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September 24, 2005

Progressive Strategy

The Freedom Center, 9/11 and Engaging the Public With Progressive Ideas
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Controversy is coming to a head here in New York City over whether the International Freedom Center (IFC), a planned new museum, will receive the prominent place it has been offered as one of four cultural institutions to occupy a rebuilt Ground Zero.   The debate has ramifications for how September 11 fits into our collective memory, and implications for how progressives put across their policy views.

The story as best as I can make out is this:  Shortly after 9/11, Tom Bernstein, the President of Chelsea Piers and long-time Board Member and Chair of Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights) came up with the idea of building a center devoted to exploring and promoting the ideal of freedom on the site of Ground Zero and worked with 9/11 widow Paula Grant Berry to get the project in motion. 

Several nights ago Bernstein was interviewed on NY1 and explained that the hope of the Freedom Center was to ensure that the 9/11 institutions "stood the test of time" and were put into a broader context.  Plans were developed, and the Center - which attracted the backing of numerous well-heeled and progressive New Yorkers - was chosen from among several hundred cultural institutions vying for space on the site.   The IFC is not to be the primary 9/11 memorial museum on the site, but rather a companion to what will be an underground permanent exhibit devoted solely to the events of that day.

But as plans for the Center shaped up, friction mounted.   In June a 9/11 widow named Debra Burlingame published an op-ed blasting the plans.  She objected to the idea that the 9/11 memorial must somehow transcend the day itself, and voiced fear that the Center would offer a "didactic history lesson":

The public will have come to see 9/11 but will be given a high-tech, multimedia tutorial about man's inhumanity to man, from Native American genocide to the lynchings and cross-burnings of the Jim Crow South, from the Third Reich's Final Solution to the Soviet gulags and beyond. This is a history all should know and learn, but dispensing it over the ashes of Ground Zero is like creating a Museum of Tolerance over the sunken graves of the USS Arizona.

She accused Freedom Center organizers of lining up support with "this arrogant appeal: The memorial to the victims will be the heart of the site, the IFC will be the brain."

Groups of 9/11 family members and fire-fighters have lined up behind Burlingame's critique.   I don't know enough to judge whether this started as an orchestrated attack, but it quickly grew into one.  In this National Review article, the IFC organizers are ridiculed as politically correct, anti-American and sex-crazed. 

Last week the IFC planners issued a last-ditch effort to save the project:  a detailed report aimed to counter claims that the Center might display exhibits that were critical of the US, or that it would sideline the events of 9/11 itself. 

Now Senator Hillary Clinton has come out against the museum, saying that she's troubled by the concerns of the relatives and first-responders.  My sense is that the momentum has swayed in favor of the families and fire-fighters, and that the IFC project could soon collapse.

What happened here?  How, in New York City of all places, did a group of savvy, well-intentioned and thoughtful progressives wind up on the wrong side of a debate over the meaning and legacy of 9/11.  It may be unfair to examine the IFC project through the lens of progressive strategy;  its organizers were focused on building an institution rather than a movement.  But  their rocky journey to engage the public in their project may shed light on progressives' larger struggle to put their ideas across to people.

Continue reading "The Freedom Center, 9/11 and Engaging the Public With Progressive Ideas" »

September 23, 2005

Iraq

Spinning -- and Dropping -- the Plates
Posted by Michael Signer

A follow-on to Suzanne's post... the NYT reports that even President Bush's friends in Saudi Arabia are experiencing the heaves when they watch Iraq convulsing:

"There is no dynamic now pulling the nation together," he said in a meeting with reporters at the Saudi Embassy here. "All the dynamics are pulling the country apart." He said he was so concerned that he was carrying this message "to everyone who will listen" in the Bush administration.

Taking off my partisan hat for a second, I'm truly concerned that the Administration's colossal f-ups in Katrina are going to distract them even more from managing the situation in Iraq well.  From Byron Dorgan's Democratic Policy Committee, a series of over 50 tough questions.  The following 10 are just for starters:

1)     Why did DHS Secretary Chertoff delay the full federal disaster response according to the National Response Plan?
2)     What caused a breakdown in coordination between federal, state, and local government entities? 
3)     Why did the Department of Homeland Security wait so long to request evacuation help from airlines?
4)     Why has Secretary Chertoff refused to take charge of disaster relief efforts? 
5)     Did the Department of Homeland Security have in place a response plan for dealing with Category 4 and 5 hurricanes?
6)     When did DHS receive warnings about FEMA's deteriorating capabilities, and how did it respond? 
7)     Why was DHS Secretary Chertoff unaware that the levees had been breached until a full day later? 
8)     Why did former FEMA Director Brown fail to send personnel to the scene until days after the hurricane hit?
9)     Why did former FEMA Director Brown divert much-needed disaster response personnel to conduct public relations?
10)   Why did FEMA issue a press release urging all fire and emergency response departments not to respond to counties and states affected by Hurricane Katrina unless requested and lawfully dispatched by state or local authorities?

It goes on and on... like, really on and on.

Even with Rove's nimble fingers, I just don't know how they keep all these plates spinning -- which means the country suffers, not just the Republican Party.

September 22, 2005

Iraq

Iraq: Hemmorhage on the Homefront
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

On the eve of a big anti-war rally slated for this weekend in Washington, CNN/Gallup have come out with a new poll suggesting that support for President Bush's Iraq policy is bleeding heavily.  (the full poll results can be found on www.gallup.com which allows a free 30-day trial).  These numbers are enough to wake up a sleeping President:

- 34% of people polled, a plurality, believe the war in Iraq is unwinnable

- An additional 20% believe the US can win, but won't

- Just 43% believe the US will definitely or probably win

- Just 33% of those polled have a clear idea of what the war is about; 67% do not

- 59% believe we made a mistake sending troops to Iraq

- 63% support a full or partial withdrawal

- Just 32% support the President's handling of the war

- 54% want to cut spending on Iraq in order to fund reconstruction post-Katrina

Most of these numbers look a lot worse for the Administration's policy than they did in early August when Heather wrote this recap.  I wrote a few weeks later about the devastating consequences that would result if Iraq were to become a failed state.  Bush has tried hard in recent months to shore up public support for the war effort, but the absence of any concrete strategy to win, deteriorating conditions on the ground and competing priorities like Katrina seem to doom those efforts to failure. 

While Kevin Drum sees Bush's glass half full and points out that 63% of those polled still see some chance of winning (and that those people will never support progressive calls for a pullout), my question is whether the creeping public pessimism might not be enough to snuff out the possibility of victory, even assuming the President were to suddenly pull a strategy out of a hat.

If Bush cannot turn these trends around, its hard to see how he turns around anything about the Iraq war effort.

Lorelei's critical questions on what all this means for the progressive stance require more thinking to answer.   But in the meantime we should not berate ourselves for not having a tidy answer to the disastrous conundrums this Administration's policies have wrought.

Potpourri

Lecturing China
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

I am sure the Chinese will love reading the set of guidelines for their behavior set out by US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in a speech given last night in New York.   According to the Washington Post's account, Zoellick said the Chinese had created a "cauldron of anxiety" about their intentions, and pressed Beijing to:

  • Openly explain its defense spending, intentions, doctrine and military exercises to ease concerns about its rapid military buildup.
  • Cease its efforts to direct rather than open markets and to "lock up" energy supplies.
  • End its tolerance for intellectual property theft.
  • Allow its currency to adjust more to market rates.
  • Alter its foreign policy to focus less on national interest and more on sustaining peaceful prosperity, through non-proliferation efforts in North Korea and Iraq and by  pledging more money to Afghanistan and Iraq.   Zoellick also decried China's relationships with Sudan and Burma.

It's not that Zoellick's points aren't well taken; most are legitimate.   But I can only imagine if the tables were turned and the Chinese laid out a comprehensive plan for how the U.S. ought to change its behavior.   From what I know, the Chinese hate having positions dictated to them, particularly by the U.S.   

This may go down well with the tough-on-China crowd at home, but its hard to imagine it will have a positive influence on Beijing (so far the Chinese are doing little more than "taking note" of Zoellick's remarks.  But I doubt it will stop at that).

Progressive Strategy

Rove at the Rally?
Posted by Lorelei Kelly

"The liberals were pretty much right on Viet Nam. And what did that get them? They destroyed their reputation on national security for three decades"

This statement--coming from a thoughtful conservative journalist--was like a sucker punch at the luncheon I attended  today.  Especially since our nation is entering another public discussion about ending a painful bout of warfighting.  This weekend, a massive anti-war march is coming to Washington.  I'm not sure yet if I'm going, as I have mixed feelings about the whole thing.  I think protesting the Bush administration's strategic blunder is right-on.  I also think demanding a policy on how we're going to transition from a combat mission to a peace support role is vital. 

My interactions with peace organizations have been encouraging in the sense that they are willing to entertain complex policy ideas instead of "Out Now" slogans.  This rally has the potential to be a positive step forward in encouraging liberal Members of Congress to agitate for an exit strategy.  The rally could be an on-message, problem-solving American exercise in participatory democracy.  But the left has its own strategic blunders to worry about. Which leads me to the question:

Is the organization ANSWER working for Karl Rove?  Only he could hatch a plot to offer up a message  muddling "Palestine Tent" on the mall coupled with an anti-Israel march to the ellipse in front of the Capitol.  So now every elected leader who comes to show support is going to have to bear the wrath of the Israeli lobby and fend off right wingers who love to paint liberals as anti-semitic.

ANSWER is short for Act Now to Stop War and End Racism.  I wonder if they ever considered that one way to stop war is to help progressive leaders become seen as serious policy advocates on issues of national security and defense. (instead of spending time playing "cry uncle" with AIPAC)

We on the left have an interesting predicament.  Our most progressive elected leaders in Congress are more conservative than their activist base.  Our progressive leaders are being pragmatic--actually trying to make progress. ANSWER's  antics hurt us.  We don't have the Fox news buzzsaw to manage perception.  We also don't routinely smear conservatives with a broad brush when their wacky base gets out of hand (like fundamentalist Christians protesting "Queers" at the funerals of soldiers killed in Iraq)  It's not fair, but we don't. I have read that reports of leftists spitting on soldiers after Viet Nam were highly exaggerated (just like bra-burning, it  took on a mythic quality and added fodder to the conservative cause)   

So we have to be extra careful.

It is vitally important to the future of our nation to have articulate and passionate progressives leading on national security  policy.  Otherwise we will move ever closer to a militarized state.  Our president and his cohorts in Congress are about to  start fiddling with posse comitatus--the law that prevents the military being used for domestic law enforcement.  While the issue deserves discussion, in the hands of this crowd, it's scary.  Without progressive voices getting involved in the debate  about lessons learned in Iraq, our troops will not get  the training and preparation they need for future conflicts,  humanitarian included.  This would be tragic.  Lacking pro military progressive voices, the anti-recruitment drive taking place across the country will be portrayed as the same old anti-military antics on the left. Yes, high school dragoon tactics  are awful,  bounties to join-up are a perversion of service.  BUT, we  civilians are the ones who put the military in this  desperate situation. The buck stops with us, the American public.  They  are desperate because we've forced it on them.

Remember, the military will hardly ever say "no" to a request.  They will do or die until the very end.  This is why we love them but it is also exasperating  for those of us who would like to see military professionals offer more expert advice to policy makers about how to share responsibilities with civilian agencies.  But they are not  the ones who will ultimately establish  the limits placed on themselves.  This is a task for civilian elected leaders.   Progressives must be at the  table, and soon.

Like the military itself,  the average American citizen’s notion of national security is in transition.  The Cold War framework of the nineties has given way to a new era defined by less discernable threats: terrorism, climate change, global pandemics, and a growing energy crisis.   Because increasing numbers of Americans are aware of the need to do things differently, and are unhappy with the polarization of our political system, there presently exists a window of opportunity to reframe the public conversation away from antagonism and toward cooperative problem solving.  In my opinion, this is what a true progressive should focus on.

The military and peace activists have much more in common than meets the stereotype.  Both seek cooperation over conflict. Besides the pacifists, both want force to only be used as a last resort.  These are long term strategies that can be dashed by the tactics of groups like ANSWER.

Instead of decrying American imperialism, why not fight for our civilian agencies to have the ability to create international networks of democratic peers like the US military does?

I know it's not emotionally satisfying to carry a sign that says "more judges for Nigeria" OR "Do we really want to be so in hock to China?"  But translating the energy of the peace movement toward these ends is the  monumental progressive challenge.

September 21, 2005

Proliferation

Elsewhere in the Blogosphere...
Posted by Arsenal Guard

Flick_kim_3Our old friend David Adesnik has a helpful roundup of what assorted blogs are saying about the recent North Korean developments--including conservative reaction.

For more insight into this non-binding understanding, click over to Opinio Juris for some legal interpretation.

September 20, 2005

Proliferation

North Korea: Unravelling already?
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

I agree with Derek's analysis, only the plot's thickening by the moment. 

It's hard not to wonder whether yesterday's pathbreaking 6-party accord on North Korean nukes is going to last through the week.  A low-down chicken-egg dispute is now playing itself out on the front pages:  North Korea is arguing that it's obligation to dismantle its nuclear program kicks in only once the US provides it with a light-water reactor for civilian power. 

The Administration (backed by Russia and Japan) says just the reverse:  only once North Korea has verifiably abandoned its nuclear program and joined the NPT will discussions on the light-water reactor even begin.  The language of the agreement itself generally supports the American interpretation:  the obligations on DPRK are fairly firm, whereas the reference to the light-water reactor comes later, and refers only to the matter being discussed "at an appropriate time."

A good-faith misunderstanding?  Not likely.  The Administration has, at least publicly, always been vehement that any enticements offered to Pyongyang reward, rather than incentivize, disarmament.  Would they privately, in the course of talks, have proffered some token on the front-end go get the quid pro quo in motion?  Possibly, but a nuclear reactor is no token and given the history on this issue and the publicity surrounding it in recent days, its inconceivable that any of the six around the table could have misinterpreted the US position on this score.

Moreover, if the North Koreans had confidence in the agreement and viewed it as a breakthrough, even if they did have a difference of interpretation on this point, why go bellicose over it just hours after the deal was announced? 

The most optimistic explanation is that they're trying to build up leverage as discussions move to thorny details such as verification and the fate of North Korea's uranium program.   In other words, they'll ultimately concede on the sequencing, but demand something in return.   But their choice of words suggests this is something more than just a nasty negotiation tactic:

"The US should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK's dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing light-water reactors," said a foreign ministry statement. "This is our just and consistent stand as solid as a deeply rooted rock."

Not clear how they back away from that.

The darker interpretation is that there wasn't much of a deal in the first place. 

[This would hardly be the first time the US finds itself with a loftily-worded document in hand, signed by a foreign nation that professes utter unawareness of - and or fundamental disagreement with - what they just signed.   During my time as a US delegate at the UN I saw similar play out several times, and with countries far less slippery than North Korea.]

Here, the Chinese and South Koreans may have been so eager for progress that they tried to paper over longstanding differences.  With the Chinese chomping at the bit to get the accord announced (see the NY Times' play-by-play that Derek cites), the Administration may have decided to take a chance, hoping that - in order to save their deal - Beijing would later pressure Kim Jong Il to defer his demand for the civilian reactor. 

If Chinese influence on Pyongyang fell short that would, at the very least, defuse the criticism that Washington's lack of focus has afforded the Chinese the upper hand in the Korean Penninsula.   This calculation is consistent with the Administration's relative reticence in trumpeting this deal:  particularly given the political shape their in, if they thought they had a clear victory the Administration would have shouted it from the hilltops.

I have to imagine that Chinese and South Korean leaders and diplomats are doing some serious scrambling behind the scenes right now.  If they can pull a lasting deal out of this morass, that will be a real achievement.

Potpourri

Who Will Make Our Foreign Policy?
Posted by Heather Hurlburt

In which we take time out from the heady issues of the day to consider where we are going to get a next generation of soldiers and diplomats, when the New York Times is telling us that 50 percent of the candiates will just stay home and breed, so they needn't be hired or even educated.

So let's see:  government and business alike can't hire enough linguists and area specialists.  The Army, Reserves and Marines can't meet their recruitment quotas -- and the Marines say specifically they don't have enough women to guard and search women in sex-segregated societies like Afghanistan and Iraq.

No question that national security is still a pretty male preserve, but it looks lots better than it did when I was in college.  Potential role models boiled down to Jeane Kirkpatrick, who somehow failed to inspire me.

And by the way, what was the first bureau of the State Department to recruit, train and promote women in quantity, while the Service as a whole was still throwing you out when you got married?  (Until 1970)?  Near East.

Now Presidents Clinton and Bush 43 are first and second, respectively, in numbers of women appointed to Cabinet positions.  The Foreign Service is almost 50 percent female, though only 25 percent at ambassadorial level.

In short, the foreign affairs establishment can't afford a future in which the best-educated women believe they can't work, while lower-income women have no choice but to work.  This looks pretty rotten for society as a whole, to my mind.

But is the culture telling us that?  No.  Is anyone suggesting that maybe men have a role to play here, too?  (I found them quite useful in several fundamental aspects of parenthood, myself.) 

Well, this blog is doing both those things.  Herewith, the honor roll of cool mama foreign policy bloggers:  our own Suzanne Nossel and myself, Laura Rosen of warandpiece, and Juliette Kayyem of America Abroad.

Please, if you're reading this and you fit the demographic, or have a daughter -- or son -- who does, combining work and family is an ongoing negotiation, not a once-for-all choice.  Pass it on.

 

Proliferation

Wine in a Box
Posted by Derek Chollet

When Secretary of State Rice assumed office earlier this year, she pledged that the “time for diplomacy is now.”  Well, on North Korea, she has lived up to her rhetoric: after nearly three years of sitting on its hands or running around in circles, the U.S. finally approached the North Korea nuclear crisis in a serious way with a serious negotiator (and someone much admired here at DA), Chris Hill.

Yet considering the 6-party deal reached yesterday in Beijing, I think the bottom-line is clear: we got rolled.  I fear that this deal is the diplomatic equivalent of wine in a box: sweet and tasty at the moment (hey, I’m not a wine connoisseur) – in fact, my first reaction yesterday was “good deal” -- but not so great after a few hours.  Age is this thing’s enemy. 

To be sure, this latest round of talks was not a complete bust: it is significant that the five parties (U.S., China, Russia, Japan, South Korea) are relatively unified, and that with this deal, North Korea has signed on to some important principles, like a commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons programs.

But the problems are obvious.  Already the U.S. and North Koreans are fighting over the interpretation of what was agreed to, and the sequencing of who is supposed to do what when.  For example, in the core trade-off of North Korea dismantling its nuclear programs in exchange for the U.S. and its allies considering giving North Korea a light water reactor, the dispute remains about which comes first.  The deal says that the discussions about a light water reactor should come “at an appropriate time.”  To the U.S., this is somewhere long down the road; to the North Koreans, this is yesterday (it’s not clear to me where the Chinese are on this).  And as long as this dispute remains, the deal is going nowhere.

Also, as the U.S. negotiators admit, yesterday’s agreement says nothing about verifying any of the North Korean pledges, or exactly when North Korea agrees to cease its nuclear weapons development.

Finally, in reading the tick-tocks of the endgame in today’s papers, I was struck by how the U.S. seemed to cave to Chinese pressure not to be fingered as the bad guy.  As the last few lines of the New York Times account put it, as the talks “unfolded over the weekend, the Chinese increased pressure on the United States to sign - or take responsibility for a breakdown in the talks. ‘At one point they told us that we were totally isolated on this and that they would go to the press,’ and explain that the United States sank the accord, the senior administration official said.”  Great.  So China has the upper hand here.

Despite these problems, the general reaction to this deal in the center-left Washington policy world has been positive, with many correctly pointing out that this looks a lot like what the Clinton Administration left on the table for Bush in 2001 and lamenting the years of lost time.

Is this a step forward?  Sure.  Is this a solution?  Not even close.  As one Administration official put it to the Nelson Report, the essence of this deal is "progress as process, which is good in the absence of a better answer, but it all reads like a default position for us, there are so many details to close in, and this fills none of the gaps. I suppose they [the North Koreans] will not risk something stupid between now and the next talks, but that takes them on faith..."            

September 19, 2005

Proliferation

Making Sense of Today's North Korea News
Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Steve Clemons, who has actually been an Asia expert, describes today's news of a North Korea breakthrough as "a positive step but nowhere near an endgame."

He also recalls that we were nearing this point at the end of the Clinton Administration.  I believe that it was something very close to these terms on which the Bush people so embarrassingly turned their backs in the ABC (anything but clinton) period in 2001.

My beloved, a foreign policy amateur, actually had the best commentary I've heard:  these are the first fruits of appointing John Bolton to the UN, thus getting him out of Korea policy.  (As they used to say at Veterans Stadium in Philly:  "give that fan a contract!")

So now we've got the deal, maybe, but the North Koreans have had several more years to make bombs.  And we've got a lot fewer military options with which to confront Pyongyang, thanks to the size of our presence Iraq.  Still, the humanitarian and security situations in North Korea are too dire for (much) partisan hay-making.  So let's wish the highly-talented Ambassador Chris Hill all the best on this one. 

Europe

What if they had an election and no one won?
Posted by Heather Hurlburt

So says Der Spiegel.

A good, short survey of where the various coalition possibilities stand this morning is here.  To do it any more precisely I would need a chart. 

There are some fascinating echoes of recent events in other countries we know and love. At one point, pollsters were projecting that Social Democratic leader and current Chancellor Schroeder would have three more seats than his conservative opponents.  Didn't pan out.  Chancellor Schroeder's almost-victory-claiming performance has some commentators calling him brilliant, others crazy.   My question:  when will we have screaming Schroeder dolls?  And check here to learn how complex things get if no government has been formed by October 18, when Schroeder's term officially ends.  (Not so bad, the electoral college...)

Heather, you're being flip again:  Why does this matter?  Craig Whitney reminds that Germany exports more than any other nation and is a central player in the EU.  But that's understating the case:  Germany is a central player on the cast of issues where politics and economic meet.  Will the EU get off the dime on agricultural reforms and push past the US on trade liberalization?  If Germany provides the momentum.  Other issues where Germany plays the impetus-or-spoiler role range from Iran-nukes to UNSC reform (if that remains relevant) to maintaining forward motion in the Balkans.

But there's another, broader reason.  Malaise.  (An aside:  Jimmy Carter never said it.  The word was in pollster Pat Caddell's memo to him.)  This divided vote, with a strong protest component against broadly-unspecified change and reform, is in many ways a continuation of the anti-EU treaty protest votes we saw in the Netherlands and France earlier this year.  Some of the more panicky-toned commentary that came out before the election reflected the fear on the one hand that Germany and Europe are stalled, have lost momentum; and that on the other hand, the German and European way of life and standard of living are under threat.

Lots of bad answers to this have emerged, but no good ones.  And I would argue (as I sit in the state tied for highest unemployment rate in the country, 40 miles from the poorest big city in the country) that the hyping of fears about terrorism in the US overlays a rather similar concern.  What to do about globalization -- how to regain both the reality and the popular sensation that we own it, not the reverse?

Some Germans think that a "grand coalition" of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats might provide space for new answers, and new leaders, to emerge -- that, along with significant social unrest, is the legacy of Germany's only previous "grand coalition," in the late 1960s.  But can that still happen?  And what's the analogy for countries without the possibility of coalition politics?

September 18, 2005

UN

UN Reform Issue Spotlight -- Responding to Genocide
Posted by David Shorr

With all the highly politicized wordsmithing of the pre-UN Summit negotiations, for some issues it's hard to tell whether the text of the resulting Outcome Document represents a step forward, backward, or sideways. New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof wrestled with this problem in his Sunday column on genocide (full disclosure, I provided Kristof with modest help). He gives an almost schizophrenically mixed verdict, calling the statement on genocide (paragraphs #138-40) both "diluted" and "immensely important."Can both be true?

Of course the proper test regarding genocide or ethnic cleansing is action in response to particular campaigns of atrocities. Kristof's critique of the Bush Administration is that while it has called the carnage in Darfur by its rightful name, genocide, it has failed to follow through by pushing for sanctions or a no-fly zone.

So then what's the point of even having a UN statement on genocide? If the most important debates over how to respond to genocide always arise in a particular context (a specific place, perpetrators), they also take place against the backdrop of a broader debate over principles. The most contentious issues of multilateralism are at root about sovereignty -- either encroachment into a country's domestic matters or its obligation to act internationally, or both. For the issue of humanitarian intervention, a blue-ribbon commission in 2001 introduced the idea of the Responsibility to Protect -- which instead of solely granting outsiders a right to intervene, talked about a shift in the onus of protecting the basic right to safety from domestic to international governments if the local authorities prove unwilling or unable.

The statement in the Outcome Document essentially ratifies this concept, and therein lies its significance. For many countries that are either relatively weak internationally or have problematic human rights record, the purpose of the UN is to protect sovereign nations from outside interference in internal affairs. These sovereigntist governments have two concerns -- one valid, and one less so.

We need only look at the post-invasion rationalization of the Iraq War to see how powerful countries can abuse this principle. Recall how Sen. Pat Roberts said the war was justified on humanitarian grounds, or the administration's emphasis on Saddam's mass graves, dating largely from the late 1980s or early 1990s. Human Rights Watch President Ken Roth debunked this premise saying, "'better late than never' is not a justification for humanitarian intervention."

Hopefully the UN summit statement will lay to rest one of the great red herrings of this debate: the idea that humanitarian intervention will be used in cases of less drastic human rights violations. The statement addresses this issue with the unwieldy though precise phrase: "responsibility to protect population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

When Bush Administration officials explained their negotiating position to me, they emphasized that the responsibility to protect should be a moral obligation rather than a legal one. But a closer reading reveals an effort to cast it as a choice rather than any kind of obligation. Now that the statement is part of the UN record, hopefully the larger principles rather than the finer points of language will help shape future decisions about genocide.

UN

What's Next for the UN? 10 Possibilities
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

After an embarrassing fizzle of a global summit intended to tackle UN reform, the U.S. and the world organization need to figure out what's next.  Ideas are proliferating:  Ivo Daalder at Americans Abroad suggests replacing the global body with a comparable forum whose membership would be limited to longstanding democracies.  The Wall Street Journal editorial page wants to put Turtle Bay in trusteeship to be run by Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker.

Before drowning UN HQ into the East River, its worth keeping in mind the many things the UN does well (here's a list of 10 important ones).   But its also time for some new thinking on the UN's shortcomings and what might be done to tackle them.  Here are 10 ideas - some serious, some slightly fanciful.   Please add in your own:

1.  Next time, get the Heads of State together without no low-level pre-meetings - It's the endless pre-meetings of middling delegates where all the good ideas seem to get reduced to the proposition-of-the-resolution-of-the-committee-of-the-commission.  While plenty of world leaders may prove just as obstinate and obfuscatory as their underlings, my bet is you'd have a more serious group in the room.  Have the heads of state meet privately for, say, 3 days, divided into committees they would volunteer for that could take real decisions.

2.  Refuse to participate in the UN's Human Rights Council unless and until its done right - The Summit did not kill the idea of a bona fide human rights council that would make decisions based on legitimate criteria and be comprised of members with proven commitments to human rights.  But it came close by kicking all the details into the General Assembly, where a majority is likely to resist such reforms.  But if the US, Europeans, Australians and others refuse to take part, any human rights mechanism will be relegated to a sideshow.   This is an issue worth forcing.

3.  Campaign for Bill Clinton as Secretary General - This notion has been swirling around for years, and this week's landmark Clinton Global Initiative will only boost it.   It makes enormous sense:  Clinton would command a level of respect from leaders well beyond what any administrator or former foreign minister could muster.  His influence with the US alone would make his candidacy a win for the rest of the world.  Achieving this when Annan's term ends in December 2006 would necessitate a shift in the usual regional order of candidacies, but that's not out of the question.  After this week's debacle, the world should be in search of a savior for the UN.  If it really wants UN reform, the Administration ought to start lobbying on this one (an interesting sideline would involve implications for HRC's presidential bid . . .)

4.    Form an Americas Regional Group - The UN's regional group system (important for candidacies and elections to virtually all UN committees) is both anachronistic and simply weird.  Rather than being paired with its neighbors in the Americas, the US is group with Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and a few other strays in a Western European and Other Group.  Two big deterrents to possible realignment are Cuba and Venezuela.  But all sorts of interesting things might happen if we cast lots with Canada and the Latins:  closer relationships with allies like Mexico, Chile, Argentina and Brazil; better ability to influence the UN's developing world blocs, strong Western sway within at least 2 UN regional groups . . .

5.  Offer to Fund the Staff Buyout - The Summit ducked on Annan's proposal to offer a one-time buyout to get rid of dead wood within the UN's staff, passing the issue to the General Assembly.  The U.S., perhaps with a private donor, should put forward a big pool of money goodies (visas, eligibility for US benefit programs like social security) to support this program, provided the GA approves it.  If the offer is attractive enough, staff demand will help propel passage of the program.  Those who have worked at the UN know how key an element of management reform this is.

6.  Create standing UN capabilities for peacekeeping and peacebuilding - I can hear you now:  how can you argue that an organization as dysfunctional as the UN merits standing capabilities?!?   As it turns out, the UN's doing a lot better at peacekeeping and things like post-conflict reconstruction and election running than it is at, say administering sanctions and reforming itself.   The UN's capacity has grown significantly in these areas, as has the US's and the world's dependence on it.   But without standing capabilities, the UN will continue to face the problem it did when the US wanted its help in Iraq:  inability to attract donations of sufficient qualified personnel.

7.  Establish a Peacekeeping Training Center with US Backing - Related to the above, but potentially more palatable:  The US would establish a program, seeking financial and in-kind contributions by others, to train several thousand peacekeepers from around the world each year.  Trainees would then be seconded by their home governments for UN service for some fixed period of time, though formally remaining on the personnel rosters of their own militaries.  This would improve the quality of UN peacekeepers, give an incentive to more countries to participate, ensure a ready flow of qualified personnel, and give the US a measure of control over the whole effort.

8.   Make clear that the US views the UN as critical to its efforts on terrorism and WMD - The Summit took some tentative steps toward a global treaty on terror, and threw up its hands when it came to proliferation.  Whereas many of the preliminary reports that fed into the reform effort highlighted these top US foreign policy priorities, the US itself has sidelined the UN in its fights against terror and WMD.  While Bush talked about terror and proliferation during his Summit address last week, the Administration has viewed the UN as too weak and untrustworthy to play a key role and, partly as a result, the UN hasn't stepped up to the plate.  While these fights cannot be outsourced to the UN, there's no reason not to convince the membership that the organization's contributions are taken seriously.

9.  Air UNTV - One way to make the UN more transparent and accountable would be to introduce CSPAN-style gavel-to-gavel coverage of the tedium of UN committee work, broadcast via satellite worldwide.   The cameras might cut down on the hypocrisy and mischaracterizations that go on in UN debates, and incentivize countries to appoint stronger delegates.  This poll on the impact of CSPAN on its 25th birthday suggests some reasons for pause, however.  The number one reason cited for Members choosing to speak on the floor is raising their personal visibility.

10.  Invoke Responsibility to Protect in Darfur - Probably the most significant result of last week's Summit was inclusion of language in the outcome document specifying a "responsibility to protect" innocents confronted by genocide and war crimes.   The Canadians deserve great credit for pioneering the concept of "duty to protect" and pushing it this far.  The next step should be a swift new UN Security Council resolution invoking this obligation in relation to Darfur.  By quickly breathing life into this new provision, the UN membership can see to it that the Summit was not for naught.

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