Grand Bargains Between the Left and Center-Left Posted by David Shorr

The more I talk to fellow Iowans, the more optimistic I am about the potential for consensus-building across the progressive spectrum, even on some difficult issues. If moderates and those with a more sweeping critique just take a step toward each other, they may be surprised to look down and find themselves on common ground.

The classic FDR quote about fearing "fear itself" used to sound like a historical echo, but now it rings in my ear with a today kind of relevance, every day. Those of us involved in the national security debate are positively spooked by the fears of our fellow citizens (or the fears we imagine them to have). How can we convince the fearful that we're worthy of their trust? In some of our more flinty statements, you can hear the clenched jaw, not because we don't mean it, but because we're trying too hard and leave out the leavening of wisdom.

And we're even afraid to talk to each other -- about military strength or international trade, for instance. But despair not...

Four Things the Connecticut Primary Won't Change Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Is The Godfather  about Italy?

Is The Sopranos about New Jersey?

The Lieberman-Lamont primary next week is a fascinating moment in American politics.  It's about the Democratic Party's self-image; it's about George W. Bush's America; it's about kissing; and, like many great works of literature, it's about a hero with the tragic flaw of arrogance in the face of impending doom.  It is even about how one small subset of the body politic deals with the wound of Iraq.

But folks, it's not about Iraq.  So discussion of it has little place on this progressive but non-partisan blog -- and gosh, I'm glad I don't live in Connecticut.  The foreign policy community, like everybody else, is getting a little over-excited.  Let me remind you why, as I indulge my inner curmudgeon on a Friday afternoon:

1.  The problem is down the street at 1600.  One Senator more in the "out now" column doesn't change a darn thing.  In fact, the only possible result here is if current polls change and a Lieberman run as an independent by some freak chance ends up electing a Republican.  For that matter, if Lieberman holds the seat either way he still votes for Harry Reid as majority leader.

2.  The solution is going to have to be a unity one.  Neither Ned Lamont nor Joe Lieberman has the credibility to come forward with a brilliant plan that Dems and concerned Republicans could coalesce around and force on the White House in 2007.  For that you'd have to look to the small group of Ds and Rs who work seriously on military issues -- and leave aside, I fear, the ones who are running for President in 08 -- not because they won't have good ideas but because it will be too hard for the others to unite around them.  My hat is off to Reid et al for the growing unity they have built in recent weeks.  The policy there will get pushed forward by people like Murtha on the one hand and Jack Reed on the other.

3.  There's not enough oxygen in the room.  Yes, Gallup said this week that Americans named Iraq as their most important issue in thinking about whom to vote for in November.  But Americans are still firmly split about how long to stay in Iraq.  The way I read the polls (and I think both parties are being advised this) the public overall still wants its leaders to make sense of Iraq, and our involvement there, more than it wants any particular solution pushed at it.  The realities of politics are what they are -- loud and short-term.  People who care about the US role in the world beyond this November shouldn't be the ones forcing ugly, caricatured policy choices on the public.  They will get what they ask for -- the public will make an ugly choice, and then turn away in disgust.

4.  Overtaken by Events.  It looks to me as if just two things matter now; whether Baghdad's descent into hell can be slowed or stopped, and who controls both houses of Congress in January.  So enjoy the spectacle in Connecticut.  But it is a sideshow, and not the main event.

“The Sixth War”: 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, and, apparently, 2006 Posted by Shadi Hamid

The last few days, I’ve been trying to watch a bit more of Al-Jazeera in order to better gauge Arab public opinion. My brother was confused when he saw the current crisis referred to on the bottom left of the screen as “The Sixth War.” So I counted, 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, and, apparently, 2006. I would have never thought of lumping the six wars together, but I suppose this captures quite well how many Arabs view the current crisis – as something not entirely new, something embedded in history. This is what we might call a “narrative.” What’s ours?

This reminds me of a conversation I had last month with an Egyptian friend. We were talking about the deteriorating situation in Iraq. I told him that the war happened, the past is gone. As much as we might like to, we cannot undo the Bush administration’s reckless behavior, its fated decision to plunge us into a war we were prepared to fight, but not prepared to win. We cannot simply sit back and criticize. Now, rather, the task for us is to work together to find a way out of the current quagmire, to come up with policy alternatives, and, ultimately, to ensure that – whether it takes 5, 10, or 50 years – that Iraqis will be able to consolidate the gains of January 30, 2005. Iraq can, one day, with sustained US, EU, and Arab involvement, become perhaps not a model democracy, but a democracy, and that would be more than enough in a region that has neither.

He looked at me, grinned, and said - I’m paraphrasing now - “well, that’s the difference between us and you.” He grinned some more. Then, he stretched his arms and sat back. He continued slowly, self-assuredly, “you are consumed by the future, we are consumed by the past.” I’m not sure that this was really deep, but it certainly sounded like it was when he said it. Perhaps he had been reading too much of Tom Friedman. Or perhaps he was on to something.

These are, of course, simplistic overgeneralizations that would no doubt disturb the quiet egalitarian inside us all. However, there is something to be said for the power of history, especially a most tragic one.

Hezbollah, Israel and the Responsibility to Protect Posted by Lorelei Kelly

Despite the ongoing tantrum  involving those who insist on cramming the Israel-Hezbollah conflict into a Cold War era rationalization of state self-defense, other more promising discussions are occurring. One of them is rooted in a report issued by Canada six years ago.

In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty issued a report called The Responsibility to Protect . The report's central theme is that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.

Unfortunately, this report was marginalized by 9/11 and subsequent conflicts--yet its importance as a new way to think about international security is evident in the current fight between Israel and Hezbollah.

The laws of armed conflict are divided into two categories: laws that apply in wars between states (such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949), and a more limited set of rules that apply in civil wars and other "non-international conflicts."  The fighting in the Middle East shows how contemporary conflicts are often difficult to accommodate within this division. 

A recent exchange on the blog of a British development organization has some  interesting insights.  Hezbollah, Israel's government and Lebanon's government are criticized while its clear that both Israeli and Lebanese citizens deserve protection.

Security Assistance and Reconstruction: Who Is Going to be in Charge? Posted by Gordon Adams

The U.S. response to the attacks of 9-11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taxed the military and the U.S. foreign policy community in a variety of new ways. In many respects, the existing institutions of government were ill-prepared for these challenges, which has meant a constant process of ad hoc invention throughout the executive branch. If the U.S. is going to continue to do the post-conflict job, after Iraq and Afghanistan, it is going to be increasingly important to figure out who is responsible for it. The answer is not clear today, and the Congress, in its new defense legislation, is hedging its bets.

The Shifting Tide of Arab Public Opinion Posted by Shadi Hamid

As I discussed in a previous post, when the current Mideast conflict first began, many Arab intellectuals, liberals, and even some Islamists were critical of Hezbollah's provocation along the Israeli border. Well, so much for that. If there was ever a time to try to start convincing Arab (and particularly Lebanese) moderates to distance themselves from the self-destructive posturing of Hezbollah, this was it. For a brief moment, Hezbollah could and should have been revealed for what it was - an organization which had chosen to sacrifice Lebanese prosperity and propel Lebanon into war for its own warped, perhaps even messianic ends. But the opportunity was lost. Today, three weeks into the current conflict, such is the tide of Arab public opinion that no one dares criticize Hezbollah. This from the AP:

And where [Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad] Saniora initially was critical of Hezbollah, he is now praising the militant group and its leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, for helping to defend Lebanon.

That pretty much sums it up. And this is not just a "Muslim thing" anymore:

Egypt's Copts have hailed the Lebanese resistance movement Hizbullah and its chief Hassan Nasrallah as a source of pride to Muslims and the Arab world... "All Arabs must be proud of Hizbullah's gallantry," Bishop Rafiq Gris, the spokesman for the Egyptian Catholic Church, told IslamOnline.net.

And this from Youssef Chahine - Egypt's most famous film director, a liberal, and usually an outspoken opponent of Islamist radicalism:

Chahine said Nasrallah is a "source of pride to Islam." "Hizbullah is a symbol of Arab dignity," he told Reuters on Sunday, July 30.The Cannes-awarded director said he hoped to shake hands with Nasrallah in a visit to Beirut earlier this year. "Nasrallah welcomed my visit…I'm really proud of him," Chahine added.

Kleinfeld on Podhoretz -- Ouch! Posted by Michael Signer

For a vigorous and invigorating response to an op-ed by John Podhoretz's recent op-ed,  where he asks, and answers, this really, really dumb neocon rhetorical question:

WHAT if liberal democracies have now evolved to a point where they can no longer wage war effectively because they have achieved a level of humanitarian concern for others that dwarfs any really cold-eyed pursuit of their own national interests?

just click on this link to read Rachel Kleinfeld tee off, as she continues her brilliant stint for Anne-Marie Slaughter over at TPM Cafe.

Snap!

Bush post-Castro policy: your handy primer Posted by Heather Hurlburt

While we wait to see whether Castro is still with us, spend the day with this handy-dandy 90-page Bush Administration compendium/blueprint on what is going on in Cuba and how we can "help the Cuban people hasten and ensure a geniune democratic transition."

I'll be the first to admit that I missed it when the Administration reconstituted the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba last fall, as well as its timely Report to the President this July.  Now's the time to catch up.

Cuba is not my area of expertise, to put it mildly; so I read the document through the lens of someone who watched the Central and Eastern European transitions from communism quite closely; who did human rights work in the 1990s; and who has seen the sausage factory where reports like this are written one too many times.

I come away with a few thoughts -- call them X Things To Watch in the US Response:

1.  Time Warp.  The US continues to have a problem of seeing Cuba and its geopolitics as they were 20-30 years ago -- intensified by the exile community's tendency to0 live in the past and the Administration's need to paint things in Cold War era terms.  I was surprised to read the following:

Cuba’s ever-deepening relationship with Venezuela parallels the earlier failed relationship with the Soviet Union, only this time not as the junior partner: Fidel Castro is calling the shots.

Well, maybe it does and maybe it doesn't.  The Soviet Union was far away, and after the Cuban Missile Crisis it ran out of appetite and then resources with which to cause trouble from Cuba.  Chavez isn't going to have either of those problems any time soon -- nor does he face the cultural barriers Moscow did, nor is he going to be draining Cuba of its doctors, etc. and sending them to Africa.  Seeing Chavez through a Communist haze actually understates and misidentifies the problem (and the extent to which our own policies have created and sustained it, and are likely to keep doing so in the kind of transition these folks envisage).

2.  Iraq redux.  A Chicago Tribune editorial on the plan pointed out that "More than one critic has observed that it reads like a blueprint to rebuild a country that has been invaded, not a plan to help a sovereign nation."  I winced in several places just going through the executive summary, at descriptions of how the US will help "Cubans create a stable, open environment where free and fair elections can take place" including, among other things, "helping prepare Cuba’s military forces to adjust to an appropriate role in a democracy."  Could we actually accomplish this, even supposing Cubans really wanted us to?

3.  Welcomed with flowers.  That, of course, is the really big, ugly question.  How able is this over-extended and exhausted Administration to go with the flow, reacting with subtlety, restraint and even grace as post-Castro Cubans look around, test the waters under a supposedly China-reform-model-minded Raoul Castro, and consider what comes next?  Are American authorities and the Cuban-American community able to extend a model that looksl ike something Cubans might like, rather than a well-meaning but heavy-handed version of the Yanqui tutelage Fidel was always warning them against?  Can we avoid giving Fidel a self-fulfilling prophecy as his final legacy? There is little subtle in the report's recommendations -- tighter controls on remittances to ordinary Cubans, more public braying about funding Cuban democracy groups -- and little consideration of how the US supports Cubans in the transition time before they decide that what they want is US-style elections.

Anyway, read the report.  We won't be able to say we weren't warned...

Hosni Mubarak, Deep Thinker Posted by Shadi Hamid

I just stumbled upon a copy of today's Daily Star (Egyptian edition). Headline: "President warns Mideast peace process could collapse." Hmmm....really? What a pessimist!

We are, of course, referring here to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the self-proclaimed bearer of good, seemingly infinite, wisdom. May God grant him continued health and prosperity.

Undermining the Budget: The Supplemental Problem Posted by Gordon Adams

As military and diplomatic crises multiply overseas, the Congress has continued its merry way providing funding for the Administration’s national security policy. Given the policy chaos, it is not surprising that there would be budgetary chaos, as well, in the way Congress is supporting national security.

This week, the Senate will consider its version of the defense appropriations bill, which includes more than $453 b. for the Defense Department (defense funds are actually higher – nearly $550 b. - since this bill does not include military pay, quality of life and construction funds). Of that amount, $50 b. is included for what is called a “bridge fund.” for Afghanistan, and global military operations against terrorists.

This $50 b. has the status of “emergency funding,” meaning it does not count against the Congress’ self-imposed ceiling for discretionary spending. This $50 b. is the tip of the iceberg for funding, Afghanistan and the so-called Global War on Terror. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), through the current fiscal year ending in September, the nation will have spent another $437 b. on Iraq, Afghanistan, and the struggle with terrorism, nearly three quarters of it for operations in Iraq alone, and over 90% of it for the military.

All of this spending has been provided as “emergency” or “emergency supplemental” funding. And it is likely to continue. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the nation is likely to spend another $371 b. on these operations between now and 2016, even with the deployed forces shrinking.

The Anti- Hezbollah Backlash that Never Came Posted by Shadi Hamid

Part of the US and Israel’s strategic calculation, thus far, has been that the Lebanese would lay most or, at the very least, some of blame on Hezbollah - rather than Israel - for their suffering. Same goes for the Palestinians blaming Hamas for the deteriorating situation in Gaza. Michael Walzer explains in The New Republic:

Reducing the quality of life in Gaza, where it is already low, is intended to put pressure on whoever is politically responsible for the inhabitants of Gaza--and then these responsible people, it is hoped, will take action against the shadowy forces attacking Israel. The same logic has been applied in  Lebanon, where the forces are not so shadowy.

There is a catch, though, since

No one is responsible in either of these cases, or, better, those people who might take responsibility long ago chose not to.  

Normally, it might sort of go like this. Hezbollah attacks. Israel responds. Lebanon gets caught in a war zone. The situation in Lebanon gets worse. In turn, the Lebanese people and, to a certain extent, the rest of the Arab world hold Hezbollah (at least partly) responsible for starting this mess and playing to Iran’s self-serving agenda with little to no gain to Arabs. At the start of the recent conflagration, Dennis Ross predicted an anti-Hezbollah backlash:

Only this time, with Hezbollah, they may have miscalculated. Hezbollah does not command an instinctive following throughout a largely Sunni Arab world… We want models of success on the non-Islamist side, and it may be that Hezbollah's action, so clearly serving a non-Lebanese agenda, is a wake-up call for a large part of the Arab world.

I wish Dennis Ross was correct on this score – that Arabs would acknowledge the stupidity of Hezbollah’s actions. I, in an initial bout of misguided optimism, suspected as much, but over the course of the last two and a half weeks, I’ve realized that I was wrong. So far, I have yet to meet anyone in Egypt – liberal or Islamist, rich or poor, angry or happy – who blames Hezbollah for unnecessarily plunging Lebanon into conflict. Not one. As the conflict has escalated, pro-Hezbollah sentiment has risen quite dramatically. It is (or was) true – Nasrallah’s reach in the mostly sunni Arab world has traditionally been limited due to the longstanding sectarian tensions. But, now, Nasrallah is increasingly becoming a folk hero, a larger-than-life hero of the "resistance," an Arab poor man’s Che Guevara. He is quite possibly the most popular man in the Arab world today. This is not a good thing - not for the US, Israel, and certainly not for Arabs themselves.

At the start of this conflict, as Abu Aardvark has shown, there was an evident, if exaggerated, split in Arab political discourse on the Hezbollah question. The Saudis – with their relatively extensive media apparatus – led the way (for their own cynical reasons of course), condemning Hezbollah’s initial operation along the border. But, as the situation in Lebanon got only worse the last two weeks, Arab public opinion began to unify behind Hezbollah pretty much across the board. For all his folly and seemingly self-destructive behavior, Nasrallah is winning the hearts and minds of Arabs and we are losing them (but, then again, they were lost long ago).   

We Should be Dividers, not Uniters, of Terrorists Posted by David Shorr

The second item on Suzanne's key questions progressives must figure out was: Is the Fight Against Terror the #1 priority or simply a top priority? I'll offer a positive answer as well as a negative one on the need for a fundamental shift in how we view counterterror efforts.

To respond directly to Suzanne's direct question, I vote for "simply a top priority." Actually, my vote is for: a priority, with others, in need of broader strategic context. It should be possible to take this threat seriously without being consumed by it. Stopping terrorists is a minimum condition for security; taken by itself, it is not a vision worthy of American ambition or international common cause.

The best strategic vision I've heard articulated lately was by a fellow Iowan I met in Dubuque. Putting it in terms of other nations' ordinary citizens, he said our aim should be to: "make people around the world believe they're part of the world and not an ally of the nut down the street," meaning terrorist.

This is a hearts-and-minds approach only in the sense of how you gauge success. The aim is not merely to gain global sympathy for America, but to build a world with the broadest possible sense of shared stake and shared benefit. What we need is a growing law-abiding global majority that deprives warlords, WMD black marketeers, gun-runners, authoritarians, genocide perpetrators, and terrorists of all their oxygen. In other words, as more of the world's nations and their citizens find their voice and their prosperity, malefactors of all kinds will be increasingly hemmed in and under pressure. If this sounds like Richard Haass' The Opportunity, then call me a Haassian.

Now for the negative, what-the-counterterror-fight-isn't response. It is not a global confrontation between two great blocs. Here, again, is the distorting power of a monomaniacal focus on terrorists; frankly, this depiction builds up our opponent. The man in Dubuque had it right -- the terrorist is a nut. And therefore he shouldn't be dignified as a worthy adversary.

Remember the climactic scene of "The Wizard of Oz?" Dorothy and friends are in the wizard's chamber, his giant face staring down at them, while Toto notices someone off to the side. My question is this: is it in America's interests to cast terrorists as "Oz the Great and Powerful" or "the little man behind the curtain?"

The point is often made that terror is a tactic rather than a cohesive force, and scholars have analyzed the relationship of terrorism to different political, ideological, and religious objectives, but we are a long way from integrating this point into our strategy. The fight against terrorism is not actually a fight against terrorISM, but against terrorISTS. We should be driving wedges between terrorists rather than pushing them together.

Lorelei Kelly highlighted a relevant West Point study for us in a post last winter. The military academy's Combating Terrorism Center has done major empirical studies of terrorist organizations revealing frequent internal divisions over operational and political decisions. I'm just civilian policy wonk, but to me, that looks like an opportunity to divide and conquer. Or, to pick up where Heather left off with analogies from Soviet Communism, we should be using "salami tactics."