Yesterday was the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Dayton accords that brought peace to Bosnia (my new book on the subject tells the story of how we got there). In all the looking back about what Dayton meant for Bosnia and American foreign policy generally, and the looking forward about the future of the Balkans, one question looms: can any lessons be drawn from Bosnia to help in Iraq?
Here’s my take (a version of this was published in yesterday’s Financial Times):
Looking at the challenges America faces today in Iraq – a violent insurgency divided three ways ethnically and religiously, fueled by foreign fighters and regional powers supporting their clients; a terrorized civilian population; and an international community deeply divided about what to do – it is hard to imagine how the country can survive as a single state at peace, let alone become a stable democracy.
But we have faced similar problems before. Ten years ago yesterday, after an intense twenty-one days of negotiations on the windy plains of an Air Force base outside Dayton, Ohio, the United States brought peace to Bosnia. By ending Europe’s worst conflict since World War II, the Dayton Accords were a complicated solution to an equally complex problem: Bosnia was deeply divided with a bitter legacy of bloodshed, in which outside powers (Serbia and Croatia) had intervened to tear the country apart. Stopping the war was President Bill Clinton’s first major foreign policy success, an accomplishment that reversed three years of frustration and failed policies toward a conflict that cost nearly 300,000 lives and almost tore the Atlantic Alliance apart.
When thinking about the lessons of Bosnia, most take heed for what not to do. To many, the outbreak of Bosnia’s war is seen as the modern-day Munich, in which the failure to stop aggression early resulted in a genocide and metastasized into a much greater challenge. Some believe that Dayton’s goal of creating a single, democratic, tolerant, multi-ethnic Bosnia was unrealistic and unwise to pursue – Clinton’s own CIA Director, John Deutch, today describes such ambitions as “fantastical.” Others see the commitment to nation-building in Bosnia as outside the sphere of America’s vital interests and a misuse of its military resources – in fact, this was the view of President George W. Bush and many of his top advisers during the 2000 presidential campaign.
Yet when it comes to today’s debate over what to do in Iraq, the lessons of the U.S. effort to end the Bosnia war also point a way forward – especially when it comes to how it can try to broaden the investment of others in Iraq’s success.
The first lesson is that a lasting peace is only possible with the support of the regional countries. Before Dayton, there were over thirty ceasefires inside Bosnia, but the war could not be settled without regional buy-in and commitments by outsiders – Serbia and Croatia -- to stop fueling the conflict. For the American negotiators, this was hardly appealing. It meant dealing with some unsavory characters, especially Serbia’s President Slobodan Milosevic (who today is behind bars in The Hague for war crimes) and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman (who died before he could get there). The U.S. wielded influence by deploying a wide array of diplomatic carrots and sticks – including the promise of lifting of economic sanctions, the possibility of military cooperation, or further punishment and international isolation – to get the outside powers to deal.
What this means for Iraq is that the U.S. needs to find ways to bring the key regional players – especially Iran -- into the process to create a positive outcome, including non-interference in Iraq’s political evolution. There are hints that the Bush Administration realizes this fact by authorizing its Ambassador to Iraq to reach out tentatively to Tehran, but it must intensify this effort.
In addition to seeking a regional agreement, Dayton succeeded because the U.S. established a mechanism to include its allies in the diplomatic effort – a “Contact Group” of five countries and the European Union that helped bolster the process with international backing. Then, as now, working with allies could be frustrating for American negotiators, but their involvement proved indispensable – especially because they needed to play a leading role in implementing any settlement. Nothing like this exists today for Iraq. With the international community still so deeply divided, creating such a regular mechanism for consultations and debate about Iraq would give other countries a stake in its success.
Finally, perhaps Bosnia’s most fundamental lesson is the importance of American patience and persistence. In 1995 the U.S. military went into Bosnia with a deadline; fearing casualties and doubting the American people’s resolve, the Clinton administration promised that the U.S. would get out within a year. Yet it stayed for almost ten, leaving only last year after turning the mission over the Europeans.
The U.S. left because Bosnia was succeeding, not failing. This was not like the disgraced American pullout from Saigon in 1975 or the humiliating withdrawal from Lebanon in 1984. It was a triumph of the right kinds of policies – including those that fostered greater regional buy-in and allied support. Getting there was not easy in Bosnia, and it will be far harder in Iraq. But with America’s patience wearing thin – and over 2000 American soldiers already dead – it is time the Bush team tried.
