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November 21, 2008

A Bit Of Theory (Or, Actually Useful Stuff Learned In Grad School)
Posted by David Shorr

It's been said many times many ways, our civilian international affairs agencies are too weak and resource-starved. I've been working with Vikram Singh and Derek Chollet of Center for a New American Security on a project that looked for ways to convert all this concern about the problem into meaningful action. Recently we drew up a memo proposing that President-elect Obama tell his national security team to collaborate on a joint FY 2010 budget for defense, diplomacy, and development. As I explain our idea, I want to share some academic underpinnings and give some hat-tips to others tilling these fields.

The intellectual debt is to Prof. John Kingdon and his 1980s classic (well, for wonks anyway), Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy. Kingdon was interested in figuring out the difference between an idea whose time has come and an idea ahead of its time. What are necessary preconditions for the adoption of ambitious or innovative policies? The title contains a clue. An alternative is quite simply a policy option, while an agenda is the political and bureaucratic setting that leads to the consideration of options. In other words, the search for a policy solution doesn't really begin until a problem is considered, well, a problem.

Continue reading "A Bit Of Theory (Or, Actually Useful Stuff Learned In Grad School)" »

The Inappropriateness of Using a Left-Right Spectrum on Foreign Policy
Posted by Shadi Hamid

Many of you have probably seen the interesting back-and-forth between Matt Yglesias and Ross Douthat regarding Obama’s foreign policy orientation. I just wanted to comment that, while I understand what Ross is saying, I still find this part somewhat baffling:

Here's a fearless prediction: On an awful lot of issues, the Obama foreign policy will end cutting to the right of Bill Clinton's foreign policy, which was already more center-left than left. Even with the GOP brand in the toilet, Republicans are still trusted as much or more than Dems on foreign policy, mostly for somewhat nebulous "toughness" reasons.

It’s never really made sense to me to use a left-right spectrum when talking about foreign policy. What does it mean to have a “leftist” foreign policy approach? I assume that people use “leftist” as a proxy for “weak.” But, even the “weak/dove” – “strong/hawk” spectrum is a weird one. I think the last 8 years would indicate that hawks have made us weaker, while doves would have made us stronger. Is a willingness to coddle dictators a sign of weakness or strength? And if it’s the former, then why do so a significant number of “neo-cons” have, contrary to what their ideology would suggest, a particular fondness for “moderate” Arab dictators? If we’re talking about the left’s foreign policy tradition, then a “moralist” concern with supporting human rights and democracy abroad is, I would say, distinctly “leftist.” But then we run into a problem: democracy promotion > leftist foreign policy approach > weak.

What about caring about what other people think about us? If you say something like, “it would be nice if Arab publics liked us,” you’re apparently weak on national security. But it would seem to me that our ability to fight terrorism would be strengthened if we had the support of target populations. The problem is our whole discourse on foreign policy has been, for some time, shaped by the Right, and many of the definitions we use are products of a post-9/11 sensibility. In other words, much of it is distorted.

NIC Global Challenges 2025 report
Posted by Moira Whelan

Two sources for our readers who may not be interested in tackling the full 120 page report:
NSN's Daily Brief, and my piece over at Guardian.General consensus: thank god John McCain lost.

November 20, 2008

Sarkozy Filling a Vaccum
Posted by Max Bergmann

Photoofficiellepresidentsarkozy_2 The International Herald Tribune has an interesting analysis of French President Nicholas Sarkozy's term as president of the EU. The gist - Sarkozy wants the spotlight, has used the French Presidency of the EU to play a larger role, but in doing so has often overstepped.

For a temporary job, being Europe's leader for six months is a tough one, battling for Master of the Universe status with limited firepower and wavering support for big ideas. Nicolas Sarkozy tries. He has sprayed concepts, some of them good ones, like buckshot from a scattergun at international issues and problems. Sarkozy can be bold, emotional and refreshing. But if you go back to July, when France took over the European Union's rotating presidency, his distinguishing feature as Europe's point man may be his institutionalizing of the political potshot in place of coherent policy - firing off noise-making, important-sounding projects or plans that for the most part don't or are unlikely to work… his thrusting at importance without the caliber of influence, consistency or number of divisions (to quote Stalin) to carry it off.

This seems right. Sarkozy definitely would like to put France back into the mix of great powers and he definitely has the ego to attempt to pursue such a role. But it is not just that Sarkozy is "thrusting at importance" it is also that there is a real opportunity for countries to play a more prominent role internationally. Russia, China, Iran, have all expanded their international roles and there is  prime opportunity for Europe to do the same.

The United States under Bush is simply not as influential around the world as it once was. Hopefully this will change, but over the last year there has been space for another country to attempt to play global leader and advocate for the current international system. Sarkozy has increasingly tried to fill this role with his involvement in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the Middle East peace process through his attempts to bring Syria and Israel together and to bring Syria back into the international community, and his recent efforts to play shuttle diplomacy between Moscow and Tbilisi and Washington. The IHT is right that despite Sarkozy's efforts, France simply doesn't have the clout to play such an outsized role, but Sarkozy's efforts are not just driven by ego they have also been driven by the need for someone to play this role - especially on Russia and the Middle East.

Second - and I think this is largely missed - Sarkozy is not simply trying not to make France a more prominent global player, but is trying to make the EU into one as well. The problem that Sarkozy is facing is not simply that France is not powerful enough globally, but that it is not powerful enough within Europe. Part of the French vision of the EU was always that they would heavily control it and with the EU's clout France would be able to punch above its weight internationally - much the same way the Brits view its "special relationship" with the U.S. But Sarkozy - or any other EU leader - is simply unable to effectively speak for Europe, even as its current president. His dealings with Russia have angered Eastern European EU countries and his efforts to play a larger role in the international response to the financial crisis have fallen flat largely because he doesn't have the weight of the EU behind him.

While many American analysts may interpret this as just further evidence that Europe is weak, divided, and irrelevant, I think Sarkozy's efforts are actually a recognition of Europe's potential strength. Sarkozy is trying to fill the EU leadership vacuum that exists after repeated failures to pass a new constitution. Europe has tremendous latent power. It already acts as one economically, creating the largest trade bloc in the world. Militarily it is more powerful then most acknowledge. Kori Schake, a Europe expert, and interestingly, a former McCain foreign policy adviser, explains in a 2007 report for the Centre for European Reform in London,

Europe does not give itself adequate credit for its strength. The EU includes at least eight of the world’s best militaries. Taken in combination, the EU would not be defeated in war by any country or coalition that did not include the United States. Its military power is undeniable; whether it is willing to use it more actively is a question that is likely to be tested by the next US administration.

Sarkozy's problem, and this is one of the real dillemmas that the EU has going forward, is that no member country or leader can speak for Europe on foreign policy. It is simply too big. This does not mean that Europe cannot act as one, only that without a change in the EU's governing structure  (ie without passing the Lisbon Treaty which would reform the EU's government and would create a EU President that would have the equivalnt of a EU Secretary of State) the EU, and subsequently France, will continue to lack the clout to play a more prominent international role.

Taliban Law
Posted by Patrick Barry

This story from the WSJ is as sure a sign as any that the Taliban's resurgence has spilled over the border, back into Afghanistan:

The Taliban are setting up courts and other local-government institutions across southern Afghanistan, challenging U.S. efforts to pacify the country and bolster the authority of the central government in Kabul.

Senior American military officials said the Taliban run roughly two dozen law courts in southern Afghanistan, one of the armed Islamist group's main strongholds. Drawing on a fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law, the courts work to resolve conflicts over property, grazing rights and inheritances, the officials said.

The Taliban have also appointed unofficial governors and mayors to exercise day-to-day control over remote areas, amounting to a parallel government independent of Kabul, according to the U.S. officials.

For the past few years, the most acute symptom of Afghanistan's worsening condition has been the steady uptick in violence, mostly resulting from insurgents coming across the border from Pakistan.  For the Taliban to be settling in Southern Afghanistan is a less destructive, but more potent signal that matters aren't going our way. 

How About That Axis of Evil?
Posted by James Lamond

The New York Times reports today that "Iran Said to Have Nuclear Fuel for One Weapon."

According to the IAEA,

"Iran has now produced roughly enough nuclear material to make, with added purification, a single atom bomb... The report concluded that as of early this month, Iran had made 630 kilograms, or about 1,390 pounds, of low-enriched uranium."

Continue reading "How About That Axis of Evil?" »

Musing on Pirates
Posted by Patrick Barry

So does anyone else find it interesting that there are now multiple countries policing, or intending to police the waters off the Somali coast?  Seriously, there are Russian, EU, NATO, Indian and U.S. ships patrolling the area, all without a clear, coordinating mechanism or any definitive sense over who has jurisdiction.  Hmmm.  Seems like someone should do some thinking on that.

Defining "Victory"
Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

It seems that Dana Perino is arguing that the U.S.-Iraq security agreement means "that the conditions are such now that we are able to celebrate the victory that we’ve had so far."

It's an interesting definition of "victory."  I guess you can define victory as more than 4,000 American fatalities, more than 30,000 wounded, probably hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths, millions of Iraqis displaced, $1-$3 trillion in costs to the U.S. economy, an empowered Iran, an unaddressed threat in Afghanistan, and massive damage to America's image around the world. All for a war that did not actually achieve its original objectives - eliminate a WMD threat that wasn't there, eliminate a terrorism threat that wasn't there, and spread democracy throughout the Middle East.  I guess we can define "victory" that way.  Probably wouldn't be my definition though.

Yea, about that Counterinsurgency Strategy...
Posted by Patrick Barry

One of the implications of the Bush Administration's decision to fight two wars, each requiring attempts to develop (Afghanistan) or re-develop (Iraq) whole countries has been that U.S. foreign assistance is increasingly perceived as an attempt to further political, even military objectives. Today's coverage in the Post on the latest report from Development Assistance Research Associates (DARA) confirms this shift in perceptions:

The United States, the world's largest international aid donor, is among the worst at promoting the independence, impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian aid deliveries to needy populations, according to a survey by a Madrid-based nonprofit group that monitors donors' performance...

... DARA findings echo concerns by aid workers that U.S. strategy subordinates humanitarian considerations to military objectives. During the past decade, the Pentagon's share of the U.S. overseas development-assistance budget has grown from 3.5 percent to 18 percent, said George Rupp, president of the International Rescue Committee.

Continue reading "Yea, about that Counterinsurgency Strategy..." »

Holding Off on the Interests Section
Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

Jim Hoagland makes a good point.

Modest openings to Tehran and to Havana are better left to the incoming Obama administration to use as wedges for change, rather than being handled as endings -- and legacy -- for Bush.

Opening a U.S. interests section in Tehran is a good idea.  And it's a relatively uncomplicated and easy way to signal good will towards the Iranians.  But having it done in the last days of a Bush administration as some kind of window dressing legacy project would rob the United States and an incoming Obama administration of a genuine diplomatic opportunity. 

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