Signs of Getting Out
Posted by Derek Chollet
After a couple weeks of being pushed out of the headlines by Katrina, Roberts, and the UN summit, Iraq roared back in a serious way this week. During the past three days, nearly 200 people there – mostly Iraqi police and civilians doing things like waiting in line to get jobs -- have been killed, beginning with 5 suicide bombing attacks on Wednesday alone, which ended up being the bloodiest single day so far. Clearly, the situation is not getting any better (for an alarmingly comprehensive list of the chaos since Wednesday, check out this timeline).
But lost in all of this has been a few events that seem to indicate that we are starting to get out of Iraq, slowly but surely. As we’ve discussed here and I’ve written elsewhere, I think that over the next year the U.S. will begin to get out of Iraq for both policy and political reasons – in terms of policy, the insurgency ain’t going away, and our all-volunteer military is stretched too thin and cannot sustain the current pace of operations much longer; and politically, the American people’s support for the current muddle through approach is eroding rapidly (and now, after Katrina, the Administration has even less political capital to spend).
So since pulling out is a policy and political reality, my prediction is that the Administration will make a virtue of necessity, declare victory (or some kind of success) and start bringing the troops home. I doubt it will do so with much fanfare and it won’t necessarily happen quickly; it will just start happening, and little by little our force presence will get smaller. Note how this will be framed differently (and in a more politically appealing way) than the withdrawal proposed by Administration’s critics: to Bush, we are getting out because we are “succeeding.” To his critics, we are getting out because we are failing. It’s the difference between Saigon 1975 and Sarajevo 2004.
That’s what I think we’ve started to see develop during that past few weeks. First, ten days ago, American forces withdrew from the southern city of Najaf and turned over control to the Iraqis (this is the first withdrawal this year). As Juan Cole described it: “We see here the beginnings of the Bush administration exit strategy for Iraq, which is that the south will be turned over to Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (the party that rules Najaf) and Badr (its paramilitary corps). The U.S. military must be convinced that Badr can now handle the Mahdi Army and can protect Grand Ayatollah Sistani from assassination (both are tall orders).”
And the Washington Post, through military sources, described the withdrawal in a broader context, explaining that the U.S. “is pushing for major withdrawals to begin in early spring. Iraqi and U.S. officials had identified Najaf as one of the first places where the United States could draw down its forces. Other cities in the heavily Shiite south, and in the Kurdish north, are likely to be next.” So stay tuned.
With this, the Iraqis themselves have been talking more openly about the U.S. getting out. This week a committee of the democratically-elected Iraqi National Assembly, the “National Sovereignty Committee,” referred to the U.S. troops as “occupation forces” (which is apparently a first) and called for setting a timeline for withdrawal.
This recommendation didn’t draw much attention, but another statement this week did: in an interview with American journalists, Iraqi President Talabani said that since Iraqi forces were improving, as many as 50,000 U.S. troops could withdraw by the end of the year. “We think that America has the full right to move some forces from Iraq to their country because I think we can replace them [with] our forces,” Talabani said. “In my opinion, at least from 40,000 to 50,000 American troops can be [withdrawn] by the end of this year.” After his meeting with Bush at the White House, Talabani walked this back a little – saying that there would be no timetable for withdrawal – but he did not retract the basic thrust of his comments: that as Iraqi forces make progress, the U.S. can start to get out.
My guess is that the main problem the Bush team had with the Talabani statement was one of timing. They believe that they need to stay until the political process plays itself out – that is, until after a new constitution is approved and new government elected at the end of this year. After then, the Administration will have no problem with statements like this – in fact, it will welcome and even encourage them, providing the justification for withdrawal that it wants.