraq fits into our strategy for the region, cognizant of the mutually-reinforcing (or defeating) linkages that exist between our policies throughout the Middle East.

Go read the whole thing here.

A Defense of Lara Dadkhah . . . Kind of, Sort of, But Not Really Posted by Michael Cohen

Last week Lara Dadkhah published a rather provocative op-ed in the New York Times that got . . how shall we say, some bad press. "Monstrous" said Glenn Greenwald. Why? Dadkhah argues that the US is losing the war in Afghanistan because it's eschewed the use of airpower out of fear that it will cause civilian casualties. Her remedy to this situation is to, in effect, weaken those rules . . . and thus kill more civilians.

So I'm about to do something kind of stupid - I'm going to try and defend Dadkhah, because I think there's an important point here that deserves greater illumination. This graf questioning General McChrystal's directive to avoid civilian casualties at all costs is the crux of Dadkhah's argument, 

General McChrystal’s directive was well intentioned, but the lofty ideal at its heart is a lie, and an immoral one at that, because it pretends that war can be fair or humane.

Wars are always ugly, and always monstrous, and best avoided. Once begun, however, the goal of even a "long war" should be victory in as short a time as possible, using every advantage you have.

As Sherman perennially reminds us, war is cruelty; you cannot refine it - and before he burned the city of Atlanta to the ground he basically made the same argument that Lara Dadkhah is making here. As Dadkhah notes if the US believes the war in Afghanistan is a "war of necessity" (which President Obama has said) and that this conflict is essential to protecting the national interest then we should do everything in our power to win it as quickly as possible. And if that means weakening the restrictions on the use of power and increasing the potential for civilian casualties then so be it.

And of course such actions in US history are hardly unprecedented. Certainly, one could argue that in the US-Japanese war it was only the willingness of the United States to engage in total war - and openly target civilians in terrorizing air raids -- that ensured victory.

Steven Walt makes the obvious rejoinder to this argument:

The purpose of the more restrictive rules of engagement is to cut down on accidental deaths inflicted on Afghan civilians, precisely because such actions make the U.S./NATO presence less popular, diminish support for our Afghan allies, and make it easier for the Taliban to recruit new soldiers. Killing more civilians also undermines troop moral and support for the war back home. Taking the gloves back off, as she suggests, might actually undermine our long-term prospects. Thus, whatever you may think about the wisdom of our engagement there, the new rules of engagement make sense.

Well not necessarily. What if these restrictive rules make it more difficult for the US to defeat the Taliban militarily? What if in 18 months when American troops are supposed to begin withdrawal for Afghanistan, the lack of an enemy-centric approach has left Afghanistan more unstable and just as liable to be taken over by the Taliban?

What's more, one is hard pressed to think of a single successful counter-insurgency effort that did not involve widespread coercion and violence against civilians (no matter what FM 3-24 says). There's an argument to be made that population centric counter-insurgency, with its obsessive focus on protecting civilians, is fundamentally ahistorical and there is little historical precedent for believing that it will work. (And before someone says "Iraq surge," I'll just remind folks that US airstrikes killed four times as many Iraqis after the surge, than before; detainment of Iraqis jumped by 50% and the surge was proceeded by widespread ethnic cleansing and civilian refugee flows). 

As for the notion that killing civilians will weaken support back home . . . wouldn't an increase in US civilian casualties (that is a result of restrictive rules of engagement) or a prolonged military occupation also weaken domestic support? Finally, there is no question that civilian casualties hurt NATO's efforts, but as Dadkhah points out while casualties caused by the US declined . . .

 . . . The overall number of civilian deaths in the country increased by 14 percent, to 2,412, and the number killed by Taliban troops and other insurgents rose by 41 percent. For Afghan civilians who are dying in greater numbers, the fact that fewer deaths are caused by pro-government forces is cold comfort.

So it's not as if civilians aren't being harmed in the war - and practically every day there are more stories of civilians being killed by American forces. (And this blog provides compelling and graphic evidence of the toll that the war in Afghanistan is taking on civilians).

Let's do a hypothetical here. Let's say the exact same number of civilians were being killed, but at the same time relaxed rules of engagement, particularly when it comes to airstrikes, allowed the US to make substantial progress in the war (even if the number of civilian deaths by US hands went up). Isn't that a better situation over the long-term for the Afghan people since it will make it less likely that they will have to live under the Taliban's tyrannical rule?

And from a narrow US perspective our ultimate goal is not Afghan security - or even protecting the Afghan people. As I've argued before, if it was the latter, we wouldn't be in Helmand in the first place. Our goal is defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda - that is after all why we are in Afghanistan. So a less civilian-friendly mission would have the added benefit of furthering US national interests.

Now before things get out of control - and people start writing blog posts calling me an apologist for war crimes - not for a second am I endorsing this argument. To support Dadkhah's underlying point is to back the idea that killing Afghan civilians is a morally appropriate thing to do in order to further US security. It's not and ultimately that's the problem. Dadkhah's remedy for the failures of US policy is to ramp up the number of civilian casualties in order to meet our goals. My suggestion would be that if that's the price that must be paid to meet out goals in Afghanistan . . . then our ultimate goals aren't worth the price it would take to achieve them. 

Going to war is an awesome and morally fraught decision. It's one that should not be taken lightly, but all too often is. And anyone who tells you that you can go to war without harming civilians is selling you a pack of lies. I don't think that General Petraeus or General McChrystal or even President Obama have tried to do that. But maintaining the fiction that we can go to war and make protecting civilians our number one priority is snake oil. Either we go to war and accept that civilians will die or we don't. As Dadkhah sagely notes pretending that war can be fair or humane is not only deeply misleading, it's immoral. (And after all, by making the decision to go to war in the first place in Afghanistan, we are making the implicit decision that protecting American lives and American interests is intrinsically more important than Afghan lives. There's nothing wrong with that; it's a calculation that all countries make when they act militarily - but let's at least be honest about it).

If our leaders decide that we must wage total war in Afghanistan in order to protect US interests - and save American lives - then Lara Dadkhah's argument has merit. In fact, it's actually quite defensible. But they haven't and they shouldn't because not much in Afghanistan, as far as American interests, is worth the moral price of killing Afghan civilians. On some level this is a point of agreement between myself and virtually all supporters of escalation in Afghanistan. Civilians should not be dying in this war. 

See How Far the Law Goes Posted by Patrick Barry

The point has been made in the context of the Underpants bomber's cooperation, that under the legal regime preferred by elements of the GOP, Abdulmutallab’s family members never would have worked with FBI interrogators to encourage further cooperation from him.  Not only does this example vindicate the use of the established legal framework for interrogating (and prosecuting) terrorists, but it casts that framework in a virtuous light.  Or so goes the argument.

What revelations about Najibullah Zazi’s case shows is that there is also a shrewd, almost cynical calculus favoring the use of the instruments granted by our criminal justice system: the law is incredibly coercive.  As the Washington Post details, Zazi’s cooperation began “after authorities charged his Afghan-born father with crimes and threatened to charge his mother with immigration offenses -- options that are not available in the military justice system.” 

Conservatives enjoy drawing a dichotomy that casts military commissions as strong and traditional legal methods as weak. But that view isn’t really borne out by reality.  The law extends far. Very far.  If interrogators or prosecutors decide, there are all kinds of options that they can deploy to reach deep into the life of a suspect, options which will sometimes invite, but more often compel cooperation. 

Military commissions or indefinite detention, as the Post points out, are a different story.  They create a legal vacuum where these options simply aren’t available for the most part.  That's important to remember for when conservatives attempt to justify the use of these methods on the basis of interrogation and intelligence gathering.  In significant respects, the decision to work within the established criminal justice system makes FBI and Justice Department officials less, not more constrained in terms of the methods they use to gain cooperation from terrorists.

Carter Reconsidered Posted by Michael Cohen

Over the years Jimmy Carter has become something of a punchline to jokes about weak and ineffectual presidents, particularly on foreign policy. And to be honest, not knowing the extent of Carter's success (only focusing on his failure vis-a-vis Iran) i've tended to agree. But over at Foreign Policy, Carter himself and his former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski - in response to a somewhat interesting article last month from Walter Russell Mead - make a pretty compelling case on behalf Carter's foreign policy legacy. Here's Brzezinski's take on Carter:

• He reconnected the United States with the quest for human rights in both the communist states and those under right-wing dictatorships, in sharp contrast to his predecessor.
• Confronting an initially hostile Congress, he pushed through the treaties that resolved the Panama Canal issue, which was threatening to poison U.S. relations with Latin America.
• He tackled the Middle Eastern conundrum, personally achieving the first peace treaty ever between Israel and an Arab neighbor.
• He not only managed to normalize relations with China, but in the process fashioned a quiet partnership against the Soviet Union.
• He actively supported the Solidarity movement in Poland and secretly assisted the national aspirations of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union.
• He promoted the modernization of U.S. strategic forces and approved the deployment of the MX missile and the development of the Rapid Deployment Force.
• He initiated a command and a support structure for a U.S. military capability in the Persian Gulf.
• Through prolonged but determined negotiations, he reached the SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union (subsequently not submitted for congressional ratification because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan).
• Following that invasion, under his leadership the United States took the initiative in organizing a cooperative effort of a number of leading European, Middle Eastern, and East Asian states in providing military aid to the Afghan resistance, and that resistance contributed to the internal crisis that eventually broke up the Soviet Union.

Read Carter's take here - its pretty good. 

Is Optimism On Afghanistan Warranted? Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at the excellent Majils blog, Greg Carlstrom is pessimistic:

Operation Moshtarak could ultimately be a significant development -- if it leads to a secure Helmand province with decent local governance. Baradar's capture, too, could have broader implications. The early signs are not all encouraging, though, and it's simply too early to declare that the U.S. has regained the initiative in Afghanistan.

Now I take a back seat to no man or woman in my pessimism about Afghanistan, but I have a slightly different take on this. The US is putting renewed military pressure on the Taliban in Helmand; deals with tribes like the Shinwari (which I'm skeptical of) have the potential to increase the political and military pressure on the Taliban; and clearly the lack of clarity in Pakistan about its support for the Afghan Taliban has to be creating some concern in Quetta and elsewhere.

So from this perspective it's really hard for me to see how the United States ISN'T in some small way regaining the initiative in Afghanistan. What has happened in the past week or so has the potential to turn the tide of the war and it should on the surface create some opportunity for optimism. The problem is there seems to be good reason to suspect otherwise. For example, CJ Chivers piece in the NYT from a few days ago seems to puncture the bubble of ISAF optimism about the Afghan Army:

Scenes from this corner of the battlefield, observed over eight days by two New York Times journalists, suggest that the day when the Afghan Army will be well led and able to perform complex operations independently, rather than merely assist American missions, remains far off.

The effort to train the Afghan Army has long been troubled, with soldiers and officers repeatedly falling short. And yet after nearly a decade of American and European mentorship and many billions of dollars of American taxpayer investment, American and Afghan officials have portrayed the Afghan Army as the force out front in this important offensive against the Taliban.

Statements from Kabul have said the Afghan military is planning the missions and leading both the fight and the effort to engage with Afghan civilians caught between the Taliban and the newly arrived troops.

But that assertion conflicts with what is visible in the field. In every engagement between the Taliban and one front-line American Marine unit, the operation has been led in almost every significant sense by American officers and troops. They organized the forces for battle, transported them in American vehicles and helicopters from Western-run bases into Taliban-held ground, and have been the primary fighting force each day.

You got to love how Chivers says that military statements "conflict" with what's happening in the field. How about those statements are blatantly untrue - that also works. But look, this is really concerning . . . and not the slightest bit surprising. We knew months ago that the ANSF wasn't up to the job of holding and building in Helmand. 

Rajiv Chandrasekeran's stellar reporting doesn't spark much confidence either:

On the satellite photographs of Marja that Marines scrutinized before launching a massive assault against the Taliban a week ago, what they assumed was the municipal government center appeared to be a large, rectangular building, cater-cornered from the main police station.

Seizing that intersection became a key objective, one deemed essential to imposing authority and beginning reconstruction in this part of Helmand province once U.S. and Afghan troops flush out the insurgents.

But when Marine officers reached the area, they discovered that two-dimensional images can be deceiving. What they had thought was the flat roof of the municipal building turned out to be a concrete foundation, and the police station was a bombed-out schoolhouse.

The problem here is not that the government center turned out to be a concrete foundation, it's that we continue to believe that government authority in places like Marjeh will be established via a gleaming municipal center or through various reconstruction projects. This has always been an underlying weakness of FM 3-24 and American COIN in general: namely viewing the provision of goods and services as fundamentally more important - and even decisive - in assuring loyalty to the state, rather than ethnic, tribal, religious or even village allegiances. The very idea that you can bring in to Marjah "government in box" likes it's pre-fabricated housing - and that it will immediately create loyalty among the people to a government in Kabul that they currently view as distant as corrupt - just strikes me as an incredibly simplistic way of thinking about how state legitimacy is derived.

Speaking of that corrupt government in Kabul, comes this piece of "good news"

The Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, has unilaterally taken control of the country's top electoral watchdog, provoking outrage from western diplomats, the Guardian has learnt.

The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), which forced Karzai into a runoff election after it disqualified nearly 1m fraudulent votes in last year's presidential election, previously included three foreign experts named by the UN.

However, according to a new presidential decree published today, Karzai will have the exclusive power to appoint all five panel members. His decision to "Afghanise" the ECC came while parliament was in recess.

I'm generally of the "Let Hamid be Hamid" school of thought, but if you're going to make extending state legitimacy a key feature of your counter-insurgency effort these types of things are not going to help.

But there are other reasons for concern. Last week I attended the International Studies Association Conference and I was very struck by the fact that over three days - and a lot of discussion on Af/Pak and COIN - one point kept getting made over and over again: US deployment schedules make it very hard to do effective counter-insurgency. This is true on both the military and civilian side - and a few days ago Robert Wehrle, who has been mentoring the Afghan police, made precisely the same point:

Length of tour for those mentoring ministry-level efforts is simply too short. Six to eight months is barely enough time to gain an understanding of system dynamics, let alone effect meaningful change. The attitude this engenders in the Afghans is "wait and see." They are reluctant to embrace recommendations from the current mentor because he will change in six months - so they push back out of wariness and fatigue.

A closely related dynamic is related to end-of-tour performance reporting. A combat-zone performance report carries significant weight at the next promotion board. Not surprisingly, the focus on doing "something meaningful" creates turmoil as people rotate in and out, declare the previous efforts ineffective, and start their own programs. This unsatisfactory situation creates its own perpetual dust storm of short-term-focused efforts to achieve immediate goals.

What is so troubling is that everyone seems to recognize this is a problem, but what's clear is that it doesn't seem like much is being done to change it . . . or even can be done.

In the end, I really have no idea what's going to happen in Pakistan with the arrest of Mullah Baradar; whether this is a shift in Pakistani attitudes toward the Taliban is still up in the air. And even though the US has at least in the interim re-claimed the initiative what's far less clear is whether we can hold it - or even fully understand how to.            

James Traub Outs the Closet Realists (Sort Of) Posted by David Shorr

As he launches a new column at ForeignPolicy.com, Jim Traub counts the many ways that the authors of current policy are muddleheaded and empty-handed -- particularly as they try to reach agreements with autocratic regimes. The strongest part of Traub's piece is the harsh bright light he shines on the trade-offs between the values agenda and other priorities. The rest of his argument, though, suffers from not being subjected to the same rigor of confronting real-life choices.

Traub's strongest point reaches a crescendo in the following passage:

Let us stipulate, then, that engagement is not quite so naive as it appears. But is it not, still, a realist bargain, trading away those universal values that the president so often evokes in the hopes of geostrategic wins, whether on Iran or climate change or the global economy?

"We're trying to say 'no,'" says SO [senior official] #2. "We're not going to accept that tradeoff. We're going to do this in parallel."

Okay, I'll cop to something. While false choices and caricatures are a staple and a curse of the American domestic political debate over foreign policy, I would admit there's a problem with asserting broadly (as politicians often do) a lack of any tension between values and interests. Yes, if we're honest, the pursuit of goals such as nonproliferation, reduced carbon emissions, or macroeconomic growth and balance all take up diplomatic bandwith that might be used for the values agenda. But does the trading off necessarily constitute "trading away?" Is this really enough to qualify someone, or an administration, as an ice-in-the-veins realist?

If we think about putting the utmost priority on the values agenda, it's the neocons, really, who focus so intently on other nations' domestic governance and regime character. Everyone else is indeed making choices about emphasis. In this light, maybe senior official #2 isn't crazy after all for talking about "doing this in parallel." If they've gone too far in betraying the values agenda, maybe people can make that case, but a trade-off is not the same as a binary either/or.

As I said, focusing on trade-offs is an ironic basis for criticizing the administration, because so much criticism . For one thing, it's as if we already have amnesia over the policy that came before, but more generally, the debate always elides the question of what's the alternative? So let me examine a few other slams that arise in Traub's column (and elsewhere).

Geostrategic wins. If there are trade-offs between values and nonpro, climate change, and the global economy, are they worth it? Are the priorities misplaced here? There has been a vigorous debate over whether to suspend nuclear negotiations with Iran and put our hopes in regime-change. I can't believe I have to keep saying this, but we just spent eight years pursuing capitulation rather than negotiation, and meanwhile the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs moved closer to nuclear weapons.

The Iran-for-Russia/China bait and switch. As advocates for engagement have directed focus toward Russia and China, this has been portrayed as settling for half a loaf -- as if Russia and China had nothing to do with Iran. That's a real head-scratcher for me. Just to be clear, the goal is still to ensure that Iran's nuclear program doesn't give them the bomb. International pressure was always highlighted as the diplomatic essence, and that means needing other key powers and not just ourselves. Once again, what's the alternative? Surely the current policy has put Iran under more pressure from more directions than the Bush-Cheney-Bolton policy; I know conservatives who have acknowleged this much.

Nothing for our troubles. Aside from the added pressures on Iran, there have been other fruits of engagement. Dramatically stronger sanctions on North Korea, for one. Chinese economic stimulus, for another. And new Chinese commitments on climate change that, while limited and disappointing, go well beyond anything prior.

Nuance and complexity. Okay, what is it we want? "You're with us or against us," or dealing with the real world in its messiness? Do we think the world isn't complicated? Which leads me to the last rap...

What does 'engagement' mean any way? A wise former colleague used to say that our problem in foreign policy is that we often treat other nations as mere objects of our policy, forgetting that they are subjects of their own policy. This was an enormous blind spot of the previous administration, which believed that because of American military strength and inherent moral rightness, all the United States had to do was make demands of others. I feel like this is a lingering blind spot of the current debate and critiques of the current policy. The fact of the matter is that the success of our policy does not depend only on our own choices. Iranian leaders have a say in what happens with their nuclear program. Frankly I think the current policy is less naive about this than the criticisms are.

And that is the essence of engagement. It's a foreign policy approach that rolls up our sleeves for the dirty work of trying to accomplish our international aims. It recognizes how many different players with different interests have to be aligned to get anything done. Is this really so obscure or misguided?

UPDATED: Senators Casey, Kaufman AND FRANKEN team up with Biden to Halt Conservative Obstructionism Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

Before top military brass, leading foreign policy officials and members of the NGO community, Vice-President Biden once again declared yesterday, “The spread of nuclear weapons is the greatest threat facing the country and, I would argue, facing humanity.”  The Administration has developed an agenda to thwart this threat—coupling nuclear stockpile reductions, aimed at eventual elimination, with investments that support our safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal.  

Some of the measures on the nuclear security agenda will require ratification by the Senate, where some conservatives have already begun politicizing our national security.  Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) has led the charge—attempting to skew the debate on the new START agreement before negotiators have even finalized the document. Earlier this week, Kyl, McCain and Lieberman penned yet another letter—a practice they’ve evidently become quite fond of—expressing “concern” that the Russians are holding out for concessions on missile defense. Max Bergman from the Center for American Progress describes what’s really going on:  “The Senators problem is not with missile defense it is with START and with reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles more generally. Yet these three Senators aren’t willing to simply oppose the effort to get a new START treaty, because flat out opposition to continuing Ronald Reagan’s treaty would reflect a new tea-partyesque level of extremism. We are after all talking about a treaty that forces the Russians to remove nuclear weapons currently pointed at the United States.”

Thankfully, these senators are in the minority.  As the Vice President reminded the audience yesterday at NDU, “Our goal of a world without nuclear weapons has been endorsed by leading voices in both parties. These include two former Secretaries of State from Republican administrations, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz; President Clinton’s Secretary of Defense Bill Perry; and my former colleague Sam Nunn, for years the Democratic Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Together, these four statesmen called eliminating nuclear weapons ‘a bold initiative consistent with America’s moral heritage.’ During the 2008 Presidential campaign, both the President and Senator McCain supported the same objective.” 

Perhaps this is yet another example of John McCain forgetting what he said, either way, strong statements of support emerged yesterday following the address.

Senator Bob Casey (D-PA), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, expressed support for Vice President Biden’s speech on protecting our country from nuclear threats:                                  

“I want to applaud the Administration’s efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons that could end up in the hands of terrorists. This is the most serious national security threat that we face and I support the Administration’s nonproliferation efforts to secure loose nuclear material around the world, negotiate an arms agreement with Russia that has strong verification standards and ensure that the U.S. nuclear stockpile is safe, secure and effective.”

“The Administration's 2011 budget request also bolsters the case for the eventual ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  A full investment in our nuclear weapons infrastructure will mean that the United States can continue to maintain its nuclear weapons infrastructure without testing.  We haven’t tested a nuclear weapon since 1992 because we now have the technical means to ensure the reliability and safety of our stockpile.  I applaud the Administration’s responsible approach to securing our nuclear weapons and look forward to working to ensure that funding for these programs is protected during the appropriations process.”  

Senator Ted Kaufman (D-Del.) also issued a statement of support. “I applaud the Obama administration for making nonproliferation, the reduction of nuclear weapons, and the safety of the nuclear arsenal top priorities of its national security agenda. As Vice President Biden outlined yesterday, the administration will continue to do everything in its power to prevent nuclear proliferation and modernize our nuclear stockpile and facilities.

  

Kaufman continued, “I strongly support the administration’s commitment to a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia, and hope Congress will ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). President Obama shares my deep concern about the safety of our aging nuclear arsenal, and I hope Congress will support his increased budget request for maintaining our nuclear stockpile and modernizing our nuclear infrastructure.  I look forward to working with the administration to continue to promote nonproliferation and arms reductions goals so that we can pass on a safer world to future generations.”

Senator Al Franken (D-Minn.) also voiced support, saying, “I applaud the Vice President for laying out the administration’s plan to reduce the threat from nuclear weapons.  It demonstrates their serious commitment to protecting our safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent while working toward the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.
 
Franken further stated, “I look forward to working with my colleagues and the administration on an upcoming strategic weapons reduction treaty with Russia as well as long overdue ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  I also look forward to taking up the President’s budget, which makes a renewed commitment to the maintenance and modernization of our nuclear arsenal and the experts who are crucial to it.”

As the Vice President concluded yesterday, “Together, we will lead this world toward a world of less reliance, and ultimately no reliance, on nuclear weapons.”  The key here is “together.”  Senators Casey, Kaufman and Franken understand that and have shown support for protecting our national security.  Perhaps someone should send a letter to Kyl, Lieberman, and McCain—explaining that.