Bombing Ourselves in the Foot - Diyala Style Posted by Patrick Barry

Buried within this piece from CBS and the AP is this troubling kernel of information:

“Still, the tree-lined farm region is more difficult terrain for fighting insurgents than the desert of Anbar, suggesting Diyala may not have seen the last of al Qaeda in Iraq. Compounding the difficulty for the military is the checkerboard pattern of Shiite and Sunni communities adjacent to one another.”

Violence has escalated as insurgents pour into Diyala from Anbar province but less attention has been paid to Diyala’s geographic and demographic peculiarities, which may affect the scope and intensity of the fighting. 

When viewed in this light, the recent round of bombings become more interesting. As Max has pointed out, air strikes are a rather counter-productive tactic for a counter-insurgency strategy, and it may be that the most recent strikes presage the challenges US troops will face as they focus their attention on Diyala.   

A Soldier's Final Blog Posted by Lorelei Kelly

... perhaps my death can serve as a small reminder of the costs of war. Regardless of the merits of this war, or of any war, I think that many of us in America have forgotten that war means death and suffering in wholesale lots. A decision that for most of us in America was academic, whether or not to go to war in Iraq, had very real consequences for hundreds of thousands of people. Yet I was as guilty as anyone of minimizing those very real consequences in lieu of a cold discussion of theoretical merits of war and peace....

Anything I could add to this would just be annoying blather. Read the rest of Major Andrew Olmsted's post here..

So much for the "peaceful" haven of Northern Iraq. Iraqis prepare to seek safe haven. But where? Posted by Anita Sharma

Although Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, downplayed a Turkish invasion in Northern Iraq, refugee agencies and Iraqis are taking the threat pretty seriously.

Antonio Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees warned of further destabilization if Turkey attacks. Iraq's Kurdistan has been a refuge for many displaced Iraqis, where -nearly five million people, ONE in SIX Iraqis -- have been pushed from their homes.

According to the recent displacement report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Turkish cross-border shelling has already displaced families living along the border. An escalation in attacks is likely to displace between 300 and 500 families in northern Dahuk (Zakho and Amediyea). IOM reports that local authorities aren't planning to set up emergency facilities, though hospitals are stocking additional supplies. I'm seeking information as to whether UNHRC or the U.S. government has contingency plans should the crisis escalate in Northern Iraq. Don't forget, this area was touted as the safest area in Iraq.

Iraq Ain't Got No Seoul Posted by Suzanne Nossel

The White House's latest spin on the Iraq War involves likening the US role in the conflict to the American military presence in Korea:  a roughly 40,000 strong force that, more than 54 years after the end of the Korean War, faces essentially no casualties and is barely noticed by the American public.

Like early efforts to compare the occupation of Iraq to that of Japan and Germany after WWII, the analogy is beguiling but deeply false.  The White House is now pivoting toward an "over the horizon" support role - a concept taken directly from John Murtha's broadside against the conduct of the war in November 2005 - under the cover of a long-ago war that bears no resemblance to Bush's quagmire. 

No one will be fooled into thinking that the monumental challenges and terrifying risks faced daily by American troops in Baghdad and elsewhere will somehow morph into the kind of calm, predictable wary watchman function performed by US troops in South Korea.  In describing this, Defense Secretary Robert Gates eschewed the Vietnam analogy, “where we just left lock, stock and barrel,” favoring “the idea is more a model of a mutually agreed arrangement whereby we have a long and enduring presence but under the consent of both parties and under certain conditions.”

But the biggest problem with Bush's latest analogy is not that its insulting to those at home whose tolerance of the war he is trying to prolong.  Iraqi opinion polls show just 1 percent of the population who wants the US to "never leave."  A further 2 percent are amenable to a US plan to "stay longer but leave eventually."  The remaining 97 either want the US to get out right away (35 percent) or to remain until either security is restored and/or the Iraqi government and security forces are capable of operating independently. 

Gates acknowledged in his comments that a key predicate of the South Korean arrangement is that the US's military presence is "mutually agreed."  In Iraq, by contrast, some 97 percent of the population would reject a similar plan. 

Some 150,000 US troops are right now risking their lives to cultivate the support of a battle-weary and angry Iraqi population against violent insurgents and sectarian warriers.  For the Administration to float a scheme involving a semi-permanent US presence in Iraq that is rejected by virtually the entire local population can only inflame anti-US sentiments and heighten the risks faced by US troops.  All this in service of a political analogy that is defied by the daily headlines of killings, kidnapping, car bombings and mortars.

10 Lessons Learned the Hard Way in Iraq Posted by Suzanne Nossel

The Best Available Intelligence Can be Dead Wrong Or, Even Worse, Manipulated for Political Purposes – When the war was first launched, the prospect that evidence of Saddam’s weapons program might never be found was an cringe-worthy nightmare scenario. It was impossible to imagine that Colin Powell’s UN powerpoint was a work of fiction. We all know what happened next, and our trust in the intelligence establishment and the White House’s use thereof has been irreparably shattered

When the World isn’t Behind Us, That Doesn’t Necessarily Mean They’re Wrong – It’s become an article of faith that the UN failed the test posed by Iraq four years ago. But how so It doesn't take a UN-hugger to acknowledge that in refusing to ratify the war, the Security Council avoided the very same mistake Members of Congress are now admitting to one by one One can argue that no matter what Saddam did, Russia, Moscow and even Paris would have given him a pass, but that wasn't put to the test.

The US Military Has Limits - Four years ago it was tough to imagine a scenario in which the mighty US military was, by all accounts, stretched to its limit When we used to hear about the requirement of preparedness to fight two regional wars simultaneously, the prospect always seemed very far-fetched Some may be heartened that, the wisdom of such a potential option aside, launching a military confrontation right now with Iran is all but impossible.  But we would rest easier if the military option were off the table only by choice, rather than by necessity as well.

The Surge that Keeps on Surging Posted by Rosa Brooks

The Administration has decided to surge yet again, adding another 4,700 troops on top of the 21,500 already announced in January. (And, lest we forget, we're sending another 3,500 troops to Afghanistan as well, bringing total US troop strength there to "an all-time high.") Needless to say, this escalation (yes, it is an escalation) is a further sign that the situation in Iraq continues to spiral out of control. But you were probably wondering: hey, where are we going to get those extra troops from? Well, it didn't take long for the Administration to stumble upon the obvious answer: raid Walter Reed! According to Salon, troops pronounced "medically unfit" as a result of injuries sustained in Iraq are nonetheless being shipped right back out. We can't have all those lazy fellows lolling around in Building 18 when they could be out there fighting for us!

Okay, okay. They're not actually raiding Walter Reed to get the extra troops. So far, the story's about injured soldiers at Fort Benning. But give the Administration time. Because after all, it's a fiendishly clever way to kill two birds with one stone: get some more troops to Iraq, while teaching the injured not to go whining to the press about the lousy care they're getting....

Why asymmetrical warfare is so effective against the US Posted by Rosa Brooks

Former Democracy Arsenal guest blogger Ike Wilson's study of asymmetrical conflicts is discussed in today's Washington Post. (Don't Send a Lion to Catch a Mouse).  Short version: "the analysis showed that the odds of a powerful nation winning an asymmetrical war decrease as that nation becomes more powerful.... the likelihood of a great power winning an asymmetrical war went from 85 percent during 1800-1850 to 21 percent during 1950-2003."

Samantha Power on how to stop genocide in Iraq Posted by Rosa Brooks

Samantha Power, who knows a little something about how the US has historically handled (or failed to handle) genocides, has a strong piece in today's LA Times: How to stop genocide in Iraq:

Although critics of withdrawal do a masterful job of painting a grim picture of the apocalypse that awaits, they offer no account of how U.S. forces in Iraq will do more than preserve a status quo that is already deteriorating into wholesale ethnic cleansing.... What is needed to stave off even greater carnage than we see today is neither assuming massacres won't happen nor suspending thought until the surge has demonstrably failed in six months — at which point other options may no longer be viable. Rather, we must announce our intention to depart and use the intervening months to prioritize civilian protection by pursuing a bold set of measures combining political pressure, humanitarian relocation and judicial deterrence.

Iraq: Wishing there had been Whistleblowers Posted by Suzanne Nossel

A piece yesterday in the NYT about an ex-British diplomat who parted ways with his country's foreign service after testifying to intelligence lapses over Iraq's weapons program got me thinking: what would have happened if, two or three years ago, a chorus had arisen among the sitting military leadership, State Dep't and Pentagon policymakers and others in government decrying the direction of our policies to try to stabilize Iraq?  Would we be in a better position now and, if so, are there ways to ensure such silence doesn't hobble the effectiveness of our policymaking going forward?

The most famous example of official heresy concerning the occupation of Iraq came from General Erik Shinseki, former Army Chief of Staff, who was criticized and snubbed by his Pentagon superiors for telling the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2003 that the mission would require several hundred thousand US servicemembers to be done right.  Three and a half years later, in November, 2006, General John Abizaid admitted that Shinseki had gotten it right. 

Shinseki's fall from grace was widely cited as having a chilling effect on other military and Administration personnel.  While retired generals have spoken out loudly against the course of the war, those still in uniform have been mostly silent.  Accounts suggest that the retired generals were motivated in part by their conviction that the mistakes of Vietnam-and the silence of top military officers as those errors unfolded-must not be repeated.  But to the extent that avoiding a pattern of silent acquiescence in a failed and deadly war requires cultural change in the military, Iraq suggests that the transformation hasn't yet happened.

It's impossible to measure the Shinseki effect, or to know what information or opinions might have come to light had the Administration better tolerated dissent.  What is certain is that years of Iraq policy have been made in an environment of remarkable opacity as far as how well the effort was going, the motives and strength of the insurgency, and the efficacy of various US tactics.   

Iraq Intel - Take it to the Committee Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Last Thursday night I took part in a discussion with Senator Jay Rockefeller, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.  Rockefeller offers a predictably blistering critique of the Administration's handling of intelligence to date, and makes clear that Congressional access to those on the frontlines of intelligence gathering is sorely limited.

But Rockefeller is surprisingly upbeat about prospects that incoming DNI Mike McConnell will start to change all that.  He respects McConnell's experience, and judges him a straightshooter who will not be beholden to a hobbled Administration.

Apropos of last week's post on how we will judge the success or (seemingly inevitable) failure of the surge/escalation, Rockefeller and his Committee may play a key role in this determination.   As illustrated by Dick Cheney's down-the-rabbithole argument that Britain's withdrawal from Iraq bodes well for the war effort, the Administration will try to spin anything into success.  Solid intelligence, assuming we have any, could be essential to baring the truth. 

If McConnell is committed to a serious effort to restore the legitimacy of the US intelligence establishment, there is no better place to start than Iraq.

More lighter side Posted by Rosa Brooks

From my friend Jack Balkin at Balkinization:

My solution to the Iraq War-- partial privatization of national security!

Frankly, I'm tired of debates about whether the Democrats should pass statutes bringing the troops home, limiting redeployments, or placing conditions in future appropriations bills.

I think the best solution to the Iraq war is to take a page from the signature domestic policy initiative of President Bush's second term.

I propose that each President be given a personal National Security Investment Savings Account modeled on the proposed Social Security Investment Savings Accounts. Under this partial privatization of National Security, each Commander-in-Chief would be given a specific amount of money taken from the national budget that he could invest in stocks, bonds, or other financial investments. He can then use the proceeds to fund any military actions or preemptive strikes he likes.
After all, it's his money.

Like most Americans, Commanders-in-Chief should be encouraged to save responsibly for their future military invasions and preemptive attacks.

      

Read the rest here.

On a lighter note Posted by Rosa Brooks

From the Borowitz Report:

Bush: I’ll Bring Troops Home on JetBlue

No Exact Timetable, President Says

Under increased pressure to announce an exit strategy from Iraq, President George W. Bush revealed plans today to bring U.S. troops home on the budget airlines JetBlue.

Mr. Bush received praise for his decision to withdraw American troops, but his choice of JetBlue to transport them raised more than a few eyebrows.

According to most official estimates, with its recent spate of scheduling problems and flight delays, JetBlue could take up to seven years to bring U.S. troops home, and possibly ten years in the event of inclement weather.

The Cross-tabs don't lie Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Via the Washington Post blog The Fix, a fascinating new poll on Iraq from a Republican firm, Moore Information.

The Fix post concentrates on the fall-away of "soft" Republicans, who now only muster a small plurality in support of the Administration's policy, and on the full third of those who disapprove who say that blame goes only or primarily to President Bush.  (Another 30% blame Bush and all members of Congress who voted for the war; 24% blame "Bush and the Republicans in Congress" and 8% blame "members of Congress who don't support the President's approach."  Oh, and 5% don't know whom to blame.

But I also see that "The concept of a partitioned Iraq meets with a plurality or majority opposition among all demographic subgroups of the voting population."  The overall figure is 47% oppose a partition, 25% support and 28% unsure.  I'd love to know how exactly they asked the question; I'm guessing there's something important here about how Americans view our role in the world -- that it's not our place to go breaking up nations, perhaps, a general discomfort with our "playing God" -- but that's just a guess.

Ghosts of Abu Ghraib Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Thursday evening on HBO, via Mark Danner.  He says:

The film, in which I took part, is difficult to watch but it seems to me one of the better attempts to explore Abu Ghraib - how it happened and what it continues to mean.

Judging the Surge Posted by Suzanne Nossel

A fascinating thing to watch over the next few weeks and months will be the Congress, the media, the Administration, the military and the American public's evaluation of how the "surge" is going.  Last week there was some qualified good news about the initial American sweeps of Baghdad going more smoothly than expected.  The weekend brought more bombings and then yesterday's unprecedented attack on a US installation. 

The stakes in assessing the surge are high.  If it fails, its hard to imagine what new tack the Administration can take that won't amount to a tacit yet unmistakable admission of defeat. 

Progressives have, after 6 years of the Bush presidency, gotten used to being of two minds on the fate of Bush's policies:  on the one hand, they want the best for US interests (and especially for US troops), mandating that they hope against hope for the surge to succeed.  On the other hand, having been repeatedly and resoundingly vindicated in their critique of Bush's policy, they rightly judge that the sooner the facts on the ground make it clear to everyone that Bush's misadventures are just that, the sooner they will be forced to end. 

The media and the public have grown weary of years of being spun on the supposed invisible successes of the Iraq mission, and will treat claims of progress with skepticism.  With an additional 20,000 people in the field, the military may be torn between trying to keep morale up among soldiers whose tours are being extended, and not wanting to fuel the continued over-extension of US forces based on false hopes of potential victory.

One of two things will happen:  either the news out of Iraq will be so consistently and grindingly bad that the Administration's policy will fall apart.  Alternatively, there may be a battle of perceptions where some positive signs make it all but impossible to figure out the truth.

Iraq: A Progressive Plan B Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Congressional Democrats are enmeshed in a dilemma that became inevitable once they took over both chambers of Congress last November.  At the time, I made the point that Congressional authority over foreign policy is limited, and that by losing sight of this Democrats would risk assuming the blame for a disaster in Iraq that was not of their own making. 

The House has passed a non-binding resolution denouncing the surge.  In the Senate, Democrats fell just short of the 60 votes needed to bring that resolution to the floor.  The maneuvering won't stop there.   President Bush has shown no appetite for heeding the will of a weary and frustrated public that mostly wants out of Iraq.  Anti-war voters are understandably insistent that Congress go beyond hortatory measures and stop Bush from continuing to escalate.

Democrats face a genuinely tough challenge:  On the one hand, they won control of the Congress with a mandate to halt Bush's folly in Iraq and non-binding resolutions are, by definition, half-measures.  On the flip side, though, Democrats cannot afford to be accused of withholding support for the troops.  Moreover, restricting funds won't, in itself, put the war on a wiser course.  And it may give Bush the ability to argue that future failure in Iraq ought to be blamed on Congress not him.

According to this account, into this mix comes a crafty proposal by John Murtha.  Rather than holding back funds wholesale for the surge, he wants to attach requirements for high levels of readiness among additional troops to be deployed in Iraq, standards he believes the Administration cannot meet.  This will de facto slow the surge, while allowing Democrats to be on the side of protecting the troops from unfavorable battlefield conditions.

While this is clever, both political and policy considerations ought to temper enthusiasm.  First of all, the Politico website has already dubbed Murtha's proposal a "slow bleed" for the Iraq mission.  As long as the President refuses to moderate his ambitions, forcing him to pursue them on a strict diet of troops and resources may only starve existing troops in the field of much needed support and rest.  Leaving 130,000 troops exposed in Iraq as political support drains away in Washington is not an appealing prospect.  At the same time, though, the fact that the President will ignore repeated messages from the Congress and the public is anything but a reason to shut up.

Iraq: War, Occupation... or Hostage Crisis? Posted by Rosa Brooks

Most of us want to get US troops out of Iraq. Leave aside for now the numerous variants of withdrawal/ drawdown/ redeployment: bottom line for most progressives-- and most Americans-- that we want all or most US troops out, sooner rather than later.

But: can we actually get them out without US deaths on a so-far unseen scale? Or are our troops trapped there, for all intents and purposes?

Logistically, tactically, how do we actually get all or most of our 140,000+ troops out safely? Do they go out by land, via Kuwait or Turkey? Are the departing convoys vulnerable to IEDs or attacks? Do we fly them out? How? From where? I know we bring hundreds of troops in and out of Iraq every day, in relative safety, but when there is a massive increase in numbers, are troops on the move either too concentrated for safety, or too spread out for safety?

Or maybe it's no big deal to get the first 130,000 or so out.... but what about the last few thousand troops? How do they get out? And what about the civilians at our vast Baghdad embassy? Do they all stay? Most? Protected by whom?

Maybe this is not as much of an issue as I worry it might be. Maybe the main organized insurgent and militia players have no particular incentive to go after departing Americans once we make it clear we're really leaving. But maybe their desire to get us out quickly is overcome by their desire to teach us a final lesson.

I'd like to think that someone, somewhere, in the bowels of the Pentagon or the Green Zone, is sitting down with maps and plans and back-up plans, figuring out just how we safely extract so many people. But I worry that political pressures may make it hard for military planners to focus on this: it would be like admitting defeat, which is not something this Administration will contemplate.

Iraq offers so much bad news and so many possible bad endings... sorry to throw one more out for discussion. But if we're pushing for withdrawal, we need to be thinking about this issue too.

Not with a Surge, but a Dribble Posted by Rosa Brooks

I was before the surge before I was against it (though I was also against it even before I was for it). What I mean-- if that was not completely clear-- is that though I wasn't sold on the original rationale for war in Iraq, I did think that if we were going to send in the troops, we should send in a lot of them.

No one listened to me (true, I mostly said this to a bunch of random people standing in my kitchen, but no one listened to General Shinseki, either, and he said it at the Pentagon). So now, four years and thousands of deaths later, the Bush Administration has resisted calls for withdrawal or redeployment of US troops, and opted instead for a so-called "surge" of 20,000 or so additional troops, mainly into Baghdad.

Too little, too late, and seriously flawed, said practically everyone, including me. But you know.... if you're gonna surge, SURGE! Get those extra battalions in there, pronto!

It turns out, though, that the surge is really more of a dribble.  Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki admits that the Iraqi troops are a little late getting organized, and Maj. Gen. William Caldwell insists that on the US side, the surge will actually be more of "a gradual effort." 

So here we are, in the worst of all possible worlds: the violence in Iraq is surging, and we're... not surging, not withdrawing, not redeploying... just slowly placing more US troops in untenable positions, while Iraqi civilians continue to suffer.  Someday, the history books will have harsh words for the architects of this "plan," which is doing little good, and endangering many.

Speaking of the Administration's "surge" architects.... Since I'm quoting famous literary figures today, here's an excerpt from TS Lewis Eliot, "The Hollow Men" (1925):

We are the hollow men
We are the stuffed men
Leaning together
Headpiece filled with straw. Alas!

....Those who have crossed
With direct eyes, to death's other Kingdom
Remember us -- if at all -- not as lost
Violent souls, but only
As the hollow men
The stuffed men.

***

This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
Not with a bang but a whimper.

Correction: A commenter points out that I typed "TS Lewis" instead of TS Eliot." I have corrected that, above. Sorry.... too many dead brain cells cluttering up my mind.

Soft Bigotry of Low Expectations of al Maliki Posted by Suzanne Nossel

In the aftermath of the most deadly bomging since the US-led occupation of Iraq began, President Bush praises the Iraqi government for professing to care to keep its citizens alive (not, mind you, for doing anything to further that end).  He said:

"I appreciate the fact that the Iraqi government is anxious to get security inside the capital of the country . . That is a good sign. It is a good sign that there is a sense of concern and anxiety. It means that the government understands they have a responsibility to protect their people."

It is a "good sign" that Iraqi officials are distressed by mass carnage in broad daylight in the country's capital?  Talk about the soft bigotry of low expectations. 

Counterinsurgency warfare as military malpractice Posted by Rosa Brooks

Edward Luttwak of CSIS has a piece in this month's Harper's called "Counterinsurgency warfare as military malpractice." Luttwak begins with a critical analysis of the Army's new counterinsurgency field manual, FM 3-24 DRAFT, written by David Petraeus, among others, then moves on apply this to Iraq. He concludes that the new counterinsrgency manual's "prescriptions are in the end of little or no use and amount to a kind of malpractice. All its best methods, all its clever tactics, all the treasure and blood that the United States has been willing to expend, cannot overcome the crippling ambivalence of occupiers who refuse to govern, and their principles and inevitable refusal to out-terrorize the insurgents...."

Read it (it's not available online-- you'll have to buy the magazine! Sorry).

NIE and Delusion Posted by Michael Signer

Sorry I've been AWOL recently -- work has been a little crazy, to say the least.

It's worth reading Laura Rozen's quick hit on the newly-released National Intelligence Estimate:

My quick read sense: this does nothing to bolster the administration's case for surge, except to argue against the wisdom of a 'rapid' withdrawal. Otherwise, totally bleak. Offers very little support that this will succeed.

The WaPo describes the report:

The estimate, which represents the views of all elements of the intelligence community, presents a much grimmer picture of the situation in Iraq than the Bush administration has acknowledged in the past.

It is just amazing how many reports this Administration can produce that it won't listen to.  Kind of flips that old Fitzgerald saw about the definition of high intelligence as the ability to hold two competing ideas in your own head at the same time. 

Reflections on the Surge and the Future of Iraq (Part 3) Posted by Shadi Hamid

Lawrence Korb, in his recent TNR debate with Reuel Marc Gerecht get this right: “Our continued unconditional support of this government, not to mention sending additional troops, means endorsing Shia repression.”

The Sunni world has much to worry from the impending Shia domination of the Middle East. There must be a counterbalance. The problem, unfortunately, is that nearly every Sunni government in the Middle East is illegitimate (i.e. does not have the consent of its people) and therefore ineffective. Cowardly authoritarian regimes are not the best of allies in times like these. This fact, which few have acknowleged, does a lot to undermine realism's "attraction."   

However, Saudi Arabia, notwithstanding its status as a most despicable regime, has expressed willingness to contribute troops to Iraq. Turkey, one suspects, might also be willing to play a larger role, considering it has much at stake as an emerging regional power (and the ideal counterbalance to Iran). Beyond this, we can’t really ask either Egypt or Jordan to contribute anything to the war effort, because, again, they can’t afford to anger their people any further (again, this is what happens when we prop up paper-thin governments which would likely fall if it wasn’t for US support. They simply can’t be counted upon). With that said, I want to tie in the points above with those I made in "part 2" - if I was in any position to suggest an “alternative” approach for Iraq, then these would be my (very) rough suggestions:

1. Begin a gradual troop reduction, to demonstrate to Maliki that we're serious about holding him to certain standards.
2. Maintain indefinitely a significant number of troops on the ground (i.e. a “rapid-reaction force”) to protect against ethnic cleansing of the Sunni minority. The US cannot tolerate a repeat of Rwanda on its watch. 
3. Encourage Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other Sunni Muslim countries to play a more constructive role in Iraq. If our autocratic friends are unwilling to play such roles, then we should consider using our leverage to convince them otherwise (yes, I know that sounds a bit “realist,” but if we’re going to support crappy dictatorships, we might as well get something out of it).
4. Work out a deal with Iran where we give them “something,” if they agree to: a) play a more active role in restraining the Sadrist Mahdi Army and other Shia militias; and b) pressure Maliki's government to pursue a bold, far-reaching reconciliation program, reaching out to moderate Sunni groups.

Reflections on the Surge and the Future of Iraq (Part 2) Posted by Shadi Hamid

The surge, like almost everything else the Bush administration comes up with, fails to address in any serious way what seems to me the fundamental problem – the utter incompetence and intransigence of the Maliki government, a government which turns a blind eye to terrorizing and murdering its opponents and a government which shows little to no interest in reaching out to Sunnis, moderate or otherwise. Maliki is an unfortunate creature, as he – by his very existence – presents the most compelling argument against electoral democracy. Of course, I imagine Spencer Ackerman will jump up and down upon hearing this, and say I told you so. Not quite. If the Iraqi people elected Maliki (and I guess you could argue whether they really did), then they have to live with that stupid decision (sort of like how we voted for Bush not once but twice). Democracy, at its essence, is the right to do the wrong thing – and taking responsibility for it afterwards.

Peter Beinart makes the most compelling argument yet that Maliki’s government is not worth defending and we – and not to mention Iraq’s Sunnis – would all be better off if Maliki wasn't longer Prime Minister. He has failed to live up to any of his empty assurances that he would, in fact, be a national leader. He is not. He is a hard-line Shia partisan who protects thugs and murderers (i.e. the Sadrists and their Mahdi Army) who operate with impunity as coalition partners in his government. Perhaps even worse, the Iraqi government has actively undermined the U.S. mission, in effect empowering Sunni insurgents in the process. Fareed Zakaria noted that in Tall Afar

The Third Armored Cavalry Regiment had repelled [the insurgents], secured the streets and won over the local population. But the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad had since ignored all appeals for money for reconstruction (the "build" phase), which has meant few new jobs. Many Sunni areas complain of similar treatment from Baghdad. Tall Afar is now sliding back into instability. Thus a smart American strategy falls prey to the political realities in Iraq.

Back to the original point, though – the fundamental question isn’t so much whether the surge will “control the violence,” (I am not sure what that even means), but, rather, if it will resolve the “Maliki problem.” Kagan and Kristol, for their part, argue that the surge will actually make political compromise between Shias and Sunnis more likely:

Democratic claims that Iraqis must immediately find a political solution to their political problems are laughable in the face of the violence in Baghdad. Abandoning American efforts to control the violence in Iraq would lead to an increase in violence. This would in turn reduce the odds of peaceful and constructive political discourse, and would further undermine any spirit of compromise between the competing Iraqi factions.

In Memorium Posted by Zvika Krieger

I hardly blinked an eye last week when I read the news that an American civilian working for the National Democratic Institute was killed in Iraq by Sunni insurgents. I didn't even bother to read her name.

Today I realized for the first time that the woman was Andrea "Andi" Parhamovich, who was about to get engaged to my friend and Newsweek colleague Mike Hastings (who is Newsweek's deputy bureau chief in Baghdad). I am still in utter shock, so apologize for the relative incoherence of this posting, but I feel the need to do my part to remember this remarkable woman. And perhaps more importantly, I think it is of vital importance to be constantly reminded of the human toll that this war is taking and not let the endless list of names make us numb to that fact. I make this point apart from any sort of cheap partisan shots against the war. Perhaps this will give some urgency and immediacy to the discussions on this blog to find a way to end the bloodshed in Iraq.

So what can we do about Iraq? Posted by Rosa Brooks

Suzanne's right. Sniping at the Bush Administration is a lot of fun, but progressives need to go beyond critique and offer alternatives-- and resist the temptation to make "let's just wash our hands of the whole thing" be what passes for an "alternative." I don't want to pick on Senator Barack Obama, but I was dismayed by his crack (in response to the President's "surge" speech last week), that "We're not going to baby-sit a civil war."  However intended-- and, in fairness, Obama's views on Iraq are much more complex than that-- it plays to the "let's wash our hands" crowd.

We do have a responsibility to Iraq, and we do have broader responsibilities in the region. The question is: what can we now do that doesn't make things worse? Is there a constructive role for our troops in Iraq to play? If so, what exactly is it? And if not-- or if their role will have to be limited-- what are our other options? If we can't do much good directly, can we still use our military, our money, and/or our diplomacy to encourage other actors to do something directly?

A few weeks ago, I outlined some suggestions, arguing that keeping combat troops deployed as they currently are is only making things worse. instead, I suggested:

In the shorter term (the next six months to a year), redeploying some U.S. troops to secure Iraq's borders might diminish the likelihood that Iraq's civil war will morph into a full-scale proxy war among regional powers.

Military and regional experts, does this make sense? If we're worried about the flow of foreign weapons and personnel into Iraq, can't we play a more helpful role along Iraq's borders-- also, perhaps, ensuring safe passage out for refugees?

I also argued:

Similarly, U.S. military advisors should continue to provide training to the Iraqi army and police in the shorter term, but such programs need to be constantly reassessed to make sure that the Iraqis we're working with don't simply become U.S.-trained members of ethnic death squads.

At this point, this strikes me as the most frightening aspect of the Bush "surge" plan. I'm told that the police and security forces are largely controlled by SCIRI, and many fear that stepped-up US cooperation with Iraqi forces in Baghdad may add up to tacit US support for the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad's Sunni neighborhoods. When I say that, I don't mean to suggest that all or even most Iraqi police and soldiers in Baghdad will try to push Sunni out-- it may be enough that Sunnis will fear that they'll be pushed out, and they'll decide to leave on their own instead of sticking around to see if things get as bad as they might. In the end, the effect would be the same: fewer and fewer Sunnis in Baghdad, squeezed into ever small and more homogeneous neighborhoods. This could well  lead to a "quieter" or "more secure" Baghdad, but the human price would be horrendous.

I'm also an enthusiastic backer of CAP's call for an international peace conference (a la Dayton), for direct negotiations with Syria and Iran, for a genuine commitment to funding Iraqi reconstruction (Bush's promised $1 billion is peanuts), and for meaningful assistance to Iraqi refugees (which starts with US acknowledgment of the scope of the refugee crisis).

No panaceas here... but some good places to start?

Reflections on the Surge and the Future of Iraq (Part 1) Posted by Shadi Hamid

Some people have asked me how I’ve managed to avoid saying anything about the “surge” up until now. It may be because I have entirely mixed feelings about the matter. The surge is, first and foremost, a pretty good example of “too little, too late.” So I would say that I’m technically against it. However, I fully realize that being against the surge does not constitute a policy, nor does it necessarily answer the question being asked. Jonah Goldberg (and many others) want “us” to take sides and declare our intentions. Easier said than done. The problem is that I’m personally invested in a cause which continues to die a slow, dispiriting death. As I’ve said before, I was beginning, in the early months of 2005, to revise my original opposition to the war, because for me it was no longer a question of whether the war was legal, just, or necessary. The war happened and to be against something that had already happened no longer seemed a logically consistent position, or even if it was, it failed to take into account what to me was always the larger issue – the welfare of millions of Iraqis, whose lives, hopes, and futures hung in the balance.

To state the obvious, I am an "idealist," meaning that while I do fully realize that the awful reality of the Iraq situation, I am hesitant to defer to that reality, for that is exactly what we have done for the last five decades in the Middle East, and at great consequence. I am particularly worried that if we leave Iraq, then there will be nothing left holding the Maliki-Sadr coalition from engaging in a campaign of massive ethnic cleansing of the Sunni population. While some seem to think that the situation in Iraq can’t get any worse, I suspect it can, and, if we don’t take some kind of decisive action, will. The Arab world has a way of defying expectations. At the end of the day, the American presence – and the intermittent American and international pressure to disband the Sadrist killing squads – provide a much-needed check against the excesses of the Iraqi government. It is not nearly enough. But it is something. It is abundantly clear that many in the ruling coalition have a thirst for revenge. The fiasco that was Saddam’s execution (or, in Hitchens’s estimation “officiated sacrifice”) is a sign of the “new” Iraq that will come to be if we immediately withdraw. 

I am also worried that we have learned precisely the wrong lessons from history. James Baker continues to think that the first Bush administration was right in not taking the fight all the way to Baghdad and deposing Saddam during the first Gulf War. He believes that the events of the last five years have vindicated his position. He is perhaps at a loss to realize that we would have never gone to war in 2003 had the “job” been finished when we had the chance to finish it (and when it would have been much, much easier). But we left prematurely then, because we were afraid of all the things that Western democracies are, understandably, afraid of – dying soldiers and the turning tide of public opinion. It should strike no one as ironic that 15 years later, we have paid a greater cost (upwards of 3000 lives) than we would have paid had we gone in then. The sins of the past, invariably, come to haunt us. It is not a matter of if, but when. So if we refuse to do what is necessary now (whatever that might be), I worry that the costs of that decision will only become apparent many years from now. But for people like Baker, hindsight is not 20/20. As the years have passed, his and others’ judgment has become imperceptibly cloudy. Baker, in his own words:

Thank You, Henry Kissinger Posted by Rosa Brooks

Never thought I would write that. But this morning, for once, I read something by Henry Kissinger with which I wholeheartedly agree (along with about twenty things with which I wholeheartedly disagree). In a lengthy column on Iraq, Kissenger tosses off plenty of tendentious, wrong-headed rhetoric-- but he also concludes that for any viable way forward in Iraq, 

  Two levels of diplomatic effort are necessary:

(1) The creation of a contact group, assembling neighboring countries whose interests are directly affected and which rely on American support. This group should include Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. Its function should be to advise on ending the internal conflict and to create a united front against outside domination.

(2) Parallel negotiations should be conducted with Syria and Iran, which now appear as adversaries, to give them an opportunity to participate in a peaceful regional order. Both categories of consultations should lead to an international conference including all countries that will have to play a stabilizing role in the eventual outcome, specifically the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council as well as such countries as Indonesia, India and Pakistan.

When progressives suggestions direct negotiations with Syria and Iran, commentators on the right tend to sneeringly suggest that we imagine all will be well if only everyone gets together and sings Kumbayah. Will they now say that Kissinger's gone soft? Perhaps-- but I doubt it. Of the various criticisms one might make of Kissinger, "gone soft" isn't one of them. But maybe-- unlikely, but maybe-- Kissinger's suggestion that we might try diplomacy as well as force will give pause even to Bush Administration true believers.

Redefining Success in Iraq Posted by Suzanne Nossel

While the crux of Bush's argument for increasing US troops in Iraq is utterly unconvincing, he's made at least one point that is valid:  those who oppose his plan ought to offer something in its stead.  As he put it: "To oppose everything while proposing nothing is irresponsible." 

Progressives have for years now offered recommendations for how Iraq could have been better handled at every turn; much of the advice  was on-target and could have helped avert the current crisis.  But voters are concerned with what their leaders are prepared to do in the here and now to address policy problems, not what they woulda, shoulda, coulda done in the past.

Counter-proposals need to go beyond simply rejecting an escalation in the number of US troops in Iraq.  If we're convinced that 17,000 extra troops won't be enough to calm Baghdad, it goes without saying that sustaining current troop levels and strategies is a recipe for continued disaster.

But before alternatives can be proffered, we need first to understand what we're trying to achieve at this late date:  with even Bush having finally stopped speaking of "victory" what does success - or even avoidance of total failure - entail?  Putting aside why we entered Iraq and what we might have achieved there, what goals are still realistic and worth striving for now.  I offer a few for your consideration:

- Preventing Iraq from becoming an unfettered breeding ground for al Qaeda and like groups (to his credit, Bush did propose allocating a portion of the increased troops he's proposing toward this end in Anbar province)

- Preventing Iraq from becoming an enemy of the US - Given the state of our relations with Iraq and Syria, we can ill-afford an out-and-out hostile regime and population in Iraq.  This has implications for how we conceive an exit, and how we interpret our moral obligations to the Iraqi people.

- Minimizing American and Iraqi loss of life - Having the political staying power to work toward any other goals in the region will depend on mitigating the ongoing loss of life that has turned the US public so sour on the war.  Rising Iraqi casualties are also likely to impede other policy objectives, such as retaining amicable relations with Iraq and fending off al Qaeda.

- Containing the geographic radius of the conflict - Though you'd never know it from the headlines, most of Iraq remains peaceful.  Keeping it that way, and confining the conflict to Baghdad, should make it easier to reach a military and political resolution.

- Salvaging American credibility in the region - This is a tough one.  While the Administration maintains that any US pullback will spell victory for al Qaeda and its kin, having the US bogged down with heavy troop commitments and scant signs of progress plays right into the hands of Iran.  For others to realize that we're prepared to dig in to the point of self-destruction in Iraq may come off not as determination, but rather foolhardiness.  As I've said before, by remaining in Iraq (and still more so by escalating) we run the risk that when we do depart, our exit is hastened by events outside our control, such as a Beirut style barracks bombing and mass US casualties.   While the Administration argues that any leave-taking will only embolden the US's enemies, the problem will be far worse if we face a tail-between-our-legs, Saigon embassy rooftop style evacuation.  Facing up to a tough situation, articulating a redefined notion of success, and then pursuing it doggedly may be our best bet to restore damaged US bona fides in the Mideast.

- Preventing hostile regimes from using the Iraq conflict to their advantage - While everyone agrees on this, there are fundamental rifts about how to do it:  Bush is using a tough line, others like Flynt Leverett believe a much more conciliatory approach toward Tehran would do the trick and even enlist the Iranians in helping us in Iraq.  My own view is that these are unpredictable regimes, and that an opening for talks with neither preconditions nor high expectations probably makes the most sense.

Corruption, Iraq and Motes in Our Eyes Posted by Heather Hurlburt

An Army captain who sounds dedicated, sincere and thoughtful has been making the rounds with his argument, in a New York Times op-ed and on NPR, that the corruption of Iraqis is a major obstacle to success in Iraq.

This strikes me as one of those observations that is quite true yet wrong-headed, for a number of reasons:

1) as offensive as it is, costing Iraq $5-7 billion a year according to an Iraqi official quoted in the Iraqi Study Group report, corruption among Iraqis is a secondary, not a root, cause of the violence and disintegration plaguing the place.

2)  Less corruption would make the task of reconstruction and peace-building easier but not remove anyone's fundamental grievances; therefore it should come in priority after interventions that might resolve fundamental problems.

3)  Then there's the problem of howling about Iraqi corruption when the Coalition Provisional Authority has "insufficient accounting" for $8.8 billion of Iraq's oil money.  And, in case you've forgotten, corruption cases involving US contractors continnue to languish under-prosecuted.  Two allegations -- $50 million involving firm Custer Battles and Halliburton subsidiary KBR's $108 million overcharge for fuel -- are equivalent to a year and a half's worth of Iraqi oil smuggling.

So I'm sure Captain Montalvan is sincere himself; but isn't there a risk that this lets us shift blame to Iraqis for things they do instead of honing in on things we've done wrong -- and could undo or at least demand accountability for?  It's tempting to think that maybe Iraqis are "hopelessly corrupt" and t hat's why our efforts may fail.  But, as we used to say on the playground, if they are, what are we?

3) 

John Burns, Say it Isn't So Posted by Shadi Hamid

Look, I'm sure that "veteran Middle East correspondent for the New York Times" John Burns is a great guy. He did, after all, win a 1993 Pulitzer for "his courageous and thorough coverage of the destruction of Sarajevo and the barbarous killings in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina." Burns has been based in Baghdad for the last couple years. So this juicy tidbit about Burns not knowing the most basic thing about Islam is unbelievable and dispiriting for all those who would like to think that we will ever understand the Muslim world. From the Angry Arab:

An American correspondent in the Middle East sent me this: "Today the Iraqi government held a one time screening of the most recent execution video of barzan ibrahim and awad hamed al bandar, with no cameras allowed. Bandar was very scared and crying. He was saying the shahada. Journalists asked if Bandar said the shahada. New york times bureau chief and veteran middle east correspondent John Burns asked Basem Ridha, Nouri al Maliki's spokesman what the shahada was. Basem said that it was the Islamic creed. 'whats that?' asked John Burns. Journalists explained that it was 'There is no God but Allah and Mohammed is his messenger.'"

If this is true, then it really is pathetic. John Burns, say it isn't so?

Prediction Posted by Michael Signer

So I'm going to go on the record and predict the President will lose the fight for this new policy in Iraq.  I think constitutionally he might well argue that even if Congress de-funds the escalation in the supplemental appropriation, he could take steps to fulfill what he sees as his role as commander-in-chief.  But that's beside the point.  I think he's going to lose, for two critical reasons: 

How Exactly? Posted by David Shorr

So I'm sitting here, trying to grant every benefit of the doubt I can. What is our best shot here? What can we still hope to salvage from this debacle? Is our ability to do good in Iraq, to do right by Iraqis, completely exhausted?

As with much of foreign policy, the debate isn't about the ends we pursue, but how we pursue them. The vision of Iraqis (and everyone else for that matter) freed from repression and violence and pursuing their happiness is shared across the widest political spectrum. The proposition (thanks Bruce) is that a boost in the forces deployed in Baghdad will secure the streets of the capital so that ordinary peace-loving citizens create the social space and the political demand for Sunni-Shia coexistence and an end to the fighting.

That sounds nice.

10 Fallacies of Bush's New Strategy Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Here are 10 fallacies I heard from the White House library tonight:

1.  That the strategy is "new" - Bush referred directly to the "clear, hold and build" strategy promulgated in October 1995.   At best, this is a course-correction which has unaccountably taken more than 15 months to be put into effect.

2.   That the strategy is any more likely to work now than in the past - Bush made two arguments as to why what failed previously will succeed now: 1) that troop levels will now be sufficient and 2) that crippling restrictions on troop movements and maneuvers will be lifted.  But rather than citing evidence for either of these, Bush made only a stilted reference to military commanders having certified to their truth.  This less than a week after replacing the leaders who refused to attest to same.

3.  That the strategy is "Iraqi" in impetus or direction - While Bush clearly wants to claim that the escalation of US troops will happen in support of a renewed Iraqi effort to secure itself, this is bunk.   Bush is under desperate pressure to do something - anything - about Iraq.  This plan is as made-in-Washington as they come, right down to the predicate laid to avoid blame for the White House.  Bush is setting himself up to be able to claim that the al-Maliki government failed to come through in the crunch, even though such failure is painfully, unavoidably foreseeable from the outset.

4.  That 20,000 troops will somehow change the game - The worst part of Bush's plan is that an additional 20,000 US soldiers will risk life and limb in furtherance of a "strategy" that is doomed to fail.  Baghdad is a city of roughly 5 million people.  The 20,000 figure is driven not by any assessment of what it would take to do the job, but by tight recruitment constraints and a straightforward political calculus of what the American public might ht possibly bear.

5.  That the Iraqi government enjoys sufficient legitimacy and impartiality to curb sectarian violence - Central to Bush's plan is the ability of the Iraqi government to credibly assert itself against the militias.  But the Iraqi armed services are themselves riddled with partisan militants.  It is a Shia army with close links to the radical Sadr militia - the idea of their going "door to door" in Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad can only strike fear among residents.

6.  That the al-Maliki government is a reliable US ally - While Bush has repeatedly affirmed his faith in AL-Milk, his advisers have grave doubts about the trustworthiness of the Prime Minister.  Milk's links to Sadr, his mishandling of Saddam's execution, his failure to take control of errant ministries, his impetuous decisions affecting US military operations emblems the difficulties of forging the sort of partnership that Bush seems to be banking on.

7.  That the Iraqi military has the competence to take the lead in securing Baghdad - For anyone who somehow harbors notions about the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, a quick read of the Iraq Study Group Report will dispel such notions in devastating terms.  Army units are described as lacking personnel, equipment and leadership and as resistant to carrying out orders.  The Iraqi police are described as "substantially worse."

8.  That the terrorists and insurgents are wholly separable from the Iraqi population at large - The strategy refers repeatedly to clearing neighborhoods of insurgents.  But what allows radical militias to survive is the support and protection they receive from ordinary citizens who are sympathetic to their aims.  Until such backers buy into a political resolution of Iraq's strife, they will continue to support and breed the insurgency, making it impossible for US or Iraqi troops to root out.

9.  That the US is in a position to "provide" a political alternative to the Middle East - It's astounding and distressing to hear Bush continue to talk in terms of the US "advancing liberty" in the Middle East through means like the Iraq war.  While Bush references standing with regional actors pressing for their own freedoms, he stops well short of acknowledging the kind of broad shift of ambitions and tactics needed to guide a new US Middle East policy.

10. That disaster is still avoidable - Bush cited a series of reasons why failure in Iraq would be a disaster: because Islamic extremists would grow in strength; because Iran would be emboldened to pursue nukes; because Iraq could become a terrorist haven.  But all those developments are underway right now.

And a Guest-Blog on the Speech Posted by Michael Signer

And these concluding thoughts contributed by an anonymous friend of mine with military experience in Iraq:

"The President's plan is contingent on Iraq Security Forces (ISF) stepping up to the plate within a year to take over from US forces.  The ISF have proven they are incapable of this.

"In order for Counterinsurgency to work, you need overwhelming force to provide static security to the local population... 16 thousand more troops in a city of 6.5 million is FAR from overwhelming force.  It is a pittance.  Once you have that security, 80% of successful counterinsurgency is non-military tools such as economic and political development within the cocoon.  Those create the indigenous institutions required to sustain the peace and stability by itself once the external forces have left.  But that process can't begin until  the initial security is provided. 

"We need 100s of 1000s more troops, not 20,000 more... and we need them for a five year comitment if this is going to be a successful project.  If as the president said, this is the singular ideological struggle of our time, how come we have not mobilized EVERY last resource of our country to win it?  If we are in the game, we must play entirely to win.  If we are not in the game to win, we should get the hell out of the game!"

Did He Meet the Gerson Test? Posted by Heather Hurlburt

I think he fails one of Gerson's tests utterly -- explaining what leverage we have and why this will work this time. 

And as for my own criteria, he met more than I expected with the de-Baathification commitment.  But we didn't hear benchmarks for success, an honest explanation of numbers, or a commitment of real prestige to get economic assistance dollars and use them wisely.  Those all seem like critical elements to me to make this work if it had any faint chance of working.

Haven't seen or heard any Republican or Democrat saying more than "I hope I'm wrong" (Gordon Smith) in response.

Liveblogging iv: the final windup Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Purely from a speech construction point of view, you don't want to stick the stuff about our great armed forces and their bravery and suffering at the end.  Having it there next to the "bipartisan working group" and the reference to Joe Lieberman smacks of cynicism somehow.

Now I'm trying to listen to two commentators at once...

Live-Blog IV Posted by Michael Signer

I like the end, about the actual soldiers serving the calling of freedom.  This doesn't sound like President Bush -- it sounds too humble and too focused on actual people suffering the actual consequences of policy.

And this is chilling to me -- "the year ahead" -- he's repeated that a couple of times.  This is a policy for an entire year?  Why?  What's the year for?  How do we get to that time?  And does that kick it farther down to his last year?  And to the next President?

I found it, in sum, halting and hedged, unconfident and contingent, and humble, but not in a great way...

Regional Solutions: Liveblogging iii Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Well, I'm glad we have this regional section of the speech, but I agree with Mike Signer that it is four years too late.  And the tone of lecturing the region that it needs to understand its own interests seems unlikely to succeed.

Now we're trying again to reclaim the democracy-building, freedom-spreading tone.  Sigh.

Overall, I have to say that this speech was oddly insular -- some parts of it would be confusing for a lay person to follow I think.  The laying out the argument section was followed by a short rhetorical section on "freedom in the greater Middle East," followed by another defensive "we can't up and leave" section.

Did he just say that??? "There will be no surrender ceremony on the deck of a battleship?"  Does no one in the White House remember that this president held his own "victory" celebration on the deck of a navy ship?

Live-Blog III Posted by Michael Signer

Heather, I think maybe the books are there to make him look studious?  Historic?  Nay, statesmanlike?

Aha, there's the emphasis on diplomacy -- "we will use America's full diplomatic resources" with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Gulf States... Ok, putting schadenfreude aside, how exactly will this happen with this Administration?  Now this is sounding just casually serial, like a State of the Union speech where the President starts listing off this and that in a focus group way.  Not getting a broad theme or effort here.

Interesting that he would say "on the one side are those who believe in freedom and moderation."  That's almost funny.

It really is amazing, stepping back from all of this, that we're sending another 20,000 troops just to focus on a capital city, in a country that's going to hell, in numbers that will be inadequate and will only secure a few dozen square miles in a huge city.

This is the only eloquent part of the speech -- the young democracy that's "fighting for its life."  And then this part -- that the terrorists are "without conscience."  But he doesn't seem to understand that they're fighting eachother as often as they're fighting us.

And this is precious -- I can't believe he said "there will be no surrender party on the deck of a battleship."  I just can't believe it.  Is it such cunning, subtle wit that he's parrying with himself about Mission Accomplished?  It is arrogance, a Big Joke like a Big Lie?  Or is it just a slip-up, an irony in a sea of portentousness?  Whatever it is, I'm not sure whether that thing on my face is a wince or a grimace, but it doesn't feel good.

"Mass killings on an unimaginable scale" -- talk about ahistorical fearmongering.  Are you kidding me?  It's awful, but it's not World War II.  And by making it into an absolute Worst Thing Ever, he attempts to trump, to make opposition to his policy a violation of a principle, or of faith itself.

Live-Blogging the Speech II Posted by Michael Signer

OK, now I'm getting more worried -- the "vast majority" of the 5 brigades will be deployed to Baghdad.  What if the major focus of the insurgents is no longer Baghdad?  What if they're smart, tough, and resourceful, and start attacking from the suburbs?  Or move to other cities? 

As a Marine friend told me, we are, with this increase, going to have one soldier for every 185 Baghdad residents; in Bosnia (where they weren't shooting at us), we had one for every 75 residents!  How is that going to be enough?

It's also striking just how much the President is relying on al-Maliki -- how much he's bringing him up, how much he's focusing on his representations about what the Iraqi government will do.  This must be the one instance in the world where the Administration fully trusts another President and is willing to defer to them -- in the instance where the state is weakest!  Why is Bush trusting al-Maliki so much?

I hate to fret, but I really am worried that our soldiers in Baghdad are going to be potted plants.  This is asymmetrical warfare, and if the insurgents ambush 5 Marines on Monday going door-to-door, and then do is again on Wednesday, then they start to win. 

There he goes again -- the Iraqi government is going to spend "10 million dollars of its own money" on jobs... I just don't get where he derives such total faith in the actions of such a weak government.

I do know from reading the speech beforehand that he actually talks about the ISG's recommendations -- for almost the first time -- and he actually embraces regional diplomacy!  Amazing!  Only four years late!

Live-Blogging the Iraq Speech Posted by Michael Signer

The President just started speaking, and I just skimmed the speech on a friend's Blackberry.  I was surprised at how defensive and hedged it seemed -- how responsive, rather than authoritative.  But then, as someone told me, it will depend on delivery.  Will he exude some gravitas?  Or will he seem small, in that particular way he has, when he tries to seem statesmanlike?

"The responsiblity rests with me" -- wow, that was unusual.  He actually said the line with some direct humility.  Good -- points for him.  Only 6 years too late.

"Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States."  This sounds good, but what does "failure" mean???  Is failure leaving?  He's listing, serially, a whole bunch of bad things, such as emboldening Iran to seek nuclear weapons.  But wouldn't redeploying and looking stronger, and marshalling our resources against Iran have the opposite effect of emboldening them?

And now he says that the generals support him -- which is, from the WaPo this morning, not true... you can't make this reality up.

More to come...