Revisiting Benghazi Posted by James Lamond

Today’s House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform hearing on Benghazi: Exposing Failure and Recognizing Courage chaired by Rep. Darrell Issa raised more questions than it answered. These are not questions about the assault on Benghazi or the response to the events, but rather questions on the process and rationale behind the hearing.

The tragic Benghazi attack has been thoroughly examined and has established a record with more than 30 hearings, interviews and briefings with senior government officials – including high-profile hearings with former Secretaries Clinton and Panetta as well as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey; the review of more than 25,000 pages of documents; and a thorough investigation by an Accountability Review Board (ARB), chaired by two distinguished nonpartisan statesmen: Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Admiral Michael Mullen.

Meanwhile, today’s hearing was the follow-up to a report released last month by the Republican chairs of five committees, who excluded their Democratic counterparts from the process - an unusual move on a sensitive national security issue. Needless to say there are a few flaws with the process going into the hearing and concerns about how the Committee’s methodology for its investigation.

Witness list: Was Amb. Pickering denied an invitation to testify? This morning a new controversy emerged about the witness list. Chairman Issa claimed in his opening remarks that Amb. Pickering was asked to testify but declined. The State Department disputed this telling ABC News that “Ambassador Pickering volunteered to appear… But Issa said no.” And Amb. Pickering told Andrea Mitchell “Yes, I'm willing to testify.” Jonathan Karl has the full back and forth on this.

Amb. Pickering, in addition to leading the ARB is one of America’s most distinguished and accomplished career diplomats having served as Ambassador to Israel under President Reagan, President H.W. Bush’s UN Ambassador and Undersecretary in the Clinton administration.

If he was denied a spot in today’s hearing this raises a lot of questions about the purpose of the hearing. Much of the hearing focused on the method of the investigation done by the ARB, and Pickering is best in a position to address and answer these concerns. He answers many of the main points in an interview this morning with Andrea Mitchell including the availability and logistics for the aircraft show of force discussed in the hearing and he states that the ARB did in fact interview Sec. Clinton, despite claims to the contrary. If the purpose of the hearing was to determine what happened and address concerns about the ARB report, then Amb. Pickering would be a logical witness to have appear.

Military’s role in the hearing. It is also curious, considering that much of the controversy is over the military response, why there was not a representative from the Pentagon at the hearing to discuss the military deliberations and operations logistics. Spencer Ackerman reports today that Pentagon officials insist “there was just no way that a small team of special-operations forces could have saved four Americans in Benghazi during last September’s deadly attacks.” This was an important part of the discussion in today’s hearing and if there are still concerns remaining from the previous investigations and hearings – including Chairman Depmsey’s testimony – then a representative from the Pentagon able to speak to these issues should have been present.

FEST deployment. One of the items discussed in today’s hearing was whether or not the deployment of the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) could have been deployed quickly enough to save lives in Benghazi. The FEST is the “United States Government's only interagency, on-call, short-notice team poised to respond to terrorist incidents worldwide.” While it is a rapid response team there remains a question about how quickly such a team can actually be deployed. The website for the FEST states that the team “leaves for an incident site within four hours of notification, providing the fastest assistance possible.” The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Foreign Consequence Management  Deskbook goes into details about the process and timing:

“In the event of a terrorist incident, a Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) and/or Consequence Management Support Team (CMST) could be deployed to assist the country team in coordinating the U.S. response…  DOS will work with the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate interagency deliberations to: 1) assess requests for U.S. assistance, 2) identify the specific support to be provided and the agencies that will provide that support, and 3) develop the initial guidance required for responding organizations. This process may take between 4 to 6 hours, but a decision to deploy the FEST could occur within 30 minutes of the event and it could be airborne within 4 hours. More time (i.e., up to a few additional hours) would probably be needed to deploy a CMST.”

Amb. Daniel Benjamin who was the top counterterrorism official at the State Department at the time of the attack spoke specifically to the decision making that took place on that day regarding the FEST deployment:

“After the attack, the first question to arise that involved the CT Bureau was whether or not the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) should be deployed. This interagency team is designed to assist and advise the U.S. Chief of Mission in assessing crises and coordinating U.S. government crisis response activities. The question of deployment was posed early, and the Department decided against such a deployment. In my view, it was appropriate to pose the question, and the decision was also the correct one. There is nothing automatic about a FEST deployment, and in some circumstances, a deployment could well be counterproductive.”

Talking points controversy: Once again the controversy over the talking points that UN Ambassador Susan Rice used following the attack has returned. The argument over the talking points that Amb. Rice used and the controversy over stating the possible connection to the protests that were occurring throughout neighboring countries was a favorite election year talking point for Republicans. The timeline and development of the talking points has been repeatedly addressed. And as recently as last month the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, a career defense intelligence professional, testified that they were accurate given the information at the time, stating “They were the best we could do at the time. And also in light of our concerns from both an intelligence and an investigatory standpoint, that is much as we should say at the time.” This issue has been addressed and readdressed, if the purpose of the hearing was to uncover new information or address new concerns this was not it. 

Country See, Country Do - Nonproliferation Edition Posted by David Shorr

Many of our debates about America's role in the world are merely different ways of asking how goody-goody we should be when faced with others' unruliness? This question is at the heart of a Jim Traub post a couple weeks ago on "Limits of Leading by Example." The piece asks whether President Obama's climb toward the nonproliferation moral high ground has gotten him anywhere. Do good deeds such as negotiating New START, narrowing doctrine for n-weapons in the Nuclear Posture Review -- and the yet-to-be-announced, though rumored, further reductions in the US arsenal -- help the United States gain others' cooperation? 

Traub offers interesting thoughts about the special challenges posed by a troglodyte regime like North Korea. He also, for the most part, avoids the familiar right wing canard about the naivety of expecting Iran or North Korea to be inspired or swayed by American rectitude. Instead Traub correctly highlights Russia, China and other key swing states as the proximate targets of the policy. Yet he still manages to oversimplify in his own way:

But the coin of rule-abidingness has not bought as much cooperation, from as many actors, as the president had hoped. As with "engagement" policy generally, Obama has found that better U.S. behavior brings applause from predictable corners (i.e., Europe) without necessarily encouraging refractory actors -- the ones Washington really worries about -- to change their ways.

This has been one of the elemental lessons of the last four years.Obama no longer expects to persuade his adversaries, whether in North Korea or Iran (or the U.S. Congress). Indeed, his policy toward Iran has increasingly come to resemble that of George W. Bush, with punishing sanctions designed to force Tehran to relinquish its program of uranium enrichment. 

There are a number of problems with Traub's argument. First, a policy course can be better than the alternatives even if it hasn't yet succeeded in its ultimate aim. To be clear, the objective has always been to corral Iran's nuclear program into being verifiably civilian, and the fact that this situation continues to fester is a big problem. But to point out that a policy has fallen short of its goal is not an argument for a different policy -- which presumably must be justified on the grounds that it would do better. If we're going to debate the wisdom of being the nonproliferation "good guys," we should focus on whether this posture has helped keep us on a better track toward our objective than we otherwise would be, whether it's been productive or counterproductive.

To be fair, Traub does mention other reasons that justify the Obama administration's move to get America's own nonproliferation house in order and some positive results he sees it attaining. Still, I think Jim has been too dismissive of the impact on other players and the international politics of nonrpoliferation. He takes the tack of saying China and Russia are too driven by national interests to be impressed with American uprightness. I see the dynamic differently; for me this is a contest over the weight of international sentiment.

It boils down to whether the world community is largely unified in putting the onus squarely on Iran, or whether Tehran manages to deflect that pressure. The increased difficulty, since Obama came to office, that Iran has had in trying divide and conquer the international community is the fruit of his stake-the-moral-high-ground approach. The point of setting a good example is to make it harder to make the US the topic of conversation rather than Iran. Contrary to what skeptics say, neither China, Russia, nor any other key player is impervious to moral authority. The tightened sanctions simply wouldn't be in place without the Obama administration's push to position itself as the reasonable one.

And the same goes for "engagement policy more generally." The more I've thought about it, the more I think engagement was a misnomer when it comes to conveying the essence of Obama foreign policy. This tag encouraged expectations, inadvertently I'd argue, that reasonableness and good faith would be a short and sure path to diplomatic solutions. It also set the administration up for the perception of a major shift in course, as portrayed by Traub and many others. Yet I see the Obama foreign policy approach as remaining basically on the same course, the one on which it originally embarked. The real point about reasonableness is that it offers the only chance of diplomatic resolution -- with the United States being accommodating enough to seek compromise, but isolating renegade regimes when they spurn the opening. We needed to get away from bluff-and-bluster foreign policy premised on getting others to capitulate by showing our resolve. Perhaps it's more accurate to say that President Obama is trying to bring back the idea of tough diplomacy that actually involves diplomacy. Oh, and if you want to know more about the idea of the US exerting influence through global civic-mindedness, then read about The Responsibility Doctrine. 

Image: National Nuclear Security Administration

Questions on the Brothers Tsarnaev Posted by The Editors

This post was written
by James Lamond and Bill French

Events and reports are coming out of Boston rapidly. Much of what we hear in the next few hours will be refined and corrected. This week’s media coverage has been a reminder of the need to wait until the facts are in before jumping to conclusions, speculation and accusations. However, it can be helpful to think through what questions need to be answered in the near term, what this means for the investigation and what lessons can be learned. Many of these questions are based on early reporting and speculation and may prove to be void in the coming days.

Did the Tsarnaev Brothers act alone? There have been reports about a third accomplice involved. Clearly if that is the case the manhunt will extend to that individual. However, it will be important to determine if they received any sort of funding or training from a larger network. Can investigators trace the funding back to individuals or groups that were involved in the planning? The Treasury Department’s tools for tracking terrorist and illicit finances have improved drastically in the past few years.  Of course, one question remains, if they had a sponsor of sorts, why were they forced to hold up a 7/11?

What was the motivation? Adam Serwer reported on a video posted on Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s YouTube account “dedicated to the prophecy of the Black Banners of Khurasan which is embraced by Islamic extremists—particularly Al Qaeda.” However as Aaron Zelin warns against jumping to conclusions saying, “it's important to AQ, but it doesn't necessarily mean jihad.” At this point we do not know the motivation or ideology of the suspects. It is always possible that it could be something off of the radar, as what happened in the Anders Behring Breivik attack in Norway in 2011.  

Did the suspects receive any training? There have been mixed reports that the suspects received military or paramilitary training in the past.  These reports have been widely questioned. However, this needs to be investigated, and will be. If they received training, how and where did they do so? What group(s) is connected? If not how were they able to assemble these crude yet effective explosives? Simply from online instructions?

If there is an international connection, what are next steps? With all the speculation of ties to Chechnya, the question of U.S.-Russia cooperation will likely be raised. Relations between the two countries have been rocky – particularly since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency. However, even throughout the tough times, there has been an increase in international cooperation on counterterrorism and international law enforcement issues.  

If there is a connection to Chechnya and/or Dagestan what does this mean for the terrorist threat from the region? If there does turn out to be a strong connection with the region, which at this point is pure speculation, there will undoubtedly be an increased focus on the region and militant groups in the area. The Washington Post explains recent cases with alleged connections to the region, “In 2011, a Chechen-born man was sentenced in Denmark to 12 years in prison for preparing a letter bomb that exploded as he was assembling it in a Copenhagen hotel a year earlier… Last month, Spain’s Interior Ministry said French and Spanish police arrested three suspected Islamic extremists in an operation in and around Paris. A statement said the suspected activists were of Chechen origin and believed to be linked to an alleged terror cell dismantled last August in southern Spain.” To be clear, ethnic origin does not mean any organizational connection. Ian Bremmer points out that there are different kinds of groups from the region adding that Russia plays up the region’s connection to al Qaeda in order to justify Russia’s harsh tactics there.

Progress and Warnings On U.S.-Africa Security Cooperation Posted by James Lamond

This morning Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel met with a delegation of leaders from Africa to discuss security and democracy in Africa. The event with presidents and prime ministers from Malawi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Cape Verde was meant to highlight African countries where democracy and security have had a mutually reinforcing impact on one another. 

The Pentagon’s increased interest in Africa is part of a progressively broader security-related interest in Africa. In the 1990’s a training program that began as a peacekeeping initiative turned into the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), under which the U.S. provided greater training to African militaries. The focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations over the past decade has grown the engagement to include training and arming African counterterrorism forces and increasing the presence of U.S. Special Operations forces. These efforts culminated in the creation of AFRICOM, a new regional command meant to integrate military efforts diplomatic and foreign assistance efforts in Africa.

Last year’s assault in Benghazi, the intervention in Mali and the Algerian hostage crisis earlier this year have brought security issues in Africa to the front page. Today’s meeting focused on many of these developments. The topics of discussion were the often interrelated topics of extremism, terrorism, narcotics and other trafficking, border security and martime security. These all have implications for U.S. security interests:

Extremism and terrorism: The seizure of more than half of Mali’s land area by Islamic militants, the violence of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and the continued religious-inspired violence from al Shabaab in Somalia have heightened attention on Islamic extremism and militancy in Africa. Terje Ostebo explains the complexity of this issue in a brief for NDU’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies: “the gains of these Islamic militant groups are not attributable to their military strength. Rather, their expanded influence is just as much a symptom of fragile and complex political contexts. More generally, Islamic militancy in Africa today represents the intersection of broader trends in contemporary Islam and local circumstances. Responding to the challenge is all the more difficult in that very little is known about these often secretive Islamic groups, some of which have only recently emerged.”

There has also been an increase in concern regarding al Qaeda related organizations in Africa. While the assault on the U.S. mission in Benghazi brought AQIM international infamy, analysts are still debating whether or not the al Qaeda offshoot is a transnational terror threat or one with primarily local goals. Its ambitions towards Europe and the United States remains unclear. However, the U.S. State Department expressed concerns that AQIM was networking with other prominent terrorist groups in the region, including Nigeria's Boko Haram, Somalia's al Shabaab, and Yemen's AQAP.

Narcotics trafficking and border security: Illicit trafficking of drugs and other material has been on the rise in Africa. A recent report from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) found that cocaine trafficking in West Africa is being fuelled by an increase in local consumption of crack cocaine and organized gangs increasingly turning to producing and trafficking methamphetamine. Over the past few years an increase in maritime patrolling had reduced the high volume of cocaine going through the traditional smuggling route from South America to Europe via Africa. However, it appears that the illicit networks have adapted to the patrolling and have increased the volume of cocaine transiting through Africa up to about 35 metric tons, still down from the high point of 47 metric tons in 2007, but a large increase from the 18 metric tons measured in 2010 following the improved patrolling. This increase is also due in part to a rise in the use of crack cocaine regionally, as many smugglers pay their way with their own product, which is then broken down into cheaper crack cocaine to be sold locally. Also, according to the report, there is an increase in regional production of crystal meth, which is produced locally due to lax control over the precursor chemicals that are highly-regulated in many countries.

This has an impact on U.S. security interests in two ways. First there is the broad concern that for the U.S. that “transnational crime threatens democratic governance, financial markets, and human rights,” as Moises Naim, former Executive Director of the World Bank explains. More specifically, though there are concerns about the smuggling routes, most of which end up in Europe, being used for moving other illicit material including weapons or people.

Maritime security: An escalation of attacks from pirates off the coast of Somalia in 2007 and 2008 raised a number of alarms about the threat of piracy. According to a report from the Atlantic Council, “Since 2008, Somali pirates have attacked more than 620 vessels, hijacked over 175 private and commercial ships, and held over 3,000 people from more than forty countries hostage.” Since then, however, real progress has been achieved. As Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro outlined in a speech at the Atlantic Council last year, “According to figures from the U.S. Navy, we are on track to experience a roughly 75 percent decline in overall pirate attacks this year compared with 2011… [and in] 2011, the number of successful pirate attacks fell by half compared to 2010.” This has been achieved through a multifaceted approach using all means of national power, including military power by expanding the use of naval assets; collaboration with the private sector by empowering industry to protect itself; legal enforcement through effective prosecution and incarceration; targeting networks with financial tracking; development and governance working to improve credible governing institutions and law enforcement in Somalia; and first and foremost through diplomatic engagement with the international community.

While piracy on the East Coast of Africa is in decline, on the West Coast it is on the rise. This is a very different phenomenon. On the West Coast it is more based on robbery and hijacking close to the shore, rather than the hostage-taking and ransom seen off the coast of Somalia.

While anti-piracy efforts have shown results, the Atlantic Council report points out that the cost of the counter-piracy is high, “The naval response alone cost the United States and its allies some $1.27 billion  in 2011,” stating, “Self-protection efforts by the shipping industry may offer a sustainable and cost-effective alternative, but a set of enabling policies is urgently needed.”

These issues are important to both U.S. and African security concerns and present both models of success and opportunities for progress. However, as cooperation continues on these near term threats it is also important not to lose sight of the long-term challenges. In a recent essay for Foreign Policy, Gordon Adams warns, “through a growing security assistance program and special operations forces action, U.S. engagement in Africa is shifting from a focus on governance, health, and development to a deepening military engagement” Adding, that security-focused engagement could “backfire, harming our long-term foreign policy interests.”

As engagement with Africa on security interests deepens it is vital that broader concerns, including more capable and responsive civilian governments and economies, are not ignored and put to the side. In addition to the harm on Africa, it also raises the likelihood of increased hostility toward the United States. Adams points out there is an applicable lesson to learn from America’s experience with Latin America during the Cold War, and America’s focus on building security and anti-Communism over long-term democracy and goodwill towards the U.S., which led to a resentful population that saw America as a contributing to security states. The lesson not to ignore progress on governance and democracy should be heeded. 

Nuclear Deterrence, National Security, and Budgetary Savings Posted by The Editors

This post is written by Katie McBee, a researcher at NSN

The argument for reducing excess nuclear arms often focuses on enhancing the
nonproliferation regime. However, while less discussed, the financial benefit
of nuclear reductions is significant, especially in the wake of sequestration.
The exact amount of savings possible depends upon the specific reductions made, but easily reaches the billions.

But determining safe, smart levels of reductions first requires thinking about the legitimate national security role of American nuclear forces. Throughout the nuclear age, the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear forces has been providing deterrence. Given the size and expense of U.S. nuclear forces the key question is: what special advantages in terms of deterrence does such an overwhelming nuclear arsenal give the U.S.? The answer: not much. The U.S. can obtain the same benefits of a massive nuclear arsenal with fewer warheads while simultaneously redirecting some savings from nuclear reductions towards more pressing security matters, thereby enhancing national security.

The U.S. numerical advantage in nuclear weapons is overwhelming compared to any conceivable competitor or bad actor state by a grossly excessive margin. According to the Ploughshare’s World Nuclear Stockpile Report, the United States possesses 7,700 nuclear weapons, including strategic and nonstrategic warheads, warheads in reserve, and retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. This is 7,460 more weapons in total than China -- which possesses an estimated 240 weapons. Russia possesses 1,499 deployed strategic, 1,022 nondeployed strategic and 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads. While the U.S. only has 500 tactical nuclear warheads in comparison, it outweighs Russia’s strategic warheads arsenal with 1,722 deployed strategic and 2,800 nondeployed strategic warheads.   

While the nuclear arsenal of the U.S. and Russia appear too close for comfortable U.S. nuclear reductions, the Obama administration has no intentions of undertaking immediate or unilateral nuclear reductions without the involvement of the only U.S. peer in terms of nuclear capabilities, Russia. The administration continually demonstrates this stance. The New START entered into force in February 2011 limits the U.S. and Russia each to 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads by 2018. And deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes said on January 31 of this year that President Obama “believes that there’s room to explore the potential for continued reductions, and that, of course, the best way to do so is in a discussion with Russia.”

Furthermore, overwhelming U.S. nuclear superiority thus far has not prevented so-called rogue states, such as Iran and North Korea, from developing or maintaining nuclear programs in the first instance. Iran has neither gained the capability to produce a bomb nor made the decision to do so, according to a recent National Intelligence Estimate. However, U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities have yet to produce any tangible results as Iran continues to be evasive and secretive about their nuclear program. Pyongyang recently declared that “they [North Korea’s nuclear weapons] cannot be disputed… as long as the U.S. nuclear threat and hostile policy persist.” This statement is in addition to the common acceptance that North Korea is not a rational state, a characteristic needed for traditional nuclear deterrence.  Therefore not only does the overwhelming U.S. nuclear superiority not act as a deterrent against so-called rogue states, it can actually inflame their desire to protect their own sovereignty against a perceived U.S. nuclear threat.    

These cases show that today’s nuclear arsenal is a relic of the Cold War and no longer fulfills national security needs. Nowhere is this truth more clear than in the case of the risk posed by non-state actors. The National Security Strategy identifies terrorists buying, building, or stealing nuclear weapons as the chief national security concern in the context of nuclear weapons. Non-state actors generally do not respond to deterrence in the same ways as states responsible for large swaths of territory and national populations. For these reasons, the National Security Strategy goes on to recognize the limited benefits of nuclear deterrence capabilities in dealing with non-state actors, “Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered in a global nonproliferation regime…”

If such a large nuclear stockpile is of such low value with regards to competitor states, rogue states and non-state actors, one wonders: what is it good for? Not much, it turns out. Indeed, U.S. defense strategists have already recognized this reality. The National Defense Strategy states that, “It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.” Furthermore, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee Senator Carl Leven noted in mid-2012 that nuclear weapons are “totally useless.”

This conclusion prompts the questions: how can the U.S. cut spending on nuclear weapons in a safe and secure manor that would provide savings that could be redirected towards more pressing national security objectives?

Over the next decade the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of Energy will spend between $352 and $392 billion on strategic nuclear weapons programs. The diminishing returns associate with nuclear deterrence in today’s security environment coupled with this hefty investment raise the question: what cuts can be made to the nuclear arsenal that would preserve national security deterrence and provide for federal budget savings needs?  

Nuclear reductions based on the lack of legitimate national security benefits and excessive spending has widespread, bipartisan support. Heritage Foundation reminds us that President Ronald Reagan was a nuclear abolitionist, demonstrating the Republican legacy behind nuclear reduction. Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-Mass), a senior member of the Energy and Commerce Committee, along with 44 other House Democrats submitted a letter to Senate and House leadership calling for nuclear arsenal cuts for reasons including, “It makes us less safe by preventing investment in the systems that our soldiers need most.” The Four Horsemen, wrote, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons” advocating nuclear reductions. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell agrees that there is a great incentive to reduce the quantity and that the current expenses take away from more pertinent national security programs. And the Nuclear Posture Review published by the Department of Defense focuses on reduction and drives President Obama’s nuclear policy. Despite the widespread, bipartisan support it is still underrepresented in the rapport concerning nuclear reductions. Clearly, more attention needs to be given to the options available for reductions that benefit both national security and budget needs.  

Given the widespread support for some form of nuclear reductions in order to match federal budget spending needs and 21^st century national security threats, what are the reduction options? There is no single answer, instead there is no shortage of options including these three that range from most to least significant reductions: 

1. In May 2012 General (ret.) Cartwright and other Global Zero members recommended the most extensive nuclear reduction. They proposed a nuclear arsenal of 500 to 900 total nuclear warheads. This includes transforming the nuclear triad into a nuclear dyad by eliminating the Minuteman land-based ICBM force. And further reducing the dyad to include ten Trident ballistic missile submarines armed with 720 strategic missiles warheads and eighteen B-2 bombers armed with 180 gravity bombs. Only half of each of these weapons systems would be deployed at a time. The B-52 heavy bombers would be dismantled or converted to carry only
   conventional weapons. Additionally, all tactical nuclear weapons would be
   eliminated. Conservatively, this 10-year agenda would reduce spending on
   nuclear weapons by $100 billion.  
2. A similarly extensive rout is provided by the Sustainable Defense Task Force of the Commonwealth Institute. It concludes that reductions to the nuclear arsenal could save $139.5 billion over the next decade. This is a two step solution. First, reduce the US nuclear arsenal to save $113.5 billion. This requires reducing the U.S. nuclear warhead total to 1050, 1000 deployed and 50 in store; limiting launchers to 160 Minuteman missiles and 7 Ohio-class SSBNs, with an official total of 328 launchers;
   adapting the nuclear “dyad” by retiring bomber aircrafts; and ending work on
   the Trident II missile. Second, limit the planned modernization of the nuclear
   weapons infrastructure and reduce research activities to save an additional $26
   billion. These two steps add up to a substantial total of $139.5 billion in
   budget savings over the next decade.   
3. Even modest reductions can have sizable saving benefits. Nuclear reductions recommended by Daryl Kimball and Tom Collina of the Arms Control Association include four options that would translate into major budget savings in the billions over the next decade. First, reduce the existing Ohio-class nuclear-armed submarines from 14 to 10 boats and set a limit of 8 new nuclear-armed submarines saving 18$ billion. Second, delay the development of the new $68 billion nuclear-armed strategic bomber fleet and save $18 billion. Third, trim the land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force from 450 to 300 and save around $360 million in the coming fiscal year and $3-4 billion in the next decade. Finally, they urge the White House and Congress to show greater budgetary discipline in the B61 bomb life extension program (LEP). If all these steps are implemented, the U.S. could save a minimum of $39 billion over the next decade, while maintaining the nuclear triad.   

The savings from any of these options would be significant. They present the opportunity to make safe, smart budget cuts between 10.48 to 63.3 percent of 67.16 percent of the total Department of Defense and Department of Energy budget. During a time of tough budget cuts and the looming sequestration, it is essential that the U.S. make smart budget decisions that will best attend to national security objectives fit for 21^st century threats. As demonstrated above, the excessive nuclear arsenal does not fall under these objectives. 

Graham's Green Light to Israel's Red Line on Iran Posted by Homa Hassan

As the dust settles from President Obama’s highly anticipated visit to Israel, one message stands out in particular.  In Jerusalem, Obama reaffirmed the strong bonds of the U.S. and Israel to Israeli students, with an added note that “it is important to be open and honest, especially with your friends,” even in disagreement.  A significant point in light of the two countries’ differing stances on dealing with Iran’s nuclear program that could incite chaos and confusion in the region unless streamlined.  And a message that Congress can be served better to remember as a controversial resolution winds its way through the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

• Undermining Diplomacy:  Mainstream Pentagon and U.S. national security officials overwhelmingly agree with the executive’s approach that any attack on Iran would not only strengthen Iran’s resolve to pursue weapons capabilities, but also lead to regional chaos and weaken Iran’s internal democracy movement.  However, even as diplomatic and technical talks between Western powers and Iranian officials have been underway in Almaty, Kazakhstan earlier this month, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), introduced a bellicose and poorly timed resolution. S.Res65 potentially jeopardizes the already delicate, U.S.-Iranian negotiations through counterproductive messaging for the U.S. to join Israel in hard-lining with Iran.  While talks are already faltering, Graham’s resolution not only threatens to fracture the incremental gains from these talks, but also risks the derailment future negotiations.

• Fractured bargaining chips:  As the executive branch expresses the necessity of Iran’s cooperation, it has offered the possibility of lifting some of the sanctions in exchange.  To attribute credibility to this bargaining chip, U.S. officials need their Iranian counterparts to legitimately be convinced that sanctions can be removed with compliance.  However, these sanctions are largely enacted by Congress and therefore need Congressional action to be repealed.  Graham’s legislation, therefore, undermines the credibility of proposed U.S. incentives in exchange for Iranian cooperation to scale back its nuclear program.  In effect, Graham and his colleagues ought to find ways to signal their assertiveness, while also allowing the executive to administer credible proposals.  

• Redefined Redline:  Because opponents of the Graham resolution seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, they have sounded an important alarm regarding the uneasy movement of the marker towards a military option that Graham’s green light for Israeli action permits. Graham adopts the Israeli definition of a redline being a “nuclear weapons capability,” in contrast to the Obama Administration’s assurance that the U.S. will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon.  The ambiguity of a bold U.S. redline not only impedes the United States and Israel’s objectives, but also hinders Iran’s prospects to give up its nuclear program peacefully.

• Unprecedented Alliances:  Even amongst alliances, Graham’s justification for unconditional support of an Israeli strike on Iran is irregular.  The traditional establishment of alliances like NATO created an agreement that an attack from the Soviet Union on any country in the coalition would be seen as an attack on every country in the coalition, thus creating a base of support for a response.  It did not, however, propose unconditional obligations of offensive measures.  In other words, the traditional nature of alliances lays out a framework for mutual defense, not offense, as Graham’s resolution proposes.

The objective of halting Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons, all sides agree, has its greatest chance for success in a coordinated international effort that needs solidarity among not just Israel and the U.S., but other regional actors, Europe, and even Russia and China.  During this particularly delicate time, Senator Graham, and indeed all Members of Congress ought to ask themselves whether this proposed resolution helps or hinders that common goal.

US Leadership Through Strength Posted by David Shorr

Recently a bipartisan group assembled by the Project for a United and Strong America released our version of a national security strategy. In the weeks since the report came out, a number of participants have posted their comments: Mark Lagon, Will Inboden, Dan Twining, and me too.  

The most substantive reaction thus far is Paul Miller's perceptive critique over at Shadow Government. One line of criticism hits particularly close to home. Here's how Miller takes aim at hackneyed appeals to American international leadership: 

Sometimes it seems like we demand that American be a strong leader in order to protect America's role as a strong leader, so that American can go on being strong and exercising leadership in the service of our strength and our leadership...and so on. It's circular reasoning, a self-justifying policy of infinite regress. I fear I may be labeled a heretic for asking what we need to be a leader for? Where are we leading people to? The report says the United States "must play an active, day-to-day role in shaping events" to "shape common action on a global agenda." I agree that global cooperation happens more effectively with American involvement, but the report treats "the global agenda" as an intrinsic good. The only intrinsic good of American foreign policy is American security. I'd like to see "the global agenda" and America's burden of leadership justified by how it contributes to American interests, not vice versa. We lead to secure interests; we don't have interests to secure our leadership.

Hey, I resemble that remark! Seriously though, Miller's point isn't heresy but a totally fair question -- and answerable. Begin with what we agree on: the US role in galvanizing international cooperation. Agreement on this is actually significant, because the loudest Republican foreign policy voices expect the United States to lead by fiat; the business of obtaining other nations' cooperation and support doesn't even enter into it. 

My response to Miller is that cooperation is essential to many of America's foreign policy priorities, making it central to our strategy. To some extent, our need for cooperation is a function of lacking the leverage to attain our objectives without others' help. One of the familiar tropes in these sorts of discussions is that "the problems of today's world are too big even for a superpower to solve on its own"; it has the added virtue of being true. [For the last few Democracy Arsenal readers who haven't yet looked at Nina Hachigian and my big "Responsibility Doctrine" article, we see an ongoing strategic push by Obama Administration to gain international support and help.]

More to the point, all the consequential international challenges of our era are basically collective action problems -- issues that aren't particular to the United States, but that we confront along with others. Whenever I've scanned big-think articles and reports in the last several years, the list of major items is the same: restoring and maintaining global economic growth, blocking the proliferation of nuclear arms, stemming global warming, and thwarting dramatic and disruptive terror attacks. And there is your global agenda. 

Instead of talking about the US as a strong leader, let's say we're first among status quo powers. This is why I always go back to Robert Zoellick's definition of a "responsible stakeholder": a nation that contributes to the maintenance of the international system because it benefits from that system. What the four above-listed items have in common is the danger they pose to the international system itself. An economically stagnant world with 15-20 nuclear-armed nations and a temperature rise of 3-4 degrees Celsius will be rough for the United States, China, Europe, and everyone else.

As a framework, the global agenda outlines the international community's norms and civic obligations (Hedley Bull's "international society"). In practical terms, it's about resisting Iranian and North Korean acquisition of nuclear arsenals and attaining a better balance of exports and domestic consumption in the global economy. I'm not sure where that leaves American national interests, and their supposed separateness from the global agenda and cooperation; I guess it's a question I'd turn around and pose to Paul Miller.

What I do know, just for example, is that the global agenda has prodded China to support Iran sanctions and commit to boosting consumption -- two things hard-headed skeptics ruled impossible because they contravened Chinese interests. 

Post Mortem on Republican Foreign Policy Posted by David Shorr

Soon I'll be headed to this year's International Studies Association convention, taking part in a panel on "Obama and Beyond: Change and Continuity in American Foreign Policy." Any Democracy Arsenal readers who will be at ISA should come to our session Thursday morning at 10:30 and be sure to say hi. 

No big surprise, but I'll be arguing the 'change' side of this question: that the foreign policies of Presidents Obama and Bush have more in contrast than in common. Sure, there is some continuity between the administrations on, say, executive powers and secrecy. But it is quite a stretch to lump together the president who sends drones to individual houses in Pakistan and Yemen with the one who invaded Iraq.

 

With the media all marking this week's 10th anniversary of the Iraq War, we've had a lot of fresh reminders of how disastrous it was. The question of continuity versus change in foreign policy is another way of asking whether Iraq has had a chastening effect or the blind spots remain. Has our debate moved on, with the lessons of Iraq having been learned and internalized?

I don't think we really have reached a post-Iraq consensus or synthesis. Not because of Republicans' adventurism or yearning for new wars -- though some segments within the GOP are worrisome -- but the generally unrealistic ideas they still hold regarding American power and influence. You don't have to believe the worst about the GOP to see continued serious problems with their approach to foreign policy. If invading Iraq was the height of hubris, there's still plenty of hubris left in the arguments Republicans have been making recently. 

Exponents of the 'continuity' argument no doubt see the exercise of power and real-world constraints as moderating influences. As the elder Governor Cuomo said, you campaign in poetry and govern in prose. After the last few campaigns, though, I'm not buying this tendency to downplay political arguments as indicators of policy -- which I term the heated rhetoric discount or contrast inflation. While it's true that political talking points can be impractical as policy guidelines, policy decisions are not insulated from public debates on the issues. That's what it means for some issues to be politically sensitive.

The title of my paper for ISA is "The Partisan Foreign Policy Divide - Rhetoric or Substance?"[PDF]. I tried to gauge the policy ramifications of recent years' political debates, arguing that the hot-button issues that mark out the partisan battle lines also set parameters for governing. The heart of the paper focuses on three main strands of the foreign policy debate that will be familiar to all DA readers. The first concerns the United States’ basic ability to mold events to its liking. The second is about the power of solidarity among like-minded democracies. The last focuses on the exigencies of diplomacy (the need to compromise for instance).

A blog post isn't enough space to give my full argument (read the whole thing), so the last few grafs after the fold encapsulate the three debate strands. Better yet, if any editors are reading this, I would happily hone the piece down to publishable size (Democratic for pol messager explains how deep Republicans' problems go).

Commitment Issues on Climate Change and Other Indian Perspectives Posted by David Shorr

Back in late-2011 I published a post here on the UN climate talks, particularly the view of some experts that pushing for a legally binding Kyoto follow-on treaty could do more harm than good. As negotiators weigh proposals to make countries' greenhouse gas reduction commitments as strong as possible, key governments work harder to keep from being on the hook than on steps to reduce emissions.

This problem was readily apparent last week when Stanley Foundation colleague Rei Tang and I were in Delhi for a round of meetings with Indian experts, and it is worth pondering and perhaps factoring into the international response to climate change. 

Just to retrace my steps, below is Michael Levi's explanation of the perverse incentives from a Financial Times piece in which he looks back at the major steps achieved at the 2009 and 2010 UN climate conferences:

Countries enter binding international agreements with an eye to ensuring that they will be able to comply with their commitments. The legally binding nature of an international deal can thus deter national ambition in the first place. It is near-certain, for example, that China would not have pledged in Copenhagen to cut its emissions intensity to well below current levels had it been required to embed that in a treaty. The same is true for the absolute emissions’ cuts pledged by the US. It is similarly unlikely that India, China and others would have accepted formal international scrutiny of their emissions cutting efforts had that been made part of a system for enforcing legal obligations. 

That last point is important because it highlights a trade-off between the strength of the reduction commitments and the process of tracking the levels of greenhouse gases being emitted. In one of our Delhi meetings, an expert stressed that measures to monitor and report on emissions in India should only apply to the plants and technologies that industrialized nations had supplied or underwritten. 

That's not to say India won't be cutting its emissions. In order to meet the energy needs associated with continued economic development, it certainly will cut GHGs through growing use of renewables and efficiency gains. But at the international level, Indians are sensitive and resistant to obligations imposed from the outside. Indian analysts and officials described this as the difference between "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches. 

To my mind, this choice between approaches seems like a matter of which route will help build the most momentum for GHG reductions: a traditional "black letter" international convention or a more dynamic form of mutual accountability and knowledge sharing? To some degree there must be a top-down dimension -- with senior levels of national governments remaining engaged rather than stepping back and seeing what happens. 

International accords should not be ends unto themselves, but means to address real-world problems. We face an important question of whether some of the fights within the UNFCCC may come at a cost to the ultimate aim of reduced emissions.

Of course climate change was not the only topic we discussed with our Indian colleagues. Without attempting a full report, I want to pass along some points -- particularly from a session with our Observer Research Foundation hosts -- that sounded like direct messages to the US. Several Indian experts emphasized India's cooperation with the energy sanctions against Iran, which entailed some cost. We also heard that Indian naval patrols of certain sea lanes alleviates some of the burden off of the US Navy. These are perfect examples of what Nina Hachigian and I meant by our "Responsibility Doctrine," and I was very glad to hear about them. The third message was in the area of energy security: India's eagerness to import liquid natural gas. 

Overall, we greatly appreciated the openness and hospitality of our Indian counterparts, and I'm looking forward to continuing the dialogue. 

Image: International Hydropower Association

Foreign Policy Bipartisanship is Not Dead UPDATED Posted by David Shorr

Bipartisanship in foreign policy hasn't vanished entirely, though in the recent political climate it probably qualifies as exotic. Today the Project for a United and Strong America is releasing a proposed national security strategy from a bipartisan group of experts (including yours truly). Having done a couple of these accross-party-lines exercises  back in 2006-07, it was interesting to see how it goes after the change of administrations. So I'll start with a congratulatory shout-out to Kurt Volker, Ash Jain, and Jim Goldgeier for successfully leading us to consensus. 

Despite the continued high temperature of foreign policy debates, relations between Republican and Democratic experts have stayed pretty amicable. For some, this is a vice not a virtue -- symptom of an insular groupthink-prone Washington establishment. For the rest of you, let me offer thoughts to inform your reading of this "Setting Priorities for American Leadership" strategy report.

What I find most interesting in a document like this are the ways it differs from what we hear in the political battles over foreign policy. With apologies to Sherlock Holmes, I suggest you listen for the partisan attack dog that didn't bark. Readers of this blog know all too well what issues and perspectives have split the opposing political camps; the "Setting Priorities for American Leadership" national security strategy marks out their common ground. It's not as if the experts in this group forgot what the political fights have been about; the report represents what all of us were comfortable saying (though not every participant agreed with every...) 

For the moment, I want to hold off from getting into the substance. I'd like to wait until after people have started to read and react to the report. That said though, another participant who blogs over at Shadow Government, Dan Twining, has already offered a comment that begs a response. Here's the lede to Dan's post:

The Obama administration's minimalist foreign policy, animated by domestic political expediency and a cramped view of America's responsibilities to uphold the liberal international order from which it has benefited so richly, can lead observers to forget what a more traditionally engaged foreign policy even looks like. The new national security strategy developed by a bipartisan group under the aegis of the Project for a United and Strong America fills that gap.

Like I say, I wanted to wait and see what others gleaned from the document, but I guess Dan went the other way. For the record then, I do not believe this report can be read as any kind of rebuke or repudiation of Obama foreign policy. At the most, it may be interesting window into a nascent intra-party debate outlined recently by Tom Wright (to which I've already reacted).

On the other hand, I guess the report can be taken as a slam against the figment Obama Republicans are always talking about. But then with enough imagination, anything can be taken that way.  

UPDATED to reflect the project's separateness from the McCain Institute.

Syria, Mali - Any Other Takers? Posted by Homa Hassan

It’s no wonder Secretary of State John Kerry has been walking on eggshells when discussing potential US support to the Syrian rebels.  As The Washington Post reported earlier in the week, a renewed discussion to supply the rebels with body armor, armed vehicles, and military training has arisen.  Until now, the support from the United States had been non-lethal aid along the lines of humanitarian assistance (such as medical supplies and packaged meals), funding for communications and logistical support, as well as an American invitation to the leader of the rebels to discuss the situation.  To date, any combat-related supplies the rebels have received has come from their own conquests of government bases or supposed help from nations like Qatar, Turkey, and, predictably, Saudi Arabia.

Not surprisingly, Syria is one of the last places the Obama administration would want its boots on the ground or its military munitions ending up in the wrong hands; however, as the situation continues to spiral downward, Kerry stated in Paris, “we need to help them to deliver basic services and to protect the legitimate institutions of the state,” indicating a concern of state failure lest the international community take another stab at aiding the rebels. 

However, recent scholarship suggests that U.S. hesitation to intervene in Syria or provide arms thus far may come from a somewhat consistent and historical aversion to military commitment, Afghanistan and Iraq notwithstanding.  According to a new study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released on U.S. Policy Responses to Potential Transitions, the U.S. has historically gone to great extents to avoid using its military during conflict driven political transitions.  The report goes on to show that over a 22 year span (1989-2010), the United States has most often defaulted to a non-response or issuing a statement, rather than imposing economic aid or sanctions, engaging in diplomatic efforts, offering military supplies, joining multilateral military action, or invoking unilateral military action. 

In effect, as the CSIS researchers point out, the question of intervention in Syria is not just figuring out the contemporary strategy, but anticipating the consequences in the decade to follow it.  The possibility of a failed state, marginalized groups facing increasingly dire livelihoods and further regional chaos loom ahead regardless of any action taken by the United States or others.  Ultimately, the Obama administration is looking to offer some form of support to the rebels before their following and credibility diminishes or Iranian influences pervade the porous Syrian border.

Syria is not the only former French-colonized country that has the leading superpowers hanging in the balance.  The dilemma in Mali has been pressing upon the world’s leaders to direct attention toward the nation without inflaming an incredibly sensitive and volatile region.  Largely credited to the spillover of armed mercenaries in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi, Mali had until now been seen by the U.S. as one of the more stable West African nations, despite a façade of democratic rule peppered with bribes, kickbacks, and corruption involving its leaders. 

But Kerry’s comments on Mali in Paris were sung to a different tune.  Kerry voiced that despite transportation, intelligence, and other U.S. support to the French-led offensive, “There has to be an African solution, ultimately. And our shared goal now should be that African and U.N. entities step up, so that France has the ability to step back.”  The different takes on Syria and Mali can be seen as informed by current strategic interests.  Though eager to stamp out strains of non-state actors like Al-Qaeda in the region, Kerry’s remarks indicate that the Obama administration is being incredibly tactful to not jeopardize its presence in regions where it is already working to curb Al-Qaeda’s influence (presumably Afghanistan). 

The question then becomes whether there is anyone more willing to take the lead when France eventually takes a step back.  Though ideally an “African solution to an African problem” would suit, the disparate interests of the neighboring African governments, the African Union, and the Western powers makes Kerry’s proposition more difficult.  Both Syria and Mali share the common roadblock that caused Somalia to turn into a debacle in the 1990s: the intelligence terrain is lacking without the eyes, ears, and interlocutors that eventually made Egypt easier to address by the West. 

Roadblocks not only come from internal politics and faulty governance in each of these nations, however.  Limited appetite for U.S. presence in international crises at the moment can be evidenced by the brutal debate over domestic issues like the impending sequestration debacle, economic instability, the inconclusive and unpredictable aftermath of aid or intervention, and the shadow of two prior military operations hanging over the heads of Americans. 

On the other hand, Russia and China are rattling the discussions further, as the former seeks to hold on to its role at the table and the latter to expand and assume a larger role in the global playing fields, particularly the mineral-rich African nations.  As such, the U.S. cannot simply ignore the impasses.  Refraining from intervention to the extent that the U.S. has done may be prudent, but should not transition their role into bystanders as the conflicts deepen.  As Marc Lynch of the Center for New American Security indicates, arming the rebels with American munitions does not mean the rebels will be able to simply defeat the Syrian army.  Instead, the Obama administration ought to be strengthening the legitimate authority of the rebels and more persistently encouraging a U.N. Resolution that emboldens them.

On the whole, the CSIS report indicates that the best U.S. policy that can and should continue to be pursued in either of these countries is the enforcement of a political solution, which will inevitably be needed whether fatigue or a stalemate batters the fighting down.  As in the civil war within Lebanon, there may be dozens of political solutions that fail, but eventually one will have to stick, even if no one is fully satisfied.  If, as has been suggested, no enforcement will hold without U.S. involvement, the Obama administration cannot simply hope a peacekeeping force will be able to ride out the tantrums wreaking havoc in the Middle East and Africa.

The strategy of having the U.S. take the lead may not be the key here, but working with its allies to push the direct stakeholders from behind in a way that avoids direct confrontation seems to be a discussion worth having.  Kerry’s cautious steps on behalf of the Obama administration regarding these fragile circumstances, therefore, are understandable.  However, both he and his boss know that if they want to make an omelet, no matter how careful, some eggs are likely to be broken.

--
Ms. Hassan is a Herbert Scoville, Jr. Peace Fellow at the National Security Network and has a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.

Welcome to Homa Hassan Posted by The Editors

Please welcome the newest contributor to Democracy Arsenal: Homa Hassan. Homa is a Scoville Fellow at the National Security Network. Before coming to NSN, she co-hosted a nationally syndicated radio show on domestic and international politics, worked in Congress and for the International Broadcasting Bureau in Washington, DC. She has spent time working abroad with the United Nations Development Programme in Kosovo, the Red Crescent Society on the Somalia drought in Qatar, and Transparency International in Colombia and Liberia.  Ms. Hassan holds a Bachelor’s degree from Columbia College SC in Political Science, Public Affairs, and Communication, as well as a Master in International Affairs from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.

The "New Foreign Policy Divide" Posted by David Shorr

Over at ForeignPolicy.com, Tom Wright welcomes us to "the Democratic Party's new foreign policy debate." Wright has noticed a fissure start to crack open, one he expects to pit progressive sister against brother. At issue is America's international role at a time of domestic challenges, and the emerging contrasts in approach could presage clashes over policy. 

Tom labels the two camps as "restrainers" and "shapers": 

Restrainers see a crumbling infrastructure, the budget deficit, a subpar education system, and a sluggish economy as much more threatening than events elsewhere in the world. Democrats of this stripe call for "nation-building at home," to use President Obama's phrase, and want to prioritize these tasks at the expense of international commitments, which they see as a drain or a distraction. 

The shapers have a starkly different view. They agree that domestic challenges are important -- and should be the subject of a strong domestic policy agenda -- but they don't believe international difficulties are on the wane. The U.S. economy is in a slump largely because of a crisis prone international economic order ... On security, the United States is a global power and detrimental developments in the Middle East, East Asia, or Europe will severely damage U.S. interests.

Since reading the piece, I've been test-driving Tom's idea. Are these two perspectives indeed prominent impulses within our major policy debates -- each of them with a clear enough orientation to offer answers to the big questions of our foreign policy? And has he avoided caricature? Actually, I think Tom's onto something. For one thing, he's given us a badly needed framework to talk about adjustments to American hegemony without the overblown specter of isolationism. 

We can start with the test of trying to place oneself in one of the two camps. Pretty easy in my case: confirmed shaper. Just take one line about the US global role from Nina Hachigian and my "Responsibility Doctrine" piece in Washington Quarterly: 

With a distinct ongoing role as a global leader, it will put great effort into bringing others along and offer its own cooperation for reasons of self-interest as well as broader peace and prosperity. 

Pretty shaper-ish sounding, I have to admit. Now I should also point out that the rest of the paragraph and article are about shifting some of the burden to other nations -- which sounds like restrainer talk -- but that's not a problem. Recall that Tom described shapers as sharing a sensitivity to our domestic challenges and constraints. 

Back during George W. Bush's presidency, we used to contrast the conservative and progressive approaches in terms that may be applicable here. Conservatives preferred to work unilaterally where they could, and multilaterally where they must; the progressive instinct is the reverse. Perhaps we can say that restrainers want the United States to involve itself only where it's imperative, while shapers also want to get involved where it can be constructive. Crucially, we shapers are still exercising prudence to ensure US involvement has good prospects for success. Shapers are picking our shots, whereas restrainers are pulling in their horns.

Naturally I recoil at Tom's forecast of progressives split into rival factions. There's also a best-case scenario in which the two perspectives provide a creative tension resulting in sound policies. Either way, though, I think Tom has identified a key fault line for us. 

UPDATE: Revised since published to add a sentence to the penultimate graf.

GRAPHIC: Cartoon by James Montgomery Flagg

How Can the G-20 Regain its Mojo? Posted by David Shorr

Recently I've traded posts back and forth with fellow G-20 watchers at the G20 Studies Centre of Australia's Lowy Institute. In a further bit of synchronicity, the Centre released a fuller analysis within days of an equivalent piece from me and a colleague. Looked at side-by-side, the two papers offer a lot of shared diagnosis of what ails the G-20, but also clarifies the lingering dispute over the scope of the group's agenda.

Both of these pieces give prescriptions to boost G-20 effectiveness in its next phase. The first four years of G-20 summits since the 2008 financial meltdown give us a good base of experience with its strengths and weaknesses as a multilateral body -- plenty of lessons to be gleaned and applied.

As the Lowy Institute's Mike Callaghan (a former Australian deputy finance minister) sees it, the process is due for a reset. His paper thus calls for Relaunching the G20 on the basis of nine essential precepts of summit-craft. My own paper on The G-20 as a Lever for Progress was written jointly with Barry Carin of the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). And while many of Barry and my ideas for a stronger G-20 are similar to Mike's, we didn't couch them as a major overhaul. That's because we see the G-20 as having gotten something of a bad rap, surrounded by cynics who make no effort to understand how the G-20 works or what it's trying to do. For all the debate over the G-20's proper focus and critique of its effectiveness, there's been scant attention to the practicalities of this comparatively new forum. 

In fact, the G-20 is dealing with an assortment of problems using various ways and means. One section of the Carin-Shorr paper takes inventory of the G-20 toolbox -- from collective declarations to national policy commitments, agenda-setting, resource-mobilization, or new multilateral mechanisms such as the Financial Stability Board and IMF Mutual Assessment Process. If you want to get the most out of this process, start with a full picture of its efforts thus far. And working from that sort of overview, Barry and I derived a cardinal rule of thumb for everything the G-20 does:

For any issue on its agenda, G-20 involvement is justified only when its attention to that issue translates into progress that could not otherwise be attained. Every proposed topic must be justified by such a theory of change, and every related report, statement, and communique must show what is being accomplished.

The G-20 can, and should, tackle a variety of international challenges, but always aimed at advancing the dialogue and moving toward solutions. As I highlighted in the last go-round with my Lowy Institute colleagues, this is a debate over which issues should be on the G-20 leaders' plates. (At some level it's also a culture clash between economic and foreign policy specialists, but that's another topic.) Mike Callaghan is arguing for erecting a wall around the G-20 agenda that keeps the leaders from dealing with anything but the main business of economic growth, financial stability, and governance reform for the Bretton Woods Institutions. 

Boiling it down, the Carin-Shorr argument is that there's a right way and a wrong way to be an agenda hawk. The G-20 can be clear about priorities, disciplined in its deliberations, and vigilant about wasted effort -- all without slamming the door on a few ancillary topics that offer the chance to make a positive difference. Some of our ideas are also echoed in a report from a study group of US and Chinese experts convened by the Stanley Foundation, Center for American Progress, and China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.

As I mentioned, both sides of this debate agree on many things. All of us are concerned about G-20 reports and communique text that highlight issues without advancing them. We all agree on the importance of keeping world leaders focused on G-20 priorities that really need their attention, and Mike offers some great ideas for how the leaders' precious hours together at summits can be best spent and structured.

But here again, key questions in this debate are only loosely connected to practical realities. The plain fact is that the leaders do not engage or even familiarize themselves with all the issues on the G-20 agenda. That's not to deny that senior aides and lower-level officials certainly spin their wheels for some of the matters on the docket. Yet that's an argument for culling the agenda and enforcing greater discipline rather than a draconian purge. 

Best State of the Union Moments-Yep, in Advance Posted by Heather Hurlburt

In addition to the domestic policy you know about, there will be serious and important words on Afghanistan, nuclear weapons, cybersecurity, global poverty and climate change tonight. I'll write on that later, but here's what will keep you on the edge of your seat:

1. Who gets more tv cutaways, Ted Nugent or Michelle Obama?

2. Does Ted Cruz look even remotely abashed after his un-freshman-like outburst at the Armed Services Committee Hagel vote this afternoon? It's probably too much to hope that he's seen with McCain on national tv. If this happens, drain your alcoholic beverage and thank the tv gods.

3. Come to think of it, do the Teds meet? What does that look like?

4. In his response, does Marco Rubio repeat his summer Brookings approach of criticizing his own party more than the President? Of calling for diplomacy with Iran, and closer ties with allies?

5. Ditto Rand Paul, only never at Brookings. What can he say on national security that his own party agrees with? Stay sober enough to track this.

6. Drink every time a commentator who has never been to South Asia says "fighting season" while discussing Afghanistan.

7. If you want to be sure to sober up in time to drive home, only drink when GOP respondents say "Afghanistan."

 

 

Tanks But No Tanks Posted by The Editors

Check out NSN Senior Advisor Major General (ret) Paul Eaton on the Daily Show last night discussing the M1 Abrams tank: 

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This Week In Threat-Mongering - The Ted Koppel Version Posted by Michael Cohen

When it comes to international relations and the nature of potential threats facing the United States there is generally a single default mode embraced by the pundit community – be afraid. To listen to both foreign policy professionals and those with just a glancing understanding of global affairs is to be presented with an image of the world that is one of great complexity and uncertainty as well as unceasing and ever-worsening threats, particularly to the United States.

Case in point: this week’s Meet The Press and in particular the embarrassing, misinformed stentorian pronouncements of former ABC Nightline anchor Ted Koppel. If you’ve been wondering what Koppel has been doing since he left late night television, ‘taking time to understand the world as it is today’ has clearly not been high on his agenda.

As the discussion on Meet The Press turned to foreign affairs (as discussed by five people who have little to no background in the issue) Koppel was asked to weigh in by host David Gregory – and the results were gruesome.

Here was Koppel’s opening salvo: “We’re entering one of the most dangerous periods this country has ever known.”

This is simply and unequivocally not true (and is completely head-scratching when you consider that Koppel was born in 1940 and thus lived through the entire Cold War). The US faces not a single plausible existential threat, no great-power rival, no near-term competitor for global hegemon and no legitimate military adversary that poses any security threat to the United States.

And as my colleague and friend Micah Zenko exhaustively pointed out last year – the world today is safer, freer, healthier and more economically prosperous than any point in human history.

Wars of all varieties are on the decline. Inter-state war is virtually non-existent. There hasn’t been a great power conflict in more than 60 years and there is little reason to believe there will be another one any time soon. In fact, in the first decade of the 21^st century there were fewer deaths from year than any previous ten-year period in the last century. 

Of course even if one recognizes that the world is safer it doesn’t mean it will stay that way, or so might argue the cynics. But again here there is more good news – all the key political, economic and social indicators point toward a future of less not more war.

There are today 117 electoral democracies around the world – a sizable increase over what the 70 or so that existed at the end of the Cold War. Moreover, economic interdependence and liberalization is the rule not the exception – and of course, increasing economic interdependence is a net positive because trade and foreign direct investment between countries generally correlates with long-term economic growth and a reduced likelihood of war.

So too does greater prosperity – which also defines our current global era. People are living longer and healthier lives with greater access to primary and secondary education. In fact, the number of people living in extreme poverty has dropped by more than half since the early 1980s. Thirty years ago, half the people living in the developing world survived on less than $1.25 a day; today, that figure is about one-sixth.

And while we know that these are not hard and fast rules, generally speaking, a world of more democracy, greater economic linkages and higher levels of prosperity and living standards is a world that is less prone to violence.

So from a global perspective:  the key democratic, economic and security-related metrics are all moving in one direction – toward greater security and a diminishing likelihood of conflict. All of this makes Koppel’s claims of a dangerous world highly dubious and deeply misleading.

Well rest assured Koppel has some “evidence” to back up his bold assertion:

“A. It’s not over in Afghanistan. B. To the degree that al Qaeda has moved over into Pakistan, that’s a country that has over 100 nuclear weapons. Syria, which is an ongoing problem. The suggestion constantly seems to be that we need to come in on the side of the rebels. There are at least 1000 Al Qaeda members in Syria today fighting on the side of the rebels. If the chemical weapons fall into their hands, big problem.

Iran . . . remember now . . . it might even have been on this program that Bibi Netanyahu suggested that come spring, come early summer if the Iranians still have not pulled back from building a nuclear weapons the Israelis may attack – the Iranians would respond against the United States and they have the capacity to do it with cyber war.”

So let’s unpack this. He’s right that things are not over in Afghanistan, although considering that the US is on a course to drawdown it troops there we can say that things are close to being over for the United States. Still, why would Afghanistan represent a future threat to the United States? The President has decided that US national security will be protected even if the US presence there declines – what makes Koppel think this is wrong?

But he is worried about Pakistan – so much so that he puts al Qaeda in the same sentence as “nuclear weapons.” Still what reason is there is to believe that al Qaeda, which is on the run, has been hammered by US drones and is down to a few key lieutenants would have any chance of gaining possession of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons – and then use them against the United States (or any other country for that matter)? Perhaps Koppel would be reassured by the fact that in January 2010, Secretary of Defense Bob Gates stated that he is “very comfortable with the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons” – a view that has been endorsed by successive senior officials.  Also, Koppel appears unaware that al Qaeda has been predominately in Pakistan since 2001 and yet amazingly no nuclear weapons have fallen into their hands.

Next while Koppel is correct that Syria remains an ongoing issue and there is pressure on the US to get involved it seems relevant to mention that Syria has been an issue for nearly 2 years; there has been pressure for the US to get involved and yet it hasn’t happened.  Moreover, while there is an al Qaeda franchise in Syria and the country has chemical weapons there is little reason to view that as a threat to the United States.  Koppel appears to believe that every group that has franchised with al Qaeda represents a danger to America and a defining feature of a less secure world.

Like in Koppel’s Pakistan example he has combined a few chilling words (al Qaeda and chemical weapons) to scare those listening into believing that US is facing a more dangerous period in global affairs. But even the most cursory analysis of his argument would suggest that this is not the case.

Finally, there is Koppel’s Iran example, which is fascinating in its complete disconnection from facts. First of all Iran is not building a nuclear weapon since according the IAEA and the US government, Teheran does not have an active nuclear program. Yes I’m aware that the country is enriching uranium, but the distinction between developing the capabilities for a nuke and actually building one is pretty important – Koppel elides it.  Second, the notion of a US strike on Iran has been dealt a rather serious blow in the wake of Israel’s recent elections (as well as the recent US elections) and few observers of the region believe that the likelihood of a unilateral Israeli strike are high. Moreover, Koppel’s conviction that such an unlikely attack would lead to an Iranian counter-attack against the United States is all well and good – but so what?

Iran is a diplomatically isolated, economically challenged country.  According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s “military forces have almost no modern armor, artillery, aircraft or major combat ships, and UN sanctions will likely obstruct the purchase of high-technology weapons for the foreseeable future.”  And their cyber capabilities are modest at best; certainly not at the level where they could threaten the United States in any serious way.  Iran is a bad actor and they can certainly make trouble when they want to – but a harbinger of a more dangerous world? Balderdash.

In of itself Koppel’s statements are fairly meaningless. It’s not as if he is a leading voice on foreign affairs or someone who today has a large media presence. But what is so troubling about these types of episodes is that after Koppel spread his misinformation he was followed by Bob Woodward, Andrea Mitchell, Jim Demint, Ben Jealous . . . all of whom bizarrely agreed with him and in the case of Woodward suggested that he was underplaying threats to the United States.

Woodward said that his next book should be on foreign policy – and be called “Meltdown” even that words comes nowhere close to describing the current global environment. Andrea Mitchell expressed concern that the US would “retreat” from the global stage even though not a single person in a position of political influence with the Obama Administration or Congress is advocating such a position. 

And Ben Jealous, president of the NAACP complained that voters want to know what their leaders will do to make them “safer” even though they are clearly at this point safer from foreign threats than at any point in decades. Rather than pointing out the uncontestable fact that the world today is safer than ever, Koppel’s panelists seemed to try and one-up his dystopian worldview.

The problem with all of this is that many Americans are simply unaware of the true nature of the global environment – and quite often take their cues on foreign policy from elites. And when you have elites like those who were on the Meet the Press this Sunday then Americans are receiving a simply wrong-headed notion about the kind of world they live in and the type of threats that confront the United States. This is more than just ill-informed analysis; it’s actually corrosive, unhelpful and makes Americans more susceptible to the type of fear-mongering that has long defined US foreign policy.  If Americans believe that the world is full of potential threats that could harm them or their families they are likely more inclined to support policies and politicians that seek to ameliorate those threats . . . or see: Iraq War, 2003.

The fact is, the world has never been safer and the United States has never been more secure. This is a fact. Indeed, it's the most salient fact of global affairs in the 21st century and it cannot be repeated enough. 

Foreign Policy "Requires Collective Action" Too Posted by David Shorr

But we have always understood that when times change, so must we; that fidelity to our founding principles requires new responses to new challenges; that preserving our individual freedoms ultimately requires collective action.  For the American people can no more meet the demands of today’s world by acting alone than American soldiers could have met the forces of fascism or communism with muskets and militias. No single person can train all the math and science teachers we’ll need to equip our children for the future, or build the roads and networks and research labs that will bring new jobs and businesses to our shores. Now, more than ever, we must do these things together, as one nation and one people.

Inaugural Address by President Barack Obama

January 21, 2013

The relatively scant discussion of the wider world in the president's second inaugural address has left some of us foreign policy types hungry for more, but I don't see a big problem. President Obama captured the main points concisely -- the folly of "perpetual war," the need to seek peaceful resolution of differences, support for the spread not only of freedom, but hope for the economically and socially marginalized. He also gave special emphasis to the challenge of climate change, and rightly so. 

Even with the speech's primary focus on our country's own polity and social contract, though, it isn't hard to connect the dots between President Obama's domestic and foreign policy approaches. I chose the key passage quoted above because of its relevance to the challenges America confronts both at home and abroad.

Picking up where last year's campaign left off, the president wanted to highlight the limits of self-reliance and individualism. To view America solely as a loose association of individuals is wilfully blind to practical realities. Only through combined efforts, commitments, resources -- and, yes, the structures of government -- do individuals have a context in which they can thrive and succeed.

The idea that a portion of society can thrive while the larger part struggles is a fantasy, and a dangerous one. We mustn't lose sight of the degree to which our fate is a shared one -- the reality that we rise or fall together. And as this truth holds for our country, it is equally true for our world. President Obama acknowledged as much in his address: "we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad, for no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation."

Sometimes I label my worldview and approach to foreign policy as "interdependent-ist." The underlying perspective about our all being "in it together" is, I think, basically what President Obama talked about today. I also think it's been evident in his foreign policy. My friend Nina Hachigian and I recently published our theory of Obama foreign policy, which we call "The Responsibility Doctrine," in the latest issue of Washington Quarterly. To a greater degree than appreciated, President Obama's foreign policy has been a steady drive to get other nations to help tackle shared international challenges. If you're one of those who's looking for a little more foreign policy here on inauguration day (after all, you're reading a foreign policy blog), you might want to read the whole thing. 

Does the G-20 Have Too Much on Its Plate? Posted by David Shorr

Over at the interpreter blog of  Australia's Lowy Institute, Mike Callaghan and Mark Thirlwell kindly responded to a recent post I wrote on the G-20 (the major focus of my Stanley Foundation program). Their piece helps sustain an important debate regarding the proper role and scope of that high-level diplomatic process. Let's see if I can keep this exchange going. 

It can only help the G-20 to make an honest inventory of its strengths and shortcomings. With the benefit of four years' experience since it first convened world leaders in the middle of the financial meltdown, we can surely fine-tune the process for improved performance in its next phase. As with any multilateral forum, the G-20 is judged by whether its deliberations help address real-world problems. The value of the process lies in its ability take the issues on the agenda and prod them toward resolution. 

The debate between Callaghan, Thirlwell, and myself is about how many issues are on the G-20 agenda, and what kind. We're in agreement about the group's core mandates and top priorities: global economic growth, financial stability, and IMF governance reform. The dispute is about G-20 involvement in matters beyond those priorities. According to Mike and Mark, G-20 leaders have been distracted by too many peripheral matters for them to accomplish their main work. I think there are valid reasons for the G-20 to maintain a diversified portfolio. 

First off, if we're trying to explain why the G-20 has fallen short, distraction is a pretty weak alibi. The newer topics on the G-20 agenda are being scapegoated for the modest progress on the group's priorities.

It's plain to all of us G20-watchers what is needed on these issues, but we lay blame for the hold-up differently. Let's go through the major issues. While the G-20 performed heroically in warding off a global great depression three years ago, it has not given us a very strong recovery. The action plan from last June's summit offers a clear to-do list for the major economies to get in better balance and stronger performance; now those countries must take the prescribed macroeconomic steps. The Financial Stability Board has been plugging away at the problem of too-big-to-fail banks, but derivatives market regulation has been a struggle, and there are fears that Basel II and III capital requirements are too weak to prevent another crisis. As I've said, I don't think you can blame this state of affairs on the G-20's forays into development, climate, or anti-corruption.

There's an elephant in the room here, and it's the debate over austerity. I've seen this many times in discourse regarding multilateral bodies; in the rush to criticize the collective entity, the policy and political divisions among member governments get overlooked. So we can debate the wisdom of tight fiscal and monetary policy, but the G-20 has clearly given its leaders ample opportunity for, as they say, a full and frank exchange of views. The November 2011 Cannes summit, for example, was pretty much consumed by the Greek political crisis.

Disputing my claim that the G-20 has enough diplomatic bandwidth to tackle a variety of issues, Callaghan and Thirlwell respond:

But do leaders have the time? Meetings of G20 leaders, finance ministers and central bank governors are very crowded affairs. There is already little time to focus on the core responsibilities.

If we asked world leaders to delve into the details of every topic on the agenda, they certainly would not have the time. But then, that's not really how it works. For many issues on the docket, leaders simply give their blessing to the agreements and work that were hashed out by lower-level officials. (Callaghan probably knows this better than I do, having been deeply involved in the G-20 process as Australia's deputy finance minister.) Some items are handled mainly in expert-level working groups such as development or anti-corruption -- which hardly place strains on the prime ministers and presidents themselves. 

How do we know efforts at this level pose no major threat of distraction? Because despite a push by the current Russian G-20 presidency for a back-to-basics agenda at St. Petersburg, my understanding is that they intend to leave all working groups in place rather than shut any of them down. My point, though, is more general. All the warnings against distraction are painting with a pretty broad brushstroke, while the demands on officials' time and attention are, in fact, as different as the issues themselves. 

As Mike and Mark noted, we all agree on the need for greater discipline. The Development Working Group agenda, for instance, cries out for focus and prioritization. But I want to warn against being too narrow or rigid. There was another notable chink in Russia's back-to-basics approach as G-20 chair: sustainability and green growth. I suspect that many world leaders are worried they're not doing enough about the climate, and rightly so. The G-20 now has a working group on climate change financing, a key pillar of the Copenhagen accord. Perhaps they could also take a cue from the United States and focus on vehicle fuel economy standards.

The G-20 is the only major recent global governance innovation that brings together rising and established powers as peer equals. At a time when international cooperation is falling short of our major global challenges, we have to get as much out of the G-20 as we can. 

Use of American Power, An Unhealthy Obsession (According to Bill Kristol) Posted by David Shorr

One line from the recent coverage of the Hagel nomination jumped out at me. Check out this quote from William Kristol in Jim Rutenberg's piece in the Sunday New York Times:

I’d much prefer a secretary of defense who was a more mainstream internationalist — not a guy obsessed by how the United States uses its power and would always err on the side of not intervening.

Okay, let's do some parsing. Kristol is a hard-core interventionist, no news there. More noteworthy is the implication that American power is synonymous with military intervention. My apologies to Albert Camus, but Kristol seems to believe that there is but one serious foreign policy problem, and that is whom to blow up. A pretty narrow view of statecraft. 

Most interesting, though, is Kristol's use of the word obsessed. Apparently it's what separates mainstream internationalists from the surrender monkeys. So, how much reflection on America's actions overseas are we allowed before Kristol rules us out of the mainstream? 

In the category of have-we-learned-nothing-in-the-last-ten-years, it's bizarre to argue against diligence in the use of American power. God forbid that Americans should think about what we're doing internationally, that we have some self-awareness as the planet's most powerful nation. As someone who thinks about this stuff a lot, I don't consider myself obsessed or outside the mainstream. On the contrary, I consider prudence a virtue. 

Photo: Gage Skidmore

Republicans' Foreign Policy Problems - Part II Posted by David Shorr

All the recent attempts to draw the lessons of 2012 for Republican foreign policy are good grist for the blog (thank you Danielle Pletka). The other day, I wrote about the overall need to offer proposals that are plausibly workable, instead of counting on other international players to bow to Republican adamance. But moving beyond this general diagnosis to unpack the Republicans' problem, there's still so much more to say.

For example Pletka gives such emphasis to the spread human rights and democracy, with President Reagan as their patron saint, that they seem to overshadow the rest of US foreign policy. At the end of the first section, she places "willingness to promote American ideals globally" at the "heart of the GOP" serving as its "moral compass."

In the next section fidelity to those ideals is the basis for the best Republican leaders to style the United States as a revolutionary rather than status quo power -- and contrast themselves with faithless Democrats (that's with a capital 'D'). Pletka goes on to talk about the unfair caricature of Republicans as war-mongers, but also about how military strength caused the downfall of the Soviets, proxy wars vindicated democracy, and the Iraq War set the stage for the Arab Spring. Then comes a discussion of how America-come-home impulses give the world's undemocratic bad guys room to run rampant. The "world's policeman" section is sort of about international peace and the United States as global security guarantor; but then, it's about containing (communist) China and (again) our vindication in the Cold War. In the final two sections of her piece, Pletka focuses on the struggle for freedom in the Middle East and concludes that Republicans in Congress must sieze the initiative -- just as they did during the Clinton years -- and support Middle Eastern freedom fighters, bolster Asian allies against the Chinese threat, defend Russia's neighbors, and generally keep the rest of the world from despairing in American leadership. 

Apologies if that review seems a bit tedious, but I actually needed to check and make sure Pletka's article is as skewed as it seemed in my first couple readings. Set aside the issue of an overmilitarized foreign policy, when every problem looks like the illegitimacy of other governments, then all you have is a policy of resisting, replacing, reforming, or encircling other nations' leaders.

To put it bluntly, this only counts as the outline of a liberal internationalism v. realism debate if you consider it "realism" to be concerned about anything other than democracy and governance. More accurately, it's just obsession with regime character. 

And the other problems with Republican foreign policy orthodoxy -- including those problems identified by Pletka herself -- are fruit from the tree of this idea of a continuing Cold War-like ideological struggle. For instance she makes five references to China as a growing military threat and regional adversary before dropping the following gem toward the end of the piece:

The United States can provide its allies in Asia with the aid and military support they need to face challenges from China, while agreeing that everyone has a shared interest in Chinese prosperity.

Glad we've cleared that up. Here's some free advice: if you want your foreign policy to be taken seriously, don't treat the global economy as an afterthought. It has ceased being useful to say "America can't be strong without a strong economy," if it ever was. Belief in the imperative of restoring strong growth is not a policy -- and won't, you know, restore growth.  Not only do the United States and others have a "shared interest in Chinese prosperity," the fragile recovery from the Great Recession gives us a mutual interest in steps to strengthen the recovery such as Chinese fiscal stimulus, currency appreciation, and shifts from dependence on exports to domestic demand.

The point being that bold assertions about what the US "can provide its allies ... while agreeing..." won't get very far in obtaining what we want from key players like China and therefore doesn't really cut it as a credible foreign policy. Not to mention the challenge of making Iranian energy sanctions work when China, Japan, Korea, and India are all major customers. One more thing, Russia provides the NATO operation in Afghanistan with a major supply route -- aside from the one through Pakistan, that is. 

I'm afraid the Republicans' challenge to present a workable alternative is a bigger job than Danielle Pletka lets on. But don't take it from this progressive blogger, Dan Drezner's new Foreign Affairs piece on "Rebooting Republican Foreign Policy" gives the full bracing dousing of cold water. A sample:

The 2012 election was the nadir of the GOP's decadelong descent. By the time Romney was selected as the nominee, Republicans had come to talk about foreign policy almost entirely as an offshoot of domestic politics or ideology. What passed for discussion consisted of a series of tactical gestures designed to appease various constituencies in the party rather than responses to actual issues in U.S. relations with the world. The resulting excess of unchecked pablum and misinformation depressed not only outside observers but also many of the more seasoned members of the Republican foreign policy community who took the subject seriously.

And American Conservative's Daniel Larison points out that Pletka and her colleagues must look in the mirror if they want to know who's responsible for the sorry state of GOP foreign policy: 

The “painful” and “often incoherent” attempts to attack Obama on foreign policy and national security did not come out of nowhere. In most cases, Romney’s criticisms of Obama’s record were taken directly from common movement conservative arguments. On everything from his obsession with the 2009 decision on missile defense to his mindless Russophobia to his automatic support for Israeli policies to his complaints about Obama’s response to the Green movement, Romney was serving as little more than a conduit for prevailing Republican foreign policy arguments. There’s no denying that these arguments were often painfully bad and incoherent, but the poor quality of these arguments can’t be pinned solely on Romney or his campaign staffers. Many of the people who presume to speak for the party on matters of foreign policy crafted those arguments, and they are responsible for them.

But hey, good luck!

The Incipient Republican Foreign Policy Re-Think Posted by David Shorr

The Republican establishment is getting all introspective on foreign policy, particularly in response to two major pieces by Danielle Pletka and Dan Drezner. Along with the rest of the GOP, the party's foreign policy brain trust is wrestling with the question of what went wrong last November.

As a progressive counterpart and close observer of Republicans offering themselves as stewards of American power, I could just sit back and watch them grope for answers. But that wouldn't be any fun. 

Reading the panel of Rebpublican expert responses that ForeignPolicy.com assembled to react to Pletka's, a few lines from Will Inboden's contribution cuts to the heart of the matter:

An unappreciated but essential part of foreign policy is accurately reading the state of the world and the tides of history.

then further down:

[T]he question for the future of Republican foreign policy should begin not with where we think the Democrats may be wrong, but with what we think the state of the international system is today and how it can be shaped in ways favorable to U.S. interests and consonant with American values.

This is an even bigger blind spot than Inboden's critique acknowledges. Republicans have become too wrapped up in their notions of American omnipotence to notice how those ideas clash with international realities. By my own reading of the foreign policy debate in 2012, this myopia rendered the GOP unable to recognize President Obama's underlying strengths or present a viable alternative. As I highlighted frequently on this blog, the Republicans' case was remarkably thin and impractical. Based broadly on the assumption that greater shows of American strength and resolve would cause everyone else to snap into line, it basically boiled down to a new twist on TR: yell loudly and carry a magic wand.

Not to say Pletka ignores the problem altogether. For me, the most interesting passage of her piece straddles the fourth and fifth sections:

But it's up to the Republican Party -- and particularly its leadership -- to articulate how it would do better than Obama, how a robust American presence can make a difference in the Middle East, how victory should be the goal in Afghanistan, and how U.S. leadership in the Pacific can constrain Chinese predations. Republicans need to explain how much can be done consistent with America's dearest principles but without the use of force, without threats, without protectionism, and without breaking the bank. They need to work to bring along the many even within the party who doubt the imperative of success against al Qaeda, who doubt the value of friendly governments, and for whom each penny spent on a new fighter for the Air Force or aircraft carrier for the Navy is a penny wasted. You cannot hope to persuade the country if you cannot persuade your own party.

and

The other objection, of course, is that the last decade of war has drained not only Americans' emotional reserves but their country's treasury, giving America little choice but to retrench. Recognizing the "limits of our power" has been one of the resurgent themes of the post-Bush years. But where has it left the country? Leading from behind -- an absurd notion that itself must be left behind. After all, neither France, whose presidents have led on both Libya and Syria, nor the U.N. Security Council can solve the thorny problems we now face.

These grafs are interesting because they reflect both insight into the Republicans' difficulty as well as continued denial. Pletka is correct that the GOP's main failure in 2012 was that they presented no plausible case for how their approach would yield better results. Yet these very passages show why it's so hard for them to do so.

When Pletka talks about the "doubts" within her party, the beam in her own eye is magical thinking about the effectiveness of those approaches. It is the height of irony that Pletka's impulse to tag others with going weak on Al Qaeda, allies, and defense spending is exactly the thing that short-circuits constructive policy discourse of the kind she called for just a few lines above.

And it's her misreading of the "limits of power" that leads her astray. For Pletka, all the talk of limits is about the US pulling back from the world because of fiscal constraints. But that is a fundamental misreading of the issue -- and, consequently, of progressive thinking on foreign policy. In the spirit of Will Inboden's comment, progressive sensitivity to limits reflects our assessment of the current international system. Where magical thinking has deluded the Republicans about what can be achieved via chest-thumping and saber-rattling, we progressives make much less presumptuous -- we believe more realistic -- calculations about the practical leverage of a superpower's might. Which is precisely why Nina Hachigian and my "Responsibility Doctrine" article in the new Washington Quartelry highlights the push for international help and support as a major thrust of Obama foreign policy. 

Illustration: Boris Rasin 

What's The Matter With The G20? Posted by David Shorr

Experts are worried about the G20. After four years and seven summit meetings, many of my fellow G20-watchers are asking why the group doesn't have more to show for its efforts? But as conventional wisdom about the problem's source starts to take hold, I think my colleagues are getting it wrong. 

Setting the question aside for a moment, this is a good time to debate these issues as the chairmanship of the G20 passes from Mexico to Russia. In fact, many of us were in Moscow last week when Russia's government -- together with leading think tanks RANEPA and the Higher School of Economics -- hosted Think20 and Civil20 expert consultations to collect ideas. Planning for next September's St. Petersburg summit is just getting underway, and President Putin's G20 Sherpa Ksenia Yudaeva hosted her counterparts for the first time, also last week.

As Australia looks toward its turn as summit host in 2014, it has set up a research center on the G20 in the Lowy Institute. The introduction to that center's new report, "Challenges Facing the G20 in 2013," offers the following critique:

Many worry that the G20's agenda has been expanding too widely and covering too many issues. Given a weak, unbalanced, and vulnerable global economy, it is essential that the G20 give top priority to reinvigorating global growth. 

I have no qualms with how the authors characterize the agenda-creep that's taken place or the G20's prorper priority on the health of the global economy. My objection is to the way they -- and, admittedly, many others -- connect the two. If you're trying to lay blame for the G20's modest progress on the leaders supposedly being distracted by secondary matters, count me a skeptic. 

Let's take stock of the shortfalls on the G20's core agenda; judge for yourself whether the its sponsorship of a few working groups on anti-corruption, development, or climate change financing seems a likely culprit: fragile economic recovery; threat posed by sovereign debt on the Eurozone's periphery; structural adjustments to economies overly dependent on exports or leverage; governance reform of the IMF and World Bank; imposition of tougher capital requirements for banks; regulation of derivatives markets... Do we really think that expert-level discussions of financial inclusion, financing for infrastructure, or commodity price volatility kept the G20 from doing more in the priority areas? 

Obviously my underlying point is about the inherent degree-of-difficulty challenges associated with the G20's main tasks. But there's also an obvious explanation that tends to be glossed over: the deep divisions among key governments over stimulus and austerity. In other words, divergence on whether deficit spending is a solution or problem has meant G20 leaders don't agree on the basic issue of how to promote economic recovery. (This split became public before the 2010 Toronto summit when Pres. Obama cautioned against hastily ending stimulus in a letter to his counterparts.)

Among other things, this has left the G20 community with contradictory impulses -- simultaneously fretting over reducing the US deficit and the threat of the fiscal cliff, which is basically drastic deficit-reduction. Indeed, one of the Civil20 conference's most interesting moments was when a light bulb seemed to go off for a development aid advocate during the discussion of fiscal consolidation. Doing the 2+2 arithmetic on austerity and recovery, she pointed out that it would be bad for the global economy for the G20 governments to fulfil their commitments on consolidation.

But let me come back to the broader matter of the G20 and its problems. I think we need to turn the idea of agenda-creep on its head. There's no denying that the G20 agenda has become messy. Critics tend to misdiagnose the problem and overstate the consequences, as I've argued, but there actually is a problem. The really problematic agenda-creep has been happening within agenda items themselves -- internal to the issue areas in the G20 portfolio -- rather than between the different topics.

Strangely enough, the problem stems from the (well-intentioned) desire to take a comprehensive approach toward problems. As issues have been added to the agenda, the impulse to identify all dimensions of those issues is a hindrance rather than a help for the G20. To get a sense of this, just scan this 2011 report from the G20 Development Working Group, which reads more like a tour of horizon for global development work, rather than a focused checklist of advances that can be made on behalf of world leaders. It is probably unrealistic to hope the G20 can catalyze game-changing grand bargains. And yet, we need to adopt a new G20 agenda discipline whereby each issue comes with a theory-of-change showing how the blessing or impetus from world leaders will contribute to progress on the issue. For an example of an agenda item with clear focus, see the latest action plan for the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group. 

I believe leaders of the G20 have sufficient diplomatic and policy bandwidth to tackle issues beyond the group's core responsibilities for global economic growth and financial stability. In fact, I've heard senior officials argue the need for a range topics to complement the top-tier items on which progress will be unavoidably slow. But with that said, there is plenty of room for sharper focus across the G20 agenda. 

Photo: Russia G20

Recording of NSN's Media Call on Pentagon Reductions and Contractor Myths Posted by The Editors

NSN_Press_Call_12312

PARTICIPANTS: Ben Freeman, National Security Investigator, Project on Government Oversight; William Hartung, Director, Arms and Security Project, Center for International Policy; Christopher Preble, VP, Cato Institute

DATE: December 3, 2012

Obama Foreign Policy - Book Review Edition Posted by David Shorr

For everyone wondering what the foreign policy junkie in their lives wants for Christmas or Hanukkah, I've written a review of two recent books bound to be of interest.

Oh let's face it, the only people who read this blog are foreign policy junkies themselves. So maybe you could buy the David Sanger and/or James Mann book for yourself, or someone else. (Do wonks give their wonk loved ones wonkish gifts?)

Any way, my essay on these two first-drafts of the history of Obama foreign policy appears in the new issue of Policy Review. The authors are two of the most respected journalists on the beat and approach the subject from different angles. Sanger's account is the story of an administration working the levers of the US government's national security apparatus, whereas Mann situates the administration's overall worldview in the political debates that shaped it. Here's how I described the contrast:

The books’ subtitles hint at the authors’ shared questions of interest but also their divergent styles and methods. Sanger’s book is about Obama’s “surprising use of American power,” whereas Mann focuses on a struggle to “redefine American power.” Sanger, who is the New York Times chief Washington correspondent, takes readers more deeply into the workings of national security policy execution; he watches President Obama and his advisers preside over the machinery of statecraft. The revelations that have earned the book buzz as well as controversy — the cyberwarfare used to sabotage Iran’s uranium enrichment centrifuges — are the fruits of this method.

While Sanger delves into the Obama team’s exertion of American power to discern a policy style, James Mann is interested in their deliberate efforts to devise a foreign policy framework matching their view of 21st-century realities. He wants to know whether they could “bring about a new American relationship with the world, one that was less unilateral in approach and less reliant on American military power.” Applying the same approach as his earlier book about President George W. Bush’s foreign policy team (The Vulcans), Mann focuses on the perspectives and ideas that policymakers bring with them into government.

But as they say, read the whole thing.