Security Council Reform R.I.P. Posted by Suzanne Nossel

State Department Under Secretary Nicholas Burns gave a major press conference today on UN reform, focusing on reform of the Security Council. 

Burns indicated that the US will offer a proposal to link membership to objective criteria that go beyond geography to include things like commitment to non-proliferation and counter-terrorism, financial and troop contributions to the UN, population, and commitments to democracy and human rights.  He said that the US is prepared to strongly back Japan's candidacy and that of perhaps one other permanent member (both non veto-wielding) as well as an expansion of non-permanent seats up to a total Council size of 19 or 20, but no more on grounds of efficacy (its worth reading his high praise for the Council's remarkable efficacy in its current shape and size - I guess we've come a long way since Bush declared the body irrelevant for failure to act on Iraq).

Interesting.  First on objective criteria:  India would be out on grounds of proliferation . . . but in on population and democracy.  Though the US has turned away from Germany's candidacy, an emphasis on financial contributions favors their inclusion.   Is each factored weighted?  Equally?  Will P5 members (namely China) agree to adopt criteria that, if applied to them (which they won't be) would mandate their exclusion?  Upshot:  the membership could debate these issues until Micronesia conquers Mexico without coming to any resolution.

Second, the limitation of new permanent members to just 2 is a non-starter.  If Japan's in then either Latin America, Africa or both (in the event of an Indian or additional European seat) are still excluded.  The vast majority of the UN membership are developing countries, and they'll never accept that.

Third, the limitation to 19-20 members also effectively kills most proposals floated in recent years.  The Clinton Administration had that stance for a while and then became slightly more flexible when the Japanese implored us that the 20 seat limitation was a deal-killer.  So it seems our support for Japan may be aimed only to mollify Tokyo's disappointment that, as a practical matter, expansion ain't gonna happen.

I read this as aimed to gum up the works with another 3-5 years of debate over the criteria.  After the Iraq impasse there seemed to be a brief period when the Administration favored SC reform on grounds that old Europe, etc. had to be balanced out.  But they've now realized they won't get to single-handedly pick who joins the party and that having the likes of Germany and Brazil on board could just make life worse.

Burns said Administration feels strongly that the UNSC reform debate not hold up proposals on other issues, listing issues like reform of the Commission on Human Rights, the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission and a counter-terrorism treaty (more on all those here and elsewhere in the UN archive on this site).   He was also rightfully forceful in rejecting pending legislation that would require withholding US dues.

Bottom line:  unless I am missing something (is this a negotiating position aimed to pave the way for . . . .) after today, Security Council reform is dead for at least a while.

Awake at Night Over Iraq Posted by Suzanne Nossel

I went to a lunch yesterday where the subject was the elephant in the room:  Iraq.  As Derek wrote earlier this week, we all need to talk and think more about it.  One reason we don't is that most discussions start with this series of disheartening premises: 

1) public support for the war's dwindling; 2) without strong public backing war becomes untenable; 3) we can't cut and run for fear terrorists will be emboldened and that Iraq itself will descend into chaos dragging down the region; 4) our very presence in-country seems to be fueling the insurgency; 5) we cannot up the number of boots on the ground without instituting a draft or similar;

6) no other countries are willing to ante up troops to help us and, under the circumstances, its hard to blame them; 7) training of Iraqi troops and police is much slower/harder than expected; 8) even if one gives up on the hope of a liberal democracy in Iraq in the short or medium term, the goal of a base level of stability to allow U.S. exit within the next 2 years or so looks out of reach; 9) the political process has bogged down to a point where its unclear whether a unified state will emerge

As progressives, we've argued at every turn against the decisions and actions that led us to this quagmire.  The longer our advice is ignored, the tougher it becomes for us to say what to do next (one of Kerry's problems during election season).

My feeling for the last few months has been that we are past the point of no-return in terms of attracting international contributions to the stabilization effort.   

But given the alternatives, maybe its time to reconsider:  Could we draw in more Europeans for roles outside the line of fire that would still take burdens off our troops?  Could Europe (or even Arab countries) do more to hasten the training of Iraqi military and police?  Joe Biden seems to think this is not a dead letter.   

While I don't hold out much hope, given the choices of conscription, premature withdrawal, or "staying the course" on a road that seems to lead inexorably to those two options and no others, why not try?

Would limited international participation help?  It might take some of the edge off what is still seen as a US occupation.  It also might pave the way for an eventual UN role, and chance for the U.S. to exit Iraq without abandoning it.

Is there anything we could do to lure some Europeans or others in?  What might help . . . A firm pledge not to build permanent bases in Iraq . . . Allowing foreign contractors to compete with the American firms for commercial and oil opportunities in-country . . . a pledge and a plan to overhaul the handling of detention and interrogations . . . broader involvement in decision-making regarding reconstruction and the political process . . . a mea culpa of sorts in terms of the mistakes and misrepresentations made en route to Iraq.  I don't know if any of it would work, but all this and more would be well worth giving in exchange for real help and an exit strategy.

At the very least, we should be holding urgent talks to find out what it would take.

Strengthening the Arsenal Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Tomorrow afternoon us Arsenalists will be powwowing down in DC, taking stock now that we're roughly 3 months into the enterprise.  In the meantime, if readers have comments, criticism, praise or ideas for this site, please post away.  We promise to read and consider faithfully. 

Help the Military, Help Ourselves Posted by Lorelei Kelly

Today, Senator Joe Biden (D,DE) circulated a Dear Colleague letter with some strong language about the need for Congress to take more responsibility for ongoing Iraq policy. (Dear Colleagues are one of the ways Members of Congress explicitly communicate with each other. They are hand delivered office to office by the internal mail service)

"To get out of the impasse that we're in, Congress must forge a new compact with the Administration to gain the informed consent of the American people on Iraq. Specifically, the Administration should develop with us clear benchmarks or goals in each of the key areas: security, reconstruction, governance and internationalization.  The six of us and the committees we represent should aggressively assert our oversight responsibilities by insisting that the Administration report on progress toward those goals every month in public testimony.  I'd expect the Administration to detail what we had achieved, where we had fallen short, why we had fallen short and what we were doing to remedy the shortfalls.

In my judgement, this combination of benchmarks and regular public accountability could go a long way toward convincing the American people that they are getting the facts on Iraq and that we have a strategy for success.  We need to win back their confidence, our troops deserve nothing less."

Senator Biden is right. We need a public conversation on Iraq.  If Congress isn't going to take his advice and do it, then the public should lead. This is important not only for its own merits--but we need to get a dialogue process started that will inhibit the kind of divided and bitter public legacy left by VietNam. By organizing public interactions in a constructive way, progressives will benefit. We will not only  learn more about today's security issues and create relationships with military professionals but also help build the political constituency for a better post 9/11 national security strategy.

The military would greatly benefit from this type of public interaction. They are learning at a remarkable pace just what combinations of power and policy are effective in today's wars. Yet they can only take their knowledge and feedback so far. It will be up to the rest of us to initiate the conversation, to take the time to understand, to translate jargon and to build a political constituency for change.

I spent two days last week at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Their Center for Strategic Leadership convened a conference entitled "Addressing the Conditions that Foster Terrorism".The premise for the conference was the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism which establishes four goals for addressing the breadth of the terrorist threat: Defeat Terrorists and their Organizations; Deny Sponsorship and Support to Terrorists;Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit; and Defend US Citizens and Interests at Home and Abroad.

The discussions over the two days centered on the concern that the least prioritized and coordinated of these four goals appears to be the foundation of the terrorists' efforts--the underlying conditions they exploit to reconstitute and grow.  The Army fully understands the recommendations of the 9/11 commission report--until these underlying conditions are addressed the defeat of terrorism cannot be assured.

The Army and Marine Corps--America's landpower forces-- have led the way in figuring out how to problem-solve in today's chaotic and complicated war zones. We discussed how we might take the lessons learned from post war experience in democracy building and apply them to prevention strategies. Progressives who want something to say "yes" to about the military would do well to check out a few military publications.  Try the Joint Electronic Library for starters...then have a look at the Army Manual for Peace Operations.  This is the guidance our soldiers take with them into war. It includes chapters on negotiation, conflict resolution, civil law, demobilization and disarmament, civil law and order.

In the break out sessions, we also discussed the drastic changes needed in budget priorities, and the difficulties of the military being both good cop and bad cop. In other words, how, in the long-term, our hearts and minds campaign may not be able to overcome a strategy based on pre-emptive war and hardware dominance.

Acknowledging, documenting and discussing these issues is something that military brain-trusts do very well. But for anyone in a uniform,  bright lines exist between these activities and acting to actually change policy priorities. Talking about budgets and about how we can translate the military's conflict resolution activities into a strategy of prevention is up to the rest of us. Is anybody out there initiating local public conversations about the Iraq war? If so, I'd love to hear about it. If not, what are we waiting for?

Paying What We Owe to the UN Posted by Suzanne Nossel

The Administration has taken the right position by firmly opposing conditions that would result in withholding of U.S. dues to the UN.  For background Rep. Henry Hyde's UN Reform Act of 2005 which is to be voted on tomorrow, and for an explanation of why withholding U.S. dues is such a bad idea, see here.  This issue has not received a lot of mainstream media attention since the bill was first debated last week, but fresh U.S. arrears to the UN would do grave damage to both the health of the UN and to the cause of reform.   A group of 8 former U.S. Ambassadors to the UN, including both Democrats and Republicans, signed an open letter to that effect yesterday.

I am looking forward to how the Administration squares its opposition to dues withholdings with the position taken by John Bolton who wrote in 1999 that:

On U.S. arrears to the UN, Bolton proclaimed, "[M]any Republicans in Congress--and perhaps a majority--not only do not care about losing the General Assembly vote but actually see it as a 'make my day' outcome. Indeed, once the vote is lost… this will simply provide further evidence to may why nothing more should be paid to the UN system."

Has the man Jesse Helms hoped to meet in Armageddon changed his tune on this?

"Smart" Trade Policy Posted by Heather Hurlburt

The week's shout-out for intelligent progressive thought on trade goes to Dan Tarullo, Dan Restrepo and the good people at the Center for American Progress for their memo on the DR-CAFTA free trade agreement.

Dan T. earned his free trade chops:  he held senior economic policy jobs at the Clinton White House and State Department.  You can't call him a closet protectionist.  When someone with those credentials says that "... this trade agreement, and the policies surrounding it, fall so far short of a much-needed smart trade policy" progressives should start taking notes.

The memo's definition of a smart trade policy is a good start toward helping progressives rebuild our consensus on trade:

"The basic principles of a smart trade policy arise from the reasons for seeking trade agreements in the first place.  Trade agreements should provide significant gains for U.S. workers, consumers, and businesses.  They should support development, democracy, and the rule of law in our trading partners.  Because trade agreements inevitably create losers as well as winners, smart trade policy requires that steps be taken to ensure economic opportunity for all those who may be displaced by trade.  Finally, a trade policy cannot be smart unless it can be sustained, both at home and abroad.  At home, this means pursuing trade agreements in a bipartisan fashion.  Abroad it means exercising U.S. leadership so as to bring the benefits of trade to all countries, including the poorest."

Another Clinton Administration economic guru, Gene Sperling, has been pushing a new trade consensus for a while.  In Googling for links for this item, I discovered that even the bloggers over at Mother Jones, or some of them anyway, think there might be some hope for a new progressive middle ground on trade.  (Based on a post I did here a while back, no less.  Don't you love the web?)

Perhaps this CAFTA mess is an opportunity.  What our smart trade folks have been saying makes a lot of sense.  It's time for the rest of us to start picking it up.

Reality Based Defense Approps Posted by Lorelei Kelly

Today’s shout-out goes to Representative John Spratt (D SC) for joining the guns versus guns tradeoff debate in Congress. Congressman Spratt is planning on offering an amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill that would move $84 million from the missile defense program  to nuclear non-proliferation programs.

During the Presidential debates in 2004, President Bush and Senator Kerry agreed that the greatest threat faced by the United States today is nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists. The best means of preventing that threat is the nonproliferation programs that secure nuclear weapons and materials in Russia and other countries.

The bill that the House will consider provides only $416 million for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The Spratt amendment increases the CTR budget to equal the original $500 million requested by Senators Nunn and Lugar in 1991.

Congress has consistently underfunded "loose nukes" programs--aid that pays to secure dangerous materials at their point of origin... while at the same time lavishing billions on the ever-dubious but oh so lucrative missile defense.

WWHSTD? Posted by Heather Hurlburt

What would Harry S Truman do?

It’s interesting, with respect to the "Trumanite" worldview propounded by Michael and edited by Suzanne (and then Michael and then Suzanne), to ponder the position of the Republican party between 1936 and 1952. Why couldn’t they break the stranglehold of the class-traitor Roosevelt and the little haberdasher Truman on the presidency?

Because it was wartime, obviously. Because Roosevelt’s anti-poverty programs became immensely popular. What do those two factors translate into? ROOSEVELT, TRUMAN AND THEIR PARTY DEFINED THE WORLDVIEW THAT ALL AMERICA BOUGHT INTO.

The Republicans found themselves divided between those who rejected that worldview – and sounded like isolationist crazies – and those who tried to pass themselves off as an improved, smarter, lighter or harder version of it. Sound familiar?

Here’s the trick: it wasn’t by making themselves over in Roosevelt and Truman’s image that Republicans wrested the Presidency back. It was by taking control of the next emerging paradigm – the Cold War abroad, the “second return to normalcy” at home – that Eisenhower and the “Eisenhower Republicans” held sway.

What did Truman have to say about this?

If it's a choice between a genuine Republican, and a Republican in Democratic clothing, the people will choose the genuine article, every time.

I have some problems with Michael's principles, though not with his passion for them.  But more importantly, I think this particular lens is pointing us down the wrong road.  This lens is built directly around the Republican worldview that has dominated US politics since shortly after 9-11. 

The fundamental problem with this lens is that it is last year's lens, last election's lens, or even a just-before-the-Iraq-war lens.  It suggests that our problems are primarily military and confrontational in nature and can be solved with the tools of military confrontation first and foremost, if we have the guts to use them.

That's not the worldview that is going to allow Democrats to break through in White House, Congress and statehouse races.  To do that, we need a set of principles that focus on the next set of problems AND a way of presenting them that convinces Americans that progressives see the world the way it is and conservatives don't.  Otherwise, we've ceded the field of reality to conservatives -- a big mistake.

Progressive chest-thumping on exceptionalism, militarism and hegemonism is never going to be as impressive as full-throated conservative chest-thumping on those themes.  And with all due respect, saying that progressives want to help people and conservatives don't is a real loser.  Who doubled US assistance to Africa?  (W.)  Who broke the stigma around assistance to AIDS patients in Africa?  (evangelicals)

What about progressives' commitment to US economic leadership -- to freeing the innovative brilliance that made US companies and our workers' livelihoods second to none but is now threatened or in abeyance?

What about our passion for human dignity -- not helping people because we think it's nice, but because we really believe that "created equal" stuff, and because we know that denying people their dignity is the surest way to create resentment, violence, terror, etc.?  (See under:  defaced Korans.)

What about our love for the American way of life -- something we really did invent here -- that needs to be defended with smart energy policies, far-sighted institution-building, and clear-headed use of our military on the real challenges we face?

The US military is a tool -- US hegemony is also a tool.  The thing we need to communicate to Americans is what we want to use those tools to accomplish.  The point of a hammer is not that you're committed to using the hammer, but that you're committed to building the house.

And while I'm at it:

1)  American exceptionalism.  Michael, I'm not sure what ideas you're thinking of, but the foundations of much of the best of our ethics and beliefs comes from folks in the Middle East several millennia ago, who handed on to us our "Judeo-Christian heritage."  Democracy, civil and political rights, non-violent protest; none of those was exactly conceived in the U.S.A.  What I would argue the US does do terrifyingly well and bravely is to take constructs and implement them -- and improve on them by doing so.

Also on exceptionalism -- the public doesn't much like talk of exceptionalism.  Check out the polls on what Americans think of bringing democracy to the world.  You may also recall that W's campaign in '00, pre-9-11, called for a humble America.  Progressives "need" an answer on exceptionalism for right-wing talk radio, not for the voters.

2)  Military.  It's interesting to note that the gap in public opinon over "who do you trust to use force" closed as close as it ever has during the Kosovo conflict. 

3)  Hegemony.  We're not interested in hegemony for its own sake, just as progressives keep having to be reminded that we don't love the UN or international cooperation for its own sake, we embrace them as means to an end.  It's far from clear that classical hegemony is the most useful way of approaching a world in which the US can't fund the reconstruction of a medium-sized country alone; can't persuade a smallish country to change its ways without a dozen or more partners in economic and political boycott; and can't stop proliferation or terror attacks (never mind those usual suspects disease and global warming) without military, law enforcement and other cooperation from countries large and small. 

First Principles for Progressives Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Michael riposted my response to his initial post recounting the conclusions of a recent Truman Project meeting that discussed the pillars of a progressive foreign policy.    Anne-Marie Slaughter at America Abroad and Stygius have also waded into the fray.

I agree with Michael that progressives need to be definite, simple, and passionate.  I wrote a piece in 2002 entitled Battle Hymn of the Democrats that said:

In a milieu of war or near-war, the public will look for leadership that is bold and strident—more forceful, resolute, and pugnacious than would otherwise be tolerated . . .The Democrats’ problem is that they fit the British description of peacetime virtue to a tee: thoughtful, reasoned, wary of hyperbole and over-simplification, and fearful of making mistakes . . .

That said, I don't think there's anything wrong with taking the time to debate how to get our ideas right.  It's too soon after the Kerry defeat to decide that we have all the answers and need only repeat them with conviction. 

1) On exceptionalism, I think the key is that we view ourselves - our history, our values, our capabilities - as exceptional.  This is something both progressives and the public at large feel proud and passionate about.  This is distinct from the belief that America's status merits automatic exemption from the rules we think are needed for a world order.  This doesn't mean our exceptionalism is without consequence.  It affects the sway we expect to hold over others, and at times it may be valid grounds to argue for new or separate rules.  Defined otherwise, I fear that the claim of exceptionalism may swallow what Michael cites as a bedrock of progressives' proprietary agenda (as distinct from those principles we hold in common with conservatives), namely "the world community."

2) As the US's military superiority and technology have advanced, most Americans are increasingly comfortable with the use of force.  Had the Iraq War ended when "major combat operations" concluded in May of 2003, most of us would have judged the risks and costs of force so diminished as to warrant a wholesale recalibration of the criteria for military intervention.  Given the military's ability to minimize loss of life (and its political consequences), a lot of the traditional phobia about force would've fallen away.  But the 2 year insurgency has called that reasoning into question.  The American people are grappling with this conundrum; I agree with Derek that progressives need to offer more thinking on how to resolve it.   We should be passionate about positioning our military to succeed.

3) On hegemony, our foreign policy should have as a primary goal the maintenance of America's primacy.  That objective is grounded in another hallmark of a hard-headed progressive philosophy (one Michael did not mention), namely that America is and must be a force for good in the world.   

But (as I've said here and here), as the world changes, exercising power by fiat will often thwart rather than promote the cause of sustained American primacy.  I am not against fiat in principle.  It would make life easier and maybe even make the world better if the U.S. could simply call the shots.  Moreover, I don't think we should tie our own hands, or willingly forfeit any of the prerogatives we enjoy as a superpower.  But as a practical matter the goal of sustaining our power (which emptywheel talks about in his comments to Michael's post) demands that most of the time - though not always - we exercise it with the support and consent of others.

The Passions of the Left? Posted by Michael Signer

O.K.  It's always a little intimidating getting into a tangle with Suzanne, not only because she knows volumes more than I do about anything and everything relating to international affairs, but also because she can write volumes more, and so my feeble response here will probably be crushed by an avalanche of devastating prose.

It's also a scorching hot day here in Richmond, where the heat waves off the sidewalks were visible at 9:00 a.m., and the elms were wilting.  So the heat is on.

That said.

Here's my beef with Suzanne's last post, which responds to my previous one laying out six principles for a reinvigorated national security left. 

Suzanne's points are all typically well-considered and thoughtful and nuanced. 

But I think that in the case of thinking about the left and national security together, nuance is actually the last thing we need.  We need to start with bold propositions and strong passions, and work our way down to the details, not vice versa.

Here's what I mean.  The social scientists and rat-choice theorists have always talked a great deal about intensity of preferences as the independent variable driving the market.  If my preferences are stronger -- if I want the widget 10 times more than you do -- I will put 10 times more effort into getting it, and I get to drive the market.

It concerns me that too many progressives lack intense affirmative preferences on national security generally.  We're very good on negative preferences (like the Deaniacs' anger about the manner in which President Bush prosecuted the war in Iraq).  But in an era where conviction has become the sine qua non of successful national politics, we doom ourselves to irrelevance by lacking emotional roots on the positive principles that could drive American foreign policy generationally.

My pet theory about 9/11 and the politics that followed is that that 9/11 was an emotional wound for the country, a gash in our collective psyche.  Ever since, we have been looking for leaders with an emotional resonance, an affirmative provenance, large enough to fill the wound. 

For all of his faults, George W. Bush and the team around him appeared to feel as deeply as my friends who were working on Wall Street when the Twin Towers were hit the wound of 9/11.  His emotional response seemed proportionate to the injury, which helps explains why Americans have trusted his GWOT (rather than his GWOE), despite his mistakes.

Kerry was hammered for being a flip-flopper, but I think the real issue was not his sincerity (whether he believed) but his conviction (how much he believed) on matters of national security.  I remember thinking during the debates that the only issue that truly seemed to come straight from his soul was his passion, ironically enough, about the perils of certainty.  This is what he said in the September 30 debate:

"But this issue of certainty. It's one thing to be certain, but you can be certain and be wrong.

"It's another to be certain and be right, or to be certain and be moving in the right direction, or be certain about a principle and then learn new facts and take those new facts and put them to use in order to change and get your policy right.

"What I worry about with the president is that he's not acknowledging what's on the ground, he's not acknowledging the realities of North Korea, he's not acknowledging the truth of the science of stem-cell research or of global warming and other issues.

"And certainty sometimes can get you in trouble."

This hurts us in comparison with conservatives.  Just look at the figures on the right who are defined by their conviction:  Sean Hannity, Ann Coulter, George Will, Pat Buchanan, John McCain, and, of course, George W. Bush and his hero, Ronald Reagan.

Now look at the left.  What was most discomfiting about the Democratic response to President Bush's State of the Union was not the thoughtfulness or facts of Senator Reid and Congresswoman Pelosi -- these were fine.  It was the relative colorlessness of their passion -- especially on national security.

This helps explain why Joe Biden is so head-and-shoulders above the field (and Hillary Clinton, not coincidentally the Senator from New York, a close second). 

I think all of this may go back at least in part to the academy.  Many of the left's political leaders have been schooled in an academy dominated by postmodern irony and the fetishes of deconstruction.  Many have been so thoroughly inculcated with radical skepticism of any deep claims that we've kind of husked over our more profound sentiments about America. 

That husk can be easily peeled away (just see the debate about Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo and our anguish about America's hard-earned moral reputation being tarnished).  But as a general matter we default to a highly tempered, balanced equipoise -- to thoughtfulness, not as a key to unlock action, but as an end in itself.

So, I ask whether we have what it takes.  What we learned in the 2004 election -- to our shock and chagrin -- was we won't win over the country just with better policies and positions, with superior statistics and by the President's self-delusion and self-destruction, and with more charismatic or experienced candidates. 

We will win it because the public trusts our conviction. 

So, given all of this:  in response to Suzanne, and many of the responses I got to my original post, I throw back the following questions on my first three principles: 

1)  American exceptionalism:  Do we really believe that America is unique, historically graced, and responsible for the world's greatest ideas?  (When Suzanne writes, "We recognize that by claiming exceptionalism, we risk undercutting values and norms whose broad acceptance would advance U.S. national interests," I fear this is an exception that swallows the rule.)

2)  The use of force:  Are we truly comfortable with the fundamental proposition that great ideas are worth dying for, and that great injustices are worth suffering and pain to rebuke?  (I think Suzanne's nuances here probably improve on my post -- she writes, "We are hard-headed about what force can and cannot accomplish, and we're committed to ensuring that force is used wisely in combination with other forms of power." -- but I still am concerned about what "wise use" ultimately means.)

3)  American hegemony:  Do we truly believe that America is great and good enough to be in a single leadership position over the world?  Especially when China -- which would surely manage the world in a much different (and worse) fashion than us, looms?  (Suzanne writes, "But we don't think even a hegemon (even one that has "earned" its status) can rule by fiat."  But I believe this drains the concept of hegemony of its core value.  In many cases, the ability and threat of fiat is what starts and pulls along cooperation, right?)

We've got to have conviction on these three ideas.  The exceptions can't swallow the rules.  Then we can get down to details and nuances, and to specifics on hard cases. 

But we need to work on the big ideas first.

The Iraq debate we need Posted by Derek Chollet

Having spent the weekend in Canada watching some very fast cars drive around a track, all the while imbibing my fair share of Canada’s finest, my head remains a little foggy for the finer details and nuances of debating America’s national security. 

Which I guess is one reason why I’m focused on the big picture. I flew home yesterday morning to find this article blaring across the right-hand column of the USA Today about the new Gallup poll showing support for the Iraq War at an all-time low, and most Americans wanting us to get out in some form, if not altogether.

Reading this poll got me to thinking: three summers ago, we had a huge debate in this country over what to do about Iraq – and this debate was highly emotional and deeply contentious (and, we now know, highly flawed because of some very bad intelligence – even those of us who believe that we weren’t lied to about Iraq’s WMD, but were just plain wrong, see that).  What happened three years ago remains very hot to this day, as illustrated by all the attention being paid to the series of British government memos being leaked to the press, especially the so-called Downing Street memo.    

What’s disturbing to me is that here we are in 2005, with 150,000 troops on the ground in combat and no end in sight, and the main subject of debate, especially in progressive circles, remains the same.  It’s not what we do about Iraq now, but what happened in 2002.  By my reading, nothing in these memos is much of a surprise – the Bush team was determined to take action against Saddam (and in the opinion of some British officials, regardless of what the intelligence showed), and it was not planning adequately for where we are today, the so-called post-conflict phase.   I’m not saying that what happened during this period is unimportant – very emphatically, it is important, which is one reason why, as others have pointed out, there should be more outrage about the Senate Intelligence Committee’s decision not to conduct “phase two” of its Iraq report into how policymakers used or misused the intelligence on Iraqi WMD they were provided. 

But historians can and will debate the events of the summer and fall of 2002 for many years to come.  It seems to me that for us, what matters most right now is the history yet to unfold: what we are going to do about Iraq today and moving forward.  That’s the Iraq debate we need. 

It makes sense why many policy types in Washington – especially internationalist progressives – have steered away from this discussion since last year’s election.  Politically, it seems like a loser.  And there are no easy answers -- as the old policy adage goes, we’re forced to choose the least bad option.  The proposals we tout – better training for Iraqi troops, more allies involved – are hardly quick fixes.  These are the very reasons we need a debate about it: because moving forward is not going to be easy, it will continue to involve sacrifices, and it will still make a lot of people unhappy.

A big part of the problem is that we really don’t have any idea what we are trying to accomplish in Iraq, other than generalities like “build democracy” or “provide security.”  A plan isn’t much good if you don’t know exactly what you want to do, or how you can define success.  We have to answer the very simple question that most Americans are asking: what needs to happen in Iraq so that our troops can come home?  And then we have to answer the obvious follow-up: when will this start happening?

As a sign of how badly we need a new debate, consider Jim Hoagland’s column in the Washington Post last Sunday.  For many years, Hoagland has been a consistent advocate for removing Saddam from power, and believes that we did the right thing.  But he is taking stock of the recent polls, and this is what he has to say:

“The cost-benefit analysis [of the Iraq War] -- the ‘How are we doing?’ question -- can be rewritten in a short time by changing circumstances and the information and perceptions the changes generate. But the character question of ‘What are we doing’ demands answers and judgments that rapidly get set in concrete. The next important tipping point may not be in Iraq but in the United States.

“It is not just the surge of violence in both conflicts in the past month that is shaking support for Bush. It is also the growing concern of middle-of-the-road Americans that they cannot trust the information they are being given by the administration -- and particularly by the Pentagon -- about the conduct and progress of these wars…

“…the White House is too quick to find comfort in the ignorant partisanship of some foes and the partisan ignorance of others -- and in the reality that patience is required in all wars and particularly in one as amorphous and demanding as this struggle has become.

“All of that is true, but it is not the whole story. Patience in times of hardship and danger has to be earned by leadership, by candor and by demonstrated accountability and responsibility at the top. A poll may be nothing more than a snapshot, but it can show us things about ourselves we need to see.”

Earning patience by demonstrating leadership, candor, and accountability.  Great idea.  Since Bush shows no signs of doing so, we should.   

Overruled on El Baradei Posted by Suzanne Nossel

So despite being vilified by conservatives for being weak-kneed on Iran, IAEA Chief Mohamed El Baradei was reappointed today with U.S. support.  The Administration, which had been waging a noisy but lonely battle against a third term for the Egyptian nuclear watchdog abruptly reversed its position last week. 

Bush first turned against El Baradei when he refused to accept their assertions about Saddam Hussein's WMD program.   The Administration has since decried the IAEA's failure to take a tougher line on Iran.  But as has happened at the OAS and in the UN Security Council over the referral of Darfur to the ICC, the U.S. found itself isolated in its opposition to El Baradei, and ultimately had no choice but to back him. 

Some observers believe that their acquiesence to El Baradei signals that the Administration has lost patience with prevention tactics in relation to Iran, though given the paucity of alternatives its hard to know what precisely that means.  The Administration has mitigated some of its concerns by securing El Baradei's agreement to take a tougher line on inspections and reports on Tehran's nuclear program.

One thing that's clear is the consistent pattern of the U.S. being isolated in multilateral forums.  In this case, the Administration's failure to put forward and build support for a clear strategy at this year's Non-Proliferation Conference (see here and here) meant that there was little prospect of consensus over whether El Baradei was doing a good job or not.  The U.S. also failed to put forward a viable alternative candidate.   None of this is because the IAEA does not matter.  The agency is a focal point of legislation in the Congress that would strengthen what is viewed as a critical UN body.

No matter what you think of El Baradei, the U.S. should not wind up backed into a corner on such an important appointment.

Weekly Top 10 - 10 Reasons to Close Guantanamo Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Amnesty International's gulag remark was hyperbole and may have just made it tougher to get the Administration to own up to a prison gone wrong.  And – while the Administration pretends it is otherwise - no one is suggesting that the Guantanamo inmates simply be set free - - many and probably most may need to be detained for years to come, though this could be done in prisons in their home countries and the U.S.  People also aren't suggestion Gitmo be shut overnight.  While it will take some time to work out what to do with the 540 inmates, declaring a shut-down date that is months away would make that work go faster.   There are good reasons to close down the Guantanamo detention camp, and here are 10:                                                                                                                                                                        

1.         Because conditions there have given rise to torture – For reasons that will be debated for years to come, multiple incidents of torture have occurred at Guantanamo.  The revelations of abuse continue to spill out, including this latest from Time Magazine.  The U.S. rejects torture unequivocally (as does President Bush ), and cannot maintain a facility where we know torture occurs.

2.         To eliminate what has become a liability in the war on terror – Reports of ill-treatment of Afghan detainees at Guantanamo have become a rallying cry for anti-U.S. insurgents across the Muslim world.  Getting rid of Guantanamo won't solve the problem, but – particularly if coupled with serious efforts to prevent all abuses in detention and interrogation - it will deprive them of what has become a highly evocative symbol around the world. (see Biden's comments - -  Rep. Mel Martinez (R-FL) agrees). 

3.         To recapture the U.S.'s position as a human rights standard-bearer – Despite the Administration's denunciations, Amnesty's fingering of the U.S. as a major human rights violator has been heard 'round the world.  The claim resonates because of the revelations concerning Guantanamo, Bagram and elsewhere.  To counter this, we need to make a dramatic gesture to show that the U.S. maintains its reputation on the forefront of promoting human rights. (see Jimmy Carter's comments).

4.        To expedite the determination of which inmates warrant continued detention – One of the most egregious aspects of the Guantanamo process is the fact that after being captive for three and a half years, many of the 540 detainees have still not had the benefit of a hearing to determine whether there is evidence to back their designation as enemy combatants.   Some still haven't even seen a lawyer.  With a fixed timeline to shut down Guantanamo, those hearings would need to happen more quickly. 

5.        Because legal advantages to offshore detention are dwindling – The original reason to use Gitmo for Afghan detainees was to stop them from asserting their rights in U.S. courts by asserting a loophole based on the fact that the prison isn't on American soil.   But the Supreme Court has held that the writ of habeas corpus does apply at Gitmo, and the Administration has been dealt a series of similar setbacks in lower courts.  So any legal advantage the Administration hoped to gain by offshoring detentions is dwindling. 

Trumanites at the Drawing Board Posted by Suzanne Nossel

A few wrinkles on the modern day Truman Doctrine as expounded by Michael and noted over at America Abroad (OK, so maybe this is the Nossel doctrine - I leave it to the Trumanites to pronounce on whether they agree or not):

Exceptionalism - Yes, we do believe it, but we part ways from the neocons in that we're not so naive as to expect the rest of the world to buy in as well. We are also less likely to assume that our unique status does or should exempt us from the rules we expect others to follow.   We recognize that by claiming exceptionalism, we risk undercutting values and norms whose broad acceptance would advance U.S. national interests.   

Use of force - We do favor the use of force to advance U.S. security and priority matters of national interest.  But we're committed to using force a lot more smartly than the neocons.  We don't fetishize American power.  We're not so blinded by our own prowess that we believe our soldiers can deliver anything regardless of how little - in terms of planning, equipment, boots on the ground, and political support - we deliver them.  We are hard-headed about what force can and cannot accomplish, and we're committed to ensuring that force is used wisely in combination with other forms of power.

Hegemony - Yes, we think America ought to fight hard not to let any other power challenge our position.  But we don't think even a hegemon (even one that has "earned" its status) can rule by fiat.  We recognize that the world is becoming more democratic with a lower case "d" and we will need to exercise power in a manner more closely resembling a democratic leader - rallying others, persuading others, building alliances and constituencies, being responsive to global concerns.  For more on that, see here.

More on the elements that distinguish progressives another time.