Stay, but change the course Posted by Morton H. Halperin

Bush's speech yesterday (see Heather's first impressions) shows that he still does not get it, but neither do many of the critics of his Iraq policy. 

The fact that there were terrorist attacks before we invaded Iraq does not mean that the war was justified or was a useful step in the struggle against al-Qaeda.  But we are there now and Saddam is gone. Bush is correct in warning that if we completely and quickly withdraw, there is a danger that some or all of Iraq will come under the control of a group that allows al-Qaeda to operate as it did in Afghanistan.

However - and here is where Bush gets it wrong again - maintaining current troop levels and the current strategy are not helping.  Indeed, by staying the course, we are making it more likely, not less, that a regime sympathetic to terrorists will come to power in part of Iraq.

It is hard to imagine that Baathists (who I believe are leading the indigenous insurgency) would be able to take power again in all of Iraq.  The Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south should be able to hold on to their territory.  However, the center of the country, including Baghdad, could easily become a Baathist stronghold again or come to be ruled by a Sunni-dominated regime which would provide safe haven to al-Qaeda.

If Iraq split into three parts it would lead to the worst of all possible outcomes. In the south we would have a regime dominated by radical Shiites.  Such a regime could well cooperate with Iran even if it would not become an Iranian satellite and could support those committed to terrorism against Israel and work actively against a Middle East Peace settlement.

In the north, an independent Kurdistan would likely provoke a civil war between the Kurds and whoever controlled the middle of the country in a battle over Kirkuk and its oil fields.  That battle could easily become an international war as Turkey and Syria intervene to prevent the formation of an independent Kurdistan which would be a safe haven for their Kurds.

And in the center of Iraq would be either a failed state or one that tolerated and encouraged the settling of terrorist training camps.

There is now agreement among many progressives and much of the American military that our current force posture and military strategy in Iraq is doing more harm than good and that the Army cannot sustain it in any case (see October 5 Wall Street Journal article, "As Bush Pledges to Stay in Iraq, Military Talks Up Smaller Force").  My colleagues at the Center for American Progress have advocated a "strategic redeployment" of U.S. forces to relieve the burden on the military and enhance our ability to confront threats to U.S. national security not just in Iraq, but also around the world.   

Yet I see no reasonable prospect that indigenous military forces can prevent the potential terrible outcomes from becoming reality and I fear that it is far too late to bring in other foreign forces, although we should try.  Therefore I differ with many progressives in believing that we need to keep a significant force in Iraq for some extended period of time to prevent Iraq from becoming a divided, foreign-controlled failed state that serves as a hotbed of regional violence. 

That is why we need to keep a significant number of troops, perhaps 50,000, in Iraq for the foreseeable future.  These troops would have a much smaller footprint and would not engage in offensive operations.   They would continue to train and support Iraqi military and police forces and prevent the establishment of terrorist training camps or a radical government in Baghdad.  By their mere presence they would reduce the chances for terrible outcomes.

At the same time we need to launch a sustained effort to bring other countries into the process and to internationalize the efforts.  We should do this in two ways.  First, we need to go back to the UN Security Council and try to get the resolution that we should have gotten right after the Mission Accomplished speech. We should ask the UN to take charge of the international community's role in the political process in Iraq and we should get out of the way.  Whether we succeed in that effort or not,  we need to engage Iraq's neighbors in an effort to prevent these terrible outcomes. Our ability to bully Iran and Syria is gone and we need to deal with them in the kind of contact group which worked in Afghanistan. 

The best we can hope for is some greater international cooperation, over time perhaps some troops from Muslim countries, and a very imperfect political process in Iraq with continued violence; but that would be a lot better than where we are headed or where we would be if we withdraw all of our troops any time soon.

It was a tragic mistake to go into Iraq and it has made the struggle with al-Qaeda far harder, but that does not mean that Bush is wrong when he warns of the consequences of our complete withdrawal any time soon.  I see no choice but to change the course and stay.

Welcome to Mort Halperin Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Starting tomorrow we will be joined here at DA by Mort Halperin.  Mort has a ridiculously distinguished background in government and in top leadership at a variety of NGOs including the ACLU.  He most recently served as Director of Policy Planning at the State Department from 1998-2001 where he was the driving force behind efforts to form the Community of Democracies, a concept that has generated great enthusiasm across the political spectrum in the US, and among allies abroad.   

Mort is now a Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress, the Executive Director of the Open Society Policy Center, Director of Advocacy at the Open Society Institute, and Director of the Security and Peace Initiative.   If the idea of one person wearing that many hats makes no sense to you, you haven't met Mort.  He was a big early supporter of the concept behind Democracy Arsenal, and - though not a regular reader of blogs - understood instinctively why we needed to create a forum for uncensored opinion and exchange on foreign policy subjects. 

Mort has seen and done it all and there is no doubt that he will up our game here at DA.  We welcome him to the fray.

Bush Speech: Now We Know Posted by Heather Hurlburt

This morning's speech is not the smoothest-running piece of prose ever produced by the Bush White House -- it loops around how evil and nasty (but officially not "insane" -- that's progress, I suppose, if we understand that our enemies are also rational actors) Islamic radicals are before getting to what I think is meant to be the point -- a five-part anti-terrorism agenda.  (Aspiring speechwriters note:  there's no signpost or "nut graf" at the top of this thing, so I am really flummoxed if I only listen to the first 5 minutes before nodding off, or need to tell you what it's about without reading all of it.)  I don't have anything to add to my earlier commentary on the level of rhetoric, so I'll move to the agenda.  Its five items cover much of the rhetorical ground of fighting extremism, but we get almost nothing on how the government is pursuing items 1-3, and no mention at all of anything that requires diplomacy, coalitions, negotiations or compromise.  Hmmm.

1.  prevent attacks before they occur.  Here we get some numbers of attacks and surveillance operations prevented, no details, which I gather are supposed to be new.  coming after several pages of fulminating about how evil our enemies are, I certainly didn't find the numbers reassuring.  But then, I guess I'm not supposed to be reassured.

2.  deny weapons of mass destruction to outlaw regimes and their terrorist allies.  Best they can do here is claim credit for A.Q. Khan again, in a paragraph so rote that it was probably lifted straight out of some office-level talking points.

3. deny radical groups the support and sanctuary of outlaw states.  sure sounds like a good idea to me.  so when will we be sealing the iraq-syria border, or the afghanistan-pakistan border?  And, umm, there's that little matter of radical groups that find support and shelter in allied states.  You'd never know from this speech that attacks had been planned and carried out from European cells and bases, yet those have been the most successful and bloody ones of late.

4.  deny the militants control of any nation.  Here we have, at long last, a rationale for Iraq:  "the terrorists want to overthrow a rising democracy, claim a strategic country as a haven for terror..."  What's odd about this Iraq segment (which circles around to this exact point twice, as if maybe we didn't get it the first time) is that it inflates the "elected leaders of Iraq" to great rhetorical heights -- "strong and steadfast" -- and assures us that "democracy, when it grows, is no fragile flower; it is a healthy, sturdy tree." (Ummm, Mr. President, see Nicaragua.)  Yet his argument seems to assume that if we withdrew, Zarqawi would be in control in Baghdad tomorrow.

5.  deny the militants future by replacing hatred and resentment with hope and opportunity across the broader Middle East.  here we learn that "America is making this stand in practical ways.  We're encouraging our friends in the Middle East, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to take the path of reform..."  a perfectly reasonable paragraph that could have been written at any time in at least the last 15 years, maybe longer.

So what I see as new here is yet another explicit rationale for Iraq:  we have to stay the course because "would the United States and other free nations be more safe, or less safe, with Zarqawi and bin Laden in control of Iraq, its people and its resources?"  (The next time your lefty friends tell you it's all about oil, they'll have heard it from the President here first.)

Bush at NED: If a speech falls in the forest... Posted by Heather Hurlburt

So I really wanted to watch the President's newly-ballyhooed (as of this morning) speech at NED and share my impressions with the blog.  Scott McLellan promised us the speech would contain "new details" about our strategy and actions in the war on terror. 

It's being broadcast on CSPAN-3.  I didn't know there was a C-SPAN 3.  MY cable provider doesn't appear to know there's a C-SPAN 3.

So I'll be back when I can figure out what's in the speech...

11:15 update:  We'll look more closely at the text later today.  But here's what I didn't see:

New strategy, or even "new details" that would convince me there is a strategy.

New details of actions we're taking.  Huh?

This looks like another dip into the "let's frighten civilians" pool.  Two problems here:  first, the excerpts I've read so far manage to take the extremist, caricatured doctrines of Al Qaeda and make them sound even more caricatured.  Second, if the President ratchets up the rhetoric like this in response to a bad couple of weeks, what are we going to do on the day that Al Qaeda gets a nuclear weapon or something else really, really bad happens?  This kind of cheap speech-making is producing a "boy who cried wolf" effect.  People flinch when they hear the rhetoric; it has the (intended?) effect of driving them further out of politics and public life; and then nothing happens.  So people are at once deeply afraid and deeply cynical.  That's a dreadful place for our national life, regardless of who's president.

1:00 update:  Judd Legum over at ThinkProgress agrees and has a nice list of some of the better fearmongering bits.

Avian Flu: Steep Learning Curve for Congress Posted by Lorelei Kelly

On Monday, I was visiting a friend  in the House of Representatives--where approximately half of the staff are walking on sunshine and the other half have the sickly look of a pithed biology frog who knows what's coming (those would be the Republicans)  As I sat in the front office, I chatted with the receptionist intern. Hill interns have a much more mundane existence than their counterparts in other branches of government.  They spend a lot of time receiving and opening mail.  Although it's nothing compared to an impeachment trial, this job has become an above average thrill since the anthrax attacks during 2001-2002.  All Capitol Hill mail is now irradiated--the crispy yellow pages and nuked envelope paste adds to the excitement of what lies beneath the letter knife.

Anyway,  while sitting there, I noticed the intern open a pack of wall posters from the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at National Defense University.  They were handsome, instructive public health posters about how to  recognize bird flu and what to do about it.  My mom is a public health nurse, so I looked at them covetously and then watched with dismay as-- PLOP-- they went into the garbage can.   He then moved on to open a stack of boxes, each of which contained several  300 page hardbound volumes entitled "Ronald Reagan: Late a President of the United States"  The books were the  compiled memorial tributes delivered in Congress last June upon the death of Reagan, published by the Government  Printing Office. I noticed there were far too many to be of use in one office.  Maybe China will accept some as barter on our debt.

But back to the avian flu.  Throwing the posters into the trash  pretty much symbolizes how Congress has responded to new security issues since the end of the Cold War.  Global threats in particular just don't fit into the antique structure of Congress, and because they don't fit into the jurisdictions of existing committees, they fall between the cracks. This is particularly true of  trans-national security issues.  Such toics--like avian flu-- cross more than one committee's interests.  If you were to narrow it down,  the committees that handle security are primarily foreign relations and defense.  In Hill speak, the defense issues are handled by the HASC and the SASC.  The foreign relations by the HIRC and SFRC.   These oversight plans and jurisdictions are instructive.  The foreign relations plans are pages and pages long.  The armed services jurisdictions and oversight plans are quite a bit shorter, especially in the Senate where it is one paragraph plus change.  These descriptions don't reflect the fact that the military is involved in just about every important foreign policy issue that exists today.  Lots and lots of issues don't get their full measure of attention because they don't "fit".

I attended the Princeton Project on National Security conference last week along with Suzanne. On Friday,  a happy yelp arose amidst the gathering as one participant announced that the Senate passed legislation on Thursday to add $4 billion to fight avian flu.  This money was tacked onto the defense appropriations bill for 2006.  Now, I think that's great, but why can't we fund a solid and generous public health system like most normal countries?  Countries where public health is a high priority are far better prepared and defended against global pandemics and biological terrorism. Why does avian flu only get the urgency it deserves on a defense bill during wartime?  Something is wrong with this picture.

On a progressive note, check out the House Armed Services site on Committee Defense Review  This panel of Members convenes on a parallel track to the official committee hearings in order to bring up all sorts of new threats and security challenges.  It is bipartisan and, as Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher says, a chance to  "look at what challenges we're confronting rather than weapons programs we want to advance."  Fine words and an auspicious start.

p.s. I rescued the posters from the trash and now they are featured in several Washington offices. I also have a book of Reagan speeches.

Now the Firing Squads: CAP Makes a Proposal for Iraq Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Kudos to the folks over at Center for American Progress (and yes, they are one of our sponsors here at DA) for spelling out something many have been quietly thinking:  a plan for ratcheting back but not ending the US presence in Iraq, turning as much security as possible over to Iraqi troops and the various Shiite and Kurdish militias.  This would allow a lower US profile as well as freeing up troops for Afghanistan, anti-terror missions, and a less killing tempo of operations (rotating troops back to the US more frequently and for longer stays).

Now, CAP could have been more honest about what this costs us:  possibly accelerating a slide toward civil war (check out Informed Comment for lengthy back-and-forth on whether US troops prevent or assist one's arrival); surely accelerating some rather noxious forms of local rule; abandoning the claim that we are helping Iraqis build a democratic, secular state; admitting that we will tolerate continuing low- to medium-level violence as long as it stays contained within Iraq.

Those tradeoffs may not be yours, but folks, some tradeoffs are going to have to be made.  CAP has made a good start at outlining what analysts like our own Derek Chollet say is happening anyway, as various military leaders and Administration friends continue to talk about drawdowns next year, whatever W. says to the contrary.

Now comes the odd part:  Patrick Doherty over at TomPaine.com says US troops should stay; that priority should be on negotiating international agreements, not brokered by the US, that would cut down the insurgency, allow for real economic revival, and lead the various forces to commit their troops in wayst hat would be more stable.  Patrick sets out brutally the possible cost of a precipitous US withdrawal -- civil war, using Juan Cole's prediction of as many as one million dead.  He also thinks that the CAP paper smacks of "cynical, cold-blooded calculation" in its concern for oil access.  (To which I say:  the GOP give no evidence recently of dispassionate, cold-blooded thought.  I'd feel better if I thought someone was thinking cold-bloodedly.  It'd be progress.)  He also thinks that just promoting this plan will help the GOP maintain its majority in Congress in '06.

So I just have to pause and note that the center-left now wants us to begin withdrawing while the lefter-left, or at least some of it, wants us to stay?  This is odd, and needs further thought.  But it also suggests sophisticated reasoning on all sides, which is hopeful.

Patrick is honest about costs, which is important.  If, in fact, the Administration does begin implementing a partial pullout without admitting it, outside groups will have the job of "nattering nabobs of negativism" -- pointing out all the bad things the Admin has abandoned us and the Iraqis to.  Note:  that is the job of people who  are not running for office.  People who are running for office have to explain what they would do better.  It's different.

I do think that most of the important questions here have empirical answers, I just don't know them:

Is a civil war more likely and more bloody if we pull out partially, entirely or not at all?  The CAP proposal is rather silent on what a reduced US force does in the face of massive civil unrest/killing.

Is the notion of negotiations run by some non-US figure, which many on the left see as a potential solution, at all possible?  It's appealing, yes, but I find it discouraging that there are no signs of UN or European interest in running such a thing, and precious few comments from people who are real Iraq experts that this could work.

So, if we could turn down the rhetoric a notch, look for the real answers and stop aiming the guns at each other (the idea that the CAP, by putting out a policy paper, is helping the GOP keep control of Congress... honestly, if only papers written by people like us actually did matter that much...) there's a lot that needs refinement here.  But at least we now have intelligent people talking specifics.

Lastly, a great quote from Iraq vet Bryan Lentz, who is running for Congress against 10-term Curt Weldon (R-PA):  "I'm not anti-war, I'm anti-failure."  He's one of 6 vets running as Ds; at least 2 are running as Rs, says the AP.  What is the Iraq War ushering into our politics?  Remains to be seen.

Russia: Back on the Front Burner Posted by Derek Chollet

Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance used to say that one of the hardest things about managing American diplomacy was that, just when you think you are on top of things, “at any moment in the day at least two-thirds of the people around the world are awake and some of them are making mischief.”  With American foreign policy consumed by the war on terror and Iraq, as well as showdowns with North Korea and Iran, it is very difficult to respond to larger trends.  As Suzanne points out  below, policy wonks and deep thinkers are trying to get their heads around challenges like the rise of China and the greater diplomatic and economic role of India.  I predict that another issue we will be talking and worrying about a lot more in the coming months and years will be one of American foreign policy’s oldest chestnuts: Russia.

Russia has receded from the front burner of U.S. diplomacy – there are lots of reasons for this, among them 9-11, Putin’s self-professed “cooperation” in the war on terror, Russia’s oil-fueled economic rebound, Bush’s close embrace of Putin (looking into his soul and all that), and his efforts to restore “order” in the Russian state and society.

Yet in the coming years, what happens inside Russia and in the states on its periphery will impact just about every major strategic issue we face: the threat from Islamic jihadists, energy security, the future of democracy, China, Central Asia, nuclear proliferation, pandemics like HIV/AIDS, just to name a few.  And Russia's internal stability will continue to be a real concern -- especially with a 2008 leadership transition approaching, when constitutionally Putin cannot run for reelection as President but few think that he will disappear from power.

There’s a strong case to be made that things have gotten worse in Russia, not better.  A few weeks ago I was in Moscow and had the opportunity to meet with a wide range of people.  Few argued that Russia was a democracy – in fact the consensus is that Russia is a “bureaucratic authoritarian” regime.  The key difference was whether people thought that that was good or bad, or whether it was anyone’s fault (meaning, that the lack of democracy was just the way Russia is). 

On the one hand, Putin’s defenders talked about the importance of the “order” that has been established and how many of the rollbacks of democracy (such as crackdown on independent sources of power, especially in the media, as well as appointing rather than electing regional governors, etc.) should be compared with how Western countries do things, which in some cases is not all that different.  Yet on the other hand, it is clear that the lack of openness and access to television suppresses political opposition – and that the trend line in Russia in terms of democracy is heading in the wrong direction.

Visiting Moscow, and seeing the enormous economic growth that is happening there, it appears that ordinary Russian citizens do have individual freedom – there is a growing middle class consumer culture – as long as they don’t challenge the state.  Some argued that there is a growing disconnect between the Russian people at the Kremlin leadership: that ordinary Russians are ready for rule of law and democracy but that the political elites are not.

From the perspective of American interests, there’s a lot to be worried about here.  The stakes are huge.  Yet America’s policy toward Russia has been on auto-pilot – as Fred Hiatt pointed out yesterday in the Washington Post, the Administration has a “fairly coherent strategy regarding Russia's slide from democracy: Ignore it. The National Security Council apparatus in the White House believes that what happens inside Russia is irrelevant to the United States; that the United States can't do much to influence domestic events in any case; and that dwelling on Putin's authoritarianism would compromise other U.S. interests in bilateral relations.”

This head-in-the-sand approach is going to become increasingly unsustainable.  As the contradictions pile up, it will be very hard to look the other way.  Next summer, Putin will host the G-8 leaders at their annual summit in St. Petersburg. This will be the first time Russia will host the annual G-8 summit meeting as a full member, and thousands of journalists and other activists will be there.  That means that not only will Putin come under pressure to explain himself, but the seven other leaders of the world’s major democracies will have to justify why they are standing there and not criticizing their host for his rollback of basic freedoms.  Remember that when the G-8 began in 1975 – then as the G-6 – the leaders affirmed their individual responsibilities “for the government of an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement.”  But this is not the direction Russia has headed under Putin.  So it will make for an interesting photo-op.

National Security: the Ground Shifting Underneath Us Posted by Suzanne Nossel

I spent Wednesday through Friday of last week at a national security conference at Princeton hosted by the awe-inspiring Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School and a blogger at America Abroad.   

A similar group  - comprised primarily of academics with a heavy quota of ex-Clinton Administration people along with a handful of current and former Bush Administration officials - met in the Spring of 2004 for a series of broad-ranging foreign policy discussions, and the changes in tenor and substance between that meeting and this one were striking.   Here are a few highlights in terms of what was discussed, and what was notable for being left out of the debate:

What was in:

The Centrality of China - China was a much bigger story this year than last.  I attribute this in part to developments like the exchange rate dispute, China's role in the N. Korea negotiations, and the short-lived Unocal episode, all of which have forced notice of China's rapid economic growth and voracious appetite for resources.  The rough consensus seemed to be that China poses at least as serious a medium and long-term threat as Islamic terrorism, but that we need to be careful not to shoot ourselves in the foot by reacting to China in ways that undercut what ought otherwise be major economic benefits we derive from its rise.   Lots of debate over China's intentions both toward the US or in shaping its global role more generally. 

India's Importance - A corollary to serious concern about China's growing power and uncertain intentions is the potential for India to become an increasingly critical ally in tempering China's rise.  I had always thought of India as an important regional ally, but this discussion helped highlight for me that, in the years to come, its conceivable that an alliance with India could become as important as our relationships in Europe.

The Decline of Europe - This was a more controversial point, but many of those present were convinced that Europe is near the start of an irreversible decline in global importance.  Grounds for the conclusion included the defeat of the EU constitution, the EU's inability to act in concert as a major global power, the internal divisions in the alliance, economic stagnation in Germany, and the geopolitical rise of the East in general.   Though the meeting was too short to fully work through the implications, if this is true, or if its simply a serious enough possibility to warrant contingency planning, the implications for US policy are profound.  Bottom line is we will badly need something we lack today:  a bigger bench of allies from around the world willing to step up to confront threats, rebuild failed states, spread norms like democracy and free trade, etc. 

American Unipolarity Waning - Probably the most notable change in the tenor of this meeting from the 2004 session was the universal sense that America's position in the world has weakened sharply as a result of all the factors we talk about here all the time:  Iraq, military over-extension, frayed alliances, lapsed moral authority, plus China's growing economic power and increasingly effective use of diplomacy and other forms of influence.  Whereas a year ago, before the 2004 election, the sense seemed to be that - - depending on who was in the White House - - things might go back to Clinton-era US dominance, the sense now was that the unipolar moment may be at the beginning of its end, and that its unlikely to come back as it once was.

The Importance of Non-Political Threats - A leading expert on global pandemics and related threats attended the conference both years and made a compelling case that the threat of avian flu or similar could kill many more than any terrorist attack, and that insufficient steps are being taken to prevent and prepare for such a threat.  The difference this year, which I attribute to Hurricane Katrina, was that participants understood very clearly that a "natural" disaster or epidemic could well become the next major foreign policy crisis, and that, particularly if we are as poorly prepared for it as we are today, the social and political ramifications could easily rival those of a major war.

Iraq as a Lost Cause - Iraq barely featured in the major presentations during the meeting.  This was partly because of a deliberate focus on long-term issues and threats.  Though opinions were divided, the majority of those I spoke to favored the US withdrawing the bulk of its troops in 2006.  It was not that they disagreed on the potentially devastating consequences of Iraq becoming a failed state, nor that they had any confidence that the country would hold together.  They were just convinced that the continued American presence was doing more harm than good. (Personally, having seen nothing that makes me confidence that the glaring holes in the US's strategy and approach in Iraq are being filled, I am slowly coming to the view that withdrawal may be the best among lousy options - more on that another time).

Fight Against Terror - The overall view was that - while there are numerous ways to make the battle against terror more effective - we risk overlooking other serious threats by focusing single-mindedly on terror.   The view that the greatest terrorist threat may emanate not from the Mideast but from alienated Muslim youth in Europe was also voiced.

Multilateral Institutions - While there was a great emphasis on the importance of multilateral institutions - existing ones like the WTO and new ones, for example, in South Asia - the UN was scarcely mentioned during the two days.  My sense was that the failure of last month's Summit to achieve more concrete results puts the UN squarely at the margins for the time being.   I brought up at one point that on issues like pandemics, where the causes are not primarily political, UN forums (WHO, FAO, etc.) tend to function much better.

Anyway, lots to chew over here at DA and elsewhere.  I hope we rise to the challenge of addressing some of these key agenda items.