Top 10 List: Consequences of Iraq Becoming A Failed State Posted by Suzanne Nossel

There is genuine uncertainty over whether, at this point, there’s anything the U.S can do to turn things around in Iraq. Kevin Drum suggests that the only reason to hesitate in calling for a pull out is the fear of looking weak.   As we debate what’s next, though, its worth considering what the consequences of a failed Iraq will be. 

I define failure as a situation in which the result of the U.S.’s invasion and subsequent occupation are not the stability (never mind the democracy) that we all hoped for, but instead continued chaos, factionalism, violence, and uncontrollable outside influence by the likes of Iran and Syria. It’s a scenario in which Iraq’s domestic security forces never gain the upper hand against insurgents, the economy does not recover, the fractious politics never coalesces into a functioning government, and the violence goes on unabated. In short, current conditions persist.

Noone, neither hawk nor peacenik, wants this to happen. But as we contemplate options that we long dismissed, its worth remembering why we’ve said for so long that the prospect of Iraq as a failed state was unacceptable. Even if we come to the conclusion that – though it may leave the country in ruins - U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is the best of an array of terrible options, if Iraq becomes a failed state that choice will not be without devastating consequences.

This post is intended not to suggest a particular course of action, but rather to point out that the result of recent years’ policies in Iraq is a painfully short list of options, all bad. Those guiding the war effort bear responsibility for backing us into this corner. At every stage, proposals have been made (to internationalize, involve the UN, improve planning, increase the number of troops when it still could have made a difference etc.) that could have helped us avoid this conundrum.

Some of the casualties if Iraq becomes a failed state:

1.   The fate of the Iraqi people – The Iraqi people will be left with a state that’s vulnerable to rampant violence, possible civil war and economic ruin. Those that believe that virtually anything is better than life under Saddam may face a Baathist resurgence.

2.   Stability in the Middle East – Chaos in Iraq will bleed over to the wider region.  Iraq’s neighbors can be expected to react opportunistically to the void, meddling in Iraqi affairs to serve their own interests, and very likely entering into violent conflict with one another.

3. Attitudes toward the U.S. in the Middle East – The U.S.’s image in the Middle East has gone from bad to worse in much of the Middle East as a result of the Iraq war. If the result of our efforts leaves the Iraqi people worse off, all the resentment over the perceived unilateralism of the Iraq invasion and the distortions of fact over WMD will harden into even deeper bitterness.

4. The fight against terrorism – Everyone from President Bush to al Qaeda #2 Ayman al Zawahri has declared the Iraqi insurgency the primary front of the fight against terrorism. If Iraq winds up a failed state, it will represent a territory terrorists have conquered and can claim. In addition to offering terrorists safe harbor to operate, the resources of the Iraqi state – oil, military, communications infrastructure, and funds – may fuel terrorist purposes.

5. Fight Against WMD, especially in Iran - Iranian influence is already on the rise in a chaotic Iraq; if Iraq fails, the role of the mullahs will only grow.  As illustrated by Ahmadinejad's election, the Iraq war has already undercut the support we used to enjoy among moderate Iranians sick of their repressive regime.  If Iraq becomes a failed state and U.S. influence in the Middle East correspondingly diminishes, the pressure on Iran to accede to American demands in relation to its nuclear program will further weaken.  Chinese and Russian economic ties to Iran will pose increasingly powerful buffers against counter-proliferation efforts.  Its hard to imagine Kim Jong Il won't find some way of scoring points off this as well; he's already benefitted from the consensus that a military response to N. Korea's nuclear program is off the table.

6. American credibility - Let's face it:  a failed state in Iraq will alter perceptions of American power the world over. Iraq is the most ambitious and important U.S. foreign policy undertaking in a generation.  Despite all the rifts, the U.S. has been united in its determination that Iraq not become a failed state.  For the U.S. to mount a massive effort to prevent that outcome, only to witness it anyway has to call into question the credibility of American power.

7. Prospects for democracy in the Middle East – The Bush Administration has often described how the creation of a stable and democratic Iraq would prompt liberalization throughout the Middle East. While this is true in theory, so is the opposite. The failure of Iraq’s democratic experiment will be a mortal blow, weakening moderates in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and elsewhere and reinforcing the notion that democracy cannot succeed in the region.

8. Americans’ willingness to use military force - Iraq as a failed state is likely to herald an era of deep reservations among the U.S. public regarding the use of force - - a kind of post-Vietnam, post-Mogadishu hangover. While this Administration has made the prospect of greater circumspection in the use of force very attractive, a level of public skepticism that makes it impossible to intervene to prevent genocide or stop live conflicts from further spreading could result in more Rwandas and Bosnias.

9. Military morale - Military morale has already been damaged by a conflict that put our troops at risk without adequate preparation or equipment, that has disrupted families and livelihoods through long extensions in tours of duty.  The unexpected difficulties confronted on the battlefield have provoked a crisis of confidence in Pentagon leadership.  Despite their frustration, those who have served want to be sure that their sacrifices result in an Iraq that's better off.  If, after all this, Iraq devolves into a failed state the blow to the military will be brutal.

10. Today’s definition of a superpower - The combined impact of Iraq's emergence as a failed state on America's image, military, credibility influence in the Middle East, and on our battles against terrorism and WMD will be profound.   In both bilateral and multi-lateral relations, most countries' dealings with the U.S. are predicated on the idea that we are capable of accomplishing whatever we set out to do.  That notion is so well understood that we rarely have to prove it.  The prevalence of this belief has made it immeasurably easier to rally others behind our causes, thwart opposition and work our will.  While failure in Iraq won't change that overnight, it will open a question about what superpowerdom means in an era of terrorism and insurgency. 

Comments

[Azael]

Pity that we didn't consider the risks *before* we went ahead and did a bunch of stupid things.

[Piers]

A sobering list! What you don't answer is whether US withdrawal will inevitably lead to Iraq's becoming a failed state.

[LibbyandLiddy]

I tend to agree with the implicit assumption behind this post - namely that Democrats need to point out more forcefully the ruin wrought by the Bush Administration's policies, rather than futilely trying to point the way out of the paper bag. There is no way out, so the key now is distance, distance, distance, while pointing out the error of the ways that led us here.

Republicans never let their inability to proffer better alternatives stand in the way of the impulse to criticize. Why do we??

[my cat]

I am worried that the debate is polarizing between the stay-and-try-to-do-someting-constructive view and the get-out-now view. I think we should save our wrath--our entirely justified wrath-- for all politicians, Democrat or Republican, who still cling to the irresponible contention that the original invasion was a good idea. Anyone still clinging to that position should be euthanized. (metaphorically ,of course).
It is possible for honorable, well-informed, ethical people to disagree about what we should do now. Those adjectives can't be applied to politicians who still support the initial invasion.

I tend, with deep reluctance, to agree that we can't just walk away. However, on the issue of what to do now: all choices are bad. We can only attempt to identify the least bad choice, the choice most likely to result in something more positive than things as they are now. We have to accept the fact that the Iraqis will create a society that is acceptable to them and might not be acceptable to us. For example, they will continue to align themselves with Iran and there isn't a damn thing we can do about it. Also a unified Iraq will be close to a thoecracy with sharia law at its foundation whether we like it or not. Those are outcomes that we should have considered before the invasion. Too late now.
One little ray of light; after this administration the myth that Republicans are strong on defense will be dispelled along with the myth that they manage the nation's finances more prudently than Democrats.

[Dan Kervick]

Welcome back Suzanne.

While there are many very dreadful outcomes that one can imagine resulting from the failure of the Iraqi central government - and believe me, my thoughts are plagued with these images - there are also conceivable outcomes in which the Iraqi state could fail, but in which something better could emerge - something better at least than the Baathist monstrosity that proceeded it. Perhaps we should begin to think more often of Iraq as an artificial colonial creation, and entertain the possibility that the invasion has created the opportunity for what was once Iraq to evolve into several successor states that are each more natural than what came before.

Of course, such an outcome would not represent the sort of clear and easy victory that the supporters of the war hoped for. In the words of Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address, most of them certainly expected an outcome "less fundamental and astounding" and it would be appropriate for pro-war Americans to be chagrined and humbled by the way in which events spun away from our ability to control them, and also ashamed of the degree of destruction they helped cause.

But neither would such an outcome represent the sort of clear and catastrophic loss that the enemies of America desired, and American critics of the war feared. It wouldn't be like Afghanistan and Vietnam, for example, where the Soviets and Americans were driven out by the forces of their enemies, which forces then assumed control of the state. In Iraq it would be a much more mixed result. The Shiites and the Kurds, whom the US encouraged to rise up in the wake of the Gulf War, would have succeeded at long last in achieving the result at which the US prodded them to aim in 1991. We should enjoy excellent relations with the Kurdish successor state, and with diligence could enjoy tolerably good relations with the Shiite successor state. Yet it is true that the Sunni Arab result is likely to be far less wholesome for us. So where America and its enemies are concerned, perhaps we could then also say with Lincoln "the prayers of both could not be answered. That of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has His own purposes."

I agree with the appropraiteness of most of the items on your list, taken as cautionary notes. But I have problems with a couple:

If Iraq winds up a failed state, it will represent a territory terrorists have conquered and can claim. In addition to offering terrorists safe harbor to operate, the resources of the Iraqi state – oil, military, communications infrastructure, and funds – may fuel terrorist purposes.

Are the Kurds terrorists? Is Sistani a terrorist? We really have to get out of this dichotomy of thinking either "we win" or the "terrorists win." That is not to say that Iraq does not pose a serious problem now on the terrorism front. It does - and likely will whether the central govenment holds together or not. Preventing Iraqi oil wealth from funding terrorist networks will be a challenge. But it is hard for me to see how a state that was once Sunni-owned and Sunni-run, and that has perished in spawning rival Kurdish and Shiite states as offspring, leaving the once powerful dominant Sunni class flailing about in an oil-deprived rump, would represent a victory for the Sunni Salafist radicals and their aim of creating a pan-Islamic Salafist state. Surely others in the region would laugh at that claim.

And what could very well emerge in central Iraq is a neo-Baathist or Arabist entity of some kind, or perhaps a traditionalist Sunni shaikhdom or emirate more akin to Saudi Arabia or the other states of the Arabian peninsula. None of these people like Salafist jihadists running rampant in their country and threatening their rule (although they are occasionally happy to get rid of them by exporting them to other countries), and are likely to deal harshly with them once the Americans are gone.

By the way, you may have read recently that it is the Sunnis who are now the party most opposed to "federalism" - such federalism being a harbinger of autonomy and separation. Federalism, autonomy or independence will all carry with them local control over oil and its revenues. The Sunni Arabs have no oil in their region, and are terrified of losing a share of that revenue. Tough luck.

If we really want to keep oil revenue out of the hands of Sunni jihadists, then perhaps the best plan is to assign those revenues to to the Kurdish and Shiite states that would occupy the regions where the oil reserves are located - that is, safely under the control of the regions where the jihadists ain't at.

Iraq as a failed state is likely to herald an era of deep reservations among the U.S. public regarding the use of force - - a kind of post-Vietnam, post-Mogadishu hangover. While this Administration has made the prospect of greater circumspection in the use of force very attractive, a level of public skepticism that makes it impossible to intervene to prevent genocide or stop live conflicts from further spreading could result in more Rwandas and Bosnias.

Yes, but perhaps it would also finally shake Americans out of their stubborn, go-it-alone hero-complex, and their fanatical and jealous regard for their uncomplicated national sovereignty; and perhaps it would jolt them into the recognition that the prevention of more Rwandas and Bosnias will require the establishment of a truly potent and transnational, UN-centered, pacification and stabilization force. Mnay idealistic young American men and women could proudly volunteer to serve in such a force and play a part in ending wars and crimes against humanity, without having to throw in their lot in with the hired imperial muscle and US protection racket occasionally run out of the White House under the aegis of the Department of "Defense".

If I thought Americans currently suffered from a debilitating unwillingness to use force for their own defense, I would be worried about your outcome #8. But given that the current problem is precisely the opposite, I would be delighted with an overall increase in national military reticence.

[Lane Brody]

I disagree with the premise of this essay. Far from there being nothing the US can do to "turn things around" I would like to go way out on a limb and say that the tide has turned. Many sunni leaders, secular and religious, are urging fellow sunni's to stop boycotting the political process and get involved. These people are the newest targets of the insurgents. This is excellent news.

While it is not apparent from reading the press, which often indicates the reverse, the insurgency mostly stopped targetting Coalition forces some time ago. For some time they've been targetting other Iraqi's, mostly shia. The shia have almost totally resisted going in for a tit for tat series of revenge attacks.

So now we have the mostly sunni insurgency going after fellow sunni's. Along with this trend are multiple reports of Iraqi security units getting much better, and timely, intell from fellow Iraqi's.

This is not to justify Iraq, or put aside the many mistakes made, but just as the press reported a quagmire a few days before both Kabul and Baghdad fell they seem to be reporting a current quagmire. War is ugly and bloody and during war people die. The press seems to often get confused between the facts of war, death, and what those facts mean. People dying does not equate to quagmire. More people will die before this is over but it's far from a static situation.

Certainly this view could be wrong. We'll know one way or the other in 12 months or so.

Lane Brody

[boz]

Great list. And by great, I mean well thought out, obviously not great news...

[Jay.Mac]

The one point I'd take issue with is the low morale among the Army. Far from it, reports seem to indicate that morale is high - http://news.yahoo.com/s/krwashbureau/20050819/
ts_krwashbureau/_bc_usiraq_media_wa

Army Capt. Sherman Powell reinforced that view with his comments during an interview Wednesday with "Today" show host Matt Lauer in Baghdad. Lauer wondered how troop morale could be so high, given the problems in Iraq.

"If I got my news from the newspapers also, I'd be pretty depressed as well," Powell replied. "Those of us who've actually had a chance to get out and go on patrols and meet the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police and go on patrols with them, we are very satisfied with the way things are going here."

News also of a request from Fallujah for more voter registration offices to cope with demand prior to the October election.

Things aren't perfect there but when some Sunni clerics and terrorist groups have to issue warnings that democracy is incompatible with Islam and that those who vote or join the Army or police are infidels and heretics, you have to assume that it's because they need to try and stop the surge towards democracy.

http://crypticsubterranean.blogspot.com/2005/08/islam-uncovered.html

They are losing.

[Jay.Mac]

More good news from Iraq The Model- this time he tells of how he was stopped inthe street close to a Sunni mosque and handed a flyer- advocating that Sunnis take part in the upcoming elections. The most interesting aspect for me was that they had included proofs from the Koran and Hadith to support their position.

Again, when we hear news actually coming from Iraq (here and Michael Yon being my prime two examples) the situation is not always as bad as it appears.

[Angryman]

What Iraq the Mouthpiece neglects to inform you is that the flyer was advocating rejecting the constitution.

Yay team! We've achieved the Worst Case Scenario! A constitution which shafts the driving force behind the insurrection while simultaneously papering over irreconcialiable differences between the Kurds and Shia.

Hoo-fsckin-ray.

[Ben P]

What the dwindling band of folks who seem to think things are a good trajectory are missing - at least in this thread, but I have seen this elsewhere - is several things.

One, trying to define success by whether or not the insurgency is increasing or decreasing. While I certainly wouldn't want to suggest that the insurgency's strenght and ability to attack is irrelevent, it is only one among a plethora of problems that currently make Iraq one of the least livable places on the planet.

Secondly, and this is a related point. Whether or not people are dropping pieces of paper in ballot boxes is by no means a significant measure of whether or not the country is a failed state or not. There have been many elections in sub-Saharan African countries, but this means nothing if life in the country remains anarchic, desperate, and poor. The bottom line is that Iraq is miles away from having the kind of civil society or rule of law that are essential preconditions for a functioning state let alone a successful democracy. Indeed, I'd say its moving in the opposite direction, at least if you accept the premise that Iraq is and should remain a contiguous state.

Thirdly, and I'd refer people to Kevin Drum's quite astute post on the topic. The question is not whether or not individual good things are happening. Surely, they are. They happen in the most desperate of situations. The question is the big picture. What is the larger trajectory? Are not ethnic and religious militias as well as criminal gangs increasingly taking over civil society vacuum, imposing draconian religious law in many parts of the country? See this Washington Post piece on the trend in Shi'ite and Kurdish areas or this Guardian piece on the construction of Taliban-style mini-state in the Sunni city of Haditha. Or how about the whole Steve Vincent affair, who was in fact murdered (likely) because he dared report on the Shi'ite fundamentalist take-over of governance and law enforcement in Basra? How about SCIRI's "forced" removal of Baghdad's mayor last week? Secondly, is there any sign that politics are not moving in the direction of a zero-sum ethno-religious game in which, say, the Shi'ites gain is the Sunni's loss? This gets back to the point about people registering to vote. Why are they registering to vote? What do they hope to achieve by voting? All these trends - towards sectarianism, away from the rule of law, collapse of civil society, astronomical crime rates, no real sense of a national identity - are all classic symptons of a failed state.

[Ben P]

What the dwindling band of folks who seem to think things are a good trajectory are missing - at least in this thread, but I have seen this elsewhere - is several things.

One, trying to define success by whether or not the insurgency is increasing or decreasing. While I certainly wouldn't want to suggest that the insurgency's strenght and ability to attack is irrelevent, it is only one among a plethora of problems that currently make Iraq one of the least livable places on the planet.

Secondly, and this is a related point. Whether or not people are dropping pieces of paper in ballot boxes is by no means a significant measure of whether or not the country is a failed state or not. There have been many elections in sub-Saharan African countries, but this means nothing if life in the country remains anarchic, desperate, and poor. The bottom line is that Iraq is miles away from having the kind of civil society or rule of law that are essential preconditions for a functioning state let alone a successful democracy. Indeed, I'd say its moving in the opposite direction, at least if you accept the premise that Iraq is and should remain a contiguous state.

Thirdly, and I'd refer people to Kevin Drum's quite astute post on the topic. The question is not whether or not individual good things are happening. Surely, they are. They happen in the most desperate of situations. The question is the big picture. What is the larger trajectory? Are not ethnic and religious militias as well as criminal gangs increasingly taking over civil society vacuum, imposing draconian religious law in many parts of the country? See this Washington Post piece on the trend in Shi'ite and Kurdish areas or this Guardian piece on the construction of Taliban-style mini-state in the Sunni city of Haditha. Or how about the whole Steve Vincent affair, who was in fact murdered (likely) because he dared report on the Shi'ite fundamentalist take-over of governance and law enforcement in Basra? How about SCIRI's "forced" removal of Baghdad's mayor last week? Secondly, is there any sign that politics are not moving in the direction of a zero-sum ethno-religious game in which, say, the Shi'ites gain is the Sunni's loss? This gets back to the point about people registering to vote. Why are they registering to vote? What do they hope to achieve by voting? All these trends - towards sectarianism, away from the rule of law, collapse of civil society, astronomical crime rates, no real sense of a national identity - are all classic symptons of a failed state.

[Gus]

1. All of the bad things Nossel lists have already occurred to a substantial extent. [True, as Jay-Mac says, army morale has been sustained, if one discounts many instances of execrable behavior toward Iraqis. But future recruits may be hard to find and units to post in Iraq hard to come by.] She is contending they would occur to an even greater extent.
2. She may well be right. But it might also be that the prospect of an American withdrawal would induce the Iraqis to achieve some measure of reconcilation. The question is whether the Shi'a, the Sunnis, and the Kurds can live together with a modicum of mutual respect or can only go their separate ways/be held together by force and intimidation.
3. Nossel doesn't make a case for keeping our troops there. That would require showing that they can stay and do something that will create a better situation for withdrawal in the future. But it's quite possible that reckless Bush and his adoring followers have created a situation just as bad as Nossel says, AND one we can do nothing about. Maybe failure--of the Iraqi state, of American policy--is inevitable.
4. As Nossel says, things could get a lot worse if we get out. But will they get better if we stay? Already life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short for Sunnis in Basra, for Arabs in Kurdistan. for Americans or Iraqis trying to uproot the Sunni insurgency.
5. The insurgents are Sunni. If they were to attempt to occupy city hall, they would be confronted by American forces. Most of those being killed by Americans are Sunni. I don't suppose this greatly saddens Shi'as or Kurds. Nossel says if American troops pull out, the insurgents would take city hall. Perhaps they would. But why, so long as American troops continue to occupy Iraq, will Sunni insurgents cease to commit atrocities and find support from other Sunnis? And don't the Kurds and Shi'a have considerable resources of their own with which to defend city hall?
But I am conceding there might be fighting (now or in a few years) between Sunnis and others if we pull out now. Does Nossel believe there won't be fighting (right away or in a few years) if we pull out after five years or ten?

[J.]

What Gus said. While an interesting list, I think the author fails to demonstrate how these things have not already occurred as a result of "staying the course" vice increasing the efforts in country. In particular I don't agree with numbers 5 and 8. The US govt has already demonstrated that the war wasn't about WMDs, and has an aggressive initiative (PSI) to demonstrate that it is serious about combating proliferation. As for the American public's not having willingness to use force, that's a canard - public opinion polls show that the public isn't shy about using force, but it wants to see results. It's the blind inertia of seeing casualties rise without a corresponding rise in success that is frustrating.

As far as how countries today define a "superpower," I don't think there's any illusion as to our strength, since we have a defense department that outspends the next 20-25 countries' defense budgets combined. It's the resolve and the focus of our national security agenda that is at question.

[Barry]

"Army Capt. Sherman Powell reinforced that view with his comments during an interview Wednesday with "Today" show host Matt Lauer in Baghdad. Lauer wondered how troop morale could be so high, given the problems in Iraq."

An udoubtedly pre-screened officer, who'd be spending quite some time in Leavenworth if he said anything else.

[J Thomas]

While I like the idea of looking at consequences, I want to note that some of the items on this list are straw men. Particularly:

10: US status as superpower. Already gone. If we're still occupying iraq 5 years from now that won't bring our reputation back.

9. Military morale. Also pretty much shot. Another 5 years in iraq before we finally pull out isn't going to help.

8. US readiness to invade other countries. Once again, staying the course in iraq won't help. We get unenthusiastic about invasion after each time we get our fingers burnt. You can argue that this is a bad thing, that we ought to reach for that next firebrand as eagerly as we did the last one, but this is just how it works. Holding on tight while our fingers get burnt worse won't help.

7. Democracy in the middle east. Ummm. People will have democracy wherever and whenever they're willing enough to fight for it. If iraqis aren't ready to set up a democracy for themselves, and we temporarily force them into one, is that actually going to encourage others in the middle east? Say we occupy them into democracy, and then the iraqis set up a solid secret police and an army that's loyal to whoever they're loyal to, and the popular general slugs it out with the secret police chief and one of them wins -- how is that going to spread democracy?

6. American credibility. If you can say with a straight face that US credibility is still at risk, you're a better actor than I am. American credibility is shot. Five more years of occupation won't help any more than the last 5 years of vietnam did.

5. WMDs. Umm. If our understaffed whack-a-mole operation in iraq really looks like it can support a credible attack on iran, then maybe the iranians will be scared of us and will back down. After all, if say the chinese were occupying mexico and threatening us with serious attacks to get us to give up our nukes, we'd give them up wouldn't we? We wouldn't risk a big war just to keep a few nukes. After all, if the only readon the chinese are threatening to invade us is a few nukes, clearly we'd be safer after they had nukes and we didn't.... Surely the iranians are as rational as we are. They'd see that a war would be destructive so they'd back down. But what if our attack doesn't look that credible? Just imagine the iranians could smuggle hi-tech weapons into iraq. All of a sudden we'd be losing tanks and helicopters and bunkers to the new weapons. And we can't afford to lose many copters, we have to have them to do our resupply. Is our army in iraq a threat to iran, or is it a hostage?

4. Terrorism. While iraq remains a failed state, international terrorists can do things there. If it remains a failed state after we leave, they can do the same things they do while we're there except we won't be there for them to attack. That would be an improvement. On the other hand we wouldn't be there to stop them from taking over the government and changing it from a failed state to a successful state owned by terrorists. So that's a real point in favor of continuing the occupation and keeping iraq a failed state for the indefinite future.

3. Attitudes in the middle east. People tend to despise us for the war. If we continue the occupation and somehow get a good outcome for iraqis in 5 years or so, then after that time people will tend to despise us less. They won't remember the 7 years of bad times, they'll remember the good result. So that's an argument for continuing until we win -- on the assumption that we'll win. On the other hand if we occupy iraq for another years and things don't improve, it won't make people in the middle east or the international community think better of us at all. So we need to carefully consider the odds on this one.

2. Stability in the middle east. If iraq stays chaotic after we're gone, it will be bad for other nations in the middle east. But if iraq stays chaotic while we stay, isn't that just as bad? Or is it worse? So it's a bet, which way is more likely to improve on the chaos, and which way is likely to go faster?

1. The fate of the iraqi people. This is an important point. But consider -- the iraqi people are armed now, apart from the ones we've successfully disarmed. For awhile there an AK47 cost well under $25 and they were selling very very well. The iraqi people are in far better shape to decide their own fate than most peoples of the world. It takes high technology and expensive armor to intimidate them now, except the ones who aren't willing to stand up for themselves. There's likely to be a certain amount of violence while they get things sorted out, but they have the chance to stand up for their choices and come up with some agreement they can live with. Do we improve things by putting a lid on it, by using our superior firepower and armor to intimidate them? Is that really in their best interest?

It would be good for iraq to stop being a failed state. But do we really help by using our military might to "support" the returning politicians? It worked in the past sometimes -- De Gaulle was a successful returnee politician that we helped install. I can't think of any other examples where it worked out well but there probably are some. Still, is this the best way for us to help iraq stop being a failed state?

[byronius]

I believe that the noted consequences in this essay Top 10 List: Consequences of Iraq Becoming A Failed State really haven't looked at the more extreme implications ( nightmares) of a failed state scenario. BTW: I personally don't believe we have much choice and have to keep engaged until we have something akind to stability however ill advised our decisions were to pursue this avenue of action.

1. Kirkuk annexation. Oil is the pre-eminent strategic resource in Iraq. Turkey has the desire to re-take the northern region - that was partitioned by the British anyway from the Ottoman Empire after WW-One. Perhaps a bilateral trade between Iran ( for the Southern Shia Iraqi region) and a very weak central Iraqi government in the middle.

2. Rise of Islamic States. Countries with leaders on already shaky ground and/or iron-fist rule [ Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan) will be directly in the eyesights of fundamentalist ( locally and nearby). The fact most of these leaders are pro-Western secularist would not be a good thing ( from an Islamic point of view).

3. Oil Security Increasingly at Risk. Industrialized countries ( OECD) would be dependent upon oil supplies that will increasingly be located in a relatively small region of the world where the US ( and at least other Western nations) would be considered at best - hostile. Perhaps this could be a blessing in disguise - depending upon how much attention and priority we focus on alternative energy policy.

4. Inward Focused US Foreign Policy. If the US first proponents ( from any parties) gain any ground, we could face an increasingly isolationist trend in foreign policy climate. I don't believe it would be as bad as after WWI but intervention options will probably be " off the table" but for the most extreme emergencies. This type of " exclusion " could lead to below.

5. Increased " approved" black operations, assassination, bombings, special operations etc. to keep a low-intensity war ongoing against " US determined threats" in designated strategic ( oil) regions.

[J Thomas]

Byronius, I'm not sure what your point is here.

1. The turks might very well decide they *don't* want another 5 million rebellious kurds, they might figure the oil and the prestige isn't worth it. So that whole scenario might be just a nightmare fantasy. But then, what if they do? Would the iraqi kurds really be worse off with the turks oppressing them than with Saddam oppressing them? Say the turks move in. The kurds keep the pipelines bombed and generally cause trouble. Turkey doesn't get into the EU. It's a lot of bother for a lot of people for five to twenty years, and then the turks give up and cede southern turkey and northern iraq to the kurds. Quite possibly a lot of kurds would prefer it that way rather than being on a long leash with an iraqi congress. After all, there's no guarantee the turks wouldn't conquer kurdistan anyway if they were part of iraq. How hard would the iraqis fight turkey to stop it?

2. Shaky secular dictators are in trouble regardless how it comes out in iraq. Because they're shaky secular dictators, right? Just how much do you want to support them, anyway. We got rid of Saddam and threatened the rest because we don't like arab dictators. Are you not with us on that? Saddam was the one that was most over-the-top, but none of them are good. It's partly that Saddam got really bad press because we considered him our enemy, while Mubarak etc get their worst features downplayed because they're pro-western. We mostly only heard how bad the Shah's torturers were after he backstabbed us with OPEC. We'll only hear the worst of Mubarak's torturers if we decide he isn't our lackey. So what's the problem? Don't we want democracy in the middle east? Sure, islamic democracy isn't as pleasant for us as a secular democracy would be. But then, in the USA a lot of us are finding christian democracy isn't as pleasant as a secular democracy would be either. You take the good with the bad.

3. Sure, it's a problem when so much oil comes from places where they think we're hostile. But what can we expect? Maybe if we weren't so hostile yjey wouldn't think we were. Do you think they'll believe we're less hostile if we run a long bloody occupation that eventually crushes the resistance?

4. It's true that if we pull out of iraq now we might get more isolationist. On the other hand, if we stage a long bloody occupation that might make us more isolationist too. What I see is that we start getting isolationist when we see intervention not working. Figure out a way to do fast easy cheap successful interventions and the US public will be all for them.

5. If we fail in iraq then sure, we'll see increased US black ops in the middle east. But if we have a long occupation we'll also see increased US black ops in the middle east. And if we eventually succeed won't we be emboldened to do increased US black ops in the middle east? I just don't see this depending on the occupation at all.

[Nancy Fulton]

I should start with the idea that I'm pro military pullout.

Actually, I'm pro massive quantities of humanitarian aid of a scale never before seen. The Iraqi's are starving, they are dying of thirst, they have no hospitals, and the war we started has blown to bits a huge percentage of their buildings.

The US has the resources to make sure that the people in Iraq, 24 million of them, are well fed, have fresh water and have the supplies required to rebuild their own cities.

I think the price of trying to walk away from our responsiblities to the Iraqi people for the war we started will be . . . that Iraqi insurgents won't stay in Iraq, and that Iran, Syria, Turkey and Saudi Arabia won't stay out of Iraq.

The softspot in the US economy is the 15% of our oil we get from Saudi Arabia, and the contribution other countries in the region make to the "pool of oil" that sustains the european, african and asian economies.

I have no reason to believe that Iraq's starving, desperate, educated, intelligent people won't be able to attack that system, or that they won't be able to see how driving oil and gas prices to $100+ a barrel will benefit their people.

I don't know why people think the US will be allowed to walk out of this mess without paying a huge price. We've killed a lot of people and destroyed an entire economy . . . Think the people we've hurt will let us walk away without paying a toll?

[Fred]

an interesting article...i wish i understood it