In Iraq, It's Not About Us Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at the New York Times this morning, Ross Douthat decides to weigh in about the future of Iraq:

The Iraq war isn’t finished yet. There are still 130,000 American troops in the country. As Maliki acknowledged during his visit to Washington, there will probably be thousands of soldiers there after 2011, when the current Status of Forces Agreement states that our troops must be withdrawn.

Nobody’s sure exactly what this residual force will be doing. But that’s because nobody -- nobody -- knows how Iraq will look once American combat troops are gone. As soon as we do, the current consensus will likely come apart. It holds, for now, because everybody has an interest in the idea of a swift withdrawal. War supporters want the chance to claim victory. War opponents want the chance to claim vindication. Obama wants the problem off his desk.

But America’s most important interest remains a stable, unified Republic of Iraq, even if takes longer than any domestic faction wants. Afghanistan may be “the good war” to most Americans, but Iraq’s size, location, history and resources mean that it’s still by far the more important one.

Douthat displays here a typical Washington-centric view of foreign policy - namely, he seems to think it's all about us. But one look at the recent stories coming out of Iraq shows that as far as the Iraqis are concerned - it's about them and their country:

In recent days, Iraqis have questioned American soldiers at checkpoints in Baghdad, at times preventing them from driving into neighborhoods. In one incident, an Iraqi soldier drew a weapon on a U.S. armored vehicle, American officials said.

Senior U.S. commanders have played down the tension, saying that the relationship remains fundamentally strong and that "hiccups" are to be expected at a time of transition. But soldiers and junior commanders called the situation alarming.

"I worry that an Iraqi army soldier will shoot at my truck with his 20 AK-47 rounds and my gunner will shoot back with his 100 50-caliber rounds instead of ducking down," a U.S. officer said on the condition of anonymity.

Another officer said U.S. soldiers have been taken aback by the sudden intransigence of their Iraqi partners. The Iraqi army seems "more and more willing to conduct operations on their own and less willing to accept our operational guidance," said the officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "But they continue to look to [us] for support. Their independence is like a 16-year-old who just got his license and doesn't want to listen anymore but still wants you to pay for the gas and the insurance and bail them out of jail" when they mess up.

Ross and others should read the whole story because it makes clear that Iraq's future isn't about anti-war and pro-war debates in Washington - and it hasn't been for a very long time. This isn't to say that the United States shouldn't do everything in its power to influence the country's future diplomatically, but folks have to start realizing that our ability to shape Iraq's future is severely constrained.

Douthat is typically vague on what he thinks the US should do differently beyond "paying attention" to the conflict. But I'll take this opportunity to 'go there.' If our militarily isn't doing much to shape Iraq's future in a positive way or if tensions are increasing between our soldiers and Iraq's security forces then the right course of action is not to slow down redeployment - it's to speed up. We've met our objectives in Iraq as best we can. The time has come to declare victory and start bringing the troops home .  . and sooner rather than later.

*** Also, check out Spencer Ackerman (the smartest and most charming man I know) as he takes down Douthat's analogizing of Iraq with the Philippines.

Hillary Clinton Talks Afghanistan on Meet the Press Posted by Michael Cohen

Today on Meet the Press Hillary Clinton was asked a single question about Afghanistan (what's up with that David Gregory, one question on the country where American troops are being killed and we're busy waging a war).

To be honest I've had a very difficult time trying to make heads or tails of what Clinton said. Below is my annotated critique with the Secretary's comments indented and italicized:

We had an intensive strategic review upon taking office. And we not only brought the entire United States government together, but we reached out to friends and allies, people with stakes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And as you know, the result of that strategic review was to conclude that al-Qaeda is supported by, and uses extremist allies like elements within the Taliban and other violent extremist group in the region as well as worldwide to extend its reach, to proxies for lot of its attacks on Jakarta, Indonesia and elsewhere so that in order to really go after al-Qaeda -- uproot it and destroy it -- we had to take on those who are giving the al-Qaeda leadership safe haven.

Again I'm having a very hard time understanding the point being made here. But if the Secretary's assertion is that Al Qaeda is seeking to further its reach by allying itself with other jihadist organizations that seems correct, but how is that necessarily in America's vital security interests?  Is the Secretary suggesting that every time a group in Indonesia or Algeria or elsewhere calls itself Al Qaeda the US has to send in the Marines? I'm also not clear if Clinton is suggesting that Al Qaeda groups in Indonesia are plotting attacks against the US, but as far as I am aware that really doesn't seem to be an issue. If Al Qaeda is recruiting these organizations to attack the United States then yes, that is in the national interest. But again that doesn't seem to be the case. These appear to be domestically-focused offshoots of Al Qaeda.

I tend to agree that it's important to go after Al Qaeda leadership and disrupt their safe havens, but I'm less clear on what that has to do with Afghanistan - a country that hasn't had a significant Al Qaeda presence since 2002. By the Secretary's own logic the "real fight" for America is in Pakistan where AQ's main leadership can be found.

Now, as you know, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is permeable. There are movements back and forth across it. I think our new strategy, which has been endorsed by a very large number of nations, some of whom don't agree with us on a lot of other things, is aimed at achieving our primary goal. And we also learned from Iraq, which were hard lessons, that in order for our military intervention to be effective, when they go in and try to clear areas of extremists, we have to go in and build up the capacity of the local community to defend itself and to be able to realize the benefits of those changes.

Let's first be clear that out military intervention in Iraq was not effective . . . or smart . . . or well-planned . . . or properly resourced. Second, we did build capacity in local communities in Iraq, but that is not the same thing as making Iraq more stable over the long-term (time will tell) and we should be honest that at least part of that "capacity building" was militarily supporting Iraqi Sunnis as they wiped out Al Qaeda in Iraq. But the most important point here is that before we can even get to the build part of clear, hold and build we have to actually do the "hold" part. And without proper support from the Afghan security services  to maximize whatever security gains are made, there is little hope of doing any serious building. I have to yet to hear a cogent explanation for how current counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan are going to succeed in the near-term if we don't have actual host country support from the Afghan military and government.

This is a new strategy. It's just beginning. I think the president believes that this is not only the right strategy but facing what he faced, to withdraw our presence or keep it on the low-level limited effectiveness that had been demonstrated would have sent a message to al-Qaeda and their allies that the United States and our allies were willing to leave the field to them. 

Am I reading this correctly, but did Hillary Clinton just make the Dick Cheney-esque argument that we have to stay in Afghanistan because if we leave (or if you prefer, cut and run) it will embolden Al Qaeda? Really, we're playing the credibility card now? Seriously, how is this any different from the argument made during the Bush Administration that we couldn't leave Iraq because it would be trumpeted as a moral victory for Al Qaeda. This may be the single most disappointing thing I've heard from a member of the Obama Administration to date.

And in addition, importantly, we can see the Pakistani government and military really step up, which had not happened to the extent it has now. So the Taliban, which is, as I believe strongly, part of a terrorist syndicate with al-Qaeda at the center, is now under tremendous pressure, and I think that's in America's national interest.

Again, I don't understand this at all - is Hillary referring to the Pakistan Taliban or the situation in Afghanistan because if it's the latter I'm having a hard time squaring it with what I read in the NYT last week about Pakistan's disinclination to go after Afghan Taliban safe havens in Pakistan. But as for the notion that the Taliban is part of a terrorist syndicate with Al Qaeda, perhaps that argument can be made in Pakistan, but what does this argument have to do with Afghanistan? The Taliban there are insurgents they are not terrorists; at the very least they are not terrorists intent on attacking the United States.

The problem here in part is that the Secretary of State is conflating all Taliban as if they are similar actors, acting under a common purpose and with shared goals and a shared set of political grievances. It is quite simply a lazy conflation that I'm afraid is meant to support a particular policy decision and not provide any real insight into the nature of the enemy we are facing in Afghanistan.

Now, I have to add, nobody is more saddened by the loss of life of our young men and women.  And no one is more impatient than we are to see this sacrifice bear fruit. We have the most extraordinary military in the world. They have leadership now we think is totally on point in terms of what we are attempting to accomplish. And I think we're going to see benefits from that.

I'm all for benefits, but it's fair to ask what those benefits will look like in the end. I don't see an answer here or anywhere in the Administration's recent rhetoric a good explanation of what victory in Afghanistan looks like. As Spencer Ackerman puts it quite succinctly, "If we don't have clear metrics for judging success or the need to change course, then we might as well start preparing for failure." And people should listen to Spencer, as I discovered on Friday he's a pretty smart dude.

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - Signs of Progress Posted by Michael Cohen

Today in the AMCW, some good news, well sort of. At least one prominent Democrat is recognizing the growing problems with the counter-insurgency mission in Afghanistan:

Feingold said he is increasingly disturbed by the war in Afghanistan, where troop levels are escalating by the month, US casualties are mounting and the insurgency is expanding. "It appears that no one even asked the president about [Afghanistan] at his [July 22] press conference after apparently thirty or thirty-one Americans were killed in Afghanistan last month. How is that possible?" Feingold asks. "People have to wake up to what's going on in Afghanistan, and my vote is a request that people wake up to what's happening, which is we are getting deeper and deeper into this situation in a way that I don't think necessarily makes sense at all and may actually be counterproductive."

This administration is almost whistling past the graveyard on this issue." Feingold added, "How is it that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and our special envoy to this region both agree that this (possibly destabilizing Pakistan by pushing Afghan fighters across the border) could be a problem and that it is not talked about as a serious mistake if we're going to keep increasing troops and increase that effect? This is, in my view, the central flaw in what is otherwise a policy that is better than the Bush administration's. This is the central flaw in the thinking of the administration on this issue, and it needs to be pursued.

Read the whole interview here. Feingold is asking exactly the sort of questions that need to be asked.

Next over at the Atlantic Council blog, Donald Snow makes the argument that I have been trying to make over the past few days - doing population counter insurgency in Afghanistan is akin to sticking a square peg in a round hole:

With these limitations in mind, is Afghanistan ripe for COIN success? I think the manual (FM 3-24) argues implicitly that it is not, for three reasons. First, Afghanistan is too big for this kind of operation. The manual clearly states that effective COIN requires one counterinsurgent for every 1,000 members of the population being protected. In Afghanistan, that means a COIN force of 660,000, a number so wildly in excess to what will ever be available to be disqualifying in and of itself. Second, the doctrine argues the heart of success is the political conversion of the population, but it fails to discuss who is going to do the converting. If it leaves this to U.S. counterinsurgents, the battle is lost. As the manual itself argues, an additional criterion for success is a good government the population can be loyal to. It is not at all clear Afghanistan has or is in any danger of acquiring such a government. Finally, the doctrine entreats that COIN is slow work and that its success will require considerable perseverance. A decade’s commitment or more is often suggested for Afghanistan: is there any danger the American public will support an Afghanistan war still going on in 2018 or 2019? I doubt it.

Finally, I'm pleased to see that my occasional interlocutor, Andrew Exum, has returned safely from Afghanistan. While I note a more somber tone in his recent postings I expect that we will be jousting again soon over COIN, Afghanistan and which Civil War general we admire most. It's good to have him back.

Here to Help Posted by The Editors

This post is by Gen. Paul Eaton (Ret.), Senior Adviser at the National Security Network

There is a standing joke in the Army regarding our very important office of the Inspector General, the office that assures for the commander the good order and discipline of the unit.

When the IG arrives he states, “We’re here to help.”  And the subordinate commander replies, “We’re glad to see you.”  There is truth and fiction in both statements.

The American Army arrived in Afghanistan shortly after 9/11 to clear Al-Queda and the training base responsible for the attacks on the United States.  The mission has morphed to include an offensive against the Al-Queda supporters in Afghanistan, including some war lords and certainly the Taliban.  We now find ourselves in full counter-narcotics operations in support of the mission of country building.  Counter narcotics operations consisting of burning famer’s crops in an agrarian country are not seen as ‘help’ by the farmers who lose their livelihood and their ability to feed their families, and the general economic viability of the community in which they live.  It isn’t the moral or national issue to them, as it is to us.  It’s business – a bad business that funds a Mafioso inspired network of Taliban, Al-Queda and other bad actors who feed upon the opiate supply line from crop to product en route to Europe.

Alternatives that have worked elsewhere include paying farmers not to grow drug producing crops, incentivizing those farmers to grow the crops that could make Afghanistan the breadbasket of the region it was decades ago and, finally, turning what is now an illegal crop into a legal source for the opiates the world legally produces for rational medical needs.

Thom Shanker’s article today in the New York Times indicates we may have finally turned the corner from actively alienating the base population of Afghanistan to helping the Afghan farmer to help himself, his family and his community.  That this effort would coincide with the arrival of General McChrystal and Ambassador (LTG(R)) Eikenberry reflects the needed shift in addressing the complex fight in Afghanistan with a nuanced menu of offensive capacity and country building at the grass – or poppy – roots level.

The United States Army and Marine Corps and our coalition comrades are really there to help.  We want the Afghan famers to be really glad to see us. And we have to be better and smarter businessmen than the Taliban.

Obama Slow in Reacting to Asteroid Strike in 2036 Posted by Adam Blickstein

In 2036, NASA scientists predict that Asteroid 99942 Apophis could possibly strike Earth, causing widespread devastation and the possible extinction of life as we know it:

Were it to strike Earth, it would not set off global havoc but would generate significant local or regional damage, experts say.

Worrisome to asteroid watchers is the exceptionally close flyby of Earth by Apophis on April 13, 2029. So close in fact, the space rock will be naked-eye visible as it darts by. And what can't be ruled out at this time is that Apophis may pass through a gravitational "keyhole" - a spot that alters the asteroid's trajectory as it zips by our planet and might put it on the bee-line lane for banging into Earth seven years later.

If it enters that deadly keyhole, plainly put, we are doomed. As Daniel Baker recently said in the Ledger of Lakeland, Florida, "let us not ignore the threat at our doorstep." Sadly, last night, President Obama did just that and ignored this imminent threat to American, global, and galactic security. Instead of addressing how Earth can avoid our looming annihilation and probable worldwide extinction, he focused on the Skip Gates controversy, something even he admitted he did not know all the facts on. This isn't the first time Obama has been slow to react to issues of global importance, as the GOP's Congressional Committee Spokesman Ken Spain so coherently pointed out:

“The president was slow to point out any wrongdoing in the wake of the Iranian election and his administration was quick to force through a failed stimulus plan even though they ‘misread’ the economy. This is certainly a questionable rush to judgment coming from a president who hasn’t exactly been quick to call out unconscionable behavior by a merciless foreign dictator."

Slow on Iran. Slow on the stimulus. But a rush to judgment over a police action in another state Obama doesn't even know the facts about? And now, the President is silent as a giant piece of space rock hurtles through the solar system a collision course with humanity's refuge amongst the stars. Even his own space agency acknowledges that an impact would be catastrophic, more dire than "those seen as a result of the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, Hurricane Katrina" and currently preparation for this pending cataclysm is "basically out of sight...out of mind." But all President Obama seems to want to do is hastily talk about the arrest of Skip Gates, not deadly space rocks. Thankfully, Bruce Willis, Ben Affleck, Owen Wilson and Michael Bay are taking action where the President seems to be absent on Armageddon. They, it seems, are humanity's last, great hope.

NSN Daily Update: 07/23/09 Posted by The Editors

For today's complete Daily Update, click here.

What We're Reading

Gunmen kill 5 Iranian pilgrims in continuing violence in Iraq. And the GAO also reports that the American Embassy in Iraq is overstaffed and needs to be downsized.

The Obama Administration denied the request of UN investigators looking into Guantanamo and CIA prisons. A federal judge challenged the Obama Administration on their evidence to hold one of the youngest detainees at Guantanamo.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence backed Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair’s authority to appoint top intelligence officials overseas, taking a side in Blair’s dispute over such authority with CIA director Leon Panetta.

US officials clarify their relationship with the authoritarian government of Kyrgyzstan prior to their presidential election tomorrow.

Commentary of the Day

Nicholas Kristof explains why Talibanization continues to creep into the heartland of Pakistan.

Chisun Lee discusses how, without guidance from either Congress or the Executive Branch, federal judges have been making decision regarding Guantanamo detainees without a sufficient legal standard.

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - Weekly Roundup Posted by Michael Cohen

It's been a rather busy week but there are a few items worthy of mention in the AMCW.

First comes word from Spencer Ackerman that in a conference call with Col. John Agoglia, the head of the Counterinsurgency Training Center-Afghanistan, he learned that Afghan forces are not well trained counter-insurgency doctrine. As Spencer puts it, "Given that this is the force the United States is relying on to hold areas that the coalition clears of the Taliban, that seems like a particularly striking training issue." Yup.

This goes back to a point I made earlier about trying to do population-centric counter-insurgency in Afghanistan: it feels more and more like sticking a square peg in a round hole.

Next we have Joe Biden in the Ukraine and Georgia making dubious assumptions about the threat posed by Afghanistan:

Mr. Biden told the BBC that the lawless region along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was “a place that, if it doesn’t get straightened out, will continue to wreak havoc on Europe and the United States.”

He said that the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region was “the place from which the attacks of 9/11 and all those attacks in Europe that came from Al Qaeda have flowed, from that place between Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

I pretty vehemently disagree with the notion that just because 9/11 and the London bombings emanated, in part, from the Af/Pak border that history will be repeated. But really the issue is whether the current COIN mission is commensurate not only to the risk of terrorism but also to the national interest. I have to yet see a very convincing argument that nation building, which is what we are currently doing in Afghanistan, is either achievable or makes sense from a national interest perspective. Biden's answer is a distraction from that question.

From across the border in Pakistan we have some more "good" news:

Pakistani officials have told the Obama administration that the Marines fighting the Taliban in southern Afghanistan will force militants across the border into Pakistan, with the potential to further inflame the troubled province of Baluchistan, according to Pakistani intelligence officials.

Pakistan does not have enough troops to deploy to Baluchistan to take on the Taliban without denuding its border with its archenemy, India, the officials said. Dialogue with the Taliban, not more fighting, is in Pakistan’s national interest, they said.The Pakistani account made clear that even as the United States recommits troops and other resources to take on a growing Taliban threat, Pakistani officials still consider India their top priority and the Taliban militants a problem that can be negotiated.  

Pakistani authorities have chosen to fight Pakistani Taliban who threaten their government, while ignoring Taliban and other militants fighting Americans in Afghanistan or terrorizing India.

This could be a problem - although not really a surprising one. If the Taliban we are attacking in Afghanistan are able to slip over the border and remain unmolested in Pakistan, well again it does bring into question the effectiveness of the current counter-insurgency mission. What's to stop the Taliban from simply waiting the United States out? And with the Taliban remaining a viable insurgent force how long do US troops have to remain in hold and build mode in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan while we wait for the Afghan Army and police to get up to speed?

To be fair, there are no easy answers to this one, except possibly browbeating the Pakistanis into seeing things our way - or brokering a peace deal with India so the Pakistan military can focus on the Taliban threat (even then it's not so sure). Granted those won't be easy. But it's just further evidence that while the US military is focused on Afghanistan the real fight is actually happening in Pakistan and that the counter-insurgency mission currently being waged in Afghanistan risks being the military equivalent of mowing the lawn.

Finally, I missed this when it first came out earlier this month by David Kilcullen explicitly makes the argument that underpins the entire Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch:

We are looking at ten years at least in Afghanistan, and that is the best case scenario and at least half of that will be pretty major combat. This is the commitment needed, and this is what people in America and Britain should be told, and they should be told that there will be a cost involved.

He's absolutely right. If this is what the US and Britain are prepared to do (foolishly I would add) the people should be told. To date, at least here in the United States, they haven't been.

Puff Daddy and IR Theory of Rap: Residual Power of The Fallen Empire Posted by Adam Blickstein

Marc Lynch continues to pioneer the burgeoning Rap Feud Theory of International Relations movement with a brilliant interview on NPR delving into the implications of hegemonic imbalance between hip hop's heavyweights. But while his focus is on the battle between Jay-Z's current hegemony and The Game's attempts to  create a counter-hegemonic movement to, at best, replace Hov's control over the genre, or at worst, increase his own credibility and stature, there's another aspect of this debate being sorely under-explored: the status of the former hegemon that, while still powerful, is no longer producing anything original (original in the broadest sense of the word) or commercially viable yet still maintains wealth, power, and to a degree stealth control over at least a portion of the system. Yes, I'm talking about Sean Combs. 

It's clear that Diddy's own ascension within rap as an artist was predicated on a symbiosis between he and Biggie, but he also was fairly meticulous about building an empire in his own right where he operated within the system but not as the De facto "face" of the system. Thus you saw him in the early 90's building up his power base with Faith Evans, Biggie, producing for Usher, Lil Kim, TLC, and amassing a fairly prominent roster which in turn made his Bad Boy records the East Coast superpower to the West Coast's Death Row superpower. But with the deaths of both Biggie and Tupac, the walls of the system was for the most part shattered, and Diddy emerged as a superpower in his own right during the East Coast/West Coast thaw. Though not possessing singularly raw talent on stage or in the recording studio in his own right, Puffy's business savvy, marketing skills and wanton sampling of previous hits allowed him to, for the better part of a decade, become raps biggest star, talent aside. In fact, one could argue that the controversy over his sampling of Zeppelin, The Police and Diana Ross, amongst others, which created sharp hooks set over mediocre but rap, somewhat mirrors the current Autotune controversy that colors the Jay-Z/The Game battle.

Nonetheless, by 2002, his rise to solo power was for the most part coming to an end, and surely his 2004 Vote or Die campaign killed any further ability for him to be a viable commercial recording artist. But by 2006, even as he descended into the bowels of reality TV, Diddy was still a powerhouse in the broader hip hop/entertainment world, though no longer on the foreground of the rap landscape. With ventures in clothing, liquor, the music industry and other products, Combs still has a huge net worth of over $400 million, not quite at Jay-Z level, but he shouldn't be displeased with his status within the system.

So who is Combs in international relations? Britain of course. The marginal power and former empire, who might no longer dictate the progress of international relations, but one which still holds great wealth and influence over its direction. While no longer the dominating force, though indeed still retaining the status as head of state for a broad commonwealth of diverse holdings across the globe, Britain is fairly well situated near the top of the system, but no longer its hegemon. This allows it to act as both a proxy of the hegemon, but also independent of the hegemon while remaining a power in its own spheres of influence. In fact, this might be an enviable place for any nation to be in.

And of course, since Combs is an ally of Jay-Z, he may get drawn into the battle with The Game, just as the special relationship dictates Britain to reluctantly act in accord with America even when it might be counter to its own interests, which is what ostensibly occurred with Iraq. Even if you are no longer on top, the game is the game.

Welcome Back to My Good Graces Tom Friedman . . . Ish Posted by Michael Cohen

After the humanitarian porn that he wrote about Afghanistan on Sunday, I was bit ticked off at Tom Friedman. But nothing like a little realism to turn the tide for old Tom:

America has just adopted Afghanistan as our new baby. The troop surge that President Obama ordered here early in his tenure has taken this mission from a limited intervention, with limited results, to a full nation-building project that will take a long time to succeed — if ever. We came here to destroy Al Qaeda, and now we’re in a long war with the Taliban. Is that really a good use of American power?

At least The Class Too Dumb to Quit is in charge, and they have a strategy: Clear areas of the Taliban, hold them in partnership with the Afghan Army, rebuild these areas by building relationships with district governors and local assemblies to help them upgrade their ability to deliver services to the Afghan people — particularly courts, schools and police — so they will support the Afghan government.

The bad news? This is State-Building 101, and our partners, the current Afghan police and government, are so corrupt that more than a few Afghans prefer the Taliban. With infinite time, money, soldiers and aid workers, we can probably reverse that. But we have none of these. I feel a gap building between our ends and our means and our time constraints. My heart says: Mission critical — help those Afghans who want decent government. My head says: Mission impossible.

This kind of gets to a point I raised yesterday on NPR's On The Point (self-promotion alert) with Max Boot from CFR and Brandon Friedman from VoteVets. Trying to do population centric counter insurgency in Afghanistan is sort of like trying to put a square peg in a round hole. Without the necessary host country support the gains we make in Afghanistan are going to be ephemeral at best.

Of course, I can't completely let Friedman off the hook:

Does Mr. Obama understand how much he’s bet his presidency on making Afghanistan a stable country? Too late now. So, here’s hoping that The Class Too Dumb to Quit can take all that it learned in Iraq and help rebuild The Country That’s Been Too Broken to Work.

No, no, no. It's not too late now. And it's not up to the officers in Afghanistan to make this work. They are being given an untenable mission that I'm quite sure they will do everything in their power to ensure succeeds. But it's not clear they have the resources, the time ofe the support to make it succeed. It's up to our political leaders in the Executive Branch and in Congress, not the military, to say enough is enough.

The Powell Doctrine's Enduring Relevance Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at World Politics Review I have a new piece up about the enduring relevance of the Powell Doctrine:

Once upon a time, there was a grand and influential foreign policy doctrine. It was based on some traditional notions about U.S. statecraft that placed severe constraints on when America went to war. It asserted that when the United States used military force, it must do so in overwhelming fashion and only in the service of vital national interests. For any military action, it counseled the dispassionate weighing of costs and benefits, recommended that policymakers have clear, realistic and achievable political objectives, and called for the strong support of the American people and a clearly defined exit strategy.

This doctrine was called the Powell Doctrine, and it was based, in large measure, on a long-simmering debate in the military about how, when and where the United States should use force.

 . . . More than a quarter-century after it first entered the strategic consciousness of the U.S. national security bureaucracy, we don't hear much about the Powell Doctrine anymore. It has seemingly become a precious artifact of a bygone era in U.S. statecraft.

Yet, the lack of attention today to the key attributes of the Powell Doctrine is difficult to understand. After the twin conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan, the more than 5,000 American troops killed, the hundreds of billions -- even trillions -- of dollars spent, it's hard to imagine a strategic doctrine that is more appropriate.

Unfortunately, the lesson seemingly being drawn from these two wars is not that the U.S. must avoid the sort of draining, manpower-intensive and time-consuming counterinsurgency operations that have defined the U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, the moral of Iraq and Afghanistan seems to be that the United States must learn to fight these types of conflicts more effectively, because they are the future of war.

Meanwhile, the lessons of the Powell Doctrine and a restrained notion of when military force should be exercised are gathering cobwebs in the U.S. strategic toolbox. The time has come, however, to dust off this old war horse, because it is perhaps more relevant and timely than ever.

Read the whole thing here