The Meaning of "Power" Posted by Shadi Hamid

In response to some of the comments on my previous post, I want to make clear the distinction between "power" and "military force" (similar to the difference between "aggressively promoting democracy" and "aggressively promoting democracy with tanks"). Unfortunately, because of the Bush administration's numerous missteps, "power" and "force" have become conflated and are, more often then they should be, used interchangeably. I am not advocating using military force to fight tyranny in Egypt or anywhere else. Rather I am saying that we should use the full extent of our economic, political, and moral resources to pressure these regimes to democratize. The notion of liberal interventionism or "muscular Wilsonianism" (vis-a-vis the Arab world) that I am advocating consists of several things:

1. Passionately committing ourselves to democracy as the best available form of government and as something which all peoples, regardless of culture or religion, both deserve and aspire to.

2. Making the vigorous, unapologetic (but peaceful) promotion of democracy and human rights the centerpiece of our policy in the Middle East, not just in words but in deeds.

3. Actively supporting non-violent, pro-democracy opposition movements against authoritarian regimes.

4. Emphasizing soft power in our public diplomacy efforts (a la Clinton) and avoiding Bush-style belligerency. This means understanding that not only military force but the threat of military force must be used judiciously and with an eye to its inherent limitations as an instrument of societal transformation.

Declarations of a Liberal Interventionist ? Posted by Shadi Hamid

I was speaking at a conference this past April and had an interesting exchange with the predominantly left-of-center audience during the question and answer session. I said something along the lines of “the US has a moral obligation to fight tyranny and promote democracy throughout the Middle East.” God forbid. I heard grumbling in the crowd. Raised eyebrows. Frowns. Several people raised their hands, presumably to grill me about my just revealed neo-con affinities, or perhaps to attack me for my “muscular Wilsonianism.”

I continued, and presented them with a couple of choices. We can decide to be “sensitive” gradualists and let things evolve naturally. After all, it took the West centuries to make the transition to liberal, democratic life – so what’s the harm if we wait, say, 50 years to let the Egyptians build strong bottom-up democratic institutions, at their own pace ? (After all, if we move to quickly, it will empower Islamic fundamentalists, or so the argument goes.) – Or, option # 2, we can come to terms with the fact that we are the most powerful nation in the world and, more importantly, that we are a country founded upon a noble sense of mission. If we truly believe in democracy as the best available form of government, then it only makes sense that we marshal our country’s great influence, resources, and power in the service of the ideals to which we subscribe (note: "power" is the not the same thing as "military force").

Silence, on the other hand, is complicity. To wait and watch the Arab people suffer under the yoke of authoritarianism, and to do nothing, to say nothing, is an abdication of responsibility. If we give Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak $2 billion of economic and military aid each year, then we have a right to demand that our dollars not go toward legitimating an authoritarian regime which has denied the God-given rights and aspirations of a people for a quarter-century (Mubarak came to power the same year as Reagan). Not only is this about ideals, but it's also about  our national security. If people are not able to express their grievances and aspirations in legitimate, peaceful ways, then they will often resort to violence to accomplish their political objectives. That’s obviously not what we want. A 2003 study conducted by Princeton University Professor Alan Krueger and Czech scholar Jitka Maleckova, which analyzed a vast amount of data on terrorist attacks, came to the alarming conclusion that “the only variable that was consistently associated with the number of terrorists was the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties. Countries with more freedom were less likely to be the birthplace of international terrorists.”

In a perfect world, oppressed peoples would rise up on their own, demand their freedom, and force constructive change . However, in places like Egypt, where apathy reigns supreme, this is not going to happen anytime soon. The Egyptian opposition is notoriously fractious and has repeatedly failed to unite behind a common pro-democracy agenda. Coalitions rarely last more than a few months, if not a few weeks. The government, for its part, has mastered the art of divide and conquer and used the fears of Islamist ascendancy to convince secular liberals that secular authoritarianism is better than the alternative. The government has at its disposal an extensive security network which can crush at a moment’s notice any threatening display of anti-regime opposition.

For all these reasons, sustained external pressure is needed. This means telling President Mubarak that if the parliamentary elections this month are not sufficiently free and fair, we will begin to withhold economic aid. In other words, If you want our money than you have to agree to play by the rules of the democratic process. In the post 9-11 world, the Faustian bargain of silence in exchange for stability is no longer operable. That is the message which must be clearly relayed to those regimes which think that we will continue to turn a blind eye to their transgressions.

Torture, Civil Liberties and Terrorists Posted by Morton H. Halperin

The only way we can lose the fight against terrorists is if we allow them to goad us into betraying our deepest values.  By sanctioning torture and violating civil liberties, the Bush Administration has set us on a course that does just that.  But the administration's misguided efforts are finally meeting with effective resistance.  There is a real chance that with continuing public pressure Congress will adopt two important measures for the end of the year.

(My colleague Suzanne Nossel dealt with the merits of the arguments about sanctioning torture at some length yesterday and I will not repeat this, but I endorse her comments.)

The Senate has led the way by adopting with overwhelming support two critical restrictions on the President's power.  First, by unanimous consent, it accepted significant changes in the Patriot Act section usually known misleadingly as the "library" provision since it relates to a whole range of documents (I return to this below). Second, it adopted by a vote of 90-9 an amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill (HR 2863 sections 8154, 8155) which prohibits cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of persons held anywhere by the Department of Defense or any other agency of the government. 

But success is not yet assured.  The House did not adopt either of the rights-protective provisions adopted by the Senate. Both hang in the balance in negotiations between the House and Senate.  Meanwhile, the administration threatens to veto both the reauthorization of the expiring provisions of the Patriot Act and the Defense Appropriations bill.

The anti-torture provision was adopted in the Senate under the leadership of Senator McCain and with the support of 90 Senators.  It has now been endorsed in the House by more than 13 moderate Republicans.  Their support, along with that of key Democrats including the ranking member of the DoD approrpriations sub-committee, gives the provision a clear majority in the House. House Republican leaders have reportedly told the administration that if put to a vote, the provision would be approved by the House.  For that reason the Republican House leadership put off appointing conferees on the bill since this would have permitted ranking Democrat Murtha to offer a motion to instruct the conferees to accept the Senate anti-torture language.

The anti-torture provisions were adopted in the Senate despite intense lobbying by Vice President Cheney.  The indictment of Scooter Libby may further weaken the hand of those within the administration who have staunchly defended the notion of presidential power to authorize torture, including Cheney (or "Official C," as perhaps he should be known).  After the torture provision was adopted, Cheney secretly suggested that the administration could live with the prohibition if the CIA was exempted.  Leaders of the anti-torture effort on both sides of the aisle in the House as well as the Senate have shown no interest in that proposal.

Senator McCain put his amendment on the Defense Appropriations bill only after Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist pulled the DoD Authorization bill off the floor in order to avoid a vote on the McCain amendment.  He has now agreed to bring the bill back next week and to permit a vote on the amendment.  There is no doubt that it will pass overwhelmingly again.  In the meantime, moderate Republicans in the House are signaling their strong and growing support for the provision in the wake of strong endorsements from former Secretary of State Colin Powell and many retired military officers.  Leading Republican foreign policy statesmen are expected to express their concern about torture and degrading treatment shortly.

Reports suggest that the administration is deeply split on this issue.  With continuing strong public pressure, this is a fight that can be won.

The favorable change in the Patriot Act -- now in conference between the House and Senate -- could lead to another important victory for respect for human rights and the rule of law.  The Senate version of the bill limits the ability of the government to get records from libraries and other institutions by either sending a letter demanding it or getting an order from the FISA court.  Under current law the government need only assert that the information is needed for a terrorism investigation and the judge can only determine that the government is making that assertion, not that it has underlying facts to support it.  The Senate amendment to the renewal of the expiring Patriot Act provisions requires proof of a much clearer nexus to a suspected terrorist and gives the Court the role it should have in determining if the government has demonstrated that there is probable cause to believe that the facts are true.

The Patriot Act conference is reportedly bogged down in fights over extraneous provisions added by the House and has not yet reached this issue.  When and if it does, there is a real prospect of getting the Senate language adopted.  Key civil liberties groups have made it clear to the conferees that this provision is the most important one in the  bill and have urged Senators to hold fast.  It is not yet clear if the House would go along with the Senate language.

By the time Congress goes home at the end of the session it might well have adopted these two provisions.  If so, this will mark at long last not only a turning point towards a greater role for Congress in the struggle against terrorists, but also recognition of the need to stand for the highest ideals of the nation as we protect our security. 

Preventing Cruel and Degrading Punishment for Terror Suspects Posted by Suzanne Nossel

There have been some interesting reports this week about the deliberations underway in the Bush Administration over whether to adopt as part of Defense Department guidelines language from the Geneva Conventions that would prohibit cruel, humiliating and degrading punishment.   These guidelines would apparently not apply to CIA interrogations, meaning that the cover prisons now coming to light would not be bound by these strictures.

Some in the Administration are putting forward solid arguments:  that referencing the conventions will help rebuild support for the war on terror among our allies, and send a signal of good faith to Muslims.  This dovetails with the fight underway now in Congress over Senator John McCain's proposed law to ban inhuman treatment during interrogations, a bill President Bush has vowed to veto.

What's amazing is how simplistic the counter-argument seems to be.   According to the NY Times:

Their opponents, who include aides to Vice President Dick Cheney and some senior Pentagon officials, have argued strongly that the proposed language is vague, would tie the government's hands in combating terrorists and still would not satisfy America's critics, officials said . . .

"We may know what they mean in the United States," one senior administration official familiar with the debate said of the Geneva terms. "But views around the world may differ from ours. Having a female interrogator even asking questions of a male might be humiliating to some parts of the Muslim faith."

Here as elsewhere those who reject international law do so on the grounds that once the US acknowledges that international legal obligations exist and apply to us, we then surrender all ability to affect how those requirements are interpreted, and how our actions are evaluated against them. 

In fact its just the opposite.   At least in this case, the mantle of international law makes us more, not less, equipped to shape how our actions are perceived by others. 

First off, its worth noting that the reference to the Geneva provisions in this DoD manual will have absolutely no effect on whether others hold our behavior up to the Geneva standards.   The Bush Administration's rationale for claiming that detentions as part of the fight against terror are exempt from Geneva Convention requirements may have gotten a hearing in the early months after 9/11, but after Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, not to mention just the simple recognition that battling terror will go on for years and sweep up tens of thousands, it no longer holds up.  So allies and enemies will continue to measure our behavior against these standards whether we acknowledge them or not. 

Being able to cite a manual that mentioned Geneva Accord requirements would not have helped us quell the firestorm after Abu Ghraib.  But if US officers are acting in good fait (as they are 99% or more of the time), their government's willingness to formally commit itself to international standards means we're more likely to get the benefit of the doubt when actions are questioned. 

Yes, there will be disputes of legal interpretation - - but in most cases it will be neither possible nor necessary to definitively settle those.   Some Muslims might argue that having a female interrogate a male is inherently humiliating.  But that claim won't be tried in court, much less a Muslim court.  It will be aired publicly and, when the US is behaving reasonably, our interpretations will prevail.   

Our influence over the media, international institutions, and foreign governments gives us a leg up in ensuring that international legal provisions can't be easily used against us since we can shape how they are understood.  The vagueness of the provision that some in the Administration are complaining about can work in our favor, allowing us to argue that where unconventional techniques are needed, nothing in the convention prohibits them.

As for the point that embracing Geneva won't satisfy our critics, that's true.  But it may just satisfy some of our friends who would rather not criticize the US's conduct in the war on terror, but feel compelled to do so in the face of the Administration's apparent indifference to the human rights of certain detainees.

I made similar points several years ago, arguing that the US ought to wrap itself in the Geneva Conventions Law of Occupation in post-war Iraq in order to win ourselves some badly needed legitimacy.  The Administration rejected that approach then, but shouldn't again now.

Is There Hope ? Yes. (The Emerging Consensus on Democracy Promotion) Posted by Shadi Hamid

A friend emailed me after reading my post yesterday and asked:  how can we ever hope to convince the US government to engage in dialogue with groups like the Muslim Brotherhood (or Al-Nahda in Tunisia or the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria) ?

Five years ago, such a question might have been prescient but, fortunately, we’ve come a long way since then. There have been, since 9/11,  two major shifts in the policy debate:   

        1) It is now a near-consensus, perhaps even an article of faith among both Democrats and Republicans, that there is a causal relationship between lack of democracy and terrorism. This new discourse took hold in the ashes of 9/11 and the Bush administration has wholeheartedly adopted it (at least in theory).

        2) More striking is the shift in policy discourse regarding US engagement with moderate Islamists, a shift that has taken place largely in the last 8 months. On both Left and Right, a growing chorus of influential voices has been calling for the inclusion of nonviolent Islamist parties in the political process.

You can imagine my surprise when I read this memorandum on the Egyptian elections by Gary Schmitt, Executive Director of The Project for the New American Century (the neo-conservative organization with close ties to the Bush administration):

Some are concerned that a truly open election will encourage the likes of the Muslim Brotherhood. We agree that is a concern. But, unless we expect Mubarak and his son to hold on to power indefinitely – despite all the corruption, dysfunctionalism, and anger his rule engenders in Egypt itself – this is a risk supporters of democracy must take.   

The Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward Reform in the Arab World, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and co-chaired by Madeline Albright and former Republican congressman Vin Weber, concluded that the United States “should not allow Middle Eastern leaders to use national security as an excuse to suppress nonviolent Islamist organizations. Washington should support the political participation of any group or party committed to abide by the rules and norms of the democratic process." Experts at the Carnegie Endowment’s Democracy and Rule of Law Project, such as Amr Hamzawy, Marina Ottaway, Michelle Dunne, and Thomas Carothers have also called on the Bush administration to reach out to moderate Islamists.  Reuel Marc Gerecht, of the American Enterprise Institute, has also come on the side of incorporating non-violent Islamists in the political process. 

I will stop there, but the point should be clear: an impressive consensus is developing and it encompasses well-regarded experts from across the ideological spectrum.

In sum, an effective democracy promotion policy must be founded upon these two foundational premises which are, again, that lack of democracy contributes to terrorism and, secondly, that real democracy necessitates some type of Islamist engagement and inclusion. Thus far, the Bush administration’s Mid-east policy has fully accepted the first premise but not the second. As for the Democrats, they must - if they want to get their act together on democracy promotion - begin to accept these two foundational premises as a matter of policy. Once they do that, they will be well-positioned to articulate a bold, comprehensive vision for future US engagement in the Midde East.

What WaPo Won't Tell Us... Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Blogger Michael Roston has summarized European press coverage to give us a much better idea of which Central European countries are housing secret CIA prisons.  And how did the enterprising European journalists get this information, considered too potentially dangerous for the Washington Post to publish?  Why, they called up old Tom Malinowski at Human Rights Watch, right there in Washington DC.  Human Rights Watch, recall, has been tracking those "rendition planes" and where they go.

Think maybe the Post was just a bit too deferential here?  Roston raises another excellent point:  Europe loves to criticize US mishandling of detainees; now will there be European investigations of what has happened on European soil?  Can the French physically expel the Poles from Europe?

The Need for a Coherent Policy Toward Political Islam Posted by Shadi Hamid

As I pointed out in yesterday’s post, despite all the rhetoric to the contrary, the Bush administration continues to exhibit a marked unwillingness to put real pressure on Egypt (and other friendly autocratic regimes in the region). For example, in May when thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the country’s largest opposition group, were arrested, the State Department stayed quiet. Not surprisingly, our silence was cited in Arab capitals as yet more proof of American hypocrisy.  In June, Condoleezza Rice gave a much-hyped policy speech at the American University in Cairo, where she stressed the need for international monitors and spoke eloquently of the day when an “independent judiciary replaces arbitrary justice.” In the end, though, it was more of the same – strong words, nice rhetoric, and no follow up.

Unfortunately, with only 7 days until the start of Egypt’s crucial parliamentary elections, the US continues to take a hands-off wait-and-see approach. If we have the political will to invade a country and embark on a long-term project of democratic engineering, the least we could have done with Egypt is dispatch an army of election observers to embarrass the regime into playing fair with the ballot boxes. We didn’t. Which leads us to the most important question – what explains the US hesitation to put its money where its mouth when it comes to democracy promotion ?

Democracy in the Arab world provides US policymakers with a confounding dilemma, one yet to be resolved. If there were in fact truly free and fair elections in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Algeria, Islamists would stand a good chance of winning a plurality, perhaps even a majority of the vote (in Jordan, the Islamic Action Front already has a plurality in parliament). The prospect of an Islamist victory at the polls – especially in strategically vital countries like Egypt – has always made American policymakers a bit nervous about the prospect of Arab democracy. So instead of allowing the Arab people to make their own choices, we opt for the “safer” route – managed democracy, façade democracy, sham democracy, no democracy. And the world plays along with the charade because the devil you know is better than the devil you don’t. Of course, the “safe” route has contributed to a toxic political environment in the region, conducive to the rise of religious extremism, rabid anti-Americanism, and terrorism.

With all that said, there is good reason to believe that the Bush administration is genuine in its desire to spread democracy in the Arab world. But there are many in the administration whose fear of Islamists coming to power overwhelms their desire to encourage real democratic reform in the region. This helps explain why President Bush has failed to back up his lofty rhetoric with substantial policy changes on the ground.

The key then is demystifying political Islam. For starters, this means engaging in a productive dialogue with Islamists, but only with those who have unequivocally renounced violence and committed themselves to the democratic process. Once we begin to better understand who the mainstream Islamists are, what they want, and what they believe on issues that are vital to American national security, only then can we confidently move forward with a long-term vision of political development in the Arab world. In other words, we cannot have an effective democracy promotion policy without first having a coherent policy toward political Islam.

Clear, Hold Build: Not So Clear Posted by Heather Hurlburt

In the last two weeks we've had a few more attempts to put forward explicit strategies for Iraq: Secretary Rice's "clear, hold and build," presented in Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony two weeks ago, and varied proposals for drawdowns from Senators John Kerry and Russ Feingold.

These are all good developments: let the American people understand what it is we think we're doing and what other options might be.  So this post is going to ask questions of all of them.

First, Secretary Rice's three-part strategy, "clear, hold and build:"

We know what we must do.  With our Iraqi allies, we are working to: Clear the toughest places -- no sanctuaries to the enemy -- and to disrupt foreign support for the insurgents.  We are working to hold and steadily enlarge the secure areas, integrating political and economic outreach with our military operations.  We are working to build truly national institutions by working with more capable provincial and local authorities.  We are challenging them to embody a national compact -- not tools of a particular sect or ethnic group.  These Iraqi institutions must sustain security forces, bring rule of law, visibly deliver essential services, and offer the Iraqi people hope for a better economic future.

Let's take this one piece at a time.

Clear: the U.S. military is conducting operations in the "toughest places" -- no argument on that.  The casualty figures show it.  But for a year now, military sources have been telling reporters that "it doesn't do much good to push them out of these areas only to let them go back to areas we've already cleared."  Exhibit A has to be Fallujah.  Have we now solved this problem, and if so, how?  With Iraqi troops?  I'd sure like to know.

Hold:  See above.  Also, Mike O' Hanlon and Brookings' Iraq Index say that while U.S. casualty rates are holding steady, Iraqi security force and civilian casualties have been high in recent months.  Overall rates of insurgent attacks, O' Hanlon writes, are the highest they have been.  That doesn't sound to me like a strategy of expanding safe ares militarily is working.  And if we have, as military leader and leader has requested, a political strategy to blunt hte insurgency, it's not obvious to me.

Build: If, as the New York Times reports, 93 percent of U.S. reconstruction funds are now committed, but "hundreds of millions" are needed to complete and maintain what has been done, according to the special Inspector-General for Iraq reconstruction, exactly what are we "building" with?

Perhaps the upcoming parliamentary elections count as building "truly national institutions."  It's hard to portray the flawed constitutional process as that.  Is the constitution the "national compact" that we are "challenging" Iraqi leaders to embody?  If not, what is the national compact that Sunnies, Shiites and Kurds all buy into, the one that will help de-fang the insurgents?  If it doesn't exist yet, are we helping it come into being, and have we figured out a more effective way to "help" than we displayed in the constitution-drafting process?

So I'd like to ask Secretary Rice to come back and explain how we are really carrying out this strategy.

Now, to complete the bipartisan gloom, I have some questions for Senator Kerry as well.  He said last week:

The way forward in Iraq is not to pull out precipitously or merely compromise to stay "as long as it takes."  To undermine the insurgency, we must instead simultaneously pursue both a political settlement and the withdrawal of American combat forces linked to specific, responsible benchmarks.  At the first benchmark, the completion of the December elections, we can start the process of reducing our forces by withdrawing 20,000 troops over the course of the holidays.

20,000, by the way, is one division.  I looked and looked for some rationale on why one division and some explicit reasoning on why we can/should expect that the challenges the day after the elections will be 20,000 troops easier than they were the day before.  (Assuming, of course, that we're not putting 20,000 extra troops in to police the elections and then just taking them out again.)

Mind you, I think there are reasonable arguments for both of these positions.  In the best possible scenario, the elections are a resounding victory for Sunni political participation and drive a much stronger wedge between insurgent leaders and average Sunnis.  This then leads to a sharp redution in insurgent recuritment and violence -- though I don't think it happens overnight.  Maybe Kerry reckons the rate of progress in Iraqi military training allows for a 20,000 troop pullout by the end of the year.  Smart people I know and lke advise Kerry on these issues, and I'm sure they were considered.

I can see -- maybe -- a rhetorical or polling-based arguemtn about not cluttering up an elegant, simple, understandable policy in a speech text.  But surely there should have been some substantive stuff for the press, at minimum, to show that Kerry is thinking about the complexities and grasps the military and strategic concerns.  Whigh God knows he does.

And while I'm at it, Senator Feingold, why is December 31, 2006 your magic number?

What are we doing that takes exactly 14 months to accomplish?

I know, I know, all of these folks are trying -- and I see all three statements as significant progress in letting Americans understand and judge exactly what it is we think we are doing in Iraq.  But as I said last week, we are very short of hard facts.  We need to be sure we know where our assumptions came from -- so we know when we need to change them.  And progressives above all need to show that we are deploying facts and military experience wisely and strategically, not cynically and for short-term political advantage.

The Senate and Phase Two Posted by Derek Chollet

Today an unusual thing happened in the U.S. Senate.  The normally well-scripted body, known for Senators inserting “colloquies” into the Congressional Record as though the debates really happened, went off the rails.  The Senate Democrats interrupted normal business and, without forewarning the Republicans, called a rare closed session to discuss intelligence in Iraq, sending the press into a frenzy.  Good for them.

The dispute in question is the so-called “Phase Two” of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s (or SSCI, pronounced in Hill-speak as “sissy”) investigation of intelligence about Iraq’s WMD programs.  “Phase One” of the Committee’s work was completed and released in July 2004, which focused on the collection and analysis of that intelligence.  At the time, the Democrats tried mightily to get the Committee investigators to turn to the more interesting questions – how policymakers in the White House actually used the intelligence they were given, or whether they knowingly manipulated it when presenting the case for war.  The Republicans on the Committee, led by their Chairman, Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, pushed back, promising to pursue these issues down the road.  The Democrats knew that this slow-walking was a way to kill the effort, and have tried to pressure the other side to act ever since.

Last week’s Libby indictment provided the pretext they needed.  As Steve Clemons notes, this move was gutsy and important.  Roberts was flushed out (he certainly has been hearing from his Kansas constituents about Iraq, and my guess is that they are not happy), and announced that next week the SSCI will work continuously to “finish” Phase Two, which he claims they have been working on all along.  This is news to the SSCI’s ranking Democrat, Jay Rockefeller, who today placed his relaxed demeanor aside and put on a tough performance.  Is the logjam broken?  Who knows – as the timeline pasted below attests, the Democrats have been trying to get Roberts to move on this for years, to no avail.  As the 9-11 Commission report accurately put it, the Congressional oversight on intelligence is “dysfunctional.”  So we’ll see.

Iraq Intelligence Investigation Timeline

Attached is a chronology prepared by Democratic staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee about Democratic efforts to address the Administration’s misuse of intelligence.

For more than two years, Senate Democrats have pressed Republicans to address the misuse of intelligence.  At every turn, Republicans have blocked efforts to investigate how intelligence was used in the run-up to the war in Iraq.  Below details the long record established by Democrats to investigate this matter.

March 14, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Director Mueller requesting an investigation into the origin of the Niger documents.

May 23, 2003 – Senators Roberts and Rockefeller sent a letter to the CIA and State Department Inspectors General to review issues related to the Niger documents.

June 2, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller issued a press release endorsing a statement made of the previous weekend by Senator Warner calling for a joint SSCI/SASC investigation.

June 4, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller issued a press release saying he would push for an investigation.  Senator Roberts issued a press release saying calls for an investigation are premature.

June 10, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Senator Roberts asking for an investigation.

June 11, 2003 – All Committee Democrats signed a letter to Senator Roberts asking for a meeting of the Committee to discuss the question of authorizing an inquiry into the intelligence that formed the basis for going to war.

June 11, 2003 – Senator Roberts issued a press release saying this is routine committee oversight, and that criticism of the intelligence community is unwarranted.  Senator Rockefeller issued a press release calling the ongoing review inadequate.

June 20, 2003 – Senators Roberts and Rockefeller issued a joint press release laying out the scope of the inquiry.

August 13, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Senator Roberts making 14 points about the investigation, asking to expand the inquiry to address the “use of intelligence by policy makers” and asking for several other actions.

September 9, 2003 – After press reports quoting Senator Roberts as saying the investigation was almost over, Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Senator Roberts urging him not to rush to complete the investigation prematurely.

October 29, 2003 – Senators Roberts and Rockefeller sent a letter to Director Tenet expressing in strong terms that he should provide documents that have been requested and make individuals available.

October 30, 2003 – Senators Roberts and Rockefeller sent letters to Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice expressing in strong terms that they should provide documents that have been requested and make individuals available.

October 31, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Director Tenet asking for documents related to the interaction between intelligence and policy makers, including the documents from the Vice President’s office related to the Powell speech.

November 2, 2003 – Senator Roberts made statements during a joint television appearance with Senator Rockefeller claiming that the White house would provide all documents they jointly requested.

December 5, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to National Security Advisor Rice asking for her help getting documents and access to individuals.

January 22, 2004 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Director Tenet asking for compliance with the Oct. 31 request for documents.

February 12, 2004 – Senators Roberts and Rockefeller issued a joint press release announcing the Committee’s unanimous approval of the expansion of the Iraq review, to include use of intelligence in the form of public statements, and listing other aspects of what became Phase II.

March 23, 2004 – Senator Rockefeller sent yet another letter to Director Tenet asking for compliance with the Oct. 31 request for documents.

June 17, 2004 – Senators Roberts and Rockefeller joint press release announcing the unanimous approval of the report.

July 16, 2004 – Committee Democrats sent a letter to Bush asking for the one page summary of the NIE prepared for Bush.  The Committee staff had been allowed to review it but could not take notes and the Committee was never given a copy.

February 3, 2005 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Senator Roberts outlining Committee priorities for the coming year and encouraging completion of Phase II.

August 5, 2005 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Senator Roberts expressing concern over the lack of progress on Phase II and calling for a draft to be presented to the Committee at a business meeting in September.

September 29, 2005 – All Committee Democrats joined in additional views to the annual Intelligence Authorization Bill criticizing the lack of progress on Phase II.

Elections in Egypt: Time to Back Up Our Rhetoric with Action Posted by Shadi Hamid

Lorelei Kelly has asked me to guest blog this week. For more about me, click here. Over the course of the next few days, I will be discussing the upcoming Egyptian parliamentary elections and, more generally, the sorry state of democracy in the Arab world . The question I will be asking throughout is how the US, through various mechanisms, can more effectively promote democratic reform in what is the most undemocratic region in the world. I'm looking forward to reading your comments.

Egypt's parliamentary elections are scheduled take place over the course of three weeks with November 9 as the first day of polling (mark your calendars). Egypt, of course, is one of our closest allies in the region and we give the the regime there nearly $2 billion in annual economic and military aid. Despite this, the elections have received barely any coverage in the American media.   

These elections provide an important test case for the Bush administration’s "forward strategy for freedom." One can only hope that the results turn out better than September’s presidential polls when strongman Hosni Mubarak was reelected with a ludicrous 88.5% of the vote. The Mubarak regime – which is a quarter-century old – has proven adept at fraud, intimidation, stuffing, and bribing its way to victory.

Is the Bush administration on its game or is dropping the ball on Egypt ? Let us backtrack a bit. In his inaugural speech earlier this year, President Bush used unprecedented language in describing America’s democratic imperative: “All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you.” I know that with many Democrats, a built-in “neo-con” alert goes up whenever they hear this kind of language. I, on the other hand, was very much impressed. In the name of stability, we had supported Arab dictatorship for decades. Now, finally, there were signs that a change in policy was in the making. But it was not be. When less than two months ago, President Bush called Mubarak to congratulate him on his (rather lopsided) victory, the high-minded rhetoric of his inaugural address seemed particularly hollow.

The gap between words and deeds, rhetoric and policy has never been wider and our credibility continues to suffer as a result. This month’s elections in Egypt present US policymakers with an excellent opportunity to regain the initiative on democracy promotion. The response (or lack thereof) to the upcoming elections - and the voter intimidation and detention of opposition activists which will surely take place - will tell us a great deal about the current thinking in the Bush administration. I can’t say, however, that I’m particularly optimistic. Bush is embroiled in domestic controversies and has lost much of the political capital he might have still had just a few months ago.

Earlier this year, many commentators, on both the Right and the Left, were speaking of an “Arab spring,” “an autumn for autocrats,” and a “springtime for democracy,” and many other flowery, seasonal formulations. Since then, the euphoria has largely died down. Mubarak, with his September victory, has legitimized his illegitimacy for the next six years. Jordan's King Abdullah has become increasingly authoritarian in dealing with an emboldened opposition and an increasingly restless civil society.  Tunisia and Algeria are dragging their feet as usual. Yet, if the Bush administration has the political will and starts to put real, sustained pressure on these recalcitrant regimes, then this negative trend can be reversed. In other words, we've got the rhetoric down. Now it’s time to back it up.

Security Council Unites Against Syria in Hariri Slaying Posted by Suzanne Nossel

The UN registered another point of proof that the rumors of its demise are exaggerated:  the Security Council coalesced around a tough consensus resolution challenging Syria to cooperate fully with the continuing investigation into the death of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, or face consequences.  Algeria, China and Russia all went along along once the US, France and Britain agreed to strike language referencing sanctions if the Syrian obligations are not met, with the proviso that the resolution be adopted under Chapter Seven of the UN's Charter which specifically references enforcement mechanisms including sanctions and military force.

While this was not unexpected, nor should the accomplishment be dismissed.  The world is, at least for now, united in isolating a rogue state.  We have been unable to achieve similar with respect to Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and other outlaw regimes.   The real proof of the UN's mettle, of course, will come only if - -  as seems almost inevitable - - Bashar Assad's compliance with the investigation is incomplete and further measures are warranted.

But in the meantime let's touch briefly on a few reasons why, at least thus far, UN diplomacy is working better than usual in this case.   The cohesion and will to act derive in part from the specifics of the incident itself - a public assassination of a wildly popular former leader by the government of an occupying country.  But certain other aspects of what's unfolding transcend the Hariri case itself and have implications for US diplomacy at the UN:

1.   Generation of Objective Evidence - Innuendo, circumstantial evidence and even US intelligence weren't enough to rally the world against Syria.  But the findings of an independent, UN-appointed expert prosecutor were.   We dismissed the role of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq but had weapons been there, in retrospect it seems incontrovertible that the teams would eventually have found them and that, if they did, the UNSC would have been forced to act.  Rather than expecting the UN members to take our word for things, the extra time and effort to allow them to gather facts objectively will tend to pay off.

2.  Patience - The simple fact that the US is in no hurry for Syrian regime change and has been willing to allow the Mehlis investigation to run its course makes a big difference.  Behind the scenes of today's resolution was undoubtedly an agreement that if the Syrians indeed stonewall, sanctions will come later.  The UN moves painfully slowly, but allowing enough time to quiet all doubts and to "give a chance" to recalcitrant regimes is sometimes what it takes to build consensus.

3.   No (Public) Foregone Political Conclusions - That the US is too mired up in Iraq and other things to be able to handle Syrian disintegration helps a lot here.  If Algeria, China and Russia were convinced we wanted Assad out and quickly, they'd be far less likely to accede to the ratcheting up of  pressure on the regime.  By contrast, because the US made so nakedly clear that it would be satisfied with nothing less than Saddam Hussein's ouster, other countries resisted all forms of cooperation with us on Iraq for fear of abetting a US-led coup.  Even if Bush and Co. believe that nothing less than toppling Assad will do the trick, the decision not to flaunt their long-term designs is making it easier to sustain consensus.

While Washington Slept Posted by Suzanne Nossel

I could not bring myself to weigh in this week either on Plamegate or on the latest "plans" for Iraq.  Yet writing about virtually anything else seems to sidestep what's uppermost on all of our minds.  But as important as the areas in which the Administration has botched US policy, are the ancillary effects of its missteps on neglected and overlooked issues.  We all know that domestic preparedness has been buried under the bureaucratic avalanche of the Department of Homeland Security, and that our military is dangerously overstretched.   But a host of other issues crawl across our minds - flickering in and out as we absorb ourselves in more immediate problems like Plamegate and Iraq.   But if we don't start paying attention soon, they'll catch up with us.  Here are 10 of them.

Middle East Peace Process – The Bush Administration's failure to engage deeply and consistently in the Mideast peace process has left the most contentious conflict in the Middle East in a dangerous limbo.  Ariel Sharon's historic decision to pull out of Gaza left a host of questions unanswered, and the Administration has done little to try to ensure that the Gaza withdrawal be followed by further steps to implement the road map.  Bush's own wise decision to reject Arafat's leadership, followed by Arafat's death, could have allowed this Administration to make history a very different kind of history in the Middle East.

Doha Round- The Doha Round of trade talks, aimed at reducing the agricultural subsidies that result in cows in France enjoying higher per capita income that millions of people in Africa, are in danger of collapse.   The worst culprits are the French, who refuse to support even modest EU proposals to trim welfare for farmers.    But while USTR Rob Portman has made important conditional commitments to reduce US subsidies, the Senate Ag Committee has voted to extend benefits for rice, cotton and other agribusinesses til 2011.  The demise of Doha will perpetuate global poverty, (fairly or not) deepen resentment toward the US, and set back economic growth at home and abroad.  The Administration should redouble its efforts to prevent that from happening.

Galloping Anti-Americanism – Karen Hughes' ear-muffed listening tours of the Middle East and Indonesia make great comic relief, but do nothing to allay the march of anti-Americanism.   While I objected to Hughes' 8-month long voluntary hiatus before taking office, now that she's on the job Hughes' tone-deafness may well be making things worse.  Apart from the serious political consequences of anti-US attitudes, businesses are increasingly worried that the friction may hurt the bottom line.  Despite years of Administration talk on the need to win hearts and minds, we aren't.

China's Growing Political Influence - China's economic and diplomatic influence in Southeast Asia, Africa and elsewhere has grown tremendously since Bush took office.  Whether or not we consider China a likely military threat, for a country that shares so few of our political values to enjoy a level of global influence that rivals our own will complicate our foreign policy for decades to come.   We could have a long debate about the best strategy to deal with this, but looking the other way while our own sway wanes is not it.

Russia - As James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul point out in a new piece in Policy Review, Russia has made no meaningful contribution to any of the Bush Administration's three chief policy objectives:  fighting terror, controlling the spread of nukes, and promoting liberty.  In many respects, the US-Russian relationship seems to be slipping backward into Cold War era antagonisms.  Despite Condi Rice's expertise in the region, Russia has not been a focus for this Administration, and it shows.

Shoring Up American Influence in Our Own Backyard - US ties to Mexico are strained, and perceptions of the US in Canada are worse than at any point in the last 25 years, with the latest tension over what the Canadians are dubbing flagrant US violations of NAFTA.   The upcoming Summit of the Americas is expected to be an anti-Bush fest and a planned POTUS visit to Brazil afterward is already attracting protests.  Meanwhile outspoken anti-American Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is consolidating his influence.

Global Warming - Remember when the Administration's repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol on emissions and its failure to propose alternatives ranked among Bush's chief foreign policy failings?  Well, that day may come again.  Since then the Administration has continued to deny the link between greenhouse gasses and global warming, impeding efforts to control pollution and prevent climate change.  The result has left countries like India and China free to continue polluting without the pressure of emerging global standards.

The Balkans - The US military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 seems to get mentioned these days only as a reminder that Democrats are unafraid to use force.   There's little talk about the fact that Kosovo's political future remains unresolved (though Charlie Kupchan has a great recent Foreign Affairs article on the subject), and that peace in the territory is contingent on continued international presence.  More than 10 years after the Dayton Accord Bosnia is likewise heavily dependent on an international administration to avoid political disintegration.  Eventually the US will have to reengage to help these territories shift toward permanent status.

Bird Flu - The Administration has finally gotten off the dime in response to the threat of bird flu, now that new cases of the disease seem to be surfacing daily.   Bush will give a major speech on the topic this week at the NIH.  But make no mistake, in terms of real preparations for an outbreak, we are near nowhere.

Pakistani Attitudes Toward the US - I wrote about this last week, but the reports now are that the second wave of post-earthquake deaths from disease and exposure are already beginning.  UN agencies will have to scale back their aid this week unless more donor money flows fast.  If tens of thousands of Pakistanis die this winter because not enough help reached them, Pakistan's number one international "partner" - the US - is the most likely target for blame.  If that happens, the failure to deal more adequately with Pakistan's October 8 earthquake could go down as one of the greatest lapses of Bush's fight against terror.