Ted Kennedy RIP Posted by Michael Cohen

In commemorating the extraordinary and complicated life of Ted Kennedy there has been significant focus on Kennedy's many accomplishments on domestic policy. But how about a few thoughts on his foreign policy acumen.

I had a chance today to read over the speech that Kennedy gave in September 2002 explaining his concerns about a possible war with Iraq. While Kennedy's speech occurred early in the Iraq debate and was focused more on finding a non-military solution to the security challenge posed by Saddam, his predictions about the consequences of war with Iraq are stunning in their prescience:

Just one year into the campaign against Al Qaeda, the Administration is shifting focus, resources, and energy to Iraq. The change in priority is coming before we have fully eliminated the threat from Al Qaeda, before we know whether Osama Bin Laden is dead or alive, and before we can be assured that the fragile post-Taliban government in Afghanistan will consolidate its authority.

No one disputes that America has lasting and important interests in the Persian Gulf, or that Iraq poses a significant challenge to U.S. interests. There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein's regime is a serious danger, that he is a tyrant, and that his pursuit of lethal weapons of mass destruction cannot be tolerated. He must be disarmed.

How can we best achieve this objective in a way that minimizes the risks to our country? How can we ignore the danger to our young men and women in uniform, to our ally Israel, to regional stability, the international community, and victory against terrorism?

There is clearly a threat from Iraq, and there is clearly a danger, but the Administration has not made a convincing case that we face such an imminent threat to our national security that a unilateral, pre-emptive American strike and an immediate war are necessary.

Nor has the Administration laid out the cost in blood and treasure of this operation.

With all the talk of war, the Administration has not explicitly acknowledged, let alone explained to the American people, the immense post-war commitment that will be required to create a stable Iraq.

The President's challenge to the United Nations requires a renewed effort to enforce the will of the international community to disarm Saddam. Resorting to war is not America's only or best course at this juncture. There are realistic alternatives between doing nothing and declaring unilateral or immediate war. War should be a last resort, not the first response. Let us follow that course, and the world will be with us – even if, in the end, we have to move to the ultimate sanction of armed conflict.

The Bush Administration says America can fight a war in Iraq without undermining our most pressing national security priority -- the war against Al Qaeda. But I believe it is inevitable that a war in Iraq without serious international support will weaken our effort to ensure that Al Qaeda terrorists can never, never, never threaten American lives again.

Of course, as it turned out, the Bush Administration ended up following Kennedy's recommendation to go to the United Nations and force Saddam to allow inspectors back in. And as we well know today the Bush Administration's unquenchable desire to invade and occupy Iraq could not be sated by mere UN inspections. And so the war came.

It is one of the great tragedies of American history that more people didn't listen to Ted Kennedy nearly seven years ago. Maybe if they had we would today only be commemorating his full life - and not also mourning the untimely loss of 2nd Lt. Joseph D. Fortin, 22, of St. Johnsbury, Vt .  Second Lt. Fortin died three days ago from an IED attack in Hussaniyah, Iraq - the 4,334th casualty of the war in Iraq.

A Cornucopia of Strategic Debates on Afghanistan Posted by Michael Cohen

These days it seems like everyone in the blogosphere wants to debate the strategic rationale for staying in Afghanistan. Andrew Exum kicked things off a few weeks ago; Jari Lindholm and Bernard Finel weighed in recently and now Josh Foust is getting in the game.

Having debated Josh in the past I look forward to reading and responding to his arguments, but a few ground rules are in order. For example, Josh kicks off his case for Afghanistan here:

Many people I know and respect, like Michael Cohen, have written articles and blog posts explaining why there is little or no strategic rationale for the continued war in Afghanistan, and therefore the U.S. should withdraw from the conflict.

. . .  When the nation’s top military officer continues to insist on teevee that al Qaeda is still capable of striking the U.S., that carries tremendous import, and building the case that even another 9/11 is an acceptable risk requires a sophistication of argument—exhaustive, comprehensive, meticulous—that simply is not evident in the “withdraw now” folks. In other words, they need to build an air tight case, which hasn’t happened yet.

Two things here. I hardly see at as being incumbent on those who oppose the current mission in Afghanistan to build an air tight case - shouldn't that be the responsibility of the people who are arguing for a continued military intervention? It's one of my great pet peeves about recent US national security strategy that the default position always seems to be in favor of using military force - and that somehow it's incumbent on the opponents to prove why this is wrong.

But Josh is raising a bit of a strawman argument here.  A top US military officer insisting that al Qaeda is capable of striking the US shouldn't exactly shut down debate. Hell we had a President who spent 5 years telling us that Iraq was the central front in the war on terror - forgive me if I take these types of pronouncements with a grain of salt. 

And just because AQ is capable of striking the US doesn't mean the current mission makes sense. And being opposed to that mission is not the same thing as believing another 9/11 is an acceptable risk. One can certainly believe that US policy in Afghanistan is wrong while also believing that the US needs to aggressively target AQ terrorists.

But my real problem here is the notion that all of those opposed to the current US mission believe we should "withdraw now." I certainly don't although I do believe we should begin looking at ways to pare down our involvement there. The choice need not be full speed ahead or cut and run. That's the same false choice we dealt with in the Iraq debate. I, for one, believe that the US has some strategic interests in Afghanistan, but I do believe those interests are not being furthered by the current mission - and what's worse there is a growing credibility gap between what the Administration says needs to happen in Afghanistan and our capabilities (not to mention resources).

Josh is a smart guy so I'm sure he will engage with this argument. But please don't make this debate a black and white choice between two unpleasant choices.

Pawlenty's Painful Misstatement on CIA Interrogations Posted by Adam Blickstein

Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty wants to be President. Therefore, the rules of Republican presidential political aspirations dictate that Tim Pawlenty needs to comment on national security matters, even though he knows very little about and has virtually no experience with this set of issues. For instance, Pawlenty weighed in on the recent debate over the Justice Department's decision to look into CIA interrogation transgressions and detainee abuse:

"As bad as the health care plan is, and it's bad for all the reasons you've been highlighting to your viewers, this decision by Eric Holder today to politicize interrogations, to bring it into the White House, we should be prosecuting individuals who are involved in the war on terror as terrorists. They are cold blood killers.

"We should not be prosecuting individuals who are working hard day in and day out to protect this country. In many cases, risking their own lives. These individuals should be, you know, encouraged and supported in their roles. But to have — see the CIA basically have this taken away from them I think is outrageous.

"The attorney general should be reminded we are still a nation at war and CIA shouldn't stand for "can't interrogate anyone."

Cute turn of phrase. But completely wrongheaded and misguided. If Pawlenty had even the slightest bit of knowledge of our intelligence community, he would know that the CIA in recent history barely had the experience nor capacity to interrogate terror suspects, something that was traditionally done by the FBI or military. For instance:

U.S. intelligence officials say the CIA, contrary to the glamorized view from movies and novels, had no real interrogation specialists on hand to deal with the number of valuable suspects it captured after Sept. 11. 

That was from a 2004 Washington Post article,and Pawlenty is clearly transfixed by that cinematically glamorized view of the CIA. Spencer Ackerman shed more light on the lack of CIA interrogation expertise:

Yet, until 9/11, the agency had limited experience with interrogation, and had few people on staff who had even conducted one. Most of the CIA’s experience had involved consulting with partner intelligence agencies on how to torture, sometimes using methods learned from the Nazis, instead of conducting interrogations itself — as demonstrated by the infamous Kubark torture instruction manual of the 1960s.

Young CIA officers weren’t trained in interrogations. "How to resist torture was the only thing related to interrogation at the training program", said one former senior official in the Directorate of Operations. "There was no thought, no commentary, or any practicality on how to apply it." The landmark Church and Pike commissions of the 1970s that examined illegal CIA programs further reinforced the CIA’s impulse to avoid, whenever possible, activity with a high political cost and marginal benefit.

The recently released CIA IG report on interrogations further exposes the fact that the CIA was never the interrogation powerhouse Pawlenty portrays it as:

The report reveals how the CIA, which had no previous experience of so broad an interrogation programme, was sending people out into the field whose only relevant prior experience was debriefing, which by definition means getting information from people who willingly participate.

In fact, the IG report states quite clearly that:

"In effect, they [the various CIA components tasked with interrogation] began with almost no foundation, as the agency had discontinued virtually all involvement in interrogations after encountering difficult issues with earlier interrogation programs in Central America and the Near East. Inevitably, there also have been some problems with current activities."

CIA veteran Bob Baer sums up the CIA's traditional participation in interrogations, or lack thereof, quite nicely:

"[T]he CIA does not specialize in the interrogation of war prisoners...the FBI has done a very good job after 9/11.  Its interrogators used normal interrogation techniques, got a lot of information, and I think we’re going to see in the CIA report that we didn’t get much out of the abusive interrogations.”

Pawlenty's whole notion that the CIA "shouldn't stand for "can't interrogate anyone" is wrong on so many levels, least of which is the Agency's lack of historical interrogation capability, lack of resources, lack of internal cultural desire to actually participate in these interrogations, and most of all, lack of quantifiable success at interrogating terror suspects as compared to the FBI's strong track record. This is not a criticism of the CIA, rather a realistic snapshot that the traditional role of the CIA, intelligence collection and analysis, was dangerously subverted by the political leadership in the White House in exchange for these interrogations which the CIA had no experience or capability to participate in. 

Pawlenty's misreading of CIA interrogation history and the traditional role of CIA displays a pretty superficial understanding of national security. He may want to become a little more educated before he again makes obtuse and erroneous statements which are antithetical to the reality of America's national security apparatus and imperatives.

Or maybe he should simply stop going to the movies.

Nuclear Posture Review: Say it Ain't So DoD Posted by David Shorr

A very important warning from Ron Rosenbaum at Slate that inertia and resistance from the Pentagon's nuclear weapons establishment threaten to undermine President Obama's stated goals for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The piece makes a number of excellent points, but most important is how Rosenbaum highlights the link between the United States' doctrinal reasons for having (and potentially using) nuclear weapons and the associated policies to preserve nuclear forces. The key grafs, worth quoting at length, point out that early hints related to the impending Nuclear Posture Review could be devastating for nuclear disarmament:

The first disquieting signal on this front came earlier this month, when the Pentagon released a series of talking points about the upcoming NPR. Although the release began with lip service to [the goal of] Zero, it quickly moved on to a long list of desiderata for maintaining, updating, modernizing, and improving our nuclear-weapons-deterrence system. "In his April 5, 2009 speech in Prague," the Aug. 6 NPR talking points begin, "President Obama made clear his intent to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy and to take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons. He also promised that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies."

"He also promised ..." That's what the NPR talking points are all about: The "also" reality we actually live in where Zero is just a dream.

Note the wording "as long as nuclear weapons exist": The Pentagon is committed to business as usual. There are also little code words in there for those in the know. Consider effective, which, in this context, can be interpreted to mean that the aging and supposedly deteriorating nuclear warhead stockpile needs more than the current "Life Extension Program" (an ironic name), which works to refurbish fissile warheads from the Cold War to ensure the credibility of their deterrent value. Most of the nuclear establishment has been straining at the bit to junk the LEP and replace it with the RRW—the "Reliable Replacement Warhead" program—which would involve developing an entire new generation of nuclear warheads and probably require underground testing (rather than the computer simulations disparaged as insufficient), and thus continued U.S. refusal to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban treaty. Obama has made signing that treaty one of his goals, but the nuclear-weapons-making establishment doesn't want to be hamstrung by it. Just another way the nuclear bureaucracy is derailing the commander in chief's goals.

There is absolutely no necessary logical connection between "as long as nuclear weapons exist" and the development of new nuclear warheads. The only real implied commitment in that sentence is to retain a nuclear arsenal to deter others from launching a nuclear attack -- i.e. forces sufficient to meet any such attack with a devastating retaliatory strike (God forbid). Rosenbaum also helpfully links to an sensible, readable, and implementable proposal from the good people at Natural Resources Defense Council and Federation of American Scientists. I just hope Rosenbaum is wrong about where the posture review is headed.

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - The Future Version Posted by Michael Cohen

Barack Obama on March 27th, 2009:

As President, my greatest responsibility is to protect the American people. We are not in Afghanistan to control that country or to dictate its future.

The newly released ISAF guidance for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan:

Essentially, we and the insurgents are presenting an argument for the future to the people of Afghanistan: they will decide which argument in most attractive, most convincing, and has the greatest chance of success.

 . . . We need to understand the people and see things through their eyes. It is their fears, frustrations and expectations that we must address.

Sigh. But this isn't even my favorite part of this guide:

Earn the support of the people and the war is won, regardless of how many militants are killed or captured. We must undermine the insurgent argument while offering a more compelling alternative. Our argument must communicate - through word and deed - that we and GIRoA have the capability and commitment to protect and support the people. Together, we need to provide a convincing and sustainable sense of justice and well-being to a weary and skeptical populace. We must turn perceptions from fear and uncertainty to trust and confidence.

And I would like a pony for every man, woman and child in Afghanistan.

Surely it's important to communicate that ISAF and GIRoA have the capability to protect and support them. But what if we don't actually posses that capability . . . or commitment for that matter.

Honestly, I urge you to read this guide and it's wonderful pie in the sky predictions about what a counter-insurgency can accomplish in Afghanistan. And then ask yourself: how are we going to achieve these goals if we a) don't have enough American troops; b) lack the political will to remain in Afghanistan at current troops levels for 5-10 years. (I mean does anyone think we're going to make a dent in Afghanistan's problem in 12-18 months); c) have little support from the Afghan government, the Afghan military and the Afghan police.

How exactly are we going to "provide a convincing and sustainable sense of justice and well-being" to the people of Afghanistan without these resources? Not to mention the fact, it's very hard to see why this would be in our national interest. Hell, how about turning perceptions of fear and uncertainty to trust and confidence here in America! It might actually help pass health care.

Yesterday, I spoke about the growing gulf between our intentions and capabilities in Afghanistan. You want prima facie evidence - read this guide and then read this article from the Sunday New York Times about how the Marines in Helmand province don't have the resources to carry out their mission.

And then maybe have a stiff drink.

"A Small Cabal of Homogenous Folks" Posted by Heather Hurlburt

it must be August if I'm on the NY Times website debating the role of emotion in politics and arguing that that halcion past where white men sat around making all the decisions behind closed doors was not really so devoid of emotion -- surely one way of reading the Inspector General's report released yesterday is as a record of what happens when fear is not just allowed to drive everything bu explicitly made the foundation of reasonign and policy-making.

NSN Daily Update: August 25, 2009 Posted by The Editors

To see today's complete Daily Update, click here.

What We're Reading

While officials in Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s cabinet believe Karzai won last week’s elections convincingly, preliminary results show a split vote with the main challenger, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. Various claims of fraud continue to be raised.

Fury in Britain and the United States continues over the early release of the Lockerbie bomber. However, the United States has limited options.

North and South Korea discuss an initiative to unify families separated by the Korean War, while South Korea launches its first rocket into space.

China surpasses the United States in the production of solar panel technology.

Commentary of the Day

Bob Herbert discusses the incongruity of Obama’s characterization of Afghanistan as a war of necessity while maintaining an all-volunteer army that uses only a fraction of the US population to fight our wars of need.

David Ignatius argues that Iranian influence in Iraq’s national intelligence service is exacerbating sectarian differences and reducing managerial integrity.

An Afghan witness describes how threats of Taliban intimidation during the recent Afghan presidential election were exploited by election officials to commit fraud in favor of incumbent Hamid Karzai.

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - The Hopeless, Not Hard Version Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at abumuqawama, Andrew Exum approvingly cites Robert Kagan's op-ed in the Washington Post on the issue of wars of necessity vs. wars of choice.  As is often the case with a Kagan op-ed it reduces a complicated question about fighting wars to a black and white issue - all wars, unless the United States is being invaded or in imminent danger, are ones of choice says Kagan:

It would have been bad if the United States had not defended South Korea in 1950 . . . but it would not have been the end of the world, either. The United States and the West suffered far more from the Soviet Union's stationing of the Red Army across Eastern Europe after World War II, but no one, including Haass, claims it was necessary to go to war with Stalin in 1945.

The fact is, unless the nation is invaded or its very survival is imminently threatened, going to war is always a choice. So what is the point of trying to make this elusive distinction anyway?

For many, including Obama, the present purpose is to distinguish Afghanistan from Iraq, Obama's "good" war from George W. Bush's "bad" war. But it won't work. As Haass correctly argues, right or wrong, they were both wars of choice.

This is wrong on a number of counts. First, it must be noted that even if you buy Kagan's formulation, there can still be good wars of choice and bad wars of choice. So Korea was likely a good choice (well until MacArthur brought the Chinese Army across the Yalu), same goes for the Gulf War. Iraq, a bad choice - same for Vietnam.

But Kagan has this whole thing backwards. The war in Afghanistan began as a war of necessity and to some extent continues to be one, because policymakers have convinced themselves that it is a war they must fight to prevent a return of an al Qaeda safe haven to Afghanistan (which would of course pose an existential threat to the United States). If you believe, for example, as Peter Bergen does that "if the Taliban did come back to power in Afghanistan, of course they would give safe haven to al Qaeda" (a rather amazing statement I might add) then of course the war in Afghanistan is a necessity.

The problem here is that we have policymakers who are operating under the dubious assumption that the current war in Afghanistan - and the current mission - is a war of necessity.  Indeed, has any president who sent troops into harm's way not believed that it was absolutely necessary to do so? So yes, let's stop arguing about wars of necessity and wars of choice - and instead let's question the assumptions that lead us to believe any war not in the country's self-defense must be fought.

Even more striking than Kagan's argument, however, is the response of Andrew Exum. He recounts a story of being quizzed by public servants as to "What are we doing in Afghanistan and why are we there in the first place?" his reaction is "this is now Obama's war, and he and Stan McChrystal need to explain to the American people in non-IR-speak why we are in Afghanistan and what we are doing there."

Yes, I suppose that is one solution. But one would imagine that if so many people were asking me "What are we doing in Afghanistan and why are we there in the first place?" it might cause me to step back and say NOT how can I sell this war better, but if after 8 years, people are still asking me this question then maybe the whole enterprise doesn't make a lot sense.

What is striking to me about the "hard not hopeless" crowd is that they no matter how "hopeless" things seem in Afghanistan, it's still not "too hard" that we shouldn't muddle through. For every indication that we don't have enough troops on the ground, that we don't have the support of the Afghan government and security forces, that the American people are increasingly unconvinced that we should be fighting this war . . there is always another call to do more, to give it another 12 months, to improve the PR job, to send more troops etc. There is always something more that can be done, except that is, actually changing course.

When does hopeless actually become . . hopeless.

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - The Helmand Sideshow Posted by Michael Cohen

If you want to get as frustrated as I am about the current US policy in Afghanistan read this article in the New York Times - it's all about how the Marine offensive in Helmand province IS in fact a sideshow:

In a region the Taliban have lorded over for six years, and where they remain a menacing presence, American officers say their troops alone are not enough to reassure Afghans. Something is missing that has left even the recently appointed district governor feeling dismayed. “I don’t get any support from the government,” said the governor, Massoud Ahmad Rassouli Balouch

Governor Massoud has no body of advisers to help run the area, no doctors to provide health care, no teachers, no professionals to do much of anything. About all he says he does have are police officers who steal and a small group of Afghan soldiers who say they are here for “vacation.”

It all raises serious questions about what the American mission is in southern Afghanistan — to secure the area, or to administer it — and about how long Afghans will tolerate foreign troops if they do not begin to see real benefits from their own government soon. American commanders say there is a narrow window to win over local people from the guerrillas.

What this article makes clear is that the US mission in Helmand lacks the resources to be carried out effectively - in short, it highlights the monstrous inconsistency between our goals in Afghanistan and our capabilities.

For example, look at what the President said last week in Phoenix about the US mission and American troops:

They're adapting new tactics, knowing that it's not enough to kill extremists and terrorists; we also need to protect the Afghan people and improve their daily lives. And today, our troops are helping to secure polling places for this week's election so that Afghans can choose the future that they want.

But this isn't what's happening. I don't doubt that it's our intention, but the facts on the ground suggest otherwise. Let's catalog all the challenges to our current mission:

1) We don't have enough US troops:

The Marine battalion, which deployed with less than 40 percent of its troops, can regularly patrol only a small portion of its 6,000-square-mile area. . . That leaves no regular troop presence across the vast southernmost reaches of Helmand. On the Pakistani border the town of Baramcha — a major smuggling hub and Taliban stronghold — remains untouched by regular military units

2) The Afghan Army and police is of little help:

He (Governor Massoud) said he was promised 120 police officers, but only 50 showed up. He said many were untrustworthy and poorly trained men who stole from the people, a description many of the Americans agree with. No more than 10 percent appear to have attended a police academy, they say. “Many are just men from the streets,” the governor said.

The Afghan National Army contingent appears sharper — even if only one-sixth the size that Governor Massoud said he was promised — but the soldiers have resisted some missions because they say they were sent not to fight, but to recuperate.

3) There is no support from the Afghan government:

“Without the Afghan government, we will not be successful,” said Capt. Korvin Kraics, the battalion’s lawyer, who is in Khan Neshin. “You need local-level bureaucracy to defeat the insurgency. Without the stability that brings, the Taliban can continue to maintain control.”

Local administration is a problem throughout Afghanistan, and many rural areas suffer from corrupt local officials — if they have officials at all.

4) The local population is more supportive of the Taliban than the government in Kabul:

 . . . two of every three local residents supported the Taliban, mostly because they make a living growing poppy for the drug trade, which the Taliban control. Others support them for religious reasons or because they object to foreign forces.

Forgive me for beating a dead horse, if we don't have the troops, if we don't have the support of the Afghan military, police and civilian government, if we are not even able to impose our military will and if the local population is not interested in what we are selling why are we continuing to pursue a counter-insurgency mission that depends on all of these things?

Why as, Andrew Exum, suggests should we give this mission 18-24 more months when there is little indication that the problems identified in the Helmand offensive are going to be fixed any time soon? If we haven't been able to get the very basics of counter-insurgency right over the past 8 years; if we haven't been able to get the Afghan government on board with providing effective services to its citizens why will a slight increase in the number of troops combined with a switch in tactics, devoid of ample resources and host country support, going to magically succeed? (And if someone says well it worked in Iraq with the surge, I'm going to pop a blood vessel).

Certainly, it's possible that things could turn around in 18-24 months but there has been precious little indication that this is going to happen. Yet instead of adopting a more restrained mission based on a somewhat narrow view of US interests we are going long- larding on more responsibilities to US troops, like hunting drug dealers and waging a PR war against the Taliban, when we've shown little indication that we can even get the big things right or as Josh Foust suggests learn from our successes. Once again, we are trying to fit a square counter-insurgency peg into a round hole.

And the gulf is more than operational, it's also rhetorical. If as the President has suggested the war in Afghanistan is a war of necessity and "fundamental to the defense of our people" then why aren't we sending 100,000 troops or 250,000 troops to Afghanistan? Why aren't we committing to be in Afghanistan for more than 12-18 months, but for five years. How can the President, on the one hand, say this war is "fundamental" to America's defense and yet at the same time not provide the resources to fight it effectively? Because, its fairly clear from reading this article in the New York Times that our troops don't have the resources to do what the President or their military commanders are asking them to do.

Every war it seems produces inconsistencies between intentions and capabilities; but it seems the gulf between why we fight and what we are actually able to accomplish seems to grow larger and larger with each war. In Iraq, presidents and defense secretaries would brag about how many Iraqi soldiers we had trained while ignoring the fact that they weren't able to do little things like operate by themselves. Now we're told that the US mission in Afghanistan will only succeed when the Afghan security forces are up to speed and we have the resources to win.

But neither situation seems to exist  . . . and so we continue down a path that provides barely a glimmer of hope that the current ambitious mission will succeed.

Afghanistan MIssion Creep Watch - War of Necessity/War of Choice Version Posted by Michael Cohen

Ok so I'm supposed to be on vacation right now, but the AMCW must roll on.

Today's must read is Richard Haass's thoughtful op-ed in the New York Times about why the war in Afghanistan is a war of choice and should be judged as such. Now Haass comes down on the view that the American interests in Afghanistan are "sufficiently important" to continue the current mission. I don't agree, but that's fine. Haass does two things that are really important - first he shows the folly of President Obama's war of necessity argument for Afghanistan and makes clear that there must be limits to a war of choice:

There needs to be a limit to what the United States does in Afghanistan and how long it is prepared to do it, lest we find ourselves unable to contend with other wars, of choice or of necessity, if and when they arise.

Second, Haasss gives creedence to military options in Afghanistan other than continuing on the current course or withdrawal:

There are alternatives to current American policy. One would reduce our troops’ ground-combat operations and emphasize drone attacks on terrorists, the training of Afghan police officers and soldiers, development aid and diplomacy to fracture the Taliban.

Whether one believes this is the right approach or not, I am pleased that Haass has shown a willingness to consider a multitude of options on what to in Afghanistan - not the strawman arguments that often define this debate.

Read the whole piece.

Bernard Finel also makes some smart points about the Haass piece.

Ok, back to vacation.