Talking Points from the Armageddon Lobby Posted by Lorelei Kelly

Not too long ago, I did a live radio show and one of the callers told me I sounded like a socialist. Hmmmmm. I thought. Silly man! don't you know that only the private sector enjoys the benefits of socialism in this country? Take last week's conservative onslaught about the "guv-mint wanting to take over your health care" In other words, taxpayer subsidized health care corporations don't want the government to negotiate lower prices on prescription drugs. Or the glorious bounty of public financing going to the school testing industry? (No Child Left Behind is a social engineering endeavor that even Lenin couldn't have dreamed up. Rise Up! And Obey! ) But the most insidious one of all is the subsidization of companies making billions off of our legitimate fear. That would be those members of the defense industry who cling to the Cold War like barnacles on a Trident sub. And they get a boost from conservative activists who are trying to send us back to the bad old days of nuclear inspired nightmares.

The Armageddon Lobby has even sent out talking points. A friend who works on the Hill sent me this example:

"I support new and improved nuclear warheads for the U.S. I also support creating smaller warheads.

North Korea: Sharing the Credit Posted by Heather Hurlburt

While others blog about the within-the-Administration deck chair movements that made this week's North Korea deal possible (here, here, here for starters), I'll suggest three less-sung heroes:

1.  The Chinese decided it was time for the North to get in line, after the embarrassment of the missile test, and are demonstrating -- with their stop-the-clock diplomacy when things got stuck-- that they can deliver.  This seems like good news for the future of the agreement -- China's prestige will be invested in it -- and for demonstrating, if that were needed, that while China is frustrating and, to put it mildly, problematic on some issues (Darfur, human rights, exchange rate) working with China on other issues of mutual concern is required, not optional.

2.  The US Foreign Service.  After a week of complaints about State's inability to come up with officers for tough/dangerous/hopeless posts in Iraq, here's a reminder in the person of Assistant Secretary for Asia Chris Hill that there is just no substitute for someone who has spent his whole professional life furthering US interests in the most challenging places and against the most challenging backdrops back in Washington.  Hill, who also happens to be a genuinely nice guy, won accolades for his performance in the Balkans a decade ago before being rewarded (?) with his Asian portfolios.  I assume he's already won every award the State Dep't has, but hey, triplicate never hurts.  (And while I'm on this subject, may I just mention how delightful it was to see career FSO and consummate professional Alejandro (Alex) Wolff, our acting rep at the UN in NY, make this comment on UN reform last week:

You’ll have a lot of different views on the details, whether this is the best one or a different approach might be better,” he said, “but you have 192 members and consensus is not easy to get, so support for the secretary general is the principle that we stand by."

Imagine what we'd have achieved in the 2005 anniversary summit with that approach.  But I digress.)

3.  The American people.  The Administration concluded, correctly, that the American people voted in November not just on Iraq but on the general proposition that we can't militarily pre-empt all our challenges all the time.  A month after the election, 82% of Americans said that we should talk to countries we disapprove of, not just threaten them; going further, seven of ten said we should sign an agreement not to attack North Korea and six of ten said we should agree to increase food aid in exchange for the North's commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons program.  Nice work, my fellow Americans.

None of that means that this deal is perfect or that the North Koreans won't try to bust it sometime in the future.  But even if it performs only half as well as the Clinton Administration agreement that lasted a decade, that five years is enough time to wind up the distracting disaster of Iraq, move to reinvigorate the global non-proliferation regime, and regain our good name as a champion of non-proliferation.

I also find myself very tempted to turn the this-deal-is-a-bad-signal-to-Teheran argument on its head:  sure, it's a signal to Teheran.  The international community stood with us and we got what we wanted, with intrusive international inspections.  Get ready to give us the non-proliferation guarantees and inspections we need to see, with the ability to know if you're not playing fair, and we're ready to give you a deal too.

Negotiations, after all, like conflict, have a certain logic that breeds more negotiations -- if they're allowed to.

When is a threat deferred a threat deterred? Posted by Suzanne Nossel

There is debate underway among proliferation experts about whether a country like Iran, assuming it gained nuclear capabilities, would be subject to the traditional logic of deterrence credited with helping avert a nuclear catastrophe over the last 50 years among the existing "club" of nuclear states.

The same question underlay the debate over whether to go to war with Iraq:  if those who were convinced that Saddam had (or was close to having) nukes were also confident that he'd never use them for fear of annihilation, the rationale for war - even assuming his nuclear program had been real and not imaginary - would have been much weaker.

This reminds me of a remark by Madeleine Albright shortly after leaving office as Secretary of State.  She was asked about Iraq and, to paraphrase, said:  "we were handed the problem by our predecessors and . . .  we've now handed it back to them."  It was a witty line, but at the time Bush's rhetoric about the folly of standing back while threats gathered still seemed plausible.   

In retrospect, though, the Clinton Administration's policy of containing the threat and preventing it from getting worse looks a whole lot better than the alternative of confrontation turned out to be.   With the perils of preemption exposed, it seems worth asking whether there are circumstances when deferring a threat - preventing it from ripening and stopping it from getting worse, but not confronting or eliminating it - may be an acceptable outcome.   

EU Gives the Run Around on Iran Posted by Suzanne Nossel

The NYT reports today that the Bush Administration is having a tough time winning European cooperation on tough economic sanctions for Iran.  The continent's excuses are two-fold: 1) they have vast commercial interests tied up with Tehran and 2) they lack the legal regimes and infrastructure necessary to implement the sorts of controls that the US Treasury Department is seeking.

Let's assume, as we are forced to in relation to all of the many foreign policy developments that do not break Washington's way of late, that part of their reluctance to cooperate is rooted in frustration and disgust with the Administration.  Let's venture that they don't trust the intelligence on the precise state of the Iranian nuclear program, that they fear that the US will make critical policy decisions without consulting them, and that they worry we will play into the hands of Ahmadinejad through ham-handed moves that make him look like a besieged innocent. 

Even given all that, they ought to promptly and fully cooperate with an effort to beef up sanctions.  Why?

- First off, nothing will embolden the Tehran regime more than a rift between the US and EU over how to react to its nuclear program.  With both Russia and China reluctant to clamp down on Iran, and the US bogged down in Iraq, transatlantic resolve is the only foundation for an international response.  If it fragments, Iran will think it has little to fear, and Israel may see no alternative but to act alone.

- There are initial signs that the tepid UN sanctions enacted on Iran thus far are having some effects - harming the country's economy and, more importantly, stimulating political dissent

- The logistical hurdles the Europeans cite seem surmountable - EU governments provided $18B in loan guarantees for transactions with Iran in 2005 even though many of the companies dealt with are known terrorist fronts.  Since the governments control these funds and guarantees, how hard can it be to cut them off?

- The commercial interests involved are another matter, but not an insurmountable hurdle.  If there's a war over Iran or Israel launches a preemptive attack, those interests will be jeopardized anyway.  Also, starting a program of distentangling those interests now will be less commercially disruptive than shutting them off suddenly and completely after, for example, an Iranian nuclear test.

- But the most important reason for the Europeans to get serious about sanctions is that they represent one among a precious handful of options for dealing with Iran's nuclear ambitions without military force.  Asset freezes and tightened export controls may well not accomplish much, but if they did tip Iran's precarious balance of power it could avert a frightening global crisis now in the works.

Assessing UN Action on Iran and North Korea Posted by Jordan Tama

2006 was a bad year for American foreign policy, marked by our inability to stop the escalating civil war in Iraq, worsening violence in Darfur, and the continued decline of our international reputation. But we also had a couple of important diplomatic achievements that haven't got as much attention as they deserve: the passage by the UN Security Council of targeted sanctions against North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs.

After North Korea's nuclear test in October, the Security Council voted unanimously for sanctions that ban the transfer of nuclear materials to North Korea, bar international travel by officials associated with North Korea's weapons programs, and freeze the overseas assets of those officials. The resolution also authorizes countries to inspect cargo going in and out of North Korea to detect illegal weapons. Eight days ago, the Security Council unanimously approved a less stringent sanctions package on Iran, including a ban on the import and export of nuclear materials and a freeze on the assets of some Iranian individuals and companies.

In both cases, the U.S. had pushed for tougher sanctions, while Russia and China had sought weaker ones. The results were painstakingly negotiated compromises that satisfied no one but represented significant diplomatic achievements considering the wide divergence of views among Security Council members. The sanctions won't stop North Korea and Iran from moving forward with their nuclear programs, but they will slow them down by making it harder for them to acquire needed materials and complicating the work of officials involved in nuclear efforts.

The bigger benefits might be political. In Iran, the sanctions already have contributed to growing discontent with President Ahmadinejad, as some Iranians blame him for unnecessarily isolating their country (though most Iranians support Iran's nuclear program). In East Asia, the sanctions have shown North Korea that its most important patron, China, is willing to cooperate with North Korea's enemies to punish it for recalcitrant behavior.

Where are we on North Korea Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Reading the reports on the UN sanctions resolution, the status of the US's effort to punish and isolate Pyongyang in the aftermath of what's now been confirmed to be an (albeit small scale) nuclear test is murky at best.   Here are some quick observations:

- The Administration is talking a good game about international unity, but actual common ground looks pretty scarce - Barely a day after the UNSC passed its resolution, China and South Korea are backing away from key elements involving border inspections and the withdrawal of support for collaborative economic development projects with Pyongyang.   Earlier last week the US backed off its proposals to provide for recourse to military action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter if North Korea continues to flout the Council.  Upshot:  Washington managed to achieve a brief show of unity that barely masked underlying deep divisions.

- US efforts to steamroll opposition to its positions failed - Reading accounts of how the Chinese quickly disavowed any intention to implement the inspections regime called for by the resolution reminded me of my time at the UN.  On several occasions, after fierce negotiations with other delegations over controversial points, we would think we'd scored a big victory when they assented to our proposed language.  Days or weeks later we were flabbergasted holding near worthless pieces of paper when they claimed that the adopted language did not represent a change in their prior position, nor a commitment to do what the paper in question said.   These delegations had concluded that making noises of capitulation that would later be reversed was an easier route than continuing to fight off a US government bent on browbeating them into submission.   In my time I never saw this happen on a matter as visible and high-stakes as the North Korea resolution, but with Bolton in the US chair at the Council, I cannot say I am surprised.

- There seems little reason for Iran to be daunted by the prospect of being the Security Council's next target- The resumed debates over Iran's nuclear program will make even the fractious North Korea debate sound like the strains of Kumbaya.  The economic stakes are higher, and Tehran has skillfully situated itself in the midst of a bloc of anti-US developing countries that will provide some cover (like Venezuela which is battling for its own temporary UNSC seat).  The more the US tries to hold China and others' feet to the fire in implementing the North Korea resolution, the harder it may be to win agreement on a text dealing with Iran.

This is not the first time that developments over North Korea are not what they seem.  But its easy enough to criticize.  What should the Administration be doing differently to get better results in the Council?

- Since its pretty clear Bolton's heavy-handed approach hasn't achieved substantive gains, it would be best not to have him at the forefront of trying to shame China into delivering on its obligations.  How about trying some quiet diplomacy in Beijing so that if the Chinese do come around, they can do so without falling into the trap they are most likely to avoid, i.e. the appearance of submitting to US pressure.

- While we're at it, how about some lip-service to the idea of avoiding war?  Russia and China have repeatedly emphasized a desire to deescalate this conflict.  Some might portray that as a sign of weakness, but since Pyongyang now is indeed nuclear, pure reason dictates that the last thing we want to do is ratchet up tensions. 

North Korea: Sticking it to Washington (and Beijing) Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Pyongyang's choice of July 4th to launch a much-anticipated and roundly discouraged test of its long-range missile capabilities, (despite having failed rather spectacularly in the first minute after launch) will go down in history as one of the more flagrant recent attempts to goad and humiliate the superpower. 

But this time there's a twist.  While the timing is unquestionably meant to provoke Washington, the move ought to attract roughly equal ire in Beijing.  First off, China now chairs the six-party talks aimed at controlling North Korea's nuclear program.  The test thus marks the failure of Beijing's highest-stakes diplomatic gambit yet in their own rise to great-power status.   

Moreover, the Chinese have, laudably, been working assiduously in recent weeks to avert the missile launch.  It was reported on Sunday that the Chinese were looking to reconvene an informal session of the six-party forum later this month.  Just yesterday China and North Korea jointly announced a planned exchange of high-level visits to, among other things, discuss the threatened missile launch.  For Kim Jong Il to have proceeded in the face of ongoing Chinese diplomatic efforts is at least as much a slap in the face to Beijing as to the US.

Apart from misery loving company, what's the significance of China being just as dissed as we are?  It's impossible to say, but a few musings:

A Question for Readers - quick replies please! Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Joseph Cirincione - up on the podium - wants to know your view:  Have North Korea and Iran made more progress on the development of their nuclear programs over the last six years, or during the period prior to 2001?  In other words, have US policies during the Bush Administration set back or fostered the momentum of nuclear proliferation?

Please give us your views!

Proliferation Panel Posted by Suzanne Nossel

A proliferation panel is underway.  The Egyptian Ambassador to the UN is arguing that you cannot solve the Iranian nuclear problem without solving the Israeli nuclear problem.  He's also pointing out the problem of the Administration's nuclear deal with India.

Joseph Cirincione, CAP's new head of National Security is up next.  He's a passionate and forceful speaker.  He's lambasting the fact that we're neglecting the nuclear threat and blames the breakdown of threat-assessment and the shameful blaming of the Iraq fiasco on intelligence analysts.

He argues that Iran is a serious threat, yet not our most serious threat, which is Iraq.  He thinks North Korea, which already has enough nuclear material to make weapons, is a more proximate theat, and that Pakistan may be next on the list, but barely even makes the Administration's threat matrix because there's no political constituency driving it.

He urges abandoning the phrase Weapons of Mass Destruction.  I agree - chem, bio and nuclear weapons require totally different responses, and the term WMD confuses them.  He supports the Ambassador on a nuclear-free Middle East.  The NPT is on the verge of collapse because of this Administration.  But he's confident all this can be turned around.  We have programs that work:  we've already secured more than 50% of the loose nukes in the fmr Soviet Union.

How to Join the Friendly Dictator Club and Live to Tell About It Posted by Shadi Hamid

It appears that the serial offensiveness of the US decision to restore diplomatic ties with Libya has been lost on most observers. It marks yet another instance of the Bush administration’s implacable disregard for Arab democracy. If anything, this was exactly the time to say to Libya that, yes, we are happy that you have renounced nuclear ambition but we will not be fully satisfied until you renounce your autocracy. Libya, unlike many of the other egregious human rights offenders in the region, is actually what may be termed a “full autocracy,” meaning that there isn’t even the charade of electoral window-dressing. There is, however, the well-scripted, although somewhat tiresome charade of Muammar Qaddafi’s “third way,” forever enshrined in the laughable “Green Book,” proof that sometimes the first and second ways are the better bet. In any case, there is a well-deserved, although now crumbling, consensus that Qaddafi is (was) a most despicable man, and one, to boot, with a fashion style bordering on the horrific.

Then there was the overwrought self-aggrandizement that seems to have become a mainstay of the State Department press operation. Condoleezza Rice declared that “just as 2003 marked a turning point for the Libyan people, so too could 2006 mark turning points for the peoples of Iran and North Korea.” She went on to call Libya “an important model.” Well, in 2006 the Libyan people are still living under the same unrepentant tyranny as they were in 2002, a tyranny which allows them no recourse to liberty and freedom - things which, lest we forget, President Bush seemed to believe in quite strongly as recently as January 20, 2005.

Yes, if you’re disciple of Scrowcroft (and it just so happens that Rice is), then yesterday’s announcement was indeed one to get triumphant about. Realism is alive and well. I, on the other hand, am perhaps being unrealistic to expect that any US administration – Republican or Democrat – will be able to resist the lure of dictator-coddling, a favorite pastime in Washington circles. Interests, interests, interests. Well, if this is the case, then the war on terror will not be won easily for an American victory requires nothing less than the dismantling of the authoritarian status quo, a status quo which has made the region a hotbed of all the things we don’t like – extremism, terrorism, fundamentalism, cultural, economic, and political stagnation... The list, as always, goes on.

Iran Learns from North Korea Posted by Derek Chollet

As we all focus on the escalating problem with Iran, there seems to be some serious cognitive dissonance about another nuclear problem – North Korea.  Remember that other part of the “axis of evil?”  The U.S. approach to these problems has been largely the same, as have the results.  Writing in yesterday’s Boston Globe, my colleague (and occasional DA contributor) Jon Wolfsthal and I take a look at this.  Here’s some of what we say: 

For nearly three years the Administration approached the North Korea issue by wavering between half-hearted diplomacy and uncoordinated pressure tactics, refusing to talk to North Koreans face-to-face and choosing instead to argue over the shape of the table.

It was not until last fall that American diplomats began to act decisively.  Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice swept into office pledging that the “time for diplomacy is now,” and empowered Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill to deal directly with the North Koreans.  This new engagement worked, as Hill extracted important pledges from Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear programs in exchange for discussions about possible cooperation on alternative energy sources.

But even then the administration began to falter.  As soon as the North Koreans inevitably and expectedly tried to negotiate for more, the Administration reverted back to its previous approach and allowed important but secondary issues like North Korea’s counterfeiting American currency to get block progress.  The September deal unraveled, and now seven months later, the U.S. is back at square one – no other six-party talks are even scheduled.  Meanwhile Pyongyang has quadrupled its nuclear arsenal potential and continues to operate a plutonium production reactor and could extract the material as early as this month, providing it with enough material to take its suspected nuclear arsenal from 9 to 12 nuclear weapons.

Instead of walking away from the problem, the U.S. must work to test North Korea’s willingness to deal by engaging them directly.  Rather than allowing less urgent issues to stand in the way, it should offer to meet with North Korea anytime and anywhere to make rapid progress on the nuclear issue.  And in the event that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions cannot be reversed, the U.S. needs to act now to shore up its deterrence on the peninsula, including by bringing back the troops moved from Korea to Iraq back and strengthening tactical missile defenses, and air and naval forces.

Finding a way to jump-start dealing with the North Korea threat is critical for the stability of East Asia; but it will also shows a possible way out of our current impasse with Iran. North Korea’s success in acquiring a nuclear capacity has provided Iran with a reliable playbook -- one they continue to use with great success.

Running out of time with Iran Posted by Derek Chollet

How far will United States go to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons?  In Washington and key capitals around the world, politicians and policymakers are focusing closely on this difficult question.  The recent frenzy of press reports about Bush Administration’s secret planning for a military attack on Iran lead many to fear that we have entered the grim and sobering endgame. 

Reaching this point was not necessarily inevitable.  For most of the 34 months since arms inspectors blew the whistle on Iran, exposing its efforts to develop nuclear technology secretly in violation of its international commitments, Washington’s approach has been shockingly bumbled and confused.  Only recently has the Bush Administration pursued the kind of strong and serious diplomatic approach the threat required months ago, working with key European allies to pressure Iran within the United Nations Security Council.

But in Tehran, the hard-line mullahs and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad show little sign that they are interested in bargaining for anything less than an independent nuclear capability.  They are on a collision course with the rest of the world – and rather than sensing trouble, they seem to relish the situation.

How do you say Karl Rove in Persian? Posted by Lorelei Kelly

"Simulated irrationality" is an unspoken policy of Iran's leadership-- according to a young  Iranian-American academic who I had the chance to hear at a roundtable this week.  Hmmmmm... Maybe the leaders in Tehran and Washington are playing the same "Careful, cuz I'm nuts" game with each other.  We declare "all options" on the table, we're all sticks with no carrots (threats but not negotiations).  We conduct questionable mega-bomb tests in Nevada (creepily called "Divine Strake"). Congress prepares to dole out money for regime change.  As for the other side, Iran's leadership is impossible to decipher (who's in charge of the nukes?) Their wack-a-doo president rants constantly about Israel, denies the holocaust and ups the ante in the nuclear roulette.  Call me cynical, but politics, like love and war has no rules nor geography. Seems President Ahmadinejad has taken a page out of the Rove handbook: Ignore mainstream folks and stoke the fundamentalist base. The armageddon lobby has gone global. 

Here are some other tidbits I heard this week at various discussions.

Ahmadinejad's anti-Israel hysterics are a terrible embarassment for the rest of Iran's leadership. In fact, others in leadership have been forbidden to ever spew in similar fashion. He continues doing this for his political base for whom Islam's relationship to Israel is critical.  The rural poor are Ahmadinejad's base. Wealth distribution is their issue--and he turns on the fundi rhetoric to distract them from this cruel problem. Values-voters anyone?

"The establishment"  in Iran want Ahmadinejad to fail. If he fails on his own, he will be marginalized. If he can blame the USA, he'll stick around, buoyed by nationalism.  He's already in constant campaign mode, holding huge rallies. We need to stop writing the plot and characters for our enemy.

In May, 2003, the Bush Administration allegedly received a missive containing extensive concessions from Iran--including nuclear issues.  They didn't respond. Keep in mind, this was right as the USA rolled victoriously into Iraq--when the Neo-Con hubris was at its most extreme. The theory is that because of the Iraq experience, the Bush administration figured that no discussion was necessary and that they could trounce the Iranians later without compromise.  Most shocking missed opportunity: one Iranian concession was an offer to disarm Hezbollah.  Given the pulseless response, the Iranians concluded that working with Washington was impossible.

Iran is Not Cuba and Bush is not Kennedy Posted by Heather Hurlburt

So now David Ignatius has jumped on Graham Allison's "Iran is the Cuban missile crisis in slow motion" bandwagon.

I think this is a non-useful and maybe even dangerous comparison for several substantive and political reasons:

1) the core problem, Iran's move toward nuclear weapons, is progressing in such slow motion, if you believe experts outside the Administration, that we have years, not weeks or months, to work with.  This only becomes an immediate threat when we start rattling nuclear sabers -- but saying "Cuban missile crisis" reinforces the idea that the problem requires immediate and comprehensive fixing.  Instead it requires immediate management with an eye toward a long-term solution.  That's different.

2) Ratcheting up the fear level serves the interests of those who are talking nuclear or conventional strikes.  It makes it -- as Allison knows better than almost anyone from his study of the Cuban missile crisis -- harder to back down.

3)  Which brings us to the crucial point:  Bush is no Kennedy.  Rumsfeld is no McNamara.  We don't have even the level of understanding of the Iranian regime that we had of the Soviets (McNamara's account of the Cuban crisis highlights the role of the US Ambassador to the USSR, Tommy Thompson, who had actually lived with Khrushchev briefly.)

4)  An additional point:  I am reminded that, while for people over a certain age the phrase "Cuban missile crisis" evokes sheer terror, for young people it evokes nothing -- except "crisis."  And again, this is a very serious problem that doesn't have to be a Cuban-scale immediate crisis -- unless we choose to make it one.

Happy spring renewal holiday of your choice -- or just enjpy the nice weather.

Posted by Arsenal Guard

Are we MAD?   Keir A. Leiber and Daryl G. Press claim that the United States is acquiring nuclear primacy - the ability to eliminate an enemy's nuclear retaliatory capability with a first strike - which will end the relative stability of Mutually Assured Destruction.

Now The Hard Part Posted by The Editors

Guest Blogger: Jon B. Wolfsthal, Nonproliferation Fellow -- International Security Program, CSIS.

For three years the United States has been trying to bring Iran’s violations of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons to the UN Security Council. The International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors reported Iran’s behavior to the UN in early February and gave Iran one month to clear up lingering concerns about its program, after having previously found Iran in violation of its inspection obligations. Nobel Laureate and IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board last week that Iran is still obstructing inspection requests by the Agency, and advancing its uranium enrichment program and despite last minute diplomatic efforts by the EU and Russia, the matter is now headed directly for New York and the UN Security Council.

Bush's Nuclear Deal with India Posted by Suzanne Nossel

I'm not ready to pronounce on the merits of the deal announced tonight on nuclear proliferation between Bush and Indian President Manmohan Singh, but I will offer some early musings.  Details of the accord are here. 

The deal would open the door for the US and others to aid India in building its civilian nuclear power capabilities despite the country's refusal to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  It provides for inspections of the 14 of India's 22 nuclear facilities that the country classifies as civilian, but leaves the remaining 8 military nuclear facilities to operate unimpeded.  The agreement needs Congressional approval and some legislative amendments before it can go into effect, and whether it will get those is in question.

There's a lot to this, but let me just offer a few observations:

1. US-India Relationship.  There's been a lot of pressure on Bush to demonstrate tangible progress is tightening ties to India, mostly as a counterweight to China's rising power.  With talk of how Bush can salvage a foreign policy legacy despite the morass in Iraq, this agreement has the potential to pave the way for a realignment, strengthening the ties between two leading democracies and deepening American influence on the sub-continent.  All this is good.

2.  Future of the NPT.  Many are pointing to this deal as the potential death knell for the NPT, in that it extends to India the same privileges that were formerly reserved for countries that renounced nuclear weapons development.  This is true, but nothing new.  Mort discussed the longstanding issues in this post.   Bottom line is that the NPT has been hobbling along for years and its not clear that pretending otherwise has served the cause of nonproliferation.  This is why IAEA Chair Mohammed El-Baradei has actually endorsed the deal.  I don't see this as the worst of all things.

3.  Legitimacy of the US's Non-Proliferation Efforts - While the contradictions inherent in the US's proliferation policy have been apparent for years, this deal would seem to mark end of US efforts to contort its policies to fit the NPT.   While that may be justified, if we do not move to undergird the deal with India with a new, broader non-proliferation framework that would justify differential treatment of states based on some objective criteria we will have zero credibility in trying to crack down on proliferators like Iran.  As we learned the hard way in Iraq, credibility in such efforts is a precondition for international support which, in turn, can be a prerequisite for success.  But the Administration has failed to proffer a vision for a redesigned non-proliferation regime, leading others to conclude that we don't care whether our proliferation policies are seen as legitimate or no.  In the absence of a credible effort to relaunch the non-proliferation regime, the accord with India will be viewed as just another circumvention of the rules.  This will undoubtedly be damaging to the US.

4.  Pakistan.  The Pakistanis aren't happy about the Indians getting a sweet nuclear deal that they will never match.  Will this snubbing further embolden the extremists that have already twice tried to assassinate Musharraf and take over the country and its nuclear arsenal?  It could very well.  This is a worrying wild card.

The North Korea Crisis: Still Simmering Posted by Jeffrey Stacey

While the current American foreign policy focus is split between the vagaries in Iraq and duplicitous protestations of nuclear innocence in Iran, the crisis in North Korea simmers on.  Why is the U.S. devoting so much time to an Iran that is ten years away from producing nuclear weapons compared with a rocket-proliferating regime that is now actively producing nuclear bombs?

The U.S. can hardly afford frittering away more time, as the window of opportunity for defusing this crisis is beginning to close—while the North may have already built as many as eight nuclear bombs, in December it announced that it was reopening nuclear plants at Yongbyon and Taechon.  This move came on the heels of Pyongyang’s announcement that as a result of new U.S. financial sanctions it is pulling out of the stalled 6-party talks.

In November the talks achieved an apparent breakthrough, when the North in principle agreed to give up its nuclear weapons in return for security guarantees and economic and fuel aid.  However, the very next day the North claimed it had not agreed to the timetable that the U.S. and China et al. had insisted on.  Since then, not only have no new talks been scheduled, but diplomatic tensions have risen, and all the while Pyongyang continues to pursue its nuclear ambitions.

No Military Option with Iran Posted by Lorelei Kelly

Joe Cirincione at the Carnegie Endowment has penned an important analysis that cautions policymakers against using military options to break the current nuclear impasse with Iran.  He writes:

There is no need for military strikes against Iran.  The country is five to ten years away from the ability to enrich uranium for fuel or bombs.  Even that estimate, shared by the Defense Intelligence Agency and experts at IISS, ISIS, and University of Maryland assumes Iran goes full-speed ahead and does not encounter any of the technical problems that typically plague such programs. 

He also elaborates on the failure of the Osirak Raid--when Israel bombed an Iraqi reactor on June 7, 1981:

The raid energized Saddam Hussein and Hussein's nuclear ambitions went from a side project to an obsession. He launched a new effort to secretly construct gas centrifuges and other devices (particularly electromagnetic isotope separation units) to produce weapons-grade uranium. The program went underground and mushroomed. "At the beginning we had approximately 500 people working, which increased to 7,000 working after the Israeli bombing," Hamza explained to a Washington audience in November 2000, "The secret program became a much larger and ambitious program.

Read the whole thing here.

A New Grand Bargain for Nuclear Nonproliferation Posted by Morton H. Halperin

With Iran and North Korea both continuing to defy American efforts to get them to abandon nuclear programs, we need to consider whether we are on the right track in our attempts to halt nuclear proliferation.   

The NPT tried to create a grand bargain.  States, other than the five who had already tested nuclear weapons, would agree not to develop such weapons.  In return they would receive assistance in developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

Ever since, all American administrations have adopted a double standard in implementing this bargain, looking the other way when our friends decline to sign and ratify the NPT or hedge their commitments and coming down hard on "rogue states."   However, the Bush administration has taken this posture several steps further by accepting the Indian nuclear programs and by seeking sanctions against Iran (which continues to observe its treaty obligations) and North Korea which has exercised its right to withdraw from the treaty.

The United States needs to put forward neutral rules which apply to all states and which take account of the realities of the twenty-first century.

Hope Springs Eternal from Annan on Iran Posted by Suzanne Nossel

The Europeans and maybe even the Russians have concluded that Iran's decision to break the seals placed on its nuclear facilities by UN inspectors is cause for serious international concern and a likely referral to the UN Security Council.   As detailed here, the sounds emanating from the regime of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are worrying indeed.

Yet if his language today is any indication, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, charged with primary global responsibility for peace and security, is going soft on Tehran.   Reuters reports that Annan said:

Iran is still interested in "serious and constructive negotiations" with the European Union on its nuclear program, so long as the talks don't go on too long

The only viable solution to the dispute over Iran's nuclear intentions was "a negotiated one," Annan said.   

He said he had been talking to all sides in the dispute and felt the matter should remain for now before the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

Once that process was exhausted, the matter could yet end up before the U.N. Security Council, where it would be up to the council's 15 members to decide how to proceed, he said.

Amid menacing acts by an Iranian regime that seems oblivious to international opinion, while it may be important for Annan to distance himself from the governments that are taking the hardest line, he should not be in the position of comforting Iran that nothing tougher than more negotiations will result from its provocations.   

This is the kind of position that plays into the hands of UN critics who accuse the body of being a talkshop that shies away from the world's most serious threats.

The NRA versus the Rest of Us Posted by Lorelei Kelly

Another example of how well conservatives have staked out the terrain at the intersection of politics and ideas: This month's Foreign Policy magazine has a terrific article about the worldwide influence of America's highly influential gun lobby, the National Rifle Association.
Author David Morton, writing from South America, depicts how the NRA exploits the dark side of globalization--using shallow "feel good" messages about liberty and freedom to push its ideological agenda--one that allows no limits on individual ownership of guns.

The disappointing part of the NRA is not found in its basic premise, gun ownership, education and safety. The problem for society and, apparently, for the rest of the world is their "slippery slope" insistence that any regulation will lead to complete disarmament. When they decide to take their message international, therefore, the painstakingly constructed and maintained regime of international arms control is threatened. If gun control is bad in America, goes the NRA logic, then arms control must be bad for the world. The NRA and their flacks in other countries claim that gun control advocates want to leave citizens vulnerable to "criminals".  Well, in increasing circumstances those "criminals" just might be free-agent or organized jihadistas who want to get their hands on deadly devices to kill us.

How About Real Engagement with North Korea? Posted by jwolfsthal

Almost unnoticed in the American press, the latest round of denuclearization talks between the United States, North Korea and four other regional players (China, South Korea, Japan and Russia) were held last week in Beijing.  No real progress was made, with North Korea rehashing old arguments about compensation and sanction.  The breakthrough of September, when North Korea agreed to end its current nuclear activities and give up nuclear weapons remains only a long term goal and no one is sure if the parties will ever get from here to there.  This setback, in turn, has put the tactic of engagement with North Korea on trial, with some experts suggesting that any such efforts are doomed.  Yet it is not clear that what is being pursued is true engagement or that the US is being as forthcoming as Washington’s allies would like it to be.  While the prospects for conflict seem low, especially given the current administration’s domestic woes and its growing desire to demonstrate some control over foreign events, North Korea continues to churn out bomb making materials, producing enough plutonium for a bomb a year.  There are also recent signs that North Korea is racing to complete another reactor that can produce enough material for 10 weapons annually.

The idea that we can prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear weapon state, or roll them back if they have already acquired nuclear arms is becoming less realistic every day.  The option of confrontation, backed by the use of military force has never been an attractive or particularly realistic option given the realities on the ground in Korea.  The more important question is whether a policy of engagement can succeed given the ground the international community has lost in the past five years?  No one knows for sure.

If the current engagement process fails, the administration will claim that diplomacy was impossible, but that at least they tried.  Yet, it is not clear to anyone watching that the United States has done all it can to convince North Korea that a new relationship is possible if Pyongyang abandons its nuclear ambitions.  The internal battles within the administration between those favoring and opposing true engagement with North Korea rage on, and those skirmishes have placed real limits on what the negotiators can offer North Korea as incentives to make real progress.  The inability of lead negotiator Ambassador Chris Hill to obtain unfettered permission from the White House to visit Pyongyang on October is just one sign of these constraints.

So if the current engagement process fails, the case will be made that engagement itself failed.  But in reality it will be a strategy of limited engagement that has failed and it remains to be seen what a truly focused, open-ended and honest set of proposals to North Korea – including negotiating a peace agreement, exchanging ambassadors, signing a non-aggression pact and providing economic and energy assistance – might produce.  In the end, even these might not be enough to talk North Korea off the nuclear ledge, but unless tried, we’ll never know.  For now, U.S. policy seems to be to do just enough to prevent Washington from bearing the burden of failure.

But no one should think that what has been tried to date meets the President’s test of “doing all we can” to prevent the most dangerous weapons from falling into the most dangerous hands.  There is much more than can and should be tried, if nothing else than to demonstrate to our allies in the region that the United States is willing to take real political risks in the name of peace and nonproliferation.

Jon Wolfsthal

Nonproliferation Fellow - CSIS

Elsewhere in the Blogosphere... Posted by The Editors

Our old friend David Adesnik has a helpful roundup of what assorted blogs are saying about the recent North Korean developments--including conservative reaction.

For more insight into this non-binding understanding, click over to Opinio Juris for some legal interpretation.

North Korea: Unravelling already? Posted by Suzanne Nossel

I agree with Derek's analysis, only the plot's thickening by the moment. 

It's hard not to wonder whether yesterday's pathbreaking 6-party accord on North Korean nukes is going to last through the week.  A low-down chicken-egg dispute is now playing itself out on the front pages:  North Korea is arguing that it's obligation to dismantle its nuclear program kicks in only once the US provides it with a light-water reactor for civilian power. 

The Administration (backed by Russia and Japan) says just the reverse:  only once North Korea has verifiably abandoned its nuclear program and joined the NPT will discussions on the light-water reactor even begin.  The language of the agreement itself generally supports the American interpretation:  the obligations on DPRK are fairly firm, whereas the reference to the light-water reactor comes later, and refers only to the matter being discussed "at an appropriate time."

A good-faith misunderstanding?  Not likely.  The Administration has, at least publicly, always been vehement that any enticements offered to Pyongyang reward, rather than incentivize, disarmament.  Would they privately, in the course of talks, have proffered some token on the front-end go get the quid pro quo in motion?  Possibly, but a nuclear reactor is no token and given the history on this issue and the publicity surrounding it in recent days, its inconceivable that any of the six around the table could have misinterpreted the US position on this score.

Moreover, if the North Koreans had confidence in the agreement and viewed it as a breakthrough, even if they did have a difference of interpretation on this point, why go bellicose over it just hours after the deal was announced? 

The most optimistic explanation is that they're trying to build up leverage as discussions move to thorny details such as verification and the fate of North Korea's uranium program.   In other words, they'll ultimately concede on the sequencing, but demand something in return.   But their choice of words suggests this is something more than just a nasty negotiation tactic:

"The US should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK's dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing light-water reactors," said a foreign ministry statement. "This is our just and consistent stand as solid as a deeply rooted rock."

Not clear how they back away from that.

The darker interpretation is that there wasn't much of a deal in the first place. 

[This would hardly be the first time the US finds itself with a loftily-worded document in hand, signed by a foreign nation that professes utter unawareness of - and or fundamental disagreement with - what they just signed.   During my time as a US delegate at the UN I saw similar play out several times, and with countries far less slippery than North Korea.]

Here, the Chinese and South Koreans may have been so eager for progress that they tried to paper over longstanding differences.  With the Chinese chomping at the bit to get the accord announced (see the NY Times' play-by-play that Derek cites), the Administration may have decided to take a chance, hoping that - in order to save their deal - Beijing would later pressure Kim Jong Il to defer his demand for the civilian reactor. 

If Chinese influence on Pyongyang fell short that would, at the very least, defuse the criticism that Washington's lack of focus has afforded the Chinese the upper hand in the Korean Penninsula.   This calculation is consistent with the Administration's relative reticence in trumpeting this deal:  particularly given the political shape their in, if they thought they had a clear victory the Administration would have shouted it from the hilltops.

I have to imagine that Chinese and South Korean leaders and diplomats are doing some serious scrambling behind the scenes right now.  If they can pull a lasting deal out of this morass, that will be a real achievement.

Wine in a Box Posted by Derek Chollet

When Secretary of State Rice assumed office earlier this year, she pledged that the “time for diplomacy is now.”  Well, on North Korea, she has lived up to her rhetoric: after nearly three years of sitting on its hands or running around in circles, the U.S. finally approached the North Korea nuclear crisis in a serious way with a serious negotiator (and someone much admired here at DA), Chris Hill.

Yet considering the 6-party deal reached yesterday in Beijing, I think the bottom-line is clear: we got rolled.  I fear that this deal is the diplomatic equivalent of wine in a box: sweet and tasty at the moment (hey, I’m not a wine connoisseur) – in fact, my first reaction yesterday was “good deal” -- but not so great after a few hours.  Age is this thing’s enemy. 

To be sure, this latest round of talks was not a complete bust: it is significant that the five parties (U.S., China, Russia, Japan, South Korea) are relatively unified, and that with this deal, North Korea has signed on to some important principles, like a commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons programs.

But the problems are obvious.  Already the U.S. and North Koreans are fighting over the interpretation of what was agreed to, and the sequencing of who is supposed to do what when.  For example, in the core trade-off of North Korea dismantling its nuclear programs in exchange for the U.S. and its allies considering giving North Korea a light water reactor, the dispute remains about which comes first.  The deal says that the discussions about a light water reactor should come “at an appropriate time.”  To the U.S., this is somewhere long down the road; to the North Koreans, this is yesterday (it’s not clear to me where the Chinese are on this).  And as long as this dispute remains, the deal is going nowhere.

Also, as the U.S. negotiators admit, yesterday’s agreement says nothing about verifying any of the North Korean pledges, or exactly when North Korea agrees to cease its nuclear weapons development.

Finally, in reading the tick-tocks of the endgame in today’s papers, I was struck by how the U.S. seemed to cave to Chinese pressure not to be fingered as the bad guy.  As the last few lines of the New York Times account put it, as the talks “unfolded over the weekend, the Chinese increased pressure on the United States to sign - or take responsibility for a breakdown in the talks. ‘At one point they told us that we were totally isolated on this and that they would go to the press,’ and explain that the United States sank the accord, the senior administration official said.”  Great.  So China has the upper hand here.

Despite these problems, the general reaction to this deal in the center-left Washington policy world has been positive, with many correctly pointing out that this looks a lot like what the Clinton Administration left on the table for Bush in 2001 and lamenting the years of lost time.

Is this a step forward?  Sure.  Is this a solution?  Not even close.  As one Administration official put it to the Nelson Report, the essence of this deal is "progress as process, which is good in the absence of a better answer, but it all reads like a default position for us, there are so many details to close in, and this fills none of the gaps. I suppose they [the North Koreans] will not risk something stupid between now and the next talks, but that takes them on faith..."            

Making Sense of Today's North Korea News Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Steve Clemons, who has actually been an Asia expert, describes today's news of a North Korea breakthrough as "a positive step but nowhere near an endgame."

He also recalls that we were nearing this point at the end of the Clinton Administration.  I believe that it was something very close to these terms on which the Bush people so embarrassingly turned their backs in the ABC (anything but clinton) period in 2001.

My beloved, a foreign policy amateur, actually had the best commentary I've heard:  these are the first fruits of appointing John Bolton to the UN, thus getting him out of Korea policy.  (As they used to say at Veterans Stadium in Philly:  "give that fan a contract!")

So now we've got the deal, maybe, but the North Koreans have had several more years to make bombs.  And we've got a lot fewer military options with which to confront Pyongyang, thanks to the size of our presence Iraq.  Still, the humanitarian and security situations in North Korea are too dire for (much) partisan hay-making.  So let's wish the highly-talented Ambassador Chris Hill all the best on this one. 

First Steps toward a New World Order Posted by Michael Kraig

Well, I'm sitting here at 4:45 Sunday CST, listening to Megadeth's 1991 song "Symphony of Destruction," essentially Dave Mustaine's gut response to the first Persian Gulf War with Saddam, and it's put me in a mindset to finish out my tenure with one last parting shot at some of the questions thrown my way.

David Adesnik has thrown the most pointed questions my way, which I can best answer by pasting in a few recent op-eds that have never been published, and also put out weblinks to two more. But first one of the easier questions (paraphrased):

--"Why don't we just start making MagLev trains and rely on wind and solar, and get the heck out of the Middle East?"

Answer: It's not a solution for China or India, or most Southeast or Northeast Asian nations, who are in a different stage of development but who are increasingly driving the global economy, of which the US is itself a part. Also, having traveled through the six Gulf Arab Monarchies: if you think the terrorism problem is bad now, imagine a hyper-developing set of Arab countries with mammoth public works projects and super-modern skyscrapers, hotels, banks, conference centers, and everything else suddenly being BROKE because all the Developing World decided to chuck their oil dependency as quickly as possible.

It's easy to think of the Middle East as just a bunch of poor nations who are hostile to globalization and who lack modern infrastructure; I daresay this is the mindset of many Americans on both sides of the aisle. It is more difficult to digest the reality, which is that 1) 80%-90% of the populations of the six Gulf Arab states are immigrants from Greater Asia (all Asian countries) who remit substantial monies to their families throughout Asia; 2) the oil surplus subsidizes the economies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan through immigrant workers and through big yearly cash checks from Saudi Arabia; and 3) places like Dubai easily surpass New York in modernity and are literally erecting dozens of new skyscrapers every year, 24/7.

Most of this is oil money, or is connected in some way to oil money. Now last time I checked, we wanted to spread democracy to the Middle East. Well, what do sociologists and historians and political scientists indicate is co-terminous with democrat liberalization? Modernization. Modernity. The Burghers (new commercial elite) of Northern Europe came along well before the first open parliamentary elections...actually, a couple of centuries before. Now, oil money is in fact modernizing the entire Middle East region...and slowly but surely drawing it into the global economy.

Do we really want to end it as soon as possible? Will this really help fight terrorism at the global level? Or would a sudden halt to all such development, and sudden poverty, collapse the entire region into flames? Something to think about. I'm not saying to go out and buy a Ford Expedition, but we have to tread carefully on the question of energy futures.

One medium-term answer is to create a stable international security environment that gives the domestic room for liberalization over decades of time international norms, processes, and rules prior to domestic democratization.

Washington puts the latter first, but my answer to David Adesnik and others is that we should think seriously whether we have nearly the control/effect over other states' domestic practices as we have over their international, foreign policy practices, especially given our power to engage other states and shape the security environment in which they operate. We can probably set up international institutions or looser arrangements....Iraq shows the innate difficulty of putting the domestic level as the "causal variable" for peace and stability.

In this regard, I offer one op-ed already published below, followed by the text of two op-eds on Syria and Iran, respectively.

Peace, Michael Kraig, Director of Policy Analysis and Dialogue, The Stanley Foundation

Gulf Security in a Globalizing World: Going beyond US Hegemony

Assuring a Free Lebanon: Don’t Forget the Golan Heights

50 years after the term "roll back" was originally coined to describe a hawkish US Cold War strategy of beating international communism by aggressively pushing it back across the borders of Russia, the term has gained a new lease on life in the streets of Lebanon. The United States and France are now being gladly joined by almost every conceivable actor around the globe in calling for Syria to leave Lebanon, now and for good: from Kofi Anon and the UN Secretariat, to Asian allies such as Japan and South Korea, to Middle Eastern leaders themselves.

In recent shuttle diplomacy to Riyadh and Cairo, Syria has attempted to gain some semblance of pan-Arab nationalist support, but to no avail. Everyone in the region, from North Africa to the Persian Gulf, from the highest decision-makers to the lowest academics and opposition figures, seem to believe that Hariri’s death was indeed perpetrated by the Syrian government, either in the form of rogue intelligence elements or via a direct decision of Bashar Al-Asad himself. The only palpable Arab nationalist support has been through the good offices of Ammr Moussa, the Secretary-General of the Arab League. No practical political or economic aid for Syria’s position will be forthcoming from the League’s varied members. Syria is truly and utterly alone

Despite these developments, however, the West can still play the crisis in Beirut wrong, with costly and violent outcomes resulting from tactical and strategic missteps. Amid the boisterous joy in the streets of Beirut, as the political and military minions of the Syrian Ba’ath regime seem ready for comprehensive rollback beyond the Bekka valley in accordance with UN Resolution 1559, the West and especially the US should take a deep breath and consider carefully the long-term strategy for peace in Lebanon if it truly wants an inexorable evolution to liberal democracy in Beirut. For as in any complex conflict, the party being backed into a corner can strike back in desperation to protect what it sees as core strategic interests and issues of national identity. And in the present crisis, there is indeed a bilateral issue with central nationalist, territorial, and ideological overtones: the status of the Golan Heights.

Although the war of 1973 is a distant memory for many in the West, for Syrian citizens and leaders alike it is an ever-present, eternal issue. And as in the case of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear power today, Syria’s attachment to the Golan is not contingent on the character of the regime in power. Just as experts have predicted that Iran will pursue a latent nuclear capability no matter who holds the reigns of power in Tehran, Syria is likely to press for this slim piece of strategic territory no matter holds power in Damascus. Any conceivable ruling coalition of reformists, secular nationalists, or ethnic-based representatives would expect a final, just, equitable settlement with Israel on this issue, since it is not just seen as a piece of land, but also as an ideological, values-based conflict artificially frozen in time by Western intervention and UN peacekeepers. Even though few in Syria today avidly support Bashar Al-Asad’s confused and ineffectual rule, fewer still support the idea of Israel controlling a piece of Syrian territory indefinitely. Syrians may wish for a different domestic regime, but they still do not trust the ultimate intentions of Tel Aviv. Majority opinion in Syria still holds that Israel is an aggressive, expansionist, irredentist power bent on fulfilling the dictates of an inflexible Zionist ideology (and supported blindly by Capitol Hill) – an attitude inculcated by the beating drums of Syria’s state-controlled media, but an attitude that exists nonetheless.

Therefore, if the well-wishers for Lebanese democracy truly want a non-violent, stable, and just outcome in Beirut, they should think strategically of all the linked issues in Lebanon’s neighborhood, and act accordingly. Syria is much more likely to play the spoiler to current trends within Lebanon (via Hezbollah or other instruments) if it believes that no benefits, no reassurances, and no hope is forthcoming on the core issue of the Golan Heights. Even as pressure is justly and universally applied to roll back Syria’s corrupt, cronyistic control of a fledgling democratic nation, the world’s lone superpower would do well to work with Europeans, Israel, and Kofi Anon to craft public and private messages assuring Damascus that a final and equitable outcome to the Golan issue will eventually materialize, respecting the relevant UN Resolutions arising from the war of 1973 – Resolutions 242 and 338, which are universally supported throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds. These promises and reassurances could in turn be diplomatically backed up by the Arab League, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to garner some measure of trust with Syria’s beleaguered regime. These assurances are crucial precisely because Israel is in a stronger position than ever to deny such a settlement to Damascus, unilaterally, with or without international support.

But this subtle strategy of linkage between different issues will require patience, wisdom, and foresight on the part of US decision-makers and Western allies alike – something that has been in regrettably short supply over the past four years. Let us hope that as the demonstrators in Beirut supply the courage of their convictions, the US and the international community can supply a balanced, realistic long-term solution to Israeli-Syrian grievances that will ultimately keep Damascus from further acts of desperation in Lebanon.

Engaging Gulliver: China’s Lessons for the Iranian Nuclear Crisis

The Washington policy community is so mired in the seemingly endless nuclear crisis with Iran that they fail to notice the long-term solution: the example of China over the past 40 years.

Looking at today’s dynamic and largely cooperative Northeast and Southeast Asian economic scene, it is easy to forget just how domestically and internationally unpredictable China once was, or how worried the US strategic community was about it. Amid Mao’s various top-down, state-led revolutions in the 1960s, China’s ascent toward nuclear weapons status galvanized the United States to explore several anti-ballistic missile systems and seriously consider preemptive military strikes on Chinese nuclear facilities – as is now being actively considered by Israel and the United States toward Iran. China was viewed as an aggressive and irrational foe that threatened to destabilize Asia – just as Iran is viewed today in the Middle East. And while a nuclear Iran could incite further nuclear proliferation among regional neighbors, China’s huge size and obvious Great Power aspirations were in large part behind South Korea’s and Taiwan’s nascent efforts to "go nuclear" in the 1970s and 80s – a trend that was further spurred by America’s weakened position in Asia after Vietnam, much as America is looking increasingly besieged in Iraq today.

And yet the worst never came to pass. China bridged the nuclear gap, but instead of brandishing nukes with bellicose, offensive threats, it fielded a minimalist arsenal based on defensive threats. China has exercised its growing power through mutually advantageous economic cooperation with its neighbors, spurred partly by the positive example of US-China bilateral trade deals. And meanwhile, strong US bilateral security guarantees and conventional arms sales with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have kept each from pursuing nuclear arsenals.

The Soviet threat had much to do with the long-term thaw between China and the United States. But it was also because China’s internal revolution – like Iran’s Islamic revolution today – failed miserably in providing its citizens prosperity. In the case of China, this domestic developmental gap was ultimately filled with capital and technology from abroad. China’s Asian Gulliver has not only been tied down by countless financial threads emanating from Lilliputians such as South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, it has also been tremendously enriched at the same time. Paradoxically, the stronger Gulliver becomes, the more he is constrained. Meanwhile, China’s burgeoning market provides the fodder for Lilliputian growth: all of Southeast and Northeast Asia (including Taiwan) have GDPs and GNPs that increase concurrently with China’s market. China has largely become a status quo power, ever hungry for more national strength but largely unable to use that strength for any conceivable aggressive ends.

Herein lies the key to resolving the Iranian crisis. Iran, like China, is an ancient civilization that has regional hegemonic ambitions, and these latent ambitions are motivating its Arab neighbors to buy high-tech conventional weaponry and grant America basing rights in the Persian Gulf. But Iran is a mess domestically, suffering from stagnant growth, declining industry, an apathetic and frustrated population, a leadership hungry for cash and domestic legitimacy, and the desperate need for infrastructure and technology improvements. It is Iran’s own neighbors, the Lilliputian Arab monarchies who are slight on geopolitical power but flush with investment capital, that could conceivably tie Gulliver down and satisfy his regional ambitions at the same time. In the short-term, if Iran could be stopped short of the nuclear weapons threshold – at the level of a latent bomb capability in the form of an indigenous nuclear energy fuel cycle, but not an actual arsenal – then the United States could use the same bilateral security guarantees perfected with South Korea and Taiwan in the Asian context to keep Iran’s neighbors from going nuclear themselves.

But precious time is already being wasted. In order for Iran to become a normal nation, the United States needs to start treating it like a normal nation, as Nixon first did with China. To dampen the nuclear crisis and allow forward momentum in other areas, the United States needs to assure a justifiably skittish Iran that it accepts the Islamic Republic’s basic claim to sovereignty, and it can even recommend Iran’s admission to multilateral economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization, which could constitute a powerful source of leverage over Iran’s regional behavior. Simultaneously, European trade arrangements and technological know-how could be mixed with Arab investment capital and US bilateral detente. Ultimately, European-Arab-US strategic cooperation could effectively create a virtuous circle of security and development with a fearful but ambitious Iran. Let the tying of Gulliver begin.

Foiled by Assumptions Posted by Michael Kraig

I am writing in my capacity as a temporary replacement for Lorelei Kelly as she takes a much-needed vacation.   And as a new voice, I would like to comment on some assumptions about international security that centrists and progressives hold in common with the conservatives, which consequently undermines attempts to arrive a truly different security paradigm that can be held up as a strong, coherent alternative.

First, David Adesnik said in a post about Cindy Sheehan, "And what if the Ba'athists and their Al Qaeda allies prevail in that war and transform Iraq into a staging ground for international terrorists attacks, a la Afghanistan except with oil?"  This is a mischaracterization of what's happening in Iraq, and it is an error that points to larger US policy community assumptions in general about connections between groups, and between states and groups.  The fact is that there are multiple fights, battles, and mini-wars going on in Iraq, by myriad groups, and though the Ba'athists and Al-Qaeda fighters may indirectly benefit from the chaos and fear that each is creating, they are NOT creating this chaos and fear with an eye to helping each other (and, they are not the only ones doing it; representatives from nearly every group are involved).  Nor is there any compelling evidence that they are actively planning and coordinating their activities together.  The Ba'athists are fighting for their once Sunni-dominated homeland; the foreign insurgents are taking the opportunity created by Bush to cause as much chaos and pain as possible in the cause of overturning the globalizing status quo in the Middle East.  Rest assured, if the Ba'athists were to finally win (even if just over a slice of the original Iraq), they will ruthlessly root out the foreign insurgents -- of any kind, creed, ideology, religion, or national origin - and rest assured, the foreign insurgents will fight them to the death (or, go next door to Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, where they can cause more trouble for years to come for those governments).   For instance, at a recent Stanley Foundation dialogue in Dubai, it was made quite clear that the biggest fears of Iraq's neighbors is not an alliance of insurgents within Iraq, that then make a strong Iraqi state that supports terrorism, but rather, an eventual return of foreign insurgents to the lands from which they first originated.  In short: they fully expect the foreign fighters to be kicked out at some point in the foreseeable future, because they do not assume that these foreign fighters agree with any other group, or ally with any other group.  Rather, the assumption (which I believe is correct) is that these groups are opportunists, quite separate from the Ba'athists, who simply wish to wreak as much havoc as possible -- and when Iraq gets its act together, whether in Sunni or Shi'ite form, then these foreign terrorists will raise literal hell elsewhere.   

With this in mind, I'm not sure it really matters whether the centrists and leftists be seen as appeasers in 2008 elections, because the entire threat and entire problem is being defined incorrectly from the beginning, by both conservatives and liberals alike -- much as Vietnam and the infamous "domino theory of communist expansion" were ruled by misconceptions on each side of the DC spectrum throughout that entire war.   The question is not whether we stay or go, but whether we are willing to admit just how big a mess it really is, and recognize the true costs of cleaning it up, and admit what kind of transnational (not national) terrorist legacy it is going to leave behind.  Iraqi stability and unity should be a goal -- but this goal will not be reached if characterize the problem incorrectly.

Another example: I find on Democracy Arsenal (and other blogs) a certain amount of agreement with the status quo policy conception that the anger in the Middle East is due to internal, domestic repression/oppression/injustice under autocratic governments, and that the anger toward Israel, the West, the US, and the globalizing world order is a byproduct of this, or an escape valve for this.   Indeed, I've heard this from numerous US officials and non-officials throughout my work for the Stanley Foundation; you could almost call it a standing epistemic agreement in the US policy community. 

Unfortunately, it's wrong -- or at least, half-wrong.  There is of course an "escape valve" factor at work here.  But after traveling to the Near East and the Persian Gulf for a combined total of two months this year (in a cross-country outreach tour for a Stanley product translated into Arabic), what I found was nearly everyone saying that "democracy" is not just about internal practices -- there is also an international dimension to justice, development, and democracy.  And this is where anger toward perceived neo-colonialist aggression, not too different from the British mandate in Egypt and the French mandate in Lebanon and Syria, comes in.  The truth is that people feel oppressed at one in and the same time by their own governments (internally) AND by perceived anti-Islamic, anti-Arab forces at the international or global level (externally), and neither of these exists in a vacuum apart from the other.  There is a palpable feeling throughout the Middle East that their values and way of life are potentially or actually under assault by hostile attempts to subvert true Arabism and Islamism and turn it into a Western template.  Israel's actions fall under this umbrella, but by no means is it just Israel alone; Israel is just sort of the lead "indicator", if you will, of overall Western intentions, especially US intentions. 

Put another way, and a bit more broadly: a Chinese analyst complained to me some years ago that Americans talk about democracy all the time, but they subvert it all the time.  I asked what he meant.  And he sincerely said that international institutions, and international rule of law, were the international equivalent of domestic democracy within sovereign states.  He said that China had finally bought into the conception promulgated by the Clinton Administration in the 90s that the NPT, the CTBT, the ICC, etc. and so on, were legitimate institutions to join and adhere to -- and the internal Chinese debate had been won on this score in part because it was "sold" by analysts within China as "international democracy" -- with soveriegn states as the individuals comprising the electorate.  But, this analyst complained, now the US is abusing the UN, failing to ratify the CTBT, disregarding key obligations of the NPT, and is slowly but surely weaponizing outer space.   In this analyst's view, this was "undemocratic" behavior at the international level, even though it was all being done due to democratic decisions made by the US within its own domestic level of politics. 

Long story short: this is how many Arabs feel about Iraq, Palestine, and about globalization in general.    And this is why the assumption mentioned above is a very dangerous one to hold, particularly for progressives trying to lay out true alternatives to the current policy status quo.  Yes, it is necessary to support democracy internally within Middle East states; yes, if people were not repressed domestically (and were not as poor economically, for some countries) in the Middle East, they probably wouldn't hate Israel, Europe, or the US as much as they currently do.  But would this anger and hate disappear if the Middle East were democratized at the domestic level?  The answer is, simply, no.  Because the feelings about lack of justice, or lack of democracy, at the INTERNATIONAL level are just as acute and just as real for many citizens and officials alike throughout the Middle East, and only the US supporting the rule of law at the international level will appease this anger and truly bring about a sea-change in relations and perceptions.  We may not see ourselves this way, but many in the Middle East (including rigorous analysts) really don't make much of a distinction between colonial Britain in Egypt, colonial France in Syria, and now today, the US in Iraq and Israel in Palestine.   It's all pretty much the same to them: international repression against pan-Arab and pan-Islamic identity (and for many citizens in the Middle East, they still even today feel just as much allegiance to pan-Arab culture as they do to the culture of their own sovereign nation; hence, purely national-domestic efforts at democratization are not meeting the culture of the region as it actually exists, in a transnational/international as well as national context).  Unless the progressive community in the US comes to grips with this reality, we really aren't offering true alternatives to the accepted assumptions of US foreign policy today.