North Korea: The Military Option Posted by Michael Signer

A smart, tough, and thought-provoking WaPo op-ed today by Susan Rice (a former Clinton assistant secretary of state) on the North Korea situation.  Her most provocative graf:

At this late stage, the United States has three options.

First, we could strike North Korea's suspected nuclear facilities or use force to change the regime. Military options must remain on the table, but all of them are problematic. U.S. intelligence on North Korea is poor. Overstretched in Iraq, the United States does not have ground forces for an invasion. South Korea and China vehemently oppose military action. Worse still, North Korea could retaliate with a nuclear or conventional strike on nearby Seoul, on our more than 30,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, on Japan or even on the United States.

Her point is made more powerful and problematic against the backdrop of an astonishing press conference earlier this week  by President Bush.  Here's how he answered a question about North Korea:

Q Good morning, Mr. President. This morning you reiterated diplomacy as the way to deal with North Korea. With all due respect, some people say that's precisely the wrong approach because diplomacy has produced nothing, while at the same time it has allowed North Korea to progress in its nuclear program.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q How do you -- what do you say to them?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then let's see -- if it's the wrong -- if diplomacy is the wrong approach, I guess that means military. That's how I view it -- it's either diplomacy or military. And I am for the diplomacy approach. And so, for those who say that we ought to be using our military to solve the problem, I would say that, while all options are on the table, we've got -- we've got a ways to go to solve this diplomatically.

BEWARE -- if you think a dovish analysis is coming, you will be disappointed. 

I don't want to be intemperate.  I'm certainly not bellicose.  I just want to think this through.  And I would like to start from a blank slate, meaning I have no ideological investment in any prefabricated policy conclusion.  I'm just interested in America's security.  From this beginning point, the President's blanket statement in his press conference triggers two questions. 

One:  Why should the military option be off the table as a matter of policy?  Why are we already committed to this binary choice? 

Two:  Why is the Administration getting away with gross illogic and hypocrisy in its contrary approaches to Iraq and North Korea?

Because these two questions are related, let's take them together.

The problem to many people in Iraq was that the underlying motivations of the war seemed to be much more about retrospective grievances than about prospective calculations.  This was why John Kerry said last year (with a typically tortured syntax):

[I]t is critical that this president gives life to the notion that the United States of America never goes to war because we want to. We should only go to war because we have to.

All the diplomatic and journalistic evidence (rather than the WMD evidence) suggested that Iraq had actually retreated into a relatively non-bellicose stance over the last several years, and was hardly currently threatening the United States.

In talking about "wanting" to go to war, Kerry was speaking to the idea that our approach on Iraq was colored by desire:  desire for revenge, desire for a fantastic, neocon guinea pig for democracy, desire for easy oil revenues. 

It was for all these reasons that the Administration did exactly the opposite of what the President is urging now:  they overtly and consistently chose the military rather than diplomatic option. 

Now, turn to North Korea.  President Bush is saying, as a matter of policy, we must choose the diplomatic rather than military option. 

Why?

As I see it, there are two ways to think about this in light of Iraq, and they have to do with whether we take Iraq and North Korea separately or apart. 

First, we can abandon any hope for logical consistency or ideological follow-through and instead approach the Administration's decision in Iraq as a kind of outlier. 

If we ignore Iraq, and look at North Korea with (somehow) fresh eyes, then North Korea becomes a test case for whether the Bush Administration has become all dewy-eyed and Clintonian in its appreciation for the power of soft power.  Then the question becomes, simply, whether or not their approach will work.

The second option is a little harder.  If we instead try to view the two situations together, as part of an integrated foreign policy, then the question becomes why we shouldn't be actively considering military along with diplomatic options -- especially if, applying the same logic we used in Iraq, North Korea is more of the same type of threat Iraq presented.

Let's go back to Rice's op-ed:

Military options must remain on the table, but all of them are problematic. U.S. intelligence on North Korea is poor. Overstretched in Iraq, the United States does not have ground forces for an invasion. South Korea and China vehemently oppose military action. Worse still, North Korea could retaliate with a nuclear or conventional strike on nearby Seoul, on our more than 30,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, on Japan or even on the United States.

We faced similar problems (regional instability, continuing attacks on our troops) going into Iraq.  But we went in anyway because of the rationales underlying what was a new American foreign policy of pre-emption.

The greatest irony is that the single greatest problem, in this crazy Catch-22 universe of the Bush Administration, is that our mismatch of rhetoric and reality in Iraq has hamstrung us for the reality in North Korea -- and so our rhetoric (with Bush looking embarrassingly weak in pleading for diplomacy with Kim Jong Il) has to play catch-up. 

As a nation, we should have some consistency to our foreign policy.  I know that the hallmark of realpolitik is intellectual flexibility based on context.  But I thought the whole point was that this Administration had moved beyond hard power calculations. 

The Bush Administration doesn't just speak for itself -- it speaks for the nation.  The Administration is tangled in a web of its own making and is trying to present Iraq and North Korea as two separate cases.  But they're not. 

Sudan - Don't Give Up So Fast Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Kevin Drum questions whether there's any truth to Derek's contention that the American public supports greater action on Darfur, and whether there's any option on the table for ending the crisis short of sending in American troops, something the public is hesitant to countenance.

As the resident night owl, I offer a few thoughts in response, with the hope that Derek adds some more in the AM:

- While Kevin's right that in the Zogby/International Crisis Group poll on U.S. public opinion toward Darfur, just 28% of Americans described themselves as "very aware" of the crisis, when the crisis was described to them large majorities nonetheless supported action: 70% thought the international community should respond and 84% thought the U.S. should use its "military assets" (short of troops) to stop the tragedy unfolding.  Under the circumstances, with the military stretched to the breaking point in a far-flung conflict that many Americans view as endless and unnecessary, its remarkable that fully 38% of survey respondents do support putting U.S. soldiers on the ground.  After all, that's 20% more than said they know what's really going on in Sudan.  Were it not for our entanglement in Iraq, that number might be a lot higher.

- Second, there are alternatives to U.S. boots on the ground.  Kevin is right that the Darfur mission is highlighting the AU's weaknesses in terms of capabilities, equipment and funding.   The most obvious short-term solution is a hefty NATO backstop to an AU force, likely going beyond the logistics, transport and training they are providing today to include actual troops in country (over the long-term, we ought to be thinking about measures like those outlined here, including a long-term investment in developing capable military leadership for a standing AU force).  This is what Derek, Madeleine Albright and others have been urging.  A large amount of U.S. energy has been expended over the last decade in sustaining and expanding NATO in preparation for a post-Cold War role.   With Europe chaotic but essential secure and peaceful, right now its hard to imagine a better use of the capabilities amassed than Darfur.  It's also a chance for the many European countries that are not entangled in Iraq to share some of the burden of keeping the global peace, something they profess willingness to do.  Building consensus for a robust NATO mission won't be easy, but the U.S. is obligated to try.

- A third option is stepped up UN peacekeeping.  The UNSC voted to establish a 10,000 person strong peacekeeping mission in Sudan back in March, but the peacekeepers have only just begun to deploy.  The UN forces will share some of the AU limitations, including lack of rapid-deployment and sophisticated airlift capabilities.  Over the long-term, a standing UN force would be one way to remedy these shortcomings, and strengthen the alternatives to U.S. intervention.  There are also political constraints on UN involvement, including most notably China's ties to the Sudanese regime.    But the Chinese are not above the kind of pressure that global acknowledgement of a genocidal crisis brings to bear.

So its not enough to throw up our hands even if we reject U.S. ground troops as a serious option.  There are alternatives.  Its the Administration's job to make them work, and our job to push them to do so.

Iraq and Democracy (theirs and ours) Posted by Lorelei Kelly

Last week, I posted about a House amendment calling for the president to submit a plan for troop withdrawal from Iraq.  One DA reader commented: What consequences do you see flowing from such an amendment, were it to be adopted as US policy? How would you justify them as good for Americans or for Iraqis?

I'd like to start to answer that question with a quotation from Richard Holbrooke.  "We need exit strategies--but they must be in the context of getting the job done."  One step forward to that end that would be both healthy for American and Iraqi participatory democracy would be to engage both publics more actively in discussions about the future (theirs and ours intermingled with theirs). Though the amendment may be a clumsy tool, it has started an important discussion in  Congress--the very body that is supposed to have authority over key decisions on war and peace.

I have queried military friends who believe that any mention of an exit strategy is detrimental. But they also agree that this aversion should not eliminate the need for some kind of plan. Well, the amendment doesn't even mention the words "exit strategy".  In order to not fuss about language, let's call it a "blueprint for viable peace" including publicly discussed achievement benchmarks.   One of my military skeptic friends also said "no matter what we call it, there has to be a way to consolidate the process."  This need is especially urgent today because of our leadership's absolute lack of conflict termination planning in the lead up to the war (a colleague with extensive time  in the Balkans named this behavior"calculated inexperience", the cousin of willful ignorance) Most of all, however,  even a generic set of issues as benchmarks will create a more effective American presence, as these items will routinely be integrated into intelligence gathering and planning. 

So in order to not to use divisive language, the discussion could be framed as a question: What would be a militarily satisfactory vision of success in Iraq? In military-speak, what are the "desired effects"?  The Bush Administration actually does have a plan: to create capable Iraqi forces and to move Americans into increasingly peripheral roles.  Yet this needs to be articulated clearly so the American public sees the meaning of the strategy and can understand the challenge that we've undertaken as one that will require long-term commitment and perserverance--but that will also--one day--end.  An example from the past to illustrate: Decades ago,  the promise of nuclear abolition brought nations to the table in support of the non proliferation treaty,  the far distant ideal of nuclear abolition turned the skeptics and potential spoilers into productive participants.  In order for both the American and the Iraqi publics to remain interested and maybe even hopeful stakeholders in the process of democracy, this kind of inspiration is vital. To live free of military occupation is a healthy ideal for the Iraqi people. To support a long-term plan for viable peace in Iraq is a healthy aspiration for the American people. But we still need an intentional plan. The additional benefit of Congress discussing troop withdrawal is that it may be an end-run way to expose the completely inadequate priorities that we allocate for the civilian tools needed for today's wars.  A healthy public discussion will also reveal more clearly the fact that the Iraq conflict, ultimately, will not be solved militarily.  The military knows this--which is why the Defense Department should answer the above questions. Then we'll have a starting point.

A wonderful book that delves deeply into the this topic The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation was just published by the United States Institute of Peace (although the origins of the book are with the Association of the US Army)  Two out of three of the volume editors have military backgrounds and the contents cover everything from how to make a peace process the guiding principle for all policy decisions during an intervention to how to deal with extremists-- including use of force. One author, British officer Ben Lovelock calls this combination of policy requirements "Fourth Generation Peacekeeping"-- necessary because in today's wars there is no "post" conflict stage.  The violence never stops.  The authors also discuss the four simultaneous and ongoing transformation strategies needed for today's wars:  moderating political conflict, defeating militant extremism, institutionalizing the rule of law and developing a legitimate political economy.

Troop withdrawal amendment or not, the administration would do well to consult this book   I thought one of the authors summed it up well when he clarified some jargon.  "Transition" he said, is what we Americans do to phase ourselves into a less intrusive role. "Transformation" however, is what they (the Iraqis) do. Its when the locals make progress and achieve civil peace. War delivers for the insurgents. How do we help make peace deliver for the Iraqi people? That could be the first sentence of a blueprint for viable peace in Iraq.

A dollar short for Africa Posted by Suzanne Nossel

A while ago we here made a list of 10 things the Bush Administration could do with no change in policy that would help improve America's image around the world .  Number 1 was getting behind Britain's initiative to dramatically up aid to Africa, making good on commitments the G8 adopted starting in 2001.

As part of the very same press conference with Thabo Mbeki in which, as Derek discusses below, Bush called the situation in Darfur genocide, the President also make clear he has no intention of being more generous to Africa because "it doesn't fit our budgetary process." 

Meanwhile the EU's original 15 members agreed Tuesday to increase official aid for immunizations, sanitation, education, and other programs for the poor to the equivalent of 0.7 percent of GDP by 2015.  The 10 newest EU members pledged to ''strive for'' 0.33 percent.  That's more than double the .16 of GDP the U.S. currently spends.

The purpose of Mbeki's trip to the U.S. was, at least in large part, to try to build support for the anti-poverty meeting in preparation for an upcoming G8 confab in Scotland.  While Mbeki tried to put a positive spin on the President's response, the absence of any new commitments means he was pretty much shut out.

The problem is not that Britain wants to shower aid willy-nilly.  They too have demanded strict accountability and anti-corruption measures as part of their proposals.  In fact, the Bush Administration's failure to support the UK is becoming a source of real friction between Bush and Blair.  Blair is considering imposing a tax to fund the program, a concept that's unimaginable here.

The EU is in chaos, but has still managed to agree that it wants to be on the forefront of the global battle against poverty, motivated partly by morality and partly by pragmatic concerns about the chaos and spillover effects that desperation breeds. 

The Administration has made the promotion of freedom a centerpiece of its policy, but won't put up the money to help lift up countries for which the biggest threats to freedom are disease, hunger, and poor education.   As the EU moves forward without us, a measure that could have boosted America's image will now hurt it. 

The end of today's press conference was a recitation of tired arguments on Zimbabwe.  Bush decried Mugabe's abuses and reckless ransacking of his country, concluding that "it's a problem."  Mbeki tripped over his own claim that the regime needs "support . . . to overcome these problems," almost saying that its the opposition that deserves the help.  Meanwhile, the despot has been rounding up tens of thousands of political opponents, burning their homes and running others out of the country's big towns.   

It's not too late for Bush to change his mind in advance of the July G-8 Summit.  Why not offer the aid, but link it to a genuine partnership on promoting democracy in Africa - including an end to Mbeki and others' support for Mugabe.  Zimbabwe now seems to be on its way to complete mayhem, which could necessitate lengthy and costly international intervention and recovery effort.  Given the choice between billions more in aid or standing by a friend who is starving his own people, African leaders might budge.

Missed Opportunity Posted by Derek Chollet

In today's Oval Office press availability with South African President Mbeki, President Bush uttered, apparently for the first time, that what is happening in Darfur is genocide (he had only "said" such in a written statement issued last year). He was also asked what he thought of the poll discussed below showing the American people's overwhelming support for stronger action to end the genocide in Darfur.  Here's the exchange in full:

Q:   And, Mr. President, on the issue of Darfur, Sudan, a new survey came out by the Zogby International Poll that finds 84 percent of Americans polled feel that the U.S. should not tolerate an extremist government committing such attacks and should use its military assets, short of using military combat troops on the ground to protect civilians there.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Let me first say something. We are working with NATO to make sure that we are able to help the AU put combat troops there. And as a part of that, I believe a transport plane of ours, for example, will be a part of this mission.

I think later on today I'm going to speak to the Prime Minister of Canada, who has also been very strong about dealing with Darfur, and I will thank him for his contributions.

Ok.  Thanks are in order.  But how about asking for more?  Seems like a missed opportunity.  In addition to Mbeki and the Candian PM, Bush also talked about Darfur today with the NATO Secretary General.  Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick is on his way to Darfur now.  Let's hope this is the beginning of something...

Darfur: Good Policy is Good Politics Posted by Derek Chollet

It’s not just us foreign policy wonks who believe that the U.S. must take stronger action in Darfur – we now know that by vast majorities, the American people agree.  Today the International Crisis Group and the polling firm Zogby International Opinion released a revealing, and important, new survey showing that the American people know what is going on in Darfur, and support strong action to end the genocide.  What’s reassuring is that this support cuts across party and religious lines.  It shows what I have long believed: that more often than not, good policy is good politics.

Some of the highlights:

• 84% of respondents said the U.S. should not tolerate an extremist government committing such attacks, and should use its military assets, short of inserting U.S. combat troops on the ground to protect civilians, to help bring them to a halt (significantly, this includes 83% Republicans and 85% Democrats).

• When asked about specific measures the U.S. might take, an overwhelming 91% of respondents say the U.S. should cooperate with the International Criminal Court -- to which, of course, the U.S. does not belong -- to help bring to justice those accused of crimes against humanity. Strong majorities also support tough sanctions on Sudanese leaders who control the militias (81%).

• Concerning NATO's role – an idea we have championed here – 80% support creating a no-fly zone over Darfur, and 76% support NATO logistical and troop support for an expanded African peacekeeping force. However, support falls quickly away at the prospect of U.S. military action; just 38% of likely voters think the U.S. should send troops under its own flag (which is not surprising).

Congrats to ICG and Zogby for conducting such a poll (ICG’s advocacy and analysis have been critical to keeping attention on Darfur and what to do about it).  These findings deserve wide attention  -- and should serve as a call for greater action.  Imagine that: doing the right thing is also wildly popular! 

Gitmo, Amnesty and the Theatre of the Absurd Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Now its no longer Newsweek, its Amnesty International.  Here's what President Bush had to say yesterday about Amnesty International's latest human rights report:

I'm aware of the Amnesty International report, and it's absurd. It's an absurd allegation. The United States is a country that is -- promotes freedom around the world. When there's accusations made about certain actions by our people, they're fully investigated in a transparent way. It's just an absurd allegation.

In terms of the detainees, we've had thousands of people detained. We've investigated every single complaint against the detainees. It seemed like to me they based some of their decisions on the word of -- and the allegations -- by people who were held in detention, people who hate America, people that had been trained in some instances to disassemble -- that means not tell the truth. And so it was an absurd report. It just is.

More on the report here.  Thinkprogress has pointed out that when the Administration was making its case against Saddam Hussein, it repeatedly cited Amnesty reports on the Iraqi regime's human rights abuses.

The President's latest comments (and similar remarks made Sunday by Cheney on Larry King - the word "absurd" clearly featured prominently in the talking points) are yet more evidence of the White House's refusal to come to grips with the abuses in detention revealed in recent weeks.  It would be one thing if Bush lashed out against Amnesty but acknowledged the troubling revelations at Guantanamo and Bagram.  But he lashed out at Amnesty and left it at that.

Bush's swept those findings to one side countering that the U.S. is a purveyor of freedom, as if this should trump everything else.  Though her husband claims not to, Laura Bush seems to get the contradicition. 

During a recent trip to Egypt she told NBC: "We are an example . . . And that's why the photographs that have come out are so particularly damaging, because we are held to a higher standard than other countries because of our own history of democracy."

This is part of why when it comes to America's image in the Arab world, when it comes to America's image our role in helping advance democracy is at risk of being overshadowed by the prisoner scandals.  See here for a more thorough analysis of why.

One of the challenges faced by the progressive movement is making clear that both morally, practically, and politically indifference and denial won't cut it in response to the abuses in detention.   The moral case is clear.  The practical impact on our foreign policy is demonstrable, though the Administration is nowhere close to acknowledging that link. 

The political piece may be the hardest. 

Global Strategy for GWOE Posted by Heather Hurlburt

OK, any post where I can link the war on terrorism/extremism to Elton John has GOT to be good.  Here goes:

Derek put up a nice post over the weekend summarizing what we know, and what we'd like to see, about the Administration's recognizing it needs to go back to the drawing board and come up with a new comprehensive and thought-through strategy for the Global War on Extremism, GWOE.  I'd like to spell out some more of the things the country needs to see in such an agenda, whether it comes from the White House, progressives, or anybody else.

Here's my five-part agenda:

I.  Diplomatic:  Redefine the war on terror in a way that our friends and partners can and will get on board.  We have failed dismally at this so far -- instead we have a rubric that our partners use to excuse massacres, mass detentions, and other actions that actually strengthen extremists -- and  further blacken our name and our legitimate security goals.

II.  Programmatic: Then, show the world that we are serious about this redefinition by following through on its non-military pieces -- fully funding the assistance programs we have announced with such fervor, for example, and stepping up to help end the festering conflicts that breed cynicism about whether the US and the developed world really give a damn about anyone else.  See democracyarsenal on darfur for one way to do that.  Dear old Bob Geldof is doing his best to gin up a major embarrassment for us at the next G8, where rock stars doing a LiveAid redux will get hundreds of thousands of Europeans to demand that the G8 "Make Poverty History."  Yes, this is where Elton John comes in, and his comment on his participation, embarrassing as it is, should stand for a whole lot of folks: 

"When the Live Aid concert happened 20 years ago I was pretty much a self-obsessed drug addict and, although I was really pleased to be part of a great day, I really wasn't adult enough or mature enough to realize the full consequences of what we were doing," John said. "Now I'm fully aware of what's going on and seeing the injustices going on."

C'mon, it doesn't get better than that.  Now back to serious foreign policy commentary.

III.  Domestic.  As Jim Hoagland pointed out in his column on Sunday, "confusion and drift mark public understanding of what the risks are here at home and what we should be doing about them.  Even Tom Ridge now admits that the color-coded system is confusing and was used dubiously during the election campaign.  A real strategy would:

-- focus on possible targets that could do the most damage, such as chemical plants, and squash industry objections to new standards that would make plants safer (and, by the way, make workers safer on a daily basis);

-- make sure first responders across the country have the tools they need to do their jobs, leapfrogging the appropriations process that has left Wyoming and Alaska first-responders better provided for than those in big urban areas if need be;

-- now that we've taken steps to fix ourr broken visa process and let foreign students back in, fix the broken process that has made so many immigrants and non-citizens feel like unwelcome suspects, and communicate to the American people that we don't need to be heedlessly afraid of foreigners in general and Muslims in particular;

-- while we're at it, some honest, non-inflammatory communication across the board would be in order.  This would require a non-aggression pact between the parties that would prevent dubious heightened security alerts on the one hand, and dubious critiques on the other.  Hey, I can dream, can't I?  Eventually, though, the politicization of the GWOE is going to discredit all sides.  (See under:  EU and its problem with getting its citizens to take it seriously.)

IV.  Military.  Confront the gap between our military ambitions and capabilities honestly.  During the Cold War, Americans who wanted to know understood that our military was keyed to being able to fight 2 1/2 wars simultaneously. 

An intelligent layperson -- and many specialists, for that matter -- couldn't tell you what set of contingencies our military is keyed to today, let alone whether they agree with it.  Having the experts debate that honestly will let us move to a more realistic discussion about military size, and where those people are coming from, as well as choices about technology, force structure, etc.  Opening a public discussion among experts would also be the best way of taking at least some of the politics out of this topic as well.

NATO to Darfur Posted by Derek Chollet

Over the weekend Kofi Annan went to Sudan, where he visited Darfur.  It is amazing – no, appalling – that almost a year after then-Secretary of State Powell called what is happening in Darfur a genocide, that the situation remains, as Annan put it after his visit, “heart wrenching” and “not a situation that can be acceptable for long.”  Over 180,000 killed and two million driven from their homes?  In my book, that’s a situation that’s long past acceptable.

The world – and that includes the Bush Administration -- recognizes that Darfur is a grave humanitarian crisis.  But it still has not found the will or the way to stop the atrocities.  The African Union (AU) has several thousand peacekeepers on the ground and has pledged more, but these won’t be deployed for some time.  In the meantime, people are dying everyday.

Here at DA we have talked about the need to act in Darfur, and fast.  One proposal that has been floating around for awhile would be for NATO to intervene, at the least assisting with logistical support, intelligence, and airlift capacity for the African Union troops (which needs help in all these areas), as well as possibly inserting NATO troops as a “bridging force” until the AU troops can get there.

The case for NATO in Darfur is slowly gaining momentum.  The State Department has been quietly working on this for weeks.  And the effort got an important boost last week by a diverse group of former officials, including Madeleine Albright, secretary of state in the Clinton administration, and former foreign ministers Robin Cook of Britain, Lamberto Dini of Italy, Lloyd Axworthy of Canada, Ana Palacio of Spain, Erik Derycke of Belgium, and Surin Pitsuwan of Thailand.  They wrote a statement that was published in the International Herald Tribune, calling for NATO to make a greater commitment to Darfur, including the possibility of troops on the ground.

The statement is worth reading in full, if nothing else for how it places the international community’s (in)action in Darfur within the larger context of UN reform and the emerging norm of the “responsibility to protect.”  But the key sections are these:

“….Because the AU force is currently too small to cover an area the size of France and lacks critical logistical capacities, the militias continue to burn villages and besiege refugees in their camps.

….NATO should immediately provide the AU with helicopters (already offered by Canada); command, control and support capabilities; and strategic and tactical lift. Drawing on its Response Force, which is now at its initial operational capacity of 17,000, NATO should put a brigade-sized element at the disposal of the United Nations to augment the AU force until it can build up sufficient strength of its own.

In addition, NATO should seek authority from the Security Council for a new Chapter VII resolution establishing a no-flight zone over Darfur, which NATO aircraft would enforce. Although some states on the Security Council, notably China, have opposed tougher measures on the grounds that the Sudanese government should be given time to resolve the conflict in Darfur through a new political process, it remains an open question as to whether these governments would vote against an action that was aimed at saving lives.

We applaud NATO's commitment to the ongoing crisis in Darfur but we also believe that this successful military alliance, strengthened by the warrant of Security Council legitimacy, could do much more to bring a halt to Darfur's horrific humanitarian crisis. The ever-popular mantra ‘never again’ has to mean more than expressing political sentiment and issuing lukewarm resolutions that fail to stop the violence. It is not too late for meaningful action.”

This is tough stuff, to be sure.  Last week the U.S. and European countries agreed to provide critical assistance -- including $300 million to fund a larger AU force, air transport, armored personnel carriers, troop transport trucks, and training.  These are very positive steps, but much more is needed.  For example, the money pledged still falls nearly $150 million short of what the AU says it needs.

With the U.S. military over-extended as it is, we would need to rely mostly on the Europeans for further support, especially troops -- although, significantly, as Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick explained last week, the U.S. has already agreed to airlift the Rwandan contingent of the AU force, help build communications facilities and assist with training.  But I believe greater American leadership could be decisive.  Zoellick has made Sudan one of his highest priorities -- he has already been to Darfur once, and is going there again this week.

Next month, the President will join other world leaders at the G-8 summit in Scotland.  One of the main items on the agenda will be Africa, which Blair has made a theme of the summit.  It’s guaranteed that they’ll be a lot of earnest talk.  But for a meaningful outcome, President Bush should make greater NATO involvement in Darfur his priority.   

The telephone is ringing... Posted by Heather Hurlburt

My ten cents on Suzanne's post-referendum questions:

Will this amplify pro-US voices?  No.  It will distract pro-and anti- US voices alike by refocusing everyone internally, on questions like how do you salvage the chunks of the constitution that concern the EU's fundamental operating mechanisms.  So the problem will be getting anyone to answer, pro- or anti-, when we call.   

Then, too, this will weaken the governing parties in France and (after Wednesday, in all probability) the Netherlands.  The Dutch government has been quite pro-US, and it's not likely that a Socialist-led French government would be less inclined to play games at US expense than Chirac.  So that is not a plus for us.

Moreover, parties scrambling for position in those countries, plus the elections coming this fall in Germany, will provide endless temptation to play on popular hostility to the US.  So as long as the US is perceived as the source or cause for much of the existential globalization angst that I mentioned in my last post, this does nothing good for pro-US voices.

Are we better off with a single number to call?  Suzanne, you may have your own views about this from your time at the UN.  But my experience working with the EU at the OSCE, and then on the Balkans, is that the US loses more than we gain when the EU is disunited and thrashing -- because the thrashing itself gets in the way of getting anything done.  The ideal situation for us is one where we can work individual states early and influence the decision the EU makes -- and then have all the EU members committed to something that is either favorable to the US or at least less harmful.  Of course, that assumes a lot of forethought and coordination on our part.

It's also worth remembering that EU unity constrains negative urges as well as positive ones; as long as Europeans themselves want the ever-closer union, I believe the US should be quietly supportive.  Where the US should never let itself get (and Condoleezza Rice's Constitution endorsement last week came close) is seeming to endorse Euro-elites' ambitions when the citizenry is not ready to follow -- there's very little in that for us.

I also think that the "non" and "nee" votes matter less for Europe's foreign policy than one might at first think.  Opposition to the establishment of a permanent EU foreign minister and a desire to be more or less oppositional to the US were not high among the reasons for voting no.  Those developments toward integration are likely to continue apace -- and, as everyone who's had to deal with them knows, the reality is something less than an impregnable wall of foreign policy unity.

Which brings me to China.  This is a lose for China in one sense -- lifting the arms embargo is not going to be top of anyone's list for a while.  For sure China is exploiting confusion or inattention anywhere it can.  But on trade issues, and in terms of develoing relationships to counterbalance the US, China too needs someone to answer the phone. 

Where China is a clear winner is in the drift of European economies, and their difficulty in rebuilding competitiveness.  If these votes represent, as some have argued, continued angst and opposition to the economic changes necessary to compete, then that's a win for China.  But not because of the constitution or even the EU per se.

 

EU Constitution - Que Sera Sera Posted by Suzanne Nossel

There will be weeks and months of analysis over what's happening in Europe and why. 

By and large the progressive and modernizing forces in Europe were behind integration and the Constitution, and for good reason:  the Union has helped bring struggling European economies to prosperity and has proven a powerful liberalizing force throughout Eastern Europe and now approaching the borders of the Soviet Union and the Arab world.  It has strengthened Europe's role as a player on the world stage which, by and large, has meant another loud voice in support of values similar to our own.

The opposition movement ginned up the likes of Jean-Marie Le Pen and was in some ways frightening.  I know less about this than Heather and Derek, but would love thoughts from them and others on a few issues:

Will this amplify pro-U.S. voices in the EU? One of Chirac's major fears with a no vote was lessening French influence in the EU.  This presumably means a larger role for Britain and the new members, all of which tend to be more in sync with U.S. policies.  Although the French no was a victory for the forces of insularity, these countries tend to be more outward looking. 

Though we've long sought it, are we really better off with a "single number to call" in Europe - I believe Kissinger coined the demand for a single number to dial for a coherent European foreign policy.  But solidly unified European positions are great only insofar as we agree with them.  When we disagree, or when a position is still under formation, it may be easier for the U.S. to have influence when its acknowledged that the Union's position is the sum of its parts.  That way, by lobbying individual countries, we can influence the whole.  It's a slow and painful process, but easier than bumping our head up against a wall.  A rock-solid, totally cohesive European policy-making regime would presumably be more resistant to U.S. influence.  A looser regime may be easier to work with.

China card - My guess is that in the coming months China tries to take advantage of confusion in the EU to extend and solidify their trade relationships and influence in their own region and in Latin America.   My guess is Beijing views this as a clear win.

Thud. Posted by Heather Hurlburt

A resounding "non" from the French for the EU Constitution today.  We will have days of commentary about how much this was "an opportunity to say up yours to the government" (as a European diplomat said to me), "about the economy" (a German scholar of organizational behavior), about immigration and Turkey, the EU's democratic deficit, and so on.

I'll say "all of the above" and stay out of that discussion, because I think there's a larger lesson here for progressives.  In a democracy, when governing elites let themselves get too separated from the people they represent -- or allow the perception of separation to go unrepaired -- the people will eventually figure out a way to bite back in a tender place.

In a funny way, the EU Constitution seems to have become for the French and the Dutch (and the Brits and perhaps some others as well) the same bogeyman that the Republicans have managed to make the dread multilateralism here at home -- representative of all that larger forces are trying to cram down your throat in the name of modernity, globalization, the 21st century.

Why do the French think that the Constitution would threaten their social policy with dread Anglo-Saxon liberalism while the British think it would bring on too much Continental socialism? (This wonderful insight came from the Brookings discussion that Derek referenced a few days ago.)  Because those are the external bogeys each fears.  If the EU Constitution didn't exist, it would have had to be invented to express the angst of the moment.

What are we afraid of here?  Globalized terrorism, a changing economy where whole categories of job and the secure lives that went with them are vanishing, a future which is fast-moving and cosmopolitan, where jobs and diseases and the new neighbors next door come from places you can hardly spell.

All reasonable fears.  But progressives are stuck in the "there's no easy answers" stage, ceding the field to conservatives who have easy answers, if not good ones:  close the borders, cut off debate,  subpoena your library books and test our kids silly on a few skills while choking off funding for the rest.

Question is, will the Europeans figure out a better response?  The early indications don't look good -- all the considerable creative energy is likely to go toward figuring out clever treaty fixes.

So whatever this vote ends up meaning for the European project, and US-EU relations, and big issues we care about, etc. etc. -- and even if you think, as I do, that few tears need be shed over the constitution itself -- it should serve as another wakeup call, as if more were needed, that this new century is unsettling to people everywhere, and people are responding by refusing to buy in to new constructs policymakers come up with, however manifestly sensible they may seem to their creators.  Think about it as a disconnect between technology and end-user.

More on GWOE Posted by Derek Chollet

The Washington Post leads this morning with more detail on the Administration’s slow shift from the GWOT to GWOE (global war on terrorism to a global war on extremism, for those who need a refresher).  There’s not much new scoop from what we already knew about this policy review, other than – surprise! – officials recognize the weakness of their public diplomacy and see that their efforts are being hampered by vacancies in key jobs (calling Karen Hughes!).  As one anonymous source admits:

"They recognize there's been a vacuum of leadership," said a former top counterterrorism official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. "There has been a dearth of senior leadership directing this day to day. No one knows who's running this on a day-to-day basis."

Part of the problem is bureaucratic inertia; another is a loss of direction at the highest levels.  As we approach 4 years after 9-11, we lack any measure (or, as Rumsfeld might put it, metrics) on how we are doing in the fight against extremism.  We also lack any sense of direction if, god forbid, we get hit again.  As Jim Hoagland explains in his column today:

“Confusion and drift mark public understanding of how individuals, communities and the nation as a whole should respond to terrorist strikes on U.S. soil. Citizens can learn more about how cities would be evacuated or other responses to a future Sept. 11-type event from watching doomsday television dramas such as "24" than from the administration.

A refocusing of the war against terrorism needs to come in several forms, from high-profile presidential speeches to secret strategy documents that will shape campaign orders to troops in the fields.

The effort should start with Bush's public declarations during this year's commemoration of American valor on the battlefield. His visionary rhetoric about freedom and American values helped rally the nation during the shocks of the past four years. The reassuring approach, he can argue, has kept public anxiety to a minimum.

But the time for reassurance alone is over. It is time for details, for a sense of a blueprint, for a progress report that goes beyond listing what has happened to the top nine or 15 or 25 al Qaeda leaders targeted for capture or elimination. That simple, clear report should trace as well where the United States stands in fighting the Salafi extremist networks that intend to rule or destroy Muslim lands.”

Progressives should be demanding such a blueprint – and just as important, offering one of our own.

An Exit Strategy is Not a Timeline Posted by Lorelei Kelly

Last week, California Democratic Representative Lynn Woolsey offered an amendment to the Defense Authorization bill that asked President Bush to develop a plan as soon as practicable to withdraw American troops from Iraq. Though the amendment was defeated 128 - 300, it drew majority support from Democrats. Here is the text of the amendment.

SEC. 1223. WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM IRAQ.

It is the sense of Congress that the President should -

(1) develop a plan as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act to provide for the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Iraq; and

(2) transmit to the congressional defense committees a report that contains the plan described in paragraph (1).

While the amendment was only a sense of Congress asking for the President to provide a plan, it an excellent start. The Woolsey amendment drew majority support from Democrats, 122 - 79. In contrast, it was many years into the Vietnam quagmire before a majority of Democrats could be rallied to call for withdrawal.

Five Republicans bucked the President and joined the ranks of other critical Republican voices. The Kool Aid refuseniks who voted for the amendment included conservative Southerners Harold Coble (NC), Walter Jones (NC) and John Duncan (TN), plus moderate Jim Leach (IA) and libertarian Ron Paul (TX). Jones is the Member who, in 2003, renamed "French Fries" "Freedom Fries" in the House cafeteria. 

See the entire vote here.

The challenge now is to not let this vote get turned into a talking point by the Right--who will claim that the affirmative votes hurt our military because the intend to impose a "timeline" and therefore aid and abet the enemy.  This is a false claim.  The amendment does not require anything so specific, but does require some sort of acknowledged plan or conceptual exit strategy.  Even something as simple as a set of "freedom benchmarks" would be nice and whether or not a permanent American military presence is part of that scenario.