Experts Comment on What's Next for Libya, the Rebels and the Region

August 25, 2011

Experts Comment on What's Next for Libya, the Rebels and the Region
Posted by The Editors

As more than 40 years of Muammar Qaddafi's corrupt and tyrannical rule appears to be drawing to a close, the National Security Network held a press call this afternoon with Heather Hurlburt, National Security Network Executive Director; Brian Katulis, Center for American Progress Senior Fellow and expert in U.S.-Middle East policy; and Tom Malinowski, Human Rights Watch Washington Director and recent visitor to Benghazi.

Listen to the call here.

Some highlights include:

Tom Malinowski detailed the spectrum of groups in the anti-Gaddafi movement [starting at minute 3:20] and their “healthy relationship” with the international community [9:55]; outlined revenge killings, prisoner executions and unsecured weapons facilities and government buildings as key operational and human rights concerns [5:42]; and explained that the anti-Gaddafi movement will require money and U.N. involvement but not foreign military peacekeeping forces to facilitate transition [18:27].

Brian Katulis explained the steps being taken to consolidate control of Libyan weapons [11:18]; examined the Arab Spring in light of U.N. General Assembly dynamics [13:02]; outlined pragmatism and judicious use of power as the two pillars of the Obama administration approach to the Arab Spring [14:43]; and insisted on a reassessment of the role of political Islam in the Middle East [16:33].

Heather Hurlburt explained that post-transition leaders’ understanding that the U.S. sides with them has been and will be key for achieving American interests in the long-run (12:10).

Selected transcriptions from the call after the jump:

On the anti-Gaddafi movement:

MALINOWSKI: They are really a cross-section of Libyan society. There are those among them who worked for the Gaddafi government during a period of time where there seemed to be some opening for reform and some Libyans tried to take advantage of it, and some Libyans tried to take advantage of it by taking patronage of Saif – the then good son, or supposedly good son. There are others who were members of the traditional political dissident community, chiefly from Benghazi, people who were mostly lawyers and human rights activists, many of whom we knew going back many years, never expected them to be leaders of governments in Libya – very good, brave people. There are you know just sort of regular folks who were never involved in politics, from just about every part of the country, including as it turned out, very decisively from the western part of the country. A lot of people assumed from the start that this was a rebellion based in eastern Libya and that therefore the country was somehow going to be divided at the end of it between easterners and westerners. And as it turned out, the decisive push from Tripoli came from the western prong of the opposition movement, particularly the folks in the western mountain region. There – because it’s a cross-section of Libya, there are also Islamists among the fighters, not a majority, I would say a very small minority. But that’s a factor. And really just about – it’s everybody. [3:20]

MALINOWSKI: They [the Libyan opposition forces] have been sort of conventionally described as being very amateurish and ill-trained. Virtually every article I see still talks about the poorly trained rebels and the elite Gaddafi troops, which I think is a very outdated concept. They, you know, their plan for taking the capital turned out to be somewhat more sophisticated than a lot of people assumed it would be. [5:17]

MALINOWSKI: Now the opposition leadership has been doing – trying to do just about everything we’ve asked them to do in terms of messaging – they’ve been trying to get the message out to avoid revenge attacks, both through statements by the leadership, by communicating through text message, social media, using imams in mosques. They have dedicated teams to secure some of the key facilities. The problem that they’ve had from the very beginning is that, although their intentions are very good, their capacity to control all the fighters in the field has never been 100%. You know, you’ve got volunteers forming militias all over Libya to create this rebellion. And these people, they’ve been told what to do for the past 41 years and they’re not going to be told what to do for the next few days at least. And so you’re gonna have a lot of chaos in Tripoli and elsewhere and potentially some abuses, which we’re going to be concerned about. [7:10]

On the relationship between Libyans and the international community:

MALINOWSKI: I think, really important difference is that Libyans come out of this with a very healthy relationship with the international community. You know, their dictator wasn’t toppled by a foreign invasion. They own this revolution. They feel responsible for their own future instead of dependent on some foreign invader. And at the same time, they are grateful to the U.S., they’re grateful to NATO, and to the Europeans and Qataris and others. And that gives us the ability to exercise constructive influence in the decisions that they make. And to provide assistance, which I think would be welcome. So there’s a lot we can do in the next few months. I don’t think we’re going to be saddled with some kind of occupation or rebuilding efforts – this is going to be a Libyan-led process. But there are a lot of things we can do and support them. [9:55]

On consolidating control of Libyan weapons:

KATULIS: The one thing that I think the Obama administration and our NATO allies have been strongly focused on is this threat though of the possibility of weapons slipping into the wrong hands. There’s some evidence that a small number of SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles have already made it onto the black market and other parts of Africa. But there’s been a very aggressive and assertive approach, contrary to the lack of such an approach in Iraq and in previous instances to try to put into place mechanisms for consolidating control of these weapons. I think there’s been very I think concerted monitoring of the known chemical storage facilities. And I think all of the concerns that people had when this conflict began, I think they are attending to it as best as they can. And I think there are certainly plans already in place and programs already that the administration has announced to work with groups to buy back weapons, to again consolidate control. Because I think that will be fundamental. And I think, you know, so far, and it’s still very early, that this has clearly been a top priority. [11:18]

On the role and effectiveness of American power:

KATULIS: We have while sort of pragmatically moving forward and getting others to support this transformation in the region, we’ve attended to some very real hard-core security concerns that remain not only in Libya but in places like Yemen: the threats posed by terrorist networks. So I think in a very combustible, complicated and fast-moving situation, this administration has been quite nimble in using American power in a way that motivates others to help this region move through the transition, doesn’t drain our own resources – so we’ve not had to invade, occupy and keep tens of thousands of troops on the ground in in any of these places that have experienced a transition in 2011—and I think it will continue to do so. It will require continued nimbleness and adjusting of policies in each of the countries. Again, there won’t be any simple one-size-fits-all template that needs to be followed here. [24:11]

KATULIS: And all of these places I think, the fundamental approach the Obama administration has taken has had two pillars. One is to be pragmatic, as opposed to dogmatic or ideological about its approach. Clearly, it has stood behind the universal human rights that every person has according to the UN Declaration of Human Rights. It is trying to tailor its policies in each of these areas to advance that cause. And I think that pragmatism has been quite fundamental in achieving some serious gains. I think the second pillar, which has been much talked about, but I would talk about using U.S. power judiciously and getting others to pull their weight. And I think that’s the case in Libya and quite clearly you know, this is only the first phase of what will I think be a multi-phased transition. And there’ll be a long sort of process to help the Libyans help themselves. And I think the way that NATO has performed militarily, this needs to be translated into a not so easy and quite difficult task of providing international assistance to the Libyans as they set up a constitutional election process and then move forward. More broadly in the region, again since there is no cookie cutter approach, I think the, the sort of pragmatic approach the Obama administration has carved out for itself is to work with our allies in Europe and in NATO and in particular a key ally like Turkey to help bring about and support those who are pushing for change. [14:43]

On the role of Islam:

KATULIS: These societies in the Middle East are opening up to political changes and I think we in America need to prepare for the role of political Islam to increase in the Middle East. And we should accept it pragmatically, we should understand that we are going and entering a period where we’re gonna have to live and deal with political Islam in many different forms. And we’ve already done this. I need to remind people that some of the leading political parties in the Iraqi government, which we’ve supported for the past several years, are Islamist party. Some of our best allies in key countries, like Turkey, come from these sorts of roots. And I think that the notion that Islamism or Islamist politics and democracy are fundamentally incompatible needs to be tested in this period. [16:33]

On long-term American interests:

HURLBURT: The real interest we have, if you look forward to what will the Middle East and North Africa look like in 10, 20 years—the question is will the generation of new leaders or even the next generation after the transitional leaders that we’re seeing now, how will they understand the United States’ role. [25:50]

August 25, 2011 at 07:03 PM | Permalink

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August 25, 2011