Institutions Not Individuals Posted by Michael Cohen

Cong. David Price (D-NC) is quickly becoming one of my favorite US Congressman. Not only did he co-sponsor legislation expanding the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to cover private security contractors (a long overdue effort to ensure greater accountability of PSCs) but he has an excellent article in this month's Washington Quarterly that makes a number of important points about the future of U.S. democracy promotion,

There is a lot of good material here, but this graf is worth noting:

Democracy is not just about elections. What is equally essential to lasting democracy is what happens between elections. Democracy requires strong institutions in legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. An important threshold is reached when a free and fair democratic election is held. Yet advancing voters’ concerns through peaceful, constitutional, and responsive means requires moving beyond elections to the practical work of developing the capacities of democratic institutions.

Too often, U.S. democracy promotion efforts have failed to penetrate beyond the rhetorical or superficial, and the Bush administration’s track record in this regard is decidedly mixed. The most consequential mistake has been to assume that democracy could spring fully formed from the barrel of a gun, most notably in the case of Iraq. Bush’s failure to avoid the errors of his predecessors, despite acknowledging and disavowing them, has also been damaging. Like many executives before him, the current president has allowed a myopic, short-term view of foreign affairs to obscure our national security vision.

. . . Admittedly, U.S. commitment to democracy abroad cannot always be absolute, after all, the United States is a nation with a complex and extensive agenda on the international stage. Yet, it is imperative that the United States be far less ready to sacrifice the democracy agenda for other goals. Supporting the growth of democracy extends beyond supporting democratic reforms and pressing non-democratic leaders. It must also include the difficult, sustained work of building and supporting democratic institutions.

This is precisely the sort of road map that our democratization efforts should be following - and while it may to some seem intuitive, it has been inconsistently advanced as a part of America's democracy promotion agenda.

Read the whole thing here.

Kagame the Democrat? Posted by Michael Cohen

A couple of days ago I linked to a piece by Joshua Kurlantzick, which extolled the virtues of Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda as the sort of enlightened yet unelected leader who could help seed democratic renewal and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. An excellent piece in the New York Times offers ample evidence as to why the myth of unelected "democratic" strongmen is just that - a myth.

According to the Times, under Kagame's leadership, Rwanda is once again seeding violence in mayhem in Congo and they are doing it in an underhanded and undemocratic manner:

Several demobilized Rwandan soldiers, speaking in hushed tones in Kigali, Rwanda’s tightly controlled capital, described a systematic effort by Rwanda’s government-run demobilization commission to send hundreds if not thousands of fighters to the rebel front lines. Former rebel soldiers in Congo said that they had seen Rwandan officers plucking off the Rwandan flags from the shoulders of their fatigues after they had arrived and that Rwandan officers served as the backbone of the rebel army. . .

Rwandan government officials are involved, providing bus fare for the men to travel to Congo and updating the rebel leadership each month on how many fighters from Rwanda are about to come over.

And why is Rwanda keeping their involvement in Congo under wraps: "Rwanda’s leaders are vigilant about not endangering their carefully crafted reputation as responsible, development-oriented friends of the West." The Times story also goes on to detail the rampant plundering of Eastern Congo by Rwanda businessmen and the veneer of freedom that defines the nation:

Rwanda may have a lot going for it — a high economic growth rate, low corruption, a Parliament with a majority of seats held by women. But many people here say they do not feel free. When the former government official was interviewed at a Kigali hotel, he abruptly stopped talking whenever the maid walked by.

Its worth a read; and serves as an ample reminder that so-called benevolent unelected leaders are often anything but.

Protecting Contractors Posted by Michael Cohen

One of the most significant and potentially damaging provisions of the recently agreed upon Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and Iraq is the removal of immunity from Iraqi law for private security contractors (PSCs).

As I've written before, there is serious danger in this policy being implemented. Many of the most experienced contractors may decide that the risks of being thrown in an Iraqi prison are not worth a paycheck and as a result the US may come to rely on third-country or local-country nationals, who often lack proper experience and training. A deprofessionalization of the PSC corps in Iraq won't be good for anyone; not for US diplomats and certainly not for Iraqi civilians.

However, in a rather troubling editorial yesterday the New York Times is decidely non-plussed about the situation.

Companies warn that the agreement will make it much harder for them to hire Americans and others to provide security in Iraq. If true, it is still an acceptable price to pay to show this country’s commitment to the rule of law.

It is astounding that the Times would cite commitment to "the rule of law" as a rationale for placing U.S. private security contractors at the mercy of the Iraqi legal system, particularly in light of the most recent report of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. The UN draws these conclusions about the Iraqi criminal justice system:

“Many detainees have been deprived of their liberty for     months or even years, often under precarious physical conditions, without     access to defence counsel, or without being formally charged with a crime or     produced before a judge. Continuing allegations of widespread torture and     ill-treatment of inmates are of particular concern.”

That this would be considered an "acceptable price to pay" for any American citizen is hard to imagine but such hyperbole should not seem surprising from an editorial that falsely accuses security contractors of being akin to "private armies" and describes American PCSs as being "infamous among Iraqis for their “spray and pray” approach to security: spraying bullets and praying they hit the enemy."  It is a charge that is very difficult to reconcile with the reality of how contractors have acted in Iraq and the low number of civilian casualties for which they have been responsible.

The Times is certainly correct to demand greater accountability for PSCs. In fact, they rightly call on Congress to pass legislation that will expand the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) to private contractors employed by the State Department. This would provide the accountability that Iraqis and Americans have been demanding for years - and to which the PSC industry has offered little resistance.

But the blase attitude with which the Times and others (including the same DoD and State Dept that has hired and utilized PSCs for nearly 5 years) have demonstrated toward contractors -- and their possible imprisonment and prosecution in a legal system that has little respect for the sort of due process provisions we take for granted -- is both shocking and unseemly.

The contractors that we hire and send into harm's way merit the same consideration and protection as any other American citizen. It's unfortunate that in a rush to condemn the Bush Administration for its mishandled occupation of Iraq and its over reliance on contractors many have chosen to ignore that fact.

When non-westerners die, does the media notice and other eternal questions Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Over at bloggingheads, Daniel Drezner and I debunk the mainstream media frenzy-du-jour that progressives are split over the Obama Cabinet (thanks to MW and others who pointed this out first); ponder the regional implications of the Mumbai attacks; and complain about the excessive and obscuring focus on western victims.  I've been meaning to point out grumpily somewhere, and the Arsenal seems like the place, that 400 people died in communal conflict in Jos, Nigeria over the same period last week and hundreds of Indians have died in previous terrorist attacks this year, not to mention the fifty Iraqis killed in bombings in the last two days. 

On a lighter note, we invite commenters to give our infrequent dialogues a catchy name.  Figured our loyal democracyarsenal crowd would want in on that.

Mumbai attacks resemble past LeT operations Posted by Max Bergmann

I was re-reading a 2003 book on Kashmir by my old grad school adviser, Sumantra Bose, and came across a pretty relevant description of the methods of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) – the group now accused of being behind last week’s attacks. The flurry of suicidal guerrilla raids that took place in Indian controlled Kashmir between 1999-200 often usually consisted of two-man guerrilla groups that would burst into an Indian military camp or other target building and would begin “firing indiscriminately from automatic rifles and lobbing grenades.” Most of these attacks were blamed on the LeT. Bose writes on p. 142:

“LeT denies that its raids are suicide missions – preferring to call them “daredevil” actions – since the group follows an ultra-orthodox version of Sunni Islam that strictly prohibits suicide, but the raids nonetheless have an undeniably suicidal character. The attackers almost never return from these penetrate and kill missions – their aim is not to save their own lives but to maximize the frightening psychological impact on the enemy by inflicting death and destruction on their targets.”

Bose notes that there were a large number of these types of attacks, and while most were directed at Indian security personnel, on a number of occasions attacks were targeted against civilians within Kashmir.  The attacks last week in Mumbai clearly resemble these past LeT attacks.

His book is highly recommended for anyone interested in what it will take to resolve Kashmir and achieve peace between India and Pakistan.

Lessons for Executive Summarizers Posted by Patrick Barry

It's no secret that poppy cultivation and opium production are a huge problem in Afghanistan, but the UNODC's latest Opium Survey for Afghanistan, which showed that cultivation declined 19% this year has raised the eyebrows of people like Spencer Ackerman and Mark Leon Goldberg.  Goldberg reports that the survey attributed this decline to both enhanced counternarcotics efforts and a drought.  As you can see, this is right from the UNODC's Executive Summary:

The full opium survey shows that cultivation reduced more than expected thanks to successful counter-narcotic efforts in the northern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan.

This decline was also a result of unfavourable weather conditions that caused extreme drought and crop failure in some provinces, especially those in which agriculture is rainfed.

But don't go thanking God and counternarcotics officers just yet.  A comparison of the Executive Summary with the Executive Summary contained in the actual report (believe it or not, they aren't the same) shows that there are SIGNIFICANT differences in their explanations for the reduction, including some that would lead you to a less-than-happy set of conclusions:

Since 2007 opium cultivation declined by 19% to 157,000 hectares this year, for several reasons. First, as shown in our August Report, restraint at planting (but not eradication), has been successful. Pressure by governors, shuras and village elders has kept cultivation down in many provinces. Second, and most importantly, the dynamics of farm prices. As (Afghan) supply has once again exceeded (world) demand, prices for opium (both fresh and old) are down 20% in nominal terms (and much more at constant prices).

The distinctions here are absolutely critical for understanding the current dynamics of Afghanistan's opium trade.  We'll start with the second cause, because it helps explain the first.  World opium prices are down 20%, indicating that supply far outpaces demand.  This glut in opium supply has consequences for cultivators and traffickers, as declining prices translate to less revenue.  Since evidence suggests that the opium supply chain is at least partially controlled by the Taliban and other warlords through taxation and extortion, declining prices mean that less revenue goes to fund the insurgency.  A logical way for the Taliban, associated warlords and drug traffickers to rebalance supply and demand is for them to reign in production, which goes to explain the steep drop in cultivation.  So what one Executive Summary made out to be a sign of counternarcotics efforts, the other shows is just a market correcting itself. 

You would think that the UN wouldn't want to publish executive summaries that wildly mis-characterize the findings contained in other UN executive summaries.  Of course, since I still haven't read the 187-page report, I'm not 100% sure that I'm mischaracterizing it either.  Let's hope not. 

Pragmatism Posted by Shadi Hamid

To add to my post the other day on the role of ideology in foreign policy, I just want to say something about “pragmatism,” since we are hearing that word a lot. The emerging consensus, as Glenn Greenwald puts it, is that “we have now entered an era where pragmatism and competence trumps all considerations and old ‘ideological’ disputes are thereby rendered obsolete.” Along these lines, Dan Lehr says “pragmatism is forcing ideology to take a back seat.” This is probably true. Ideology has taken a back seat. But this does not mean ideology is gone or irrelevant. All it means is that our current political discourse has opted to de-emphasize questions of ideology for reasons that may have little to do with the actual, and supposed, decline of ideology.

Jim Arkedis argued last week that “no matter who’s in the Oval Office for the foreseeable future, I think we’re ending the left/right divide and putting a premium on smart pragmatism.” I am, to be honest, not totally reassured by the rise of “smart pragmatism." It brings to mind our pre-9/11 foreign policy, which while infinitely better than our post-9/11 one, is not necessarily the standard to which we should strive (for that argument, see here). In some sense, everyone is “pragmatic.” What differs from one person to the next, however, is what and where their “non-negotiables” are. Where are the red lines of foreign policy? There are always red lines because there are certain things we won’t do even if they're in our pragmatic “self-interest.” And there are always things we'll choose to do even if they go against our narrowly-defined national “self-interest.”

The fact of the matter is liberal Democrats and conservative realists have different red lines, in part, because they are animated by different principles. In short, while principles or “ideology” may not seem to matter as much now, that has little bearing on the question of whether they will matter at some point in the future. They will come to matter more if and when we move away from lowest common denominator agreements and start to talk fundamentals and “first-order questions,” which is something I think we'll have to do eventually. 

Bruce Riedel on Pakistan, India and a Kashmir Solution Posted by Patrick Barry

This past summer, the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science published a piece by Bruce Riedel, which explained why resolution of India and Pakistan's dispute over Kashmir is essential if the region hopes to reduce terrorism, and attain a modicum of stability.  In the wake of the Mumbai attacks, this excerpt seemed especially relevant and prophetic:

"In a worst-case scenario, a terrorist incident like the July 2006 metro bombings in Mumbai or the hijacking of IA 814 could spark an Indian military response against targets in Pakistan allegedly involved in the planning and orchestration of terrorism. And that could lead to nuclear war."

So the question is, now that the 'attack' has taken place, what next?  It's true that if an investigation uncovers evidence of high-level Pakistani involvement in the Mumbai attacks, we can safely say that productive negotiations between the two countries over Kashmir, leading to warmer relations, are no longer possible.  Even before the attack, I would say that short-term prospects for a settlement were almost non-existent.  But still, are matters so far beyond salvaging?  Afterall, the initial responses to the crisis from both countries have been commendable.  India has shown remarkable restraint given the circumstances, with foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee firmly stating that "[n]obody is talking of military action."  Pakistan too has taken some important steps. While they have not issued a reply to the initial set of demands put forth by the Indian Government, national security briefings will begin today, involving Pakistan's parliament, and notably, the ISI - a sign that at least the ISI's leadership is treating this matter seriously.

I don't want to suggest that the worst is over, that this is no longer a highly delicate situation.  There could easily be missteps, and if it turns out that Pakistan's government played any role in the attacks whatsoever, Pakistan and India might be headed for all-out war.  But the initial responses give me reason to hope that tensions might ease. If that's the case (and there's no question that is a huge if), I don't see a reason why efforts at rapprochement - over Kashmir, or any other issue - couldn't resume.

Bush Logic Posted by James Lamond

In his recent interview with Charlie Gibson, the President spoke of regrets and do-overs in a sad attempt to shape his legacy.

Here is part of the exchange:

GIBSON: You've always said there's no do-overs as President. If you had one?

BUSH: I don't know -- the biggest regret of all the presidency has to have been the intelligence failure in Iraq. A lot of people put their reputations on the line and said the weapons of mass destruction is a reason to remove Saddam Hussein. It wasn't just people in my administration; a lot of members in Congress, prior to my arrival in Washington D.C., during the debate on Iraq, a lot of leaders of nations around the world were all looking at the same intelligence. And, you know, that's not a do-over, but I wish the intelligence had been different, I guess.

GIBSON: If the intelligence had been right, would there have been an Iraq war?

BUSH: Yes, because Saddam Hussein was unwilling to let the inspectors go in to determine whether or not the U.N. resolutions were being upheld. In other words, if he had had weapons of mass destruction, would there have been a war? Absolutely.

GIBSON: No, if you had known he didn't.

BUSH: Oh, I see what you're saying. You know, that's an interesting question. That is a do-over that I can't do. It's hard for me to speculate.

The President's responses are just disturbing on two levels.

First, his logic.  President Bush completely contradicts himself by first saying that the intelligence failure is his biggest regret, but if the intelligence had been correct, he still would have gone to war.  Does that make any sense?  He regrets that the intelligence was wrong, but if it was right he would have done the same thing.

Second, Bush is trying to erase his responsibility for the failure in Iraq by placing the blame on the flawed intelligence.  While others may have believed the manipulated intelligence the Bush administration offered, he is the one who rushed to war and completely mismanaged it once he was there.  He does not seem to regret his doctrine of "preventative war" and spreading democracy to the Middle East, his dismissal of allies, the lack of preparation for war, or the complete lack of understanding of the country in which he was invading.  These combined with the the utter mismanagement of the war effort by the Bush administration is what led to the disaster, we see today- not just the fact that there were no WMDs in Iraq.

By reading the president's responses in the the interview, one would think that the only problem in Iraq is that we didn't find WMDs.  The truth is that there is so much more went wrong with the war than just the intelligence.  It was also the failed policies of the administration.  Ultimately the blame falls on the president himself.

Terror Incentives and the Decline of Tourism Posted by Shadi Hamid

Jeff Goldberg in a recent post on, um, "how to stay alive in a terrorized hotel," recommends that travelers "stay in hotels that have already been bombed or otherwise attacked. Mumbai is a fairly safe place for travelers right now."

This is a really interesting point. After cities get hit by attacks, tourism usually declines significantly. The response that most people to have to, say, a terrorist attack in Sharm el-Sheik is, "well, let's not go to Sharm until things cool down." The "rational" response is actually to go to Sharm immediately after an attack, since it's unlikely that terrorists will bomb the same city in consecutive weeks or months (or even consecutive years). I'd actually be interested to see data on this.

From a more macro standpoint, if enough people took Goldberg's advice and either 1) kept their booking for Sharm after the occurrence of an attack, or 2) decided to go to Sharm right after the attack for either safety or symbolic reasons, then the incentives for terrorists would change. In many contexts, a major objective of terrorist attacks is to hurt the target country's economy by hurting the tourism industry. This is particularly the case in countries, such as Egypt, that disproportionately depend on the tourism sector. If launching a terrorist attack failed to have an adverse effect on tourism, then that, by itself, would probably not dissuade terrorists from attacking in the short-run, but it would likely affect their calculations in some fashion in the long-run and would probably affect the selection of targets.

The other aspect of this is the relationship between a terrorist group and the target government. One of the main points of leverage terrorists have with a given regime is that they can hold the tourism industry hostage. This obviously affects the government's response to terrorism but also on civil and political rights more generally. I don't know enough about the data in this regard to say how a smaller rather than a larger decline in tourism after a terrorist attack would affect government policy, but I imagine there would be a significant effect of some kind.

The Economically Bipolar Generation Posted by Adam Blickstein

In accordance with over medicalized, over psychoanalyzed, overdiagnosed society, it's pretty clear that my generation (Gen Y, the millenials) has suffered from some pretty severe childhood financial trauma. We've been savaged in rapid succession with the one-two punch of decadent irrational exuberance and complete systematic economic collapse. And history can already boast that these weren't any mild swings either. No one really can predict how major trauma in youth will manifest itself in adulthood since individuals cope with such stressors differently. But one thing we do know is that these sort of specters haunt people in some capacity or another throughout their entire life. And the long-term ramifications of my generation's financial afflictions remain extremely unclear.

Is Contracting All Bad? Posted by Michael Cohen

Thomas Frank had a piece last week in the Wall Street Journal about the supposed evils of government contracting that somehow in my gorging on turkey and other Thanksgiving delights I missed at the time. But it really deserves to be highlighted:

Some federal contracting, surely, is unobjectionable stuff. But over the past few years it has become almost impossible to open a newspaper and not read of some well-connected and obscenely compensated contractor foisting a colossal botch on the taxpayer. Contractors bungling the occupation of Iraq; contractors spinning the revolving door at the Department of Homeland Security; contractors reveling publicly in their good fortune after Hurricane Katrina.

First of all it's simply incorrect to argue that contractors bungled the occupation of Iraq. That actually would be the United States government. Indeed, for all the anecdotal examples of malfeasance there are many more examples of government contracting being "unobjectionable" and not wasteful.

Don't believe me: check out what the CBO has to say on this subject:

The costs of a private security contract are comparable with those of a U.S. military unit performing similar functions. During peacetime, however, the private security contract would not have to be renewed, whereas the military unit would remain in the force structure.

What this suggests is that the costs for using PSCs is, over the long-term, a cost savings for U.S. taxpayers because of the lack of legacy costs. But what's really objectionable, is that the person for failure in Iraq is placed on contractors and not where it really belongs - on the policymakers who sent them there in the first place.   

To make matters worse, Frank also argues that private companies who work with the government should turn over all pertinent financial information:

Government by contractor also makes government less accountable to the public. Recall, for example, the insolent response of Erik Prince, CEO of Blackwater, when asked about his company's profits during his celebrated 2007 encounter with the House Oversight Committee: "We're a private company," quoth he, "and there's a key word there -- private."

So you and I don't get to know. We don't get to know about Blackwater's profits, we don't get to know about the effects all this has had on the traditional federal workforce, and we don't really get to know about what goes on elsewhere in the vast private industries to which we have entrusted the people's business.

What possible relevance is there between Blackwater's profits and its effects on the traditional workforce? The pertinent information here is not how much money BW makes, but whether they are fulfilling the requirements of their contracts with the US government. Moreover, does Mr. Frank think that every government contractor -- including the legions of NGOs and non-profits that take government funds -- should turn their books over to the federal government for review?

Now I am not a contractor booster, as I recently wrote a report that called on the US government to transition away from the use of private security contractors; but it's crucial that we consider the use of contractors in a fact-based manner and not rely on anecdotal examples of supposed contractor excess.

Over the past eight years, the Bush Administration and Congress has done a terrible job managing contractors; they haven't supported the contractor work force, they haven't valued or emphasized the importance of contractor oversight, they've ignored and weakened accountability measures and they've used contractors without any sort of overall plan for how they can fulfill US government responsibilities and missions.

But for the most part contractors are not really to blame for these problems - indeed many of the same contractors blamed for their supposed failures in Iraq were praised for their success in the Balkans.

The key here is not to demonize contractors and contracting in general. The key is figuring out how to work with more effectively and how to ensure better oversight of their activities. Articles like this one that rely more on anecdotes rather than facts are not helping things. 

Team of Non-Ideologues Posted by James Lamond

In order to avoid the now clichéd  "team of rivals" label, lets call Barack Obama’s foreign policy team the “team of non-ideologues."  As the foreign policy line-up was announced today we saw the main foreign policy and national security positions go to Jim Jones as National Security Advisor, Hillary Clinton at State, Susan Rice at the U.N., and Robert Gates staying on as Defense Secretary.  This team is made up of variety commanding individuals, all with differing experiences and world views.  These picks, along with Tim Geithner at Treasury and Eric Holder at Justice, may very well represent how Obama plans to govern.  That is from a logic-based, pragmatic, and responsible approach.

Casualties Drop in Afghanistan for December Posted by Patrick Barry

There was one U.S. military casualty in Afghanistan this month, a statistic that would not ordinarily be at all surprising, since fighting there is traditionally less intense during the winter months.

What does make this news surprising is that it comes amidst a lot of speculation that the Taliban intend to carry on their offensive through the winter (Note: I am just as complicit in this as anyone).  Divining too much from one month's data point is probably unwise, but it may be a sign that the insurgents are not off to the auspicious start they would have liked.

Does Africa Need Democracy? Posted by Michael Cohen

In this weekend's Boston Globe, Joshua Kurlantzick has an interesting piece on the turn away from democracy in a number of African nations - and the corrupting influences that are undermining democratic transitions.

With a few exceptions, like Botswana and South Africa, most of these countries have failed to create truly inclusive or stable democracies. Instead, they have created systems in which leaders, representing one ethnic group or religious group, win elections and then use their time in office to enrich only their tribe or religious cohort. These divisions, exacerbated by elections, make some newer democracies more conflict-prone than old-fashioned autocracies.

It's hard to disagree with Kurlantzick's point except to note that the democratic process is rarely easy and tidy or necessarily follows a linear path. But what is somewhat troubling about Kurlantzick's piece is his solution to the problem:

The rise of failed democracies also provides a lesson for Western leaders, and their democracy-promotion outfits, who thought they had the formula right. Holding elections is not enough; and, though it might be heresy to suggest it, sometimes a strong, unelected leader may prove more effective in the short term.

While Kurlantzick is right to attack the slavish devotion of some policymakers to elections,  he is wrong to lump democracy promotion groups in with this mindset. Indeed, if there is one recurring thought in almost all democracy promotion literature it is the argument that too much focus is put on elections and not enough on the promotion of civil society. For all the criticisms one might make of the Bush Freedom Agenda -- and its own occasionally slavish focus on elections -- their support for the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Middle East Partnership Initiative -- has been a welcome addition to the democracy promotion toolbox because of its attention to institution building in emerging democracies.

In fact, Kurlantzick oddly makes this claim:

For some democracy-promotion organizations, this will mean broadening their work, to include promoting inter-ethnic dialogue and supporting other aspects of democracy, like free media, so that they are not relying on polls alone to bring societies together.

No kidding. But this is precisely what most democracy promotion groups are doing on a regular basis.

But the real beef I have here is with the notion that a strong unelected leader might be beneficial in the short-term. In fact, most evidence in sub-Saharan Africa suggests otherwise. Most bizarrely Kurlantzick points to Rwandan President Paul Kagame as the sort of unelected leader who has brought real change to Africa. One would imagine that there are quite a few folks in Eastern Congo who would argue that his country's military forays into the region prove otherwise.

While noting some of Kagame's flaws, Kurlantzick actually highlights this astounding quote:

Kagame is not without flaws. . . But before him, says Mauro de Lorenzo, an Africa expert at the American Enterprise Institute, Rwanda faced disaster. "Look carefully at what happened in Rwanda, Zaire, and Burundi, 1990 to 1994," he says. "In each case, the rapid imposition, from outside, of the structures and mechanisms of multiparty democracy leads directly to the unprecedented cataclysm that subsequently engulfed each place. People here [in America] forget or never knew; those who lived through it learned some lasting lessons."

This is simply beyond bizarre. To blame multi-party democracy directly for the problems in these countries is not only wrong, it's borderline perverse. Indeed, this is the sort of language adopted by unelected leaders to explain away their own, undemocratic practices.

Kurlantzick's heart is in the right place here - he sees quite properly the problems in focusing on elections versus larger institution building. But this is not a zero sum game. To ensure democratic viability and, most important, accountability from elected leaders, there must be in place some sort of democratic competition. To assume the best intentions of unelected leaders is a surefire recipe for continued undemocratic rule.  Finding the right mix and the right political timing for elections is frequently tricky, but let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater and make the turn toward endorsing autocratic rule.

The response to Africa's democratic u-turn is not to make elections the end-all, be-all, but instead to continue the focus of America's democracy promotion on strengthening civil society and nascent democratic institutions while never losing sight of the importance of elections in clarifying and legitimizing democratic transitions.

Rolling Back the Fog at Justice Posted by Adam Blickstein

Plenty of others have dissected Eric Holder's record, both in substance and rhetoric, so I'm going to try and steer clear from digging too deep into his past. But one thing has become clear in the reaction Holder's nomination, and indeed within reaction to most of Obama's nominees: these are seasoned professionals with long track records who couldn't be further from the cronyism and malfeasance that occurred under President Bush. But one problem with putting seasoned professionals into these posts is that long track-records don't tend to please 100% of the traditional and online punditry 100% of the time. Of course I think it's completely instructive to try and deduce how nominees like Holder will perform in their respective capacities by examining their histories, but this exercise is also fraught with the peril. It tends to create a sort of self-fulfilling disappointment since many times, folks trying to discern the philosophies of future cabinet officials invariably find reasons to be pessimistic rather than find footholds for optimism. And the Attorney General's office, with its broad legal authority and history of abuse and disorder under President Bush's reign, is particularly vulnerable to this type of analysis.

For me, the greatest asset of Holder's nomination, is that, with over 20 years at Justice, he intimately understands both the pre-Bush, pre-politicized culture there.  In fact, Holder would be the first Attorney General since Dick Thornburgh became AG in 1988 who's actually spent a substantial part of (and actually made) his career at Justice itself. That in and of itself makes Holder a unique and important pick, one that is as much of a "cultural" departure as it is ideological. In a department that is so vital to both protecting the nation and the constitution, but one which has been rotted by a political infestation and a blanketing "fog of law" from failed leadership under Ashcroft/Gonzalez/Mukasey, having such a deep institutional knowledge is critical for both internal and external reasons.

Napolitano Goes to Homeland Posted by Moira Whelan

In foreign policy circles, the Homeland Security department is often regarded with fear…fear that you might end up having to work there. With Janet Napolitano, a department often viewed as a backwater could surprise everyone, if the innovation it could show is in any way reflective of what we've seen from Napolitano.

I’d read quite a bit about Napolitano as potential short-lister for AG, and it’s clear her legal credibility is unrivaled. Clearly, an asset at DHS. Upon hearing the rumors that she would be nominated for Homeland Security, I tapped into some friends from Arizona to ask about her reputation as governor since in my opinion, the job requires a pretty sophisticated understanding of many things, not to mention, outstanding leadership abilities. Suffice to say, rave reviews came back, and as a result, I offer a few high points of the Napolitano nomination I haven’t seen in other media reports...

A Progressive Case for Gates Posted by Max Bergmann

The appointment of Secretary Gates is sure to irk many progressives – and for good reason. Gates was a part of the Bush administration, he oversaw the implementation of the President’s “surge” strategy, and has supported missile defense. While many progressives acknowledge that Gates has said some reasonable things (on Iran and Russia) and has been a positive influence within the Bush administration, many argue that this does not justify keeping someone on who was simply not as bad as the rest – especially when you have an opportunity to bring in someone more progressive.

But in keeping Gates, Obama, is actually indicating that he is very serious about instituting significant reform of the Pentagon.

Gates has advocated some very bold progressive reforms during the last couple of years. He has broken with the Rumsfeld emphasis on military transformation and has repeatedly talked about the need for the Pentagon to move away from procuring unnecessary weapons that are hugely expensive and have little strategic role. He also took on the Air Force’s “fighter mafia” by firing two top Air Force officials and appointing Gen. Norton Schwartz – a non fighter pilot – to be Chief of Staff. As Slate’s Fred Kaplan argues,

In his nearly two years at the helm of the Pentagon, Gates has delivered a series of speeches on the future direction of military policy. He has urged officers to recognize the shift in the face of warfare from the World War II legacy of titanic armored battles between comparably mighty foes to the modern reality of small shadow wars against terrorists and insurgents. More than that, he has called for systematic adjustments to this new reality: canceling weapons systems that aren't suited to these kinds of wars and building more weapons that are; reforming the promotion boards to reward and advance the creative officers who have proved most adept at this style of warfare; rethinking the roles and missions of the individual branches of the armed services; siphoning some of the military's missions, especially those dealing with "nation building," to civilian agencies.

By keeping him on, Obama is telling Gates to start implementing the reforms that he and progressives have been advocating for years. This is true especially on the defense budget. Since Gates is continuing on as Secretary of Defense he will now be empowered to bust out the scalpel and begin a difficult review process. Many had feared that the Pentagon would attempt to undermine a new Obama administration by dropping a $450 billion request for additional spending on weapons systems in the first months of his administration. This would have put Obama in the politically awkward position of being accused of cutting defense spending as one of his first foreign policy acts and would have set the battle lines over any potential reform of the defense budget. Not the sort of confrontational start that one would want. Gates essentially shields the Obama administration from that charge and hamstrings the elements within the Pentagon that would have sought to play politics to undermine a reform effort. Gates, as a Republican holdover in a Democratic administration, has an aura of bi-partisanship that makes him much more difficult to attack.

The question then that remains then is will Gates actually implement the far-reaching reforms he has talked about? I wrote in October after Gates had called for a massive change in the Pentagon’s strategic approach toward weapons systems:

why doesn't Gates actually begin the procurement review process now and submit to the next administration his recommendations for what systems are necessary and what are not. He is after all the Secretary of Defense RIGHT NOW.

But Fred Kaplan, once again, makes a fair point,

From the start, he knew that he wouldn't have time to make a lot of headway in these campaigns—which, within the military, represent fairly radical ideas. His intent was to spell out an agenda, and lay the groundwork, for the next administration. Now it seems he's going to be in the next administration.

It seems fairly clear that Gates was kept on (and has agreed to stay) in order to implement the reforms he had advocated. The New York Times this morning seemed to confirm this, reporting that Gates was “selected in large part because [he has] embraced a sweeping shift of resources in the national security arena. The shift, which would come partly out of the military’s huge budget.”

It is also important to note that Gates’ term will also probably be relatively brief, as he will in all likelihood make way for a more progressive leader – like Richard Danzig, a rumored nominee for be Deputy Secretary of Defense – in a year or two. Hopefully by that point Gates will have already done much of the heavy lifting and his successor will inherit a reform process that is already well under way. If that is the case, then Gates will have advanced the progressive vision on military affairs further than just about anyone could have hoped for.

General Jim Jones - National Security Advisor Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

To effectively evaluate the appointment of General Jim Jones, it's very important to first understand what the national security adviser and National Security Council actually do.  For that, I'd recommend this piece from Ivo Daalder and I.M Destler (Though written in 2000, it's the best explanation I've seen of the function of the NSC).  As they explain, the most important task of the NSC is

coordinating the policy process so that, simultaneously, agencies get a full and fair hearing and the president can make clear foreign policy choices in a timely manner.

To do this, you need a strong and fair mediator as national security adviser.  Someone who can be trusted by the other agencies (especially State and Defense) to present all the options to the President fairly, while being careful to not take sides too loudly.   You need someone who is strong enough to ensure that there is a clear process for decision-making and that the paper flow to the President is well organized.  You need someone strong, who is respected by the other national security principals, to ensure that they don't try to win the argument by bureaucratically outmaneuvering the national security adviser.  Finally, as the national security official with most access to the President, you need someone that the President truly trusts and respects.

The first Bush term was an example of the disastrous consequences of a weak national security adviser.  Condi Rice was close to President Bush, but she was bureaucratically inexperienced compared to heavyweights such as Rumsfeld, Cheney and Powell.  The result was that Cheney and Rumsfeld would use other avenues to get to the President and influence decisions behind her back.  Rumsfeld went as far as not sending reprsentatives to interagency meetings.  Cooperation broke down between the various agencies.  One of the results was the completely disjointed and ineffective planning for the postwar period in Iraq, which truly did require cooperation from Defense, State, Treasury, Justice and other agencies.  Another, was the fact that the decision to go to war was made without all the principals getting to clearly and fairly make their case.  What mattered more in decision-making was not the quality of the argument, but how close you were to the President and whether you could gain access.  And thus more often than not Cheney and Rumsfeld won out.

Jones, on the other hand, seems to have exactly the traits that Rice lacked.  As a General he has a long history of experience with the national security bureaucracy and understanding how to work within it.  Setting up an organized decision-making process is a key part of the national security advisor's job description, and no institution is better at setting up clear decision-making processes than the military.  With his level of experience and the respect he commands, I also can't imagine the other principals trying to actively undermine the policy coordination process he sets up.  Moreover, as Matt Yglesias writes

He’s a career military guy who wasn’t known during that time for doing much “off the record” sharing of his views on policy issues — he followed orders, impressed people enough to keep getting promoted, and either kept his views to himself or else only shared them with people who are extremely tight-lipped.

I think that is exactly the type of guy you want running the NSC. He is not going to draw a lot of attention to himself. This really is a position where most of the work needs to be done behind the scenes and requires much less of a public persona than say Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense.  In fact, it's also worth remembering that Brent Scowcroft is known for running one of the most effective NSC's in recent times and he to came from a military background.  He generally took a similar approach, with James Baker spending much more time in the limelight, while Scowcroft worked behind the scenes.

Jones also has other strengths.  His experience as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is probably the best preparation any General can have for understanding diplomacy.  It also gave him a first hand look at the war in Afghanistan - a situation that will be at the top of Obama's agenda.  And of course, as Democrats work to actively build a stronger relationship with the military, choosing a General as the President's top national security aide sends a powerful message. 

Overall, I think this is a very compelling choice.

Foreign Policy and "First-Order" Questions Posted by Shadi Hamid

I’m a bit worried that some people mistook my post on the “inappropriateness of a left-right spectrum on foreign policy” last week. In some ways I did, as Dan Lehr put it, “[celebrate] the end of the old ‘left-right/war-peace’ dichotomies.” But this does not mean that other dichotomies, or dichotomies in general, are inappropriate. Brent Scrowcroft and I may agree on many things now, but this convergence, in my view, is an accident of recent history. It tells us little about our competing visions of a global system, about the ends of foreign policy, and, then, how means and ends are to be matched. Grappling with these same issues, and taking a more positive view, Ilan says

There is relatively universal agreement among [liberals, liberal hawks, and realists] that we need to begin withdrawing from Iraq, focus more on Afghanistan, opt for direct diplomacy with Iran, reengage with the world, improve our image, strengthen our alliances, close Guantanamo and deal with global warming and energy security.

He is of course right. But the fact that agreement on these issues would be cause for relief, or perhaps even celebration, is itself a grim indictment of our foreign policy discourse. The lowest common denominators are quite low. That aside, my bigger problem with this emerging “consensus” is that it fails to address what one might call “first-order” questions. Glenn Greenwald, in a very interesting post, touches on this here.

For starters, were we against the war because of its consequences or despite its consequences? I worry that the answer to this question is no less clear today than it was several years ago. This is not necessarily a bad thing. I don’t have a clear answer myself. Was there something morally wrong with launching the Iraq war in and of itself, and, if so, what is the nature of the "moral" component in this case, but, more importantly, in so many others? Is what makes such wars immoral the fact that they are pre-emptive, or is it that preemption, as a matter of fact, fails much more often than it succeeds? In other words, if pre-emption was successful from a pragmatic standpoint, would it be less immoral? Or would the very fact of its efficacy negate, or supercede, moral considerations?   

The Palestinian Question in Jordanian Politics Posted by Shadi Hamid

Last month, I wrote on the apparent rapprochement between three key Jordanian actors, the Islamic Action Front (the largest opposition party), the regime, as well as Hamas, which continues to wield substantial influence within the kingdom, both directly and indirectly.

The Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, is devoting much of its attention to the "Palestinian portfolio," perhaps more of a priority now with Hamam Said leading the Brotherhood after his surprise May election to the post of Overseer-General (Said is the first Jordanian of Palestinian origin to ever head the Jordanian Brotherhood). In a country that is nearly 60% Palestinian, the IAF is hoping to capitalize on Jordanian anger over the situation in Gaza. The government appears to be encouraging them. Anything that can detract from demands for political reform is high on the government's priority list. In less than two weeks, the IAF has held three protests, all approved by the regime.

Before July, this would have been unheard of, as the government had, for nearly three years, done nearly all it could to restrict, repress, and marginalize the opposition. To my knowledge, this is the first time in recent memory that three consecutive IAF protests have been permitted to go forward. The Jordanian government, one of our closest allies in the region, is playing a difficult balancing act, between different domestic and foreign poles of influence (the Muslim Brotherhood, the U.S., Israel, Iran, Hamas, and increasingly Russia).