Democracy Arsenal

November 01, 2005

Iraq

Clear, Hold Build: Not So Clear
Posted by Heather Hurlburt

In the last two weeks we've had a few more attempts to put forward explicit strategies for Iraq: Secretary Rice's "clear, hold and build," presented in Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony two weeks ago, and varied proposals for drawdowns from Senators John Kerry and Russ Feingold.

These are all good developments: let the American people understand what it is we think we're doing and what other options might be.  So this post is going to ask questions of all of them.

First, Secretary Rice's three-part strategy, "clear, hold and build:"

We know what we must do.  With our Iraqi allies, we are working to: Clear the toughest places -- no sanctuaries to the enemy -- and to disrupt foreign support for the insurgents.  We are working to hold and steadily enlarge the secure areas, integrating political and economic outreach with our military operations.  We are working to build truly national institutions by working with more capable provincial and local authorities.  We are challenging them to embody a national compact -- not tools of a particular sect or ethnic group.  These Iraqi institutions must sustain security forces, bring rule of law, visibly deliver essential services, and offer the Iraqi people hope for a better economic future.

Let's take this one piece at a time.

Clear: the U.S. military is conducting operations in the "toughest places" -- no argument on that.  The casualty figures show it.  But for a year now, military sources have been telling reporters that "it doesn't do much good to push them out of these areas only to let them go back to areas we've already cleared."  Exhibit A has to be Fallujah.  Have we now solved this problem, and if so, how?  With Iraqi troops?  I'd sure like to know.

Hold:  See above.  Also, Mike O' Hanlon and Brookings' Iraq Index say that while U.S. casualty rates are holding steady, Iraqi security force and civilian casualties have been high in recent months.  Overall rates of insurgent attacks, O' Hanlon writes, are the highest they have been.  That doesn't sound to me like a strategy of expanding safe ares militarily is working.  And if we have, as military leader and leader has requested, a political strategy to blunt hte insurgency, it's not obvious to me.

Build: If, as the New York Times reports, 93 percent of U.S. reconstruction funds are now committed, but "hundreds of millions" are needed to complete and maintain what has been done, according to the special Inspector-General for Iraq reconstruction, exactly what are we "building" with?

Perhaps the upcoming parliamentary elections count as building "truly national institutions."  It's hard to portray the flawed constitutional process as that.  Is the constitution the "national compact" that we are "challenging" Iraqi leaders to embody?  If not, what is the national compact that Sunnies, Shiites and Kurds all buy into, the one that will help de-fang the insurgents?  If it doesn't exist yet, are we helping it come into being, and have we figured out a more effective way to "help" than we displayed in the constitution-drafting process?

So I'd like to ask Secretary Rice to come back and explain how we are really carrying out this strategy.

Now, to complete the bipartisan gloom, I have some questions for Senator Kerry as well.  He said last week:

The way forward in Iraq is not to pull out precipitously or merely compromise to stay "as long as it takes."  To undermine the insurgency, we must instead simultaneously pursue both a political settlement and the withdrawal of American combat forces linked to specific, responsible benchmarks.  At the first benchmark, the completion of the December elections, we can start the process of reducing our forces by withdrawing 20,000 troops over the course of the holidays.

20,000, by the way, is one division.  I looked and looked for some rationale on why one division and some explicit reasoning on why we can/should expect that the challenges the day after the elections will be 20,000 troops easier than they were the day before.  (Assuming, of course, that we're not putting 20,000 extra troops in to police the elections and then just taking them out again.)

Mind you, I think there are reasonable arguments for both of these positions.  In the best possible scenario, the elections are a resounding victory for Sunni political participation and drive a much stronger wedge between insurgent leaders and average Sunnis.  This then leads to a sharp redution in insurgent recuritment and violence -- though I don't think it happens overnight.  Maybe Kerry reckons the rate of progress in Iraqi military training allows for a 20,000 troop pullout by the end of the year.  Smart people I know and lke advise Kerry on these issues, and I'm sure they were considered.

I can see -- maybe -- a rhetorical or polling-based arguemtn about not cluttering up an elegant, simple, understandable policy in a speech text.  But surely there should have been some substantive stuff for the press, at minimum, to show that Kerry is thinking about the complexities and grasps the military and strategic concerns.  Whigh God knows he does.

And while I'm at it, Senator Feingold, why is December 31, 2006 your magic number?

What are we doing that takes exactly 14 months to accomplish?

I know, I know, all of these folks are trying -- and I see all three statements as significant progress in letting Americans understand and judge exactly what it is we think we are doing in Iraq.  But as I said last week, we are very short of hard facts.  We need to be sure we know where our assumptions came from -- so we know when we need to change them.  And progressives above all need to show that we are deploying facts and military experience wisely and strategically, not cynically and for short-term political advantage.

Intelligence

The Senate and Phase Two
Posted by Derek Chollet

Today an unusual thing happened in the U.S. Senate.  The normally well-scripted body, known for Senators inserting “colloquies” into the Congressional Record as though the debates really happened, went off the rails.  The Senate Democrats interrupted normal business and, without forewarning the Republicans, called a rare closed session to discuss intelligence in Iraq, sending the press into a frenzy.  Good for them.

The dispute in question is the so-called “Phase Two” of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s (or SSCI, pronounced in Hill-speak as “sissy”) investigation of intelligence about Iraq’s WMD programs.  “Phase One” of the Committee’s work was completed and released in July 2004, which focused on the collection and analysis of that intelligence.  At the time, the Democrats tried mightily to get the Committee investigators to turn to the more interesting questions – how policymakers in the White House actually used the intelligence they were given, or whether they knowingly manipulated it when presenting the case for war.  The Republicans on the Committee, led by their Chairman, Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, pushed back, promising to pursue these issues down the road.  The Democrats knew that this slow-walking was a way to kill the effort, and have tried to pressure the other side to act ever since.

Last week’s Libby indictment provided the pretext they needed.  As Steve Clemons notes, this move was gutsy and important.  Roberts was flushed out (he certainly has been hearing from his Kansas constituents about Iraq, and my guess is that they are not happy), and announced that next week the SSCI will work continuously to “finish” Phase Two, which he claims they have been working on all along.  This is news to the SSCI’s ranking Democrat, Jay Rockefeller, who today placed his relaxed demeanor aside and put on a tough performance.  Is the logjam broken?  Who knows – as the timeline pasted below attests, the Democrats have been trying to get Roberts to move on this for years, to no avail.  As the 9-11 Commission report accurately put it, the Congressional oversight on intelligence is “dysfunctional.”  So we’ll see.

Iraq Intelligence Investigation Timeline

Attached is a chronology prepared by Democratic staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee about Democratic efforts to address the Administration’s misuse of intelligence.

For more than two years, Senate Democrats have pressed Republicans to address the misuse of intelligence.  At every turn, Republicans have blocked efforts to investigate how intelligence was used in the run-up to the war in Iraq.  Below details the long record established by Democrats to investigate this matter.

March 14, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Director Mueller requesting an investigation into the origin of the Niger documents.

May 23, 2003 – Senators Roberts and Rockefeller sent a letter to the CIA and State Department Inspectors General to review issues related to the Niger documents.

June 2, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller issued a press release endorsing a statement made of the previous weekend by Senator Warner calling for a joint SSCI/SASC investigation.

June 4, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller issued a press release saying he would push for an investigation.  Senator Roberts issued a press release saying calls for an investigation are premature.

June 10, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Senator Roberts asking for an investigation.

June 11, 2003 – All Committee Democrats signed a letter to Senator Roberts asking for a meeting of the Committee to discuss the question of authorizing an inquiry into the intelligence that formed the basis for going to war.

June 11, 2003 – Senator Roberts issued a press release saying this is routine committee oversight, and that criticism of the intelligence community is unwarranted.  Senator Rockefeller issued a press release calling the ongoing review inadequate.

June 20, 2003 – Senators Roberts and Rockefeller issued a joint press release laying out the scope of the inquiry.

August 13, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Senator Roberts making 14 points about the investigation, asking to expand the inquiry to address the “use of intelligence by policy makers” and asking for several other actions.

September 9, 2003 – After press reports quoting Senator Roberts as saying the investigation was almost over, Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Senator Roberts urging him not to rush to complete the investigation prematurely.

October 29, 2003 – Senators Roberts and Rockefeller sent a letter to Director Tenet expressing in strong terms that he should provide documents that have been requested and make individuals available.

October 30, 2003 – Senators Roberts and Rockefeller sent letters to Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice expressing in strong terms that they should provide documents that have been requested and make individuals available.

October 31, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Director Tenet asking for documents related to the interaction between intelligence and policy makers, including the documents from the Vice President’s office related to the Powell speech.

November 2, 2003 – Senator Roberts made statements during a joint television appearance with Senator Rockefeller claiming that the White house would provide all documents they jointly requested.

December 5, 2003 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to National Security Advisor Rice asking for her help getting documents and access to individuals.

January 22, 2004 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Director Tenet asking for compliance with the Oct. 31 request for documents.

February 12, 2004 – Senators Roberts and Rockefeller issued a joint press release announcing the Committee’s unanimous approval of the expansion of the Iraq review, to include use of intelligence in the form of public statements, and listing other aspects of what became Phase II.

March 23, 2004 – Senator Rockefeller sent yet another letter to Director Tenet asking for compliance with the Oct. 31 request for documents.

June 17, 2004 – Senators Roberts and Rockefeller joint press release announcing the unanimous approval of the report.

July 16, 2004 – Committee Democrats sent a letter to Bush asking for the one page summary of the NIE prepared for Bush.  The Committee staff had been allowed to review it but could not take notes and the Committee was never given a copy.

February 3, 2005 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Senator Roberts outlining Committee priorities for the coming year and encouraging completion of Phase II.

August 5, 2005 – Senator Rockefeller sent a letter to Senator Roberts expressing concern over the lack of progress on Phase II and calling for a draft to be presented to the Committee at a business meeting in September.

September 29, 2005 – All Committee Democrats joined in additional views to the annual Intelligence Authorization Bill criticizing the lack of progress on Phase II.

Democracy, Middle East

Elections in Egypt: Time to Back Up Our Rhetoric with Action
Posted by Shadi Hamid

Lorelei Kelly has asked me to guest blog this week. For more about me, click here. Over the course of the next few days, I will be discussing the upcoming Egyptian parliamentary elections and, more generally, the sorry state of democracy in the Arab world . The question I will be asking throughout is how the US, through various mechanisms, can more effectively promote democratic reform in what is the most undemocratic region in the world. I'm looking forward to reading your comments.

Egypt's parliamentary elections are scheduled take place over the course of three weeks with November 9 as the first day of polling (mark your calendars). Egypt, of course, is one of our closest allies in the region and we give the the regime there nearly $2 billion in annual economic and military aid. Despite this, the elections have received barely any coverage in the American media.   

These elections provide an important test case for the Bush administration’s "forward strategy for freedom." One can only hope that the results turn out better than September’s presidential polls when strongman Hosni Mubarak was reelected with a ludicrous 88.5% of the vote. The Mubarak regime – which is a quarter-century old – has proven adept at fraud, intimidation, stuffing, and bribing its way to victory.

Is the Bush administration on its game or is dropping the ball on Egypt ? Let us backtrack a bit. In his inaugural speech earlier this year, President Bush used unprecedented language in describing America’s democratic imperative: “All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you.” I know that with many Democrats, a built-in “neo-con” alert goes up whenever they hear this kind of language. I, on the other hand, was very much impressed. In the name of stability, we had supported Arab dictatorship for decades. Now, finally, there were signs that a change in policy was in the making. But it was not be. When less than two months ago, President Bush called Mubarak to congratulate him on his (rather lopsided) victory, the high-minded rhetoric of his inaugural address seemed particularly hollow.

The gap between words and deeds, rhetoric and policy has never been wider and our credibility continues to suffer as a result. This month’s elections in Egypt present US policymakers with an excellent opportunity to regain the initiative on democracy promotion. The response (or lack thereof) to the upcoming elections - and the voter intimidation and detention of opposition activists which will surely take place - will tell us a great deal about the current thinking in the Bush administration. I can’t say, however, that I’m particularly optimistic. Bush is embroiled in domestic controversies and has lost much of the political capital he might have still had just a few months ago.

Earlier this year, many commentators, on both the Right and the Left, were speaking of an “Arab spring,” “an autumn for autocrats,” and a “springtime for democracy,” and many other flowery, seasonal formulations. Since then, the euphoria has largely died down. Mubarak, with his September victory, has legitimized his illegitimacy for the next six years. Jordan's King Abdullah has become increasingly authoritarian in dealing with an emboldened opposition and an increasingly restless civil society.  Tunisia and Algeria are dragging their feet as usual. Yet, if the Bush administration has the political will and starts to put real, sustained pressure on these recalcitrant regimes, then this negative trend can be reversed. In other words, we've got the rhetoric down. Now it’s time to back it up.

October 31, 2005

UN

Security Council Unites Against Syria in Hariri Slaying
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

The UN registered another point of proof that the rumors of its demise are exaggerated:  the Security Council coalesced around a tough consensus resolution challenging Syria to cooperate fully with the continuing investigation into the death of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, or face consequences.  Algeria, China and Russia all went along along once the US, France and Britain agreed to strike language referencing sanctions if the Syrian obligations are not met, with the proviso that the resolution be adopted under Chapter Seven of the UN's Charter which specifically references enforcement mechanisms including sanctions and military force.

While this was not unexpected, nor should the accomplishment be dismissed.  The world is, at least for now, united in isolating a rogue state.  We have been unable to achieve similar with respect to Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and other outlaw regimes.   The real proof of the UN's mettle, of course, will come only if - -  as seems almost inevitable - - Bashar Assad's compliance with the investigation is incomplete and further measures are warranted.

But in the meantime let's touch briefly on a few reasons why, at least thus far, UN diplomacy is working better than usual in this case.   The cohesion and will to act derive in part from the specifics of the incident itself - a public assassination of a wildly popular former leader by the government of an occupying country.  But certain other aspects of what's unfolding transcend the Hariri case itself and have implications for US diplomacy at the UN:

1.   Generation of Objective Evidence - Innuendo, circumstantial evidence and even US intelligence weren't enough to rally the world against Syria.  But the findings of an independent, UN-appointed expert prosecutor were.   We dismissed the role of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq but had weapons been there, in retrospect it seems incontrovertible that the teams would eventually have found them and that, if they did, the UNSC would have been forced to act.  Rather than expecting the UN members to take our word for things, the extra time and effort to allow them to gather facts objectively will tend to pay off.

2.  Patience - The simple fact that the US is in no hurry for Syrian regime change and has been willing to allow the Mehlis investigation to run its course makes a big difference.  Behind the scenes of today's resolution was undoubtedly an agreement that if the Syrians indeed stonewall, sanctions will come later.  The UN moves painfully slowly, but allowing enough time to quiet all doubts and to "give a chance" to recalcitrant regimes is sometimes what it takes to build consensus.

3.   No (Public) Foregone Political Conclusions - That the US is too mired up in Iraq and other things to be able to handle Syrian disintegration helps a lot here.  If Algeria, China and Russia were convinced we wanted Assad out and quickly, they'd be far less likely to accede to the ratcheting up of  pressure on the regime.  By contrast, because the US made so nakedly clear that it would be satisfied with nothing less than Saddam Hussein's ouster, other countries resisted all forms of cooperation with us on Iraq for fear of abetting a US-led coup.  Even if Bush and Co. believe that nothing less than toppling Assad will do the trick, the decision not to flaunt their long-term designs is making it easier to sustain consensus.

October 30, 2005

Weekly Top Ten Lists

While Washington Slept
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

I could not bring myself to weigh in this week either on Plamegate or on the latest "plans" for Iraq.  Yet writing about virtually anything else seems to sidestep what's uppermost on all of our minds.  But as important as the areas in which the Administration has botched US policy, are the ancillary effects of its missteps on neglected and overlooked issues.  We all know that domestic preparedness has been buried under the bureaucratic avalanche of the Department of Homeland Security, and that our military is dangerously overstretched.   But a host of other issues crawl across our minds - flickering in and out as we absorb ourselves in more immediate problems like Plamegate and Iraq.   But if we don't start paying attention soon, they'll catch up with us.  Here are 10 of them.

Middle East Peace Process – The Bush Administration's failure to engage deeply and consistently in the Mideast peace process has left the most contentious conflict in the Middle East in a dangerous limbo.  Ariel Sharon's historic decision to pull out of Gaza left a host of questions unanswered, and the Administration has done little to try to ensure that the Gaza withdrawal be followed by further steps to implement the road map.  Bush's own wise decision to reject Arafat's leadership, followed by Arafat's death, could have allowed this Administration to make history a very different kind of history in the Middle East.

Doha Round- The Doha Round of trade talks, aimed at reducing the agricultural subsidies that result in cows in France enjoying higher per capita income that millions of people in Africa, are in danger of collapse.   The worst culprits are the French, who refuse to support even modest EU proposals to trim welfare for farmers.    But while USTR Rob Portman has made important conditional commitments to reduce US subsidies, the Senate Ag Committee has voted to extend benefits for rice, cotton and other agribusinesses til 2011.  The demise of Doha will perpetuate global poverty, (fairly or not) deepen resentment toward the US, and set back economic growth at home and abroad.  The Administration should redouble its efforts to prevent that from happening.

Galloping Anti-Americanism – Karen Hughes' ear-muffed listening tours of the Middle East and Indonesia make great comic relief, but do nothing to allay the march of anti-Americanism.   While I objected to Hughes' 8-month long voluntary hiatus before taking office, now that she's on the job Hughes' tone-deafness may well be making things worse.  Apart from the serious political consequences of anti-US attitudes, businesses are increasingly worried that the friction may hurt the bottom line.  Despite years of Administration talk on the need to win hearts and minds, we aren't.

China's Growing Political Influence - China's economic and diplomatic influence in Southeast Asia, Africa and elsewhere has grown tremendously since Bush took office.  Whether or not we consider China a likely military threat, for a country that shares so few of our political values to enjoy a level of global influence that rivals our own will complicate our foreign policy for decades to come.   We could have a long debate about the best strategy to deal with this, but looking the other way while our own sway wanes is not it.

Russia - As James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul point out in a new piece in Policy Review, Russia has made no meaningful contribution to any of the Bush Administration's three chief policy objectives:  fighting terror, controlling the spread of nukes, and promoting liberty.  In many respects, the US-Russian relationship seems to be slipping backward into Cold War era antagonisms.  Despite Condi Rice's expertise in the region, Russia has not been a focus for this Administration, and it shows.

Shoring Up American Influence in Our Own Backyard - US ties to Mexico are strained, and perceptions of the US in Canada are worse than at any point in the last 25 years, with the latest tension over what the Canadians are dubbing flagrant US violations of NAFTA.   The upcoming Summit of the Americas is expected to be an anti-Bush fest and a planned POTUS visit to Brazil afterward is already attracting protests.  Meanwhile outspoken anti-American Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is consolidating his influence.

Global Warming - Remember when the Administration's repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol on emissions and its failure to propose alternatives ranked among Bush's chief foreign policy failings?  Well, that day may come again.  Since then the Administration has continued to deny the link between greenhouse gasses and global warming, impeding efforts to control pollution and prevent climate change.  The result has left countries like India and China free to continue polluting without the pressure of emerging global standards.

The Balkans - The US military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 seems to get mentioned these days only as a reminder that Democrats are unafraid to use force.   There's little talk about the fact that Kosovo's political future remains unresolved (though Charlie Kupchan has a great recent Foreign Affairs article on the subject), and that peace in the territory is contingent on continued international presence.  More than 10 years after the Dayton Accord Bosnia is likewise heavily dependent on an international administration to avoid political disintegration.  Eventually the US will have to reengage to help these territories shift toward permanent status.

Bird Flu - The Administration has finally gotten off the dime in response to the threat of bird flu, now that new cases of the disease seem to be surfacing daily.   Bush will give a major speech on the topic this week at the NIH.  But make no mistake, in terms of real preparations for an outbreak, we are near nowhere.

Pakistani Attitudes Toward the US - I wrote about this last week, but the reports now are that the second wave of post-earthquake deaths from disease and exposure are already beginning.  UN agencies will have to scale back their aid this week unless more donor money flows fast.  If tens of thousands of Pakistanis die this winter because not enough help reached them, Pakistan's number one international "partner" - the US - is the most likely target for blame.  If that happens, the failure to deal more adequately with Pakistan's October 8 earthquake could go down as one of the greatest lapses of Bush's fight against terror.

October 28, 2005

Protecting Sources
Posted by Morton H. Halperin

The indictment of Scooter Libby puts into jeopardy the system by which the public learns most of what it knows about what the government is doing.  Officials say things to reporters "on background" confident that their names will not be released.  Sometimes they release information to support a government position and sometimes to expand the fight against a policy they oppose.  Sometimes the official providing the information thinks or knows that his boss (and even the President) has approved or would approve of his providing the information.  Sometimes he knows for sure they would not.

This was an extraordinary case in which the Justice Department was forced to go forward with an investigation of a leak that the administration clearly desired.  However, in most cases such investigations will occur when there is a leak that the administration of the day does not like.  Any official who believes that the public needs to know the information he is considering making public, but which he knows the President wants secret, will need to think twice.  He will know that once an investigation begins, officials will be asked to sign a waiver so that their sources are able to testify before a grand jury.   

Reporters, now that they know the facts of this case, need to consider whether they should state in advance that a source cannot in retrospect waive the confidentiality of a conversation.

One final comment:  no one who watched the press conference of Patrick Fitzgerald, as I just did, could come away with anything but extraordinary admiration. If only our Attorneys General and other US Attorneys followed his practice of not going beyond the facts of the indictment.  If  only they reminded the press of the presumption of innocence as he continually did.  If only they shared his view of the importance of freedom of the press as well as the protection of national security.  If only they avoided leaks as he did.  No one who watched who has any judgment will think they can get away with suggesting that he is partisan or that he has based the charges on technicalities.   

Once again the cover up
Posted by Morton H. Halperin

As I write, official Washington remains focused on who, if anyone, will be indicted by special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald.  The only thing that is clear is that he knows how to keep a secret, although the New York Times is reporting this morning that I. Lewis Libby Jr. will be indicted for misleading the Grand Jury and that Karl Rove will remain under investigation.  I will have more to say this morning once Fitzgerald announces the results of his investigation.

We appear to have escaped the worst outcome of an indictment under the espionage statutes for disclosing classified information to the press.  As I wrote last week, this would have been a serious threat to the public debate about national security, a threat still posed by the ongoing AIPAC case (an issue I will return to later as well).  (You may have heard Steve Aftergood of the Secrecy News and me on this issue on NPR's Morning Edition this morning.)

Libby and Rove have certainly by now learned the lesson of Watergate -- once there is a criminal investigation begins, tell the truth and the full truth.  "Forgetting" what no reasonable person would forget can lead to indictment as easily as deliberately saying something that is not true.  One hopes that at least some Republicans will remember what they said about perjury before a Grand Jury during the Clinton years when they react to this story.

For the rest of us the larger issues relate to how the nation goes to war and how much truth and how much debate we should have before the President can send Americans into harm's way.  Allowing the president to make the decision to go to war without Congress declaring war leads inevitably to deception.    

I believe that the President and most, if not all, of his advisers believed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.  However, it is equally clear that for most of them this was not the primary reason to go to war. For many in the administration this was a classic case of a group of people with a solution -- topple Sadam -- looking for a problem.  They found it with 9/11 and used the President's feeling that he needed to do more than invade Afghanistan to persuade him to invade Iraq. For others, including the President, it was the need to show resolve in the face of the terrorist attacks.

There were clearly others in the administration who were not sure the time for war had come --including Secretary Powell, who had his usual doubts about ever using force -- and who had concerns about some of the evidence.  While the intelligence community came to the conclusion that Iraq still had chemical and biological weapons, many had doubts about some of the sources and few believed that Iraq had an active nuclear program.

The fault was in not laying out all of these uncertainties and differences so that the American people and the Congress could fully debate the issues. 

The most important lesson to learn therefore is that we need to restore the role that the framers intended Congress to have before the nation goes to war.  They understood how momentous a decision this is and therefore required that the Congress "declare" war before the nation goes into battle unless there is an urgent need to respond to an attack.  (For a post-Iraq bi-partisan re-assertion of this "conservative" view, see a report of the task force of the Constitution Project.  Full disclosure -- I was on the task force and serve on the Board of the Project.)

The key is to insist that only the Congress can take us to war.  Once this was accepted by all, the responsibility would clearly be on the Congress and it would insist on full disclosure of information, including disagreements within the Executive branch, and would conduct full hearings that would include outside critics of the proposed war.  At least after the Gulf of Tonkin fiasco it is hard to imagine Congress doing less if its support for the war is understood to be essential and not just a side show.  The administration of the day would have to focus on making its case to the public and the Congress and not on deciding what to keep secret and what to say in public to get the support it thinks it needs.

Taking the nation to war without a full debate not only violates the Constitution, but it also leads to the deception of the public which in the end undercuts support for the war.  This was one key lesson of Vietnam, as it will be of Iraq.  And when the deception somehow becomes the subject of a criminal investigation, it leads inevitably to deception and criminal conduct and the destruction of people who set out to do what they believe is right for the nation.

October 27, 2005

Capitol Hill

A Budget for Halloween
Posted by Lorelei Kelly

With indictments imminent, DC is very jumpy these days--giving everything the John Stewart-esque-Halloween glow of wacky, ironic foolishness.  In this spirit, I will now proceed to link the DDX destroyer and genocide in the Sudan.

But first a little background.   I grew up in the Berkeley Hills--the original nuclear free zone--where we painted peace doves on the walls in elementary school and figured out ways to hide Salvadoran refugees during the pot lucks at church.  When I was 12, my single parented family moved to Northern New Mexico, where big letters on the way into my new hometown read "Roll Your Own Ammo" and little signs linking the United Nations with satan popped up like baby tumbleweeds on the median. Ah, the 1970's. We went from nuclear family to nuclear fallout in 14 months. 

None of this stuff mattered at age 12 because I soon got a pony.  I do however, think it gave me an ability to rationalize contradictions.  But this skill,  for the life of me,  fails to help me understand the priorities of our elected leaders these days.

I've been wandering around town all week thinking about a discussion on the Sudan that I participated in on Monday.  Discussion leaders included both American humanitarians as well as Sudanese citizens.  Mostly, we covered the African Union  mission presently ongoing in the Sudan (called AMIS). It is a ceasefire monitoring mission now 1.5 years old.  Here is a new ICG report on it. The speakers had  just returned from the Sudan and reported that this mission is under serious stress.   The AMIS soldiers are being shot at  and kidnapped and even killed. The government is not providing security.  The government btw, has AK 47s, artillery and  attack helicopters. AMIS has a few RPGs and rifles.  The monitoring soldiers from 5 different African nations patrol in toyota pickup trucks.  Canada has  recently given 105 armored vehicles--which is generous--but split between  64 teams it is spread thin. This mission  is being tested by roaming violent gangs and the Sudanese government, the speakers believed.  They don't have enough wherewithal nor the mandate to enforce stability.   

The AMIS mission is  like a  trip-wire. It is symbolic. The numbers of soldiers is so small that its most important effect is the show of resolve.   It is a vital test-drive of international willingness to stand for something.  We are not only letting them down, we're missing out on an opportunity to blaze the trail on behalf of early warning and response--key policies for combatting terrorism.

I was thinking about this talk today, as I walked through the Capitol South metro station on my way up to the Hill.  Metro stations are full of large advertisements. This fall,  the defense bills have been wending their way through committees.  Hence fighter planes, guns,submarines and lots of gadet laden soldiers float along the walls of most DC metro stations like an X-box dream menu.  Capitol South had a nautical theme. ....

Continue reading "A Budget for Halloween" »

October 26, 2005

Progressive Strategy

Stepping Back to Look at the Big Picture
Posted by Heather Hurlburt

(apologies to our fans -- this is quickly-reconstructed from a post that typepad seems to have eaten last night)

While we wait to see whether Steve Clemons is right in predicting 1-5 Plamegate indictments, and Think Progress has CBS's John Roberts pointing to a "Mr. X," I've been trying to keep my head in somewhat more elevated precincts.

Steve, our own Lorelei Kelly and I represented the bloggers' corner last weekend at the Stanley Foundation's annual Strategy for Peace conference.  I am not an unalloyed fan of such events, as they can all too easily turn into self-congratulatory groupthink exercises.  I was pleasantly surprised to find myself in a more-diverse-than-usual group of realists and idealists; military, academics and activists; CATO and TomPaine.org types.

The worst news of the weekend came not from my own "Grand Strategy" working group, but from the Gulf experts group meeting simultaneously.  For months I have assumed, and even posted, that the frantic thrashing around for alternatives in Iraq was based at least in part on a lack of answers to some more-or-less factual questions about what Iraqis would do under various circumstances.  My mistake seems to have been to assume that we had access to those answers; as one academic expert said to me when I asked her about various civil war scenarios:  "Maybe Iranian intelligence could tell you that."

For a while I've wondered why the most prolific writing on options for Iraq comes from people who are not, um, the most expert in the region.  The answer seems to be that those in the know... feel that they don't know.

The discussion of a grand strategy in which I participated brought together a diverse group of people who did agree, at the broadest level, that the strategic underpinnings of US policy need to be more focused on integration -- while managing the pace of integration to protect our interests, and maintaining hedges against failure.

But when it comes to the question integration to what end, we didn't agree -- and that tells a great deal about our uncertain times. 

Continue reading "Stepping Back to Look at the Big Picture" »

October 25, 2005

Progressive Strategy

Bush's Presidency ends...and our challenge begins
Posted by Derek Chollet

With Washington swirling in scandal and a seemingly endless barrage of bad news at home and abroad, it is time to focus on a fundamental fact: the Bush Presidency is over.

Ok, that’s an intentional overstatement, because of course George W. Bush will be President for another three years – and that gives him plenty of time to do a lot of good things, and bad.  According to today’s Washington Post, his team is scrambling to figure out how to move forward after this week’s amazing confluence of crises – there’s a lot of talk about “compartmentalization.”  But events of the past few months – Katrina, the Iraq quagmire, the exploding deficit, the conservative infighting the Miers nomination has exposed, gas prices, concerns about runaway government spending, the criminal indictments of key figures within the Republican establishment (and the possibility of more to come) -- have damaged his leadership in a way that is beyond repair.  When combined with the crucial fact that he has no successor-in-waiting with any interest in defending this embattled legacy, this means that Bush has already run out of the political capital that, only months ago, he believed he had in abundance to spend (remember the social security roll-out?).

Second terms are often seen by the political class as a countdown to the next campaign, and as such, this one is going to be defined by an historical anomaly: because neither Cheney nor anyone from Bush’s Cabinet is running, the next election will be the first truly open campaign in 56 years – since Eisenhower and Stevenson campaigned to replace Truman in 1952.  This fact isn’t just some piece of political trivia; it will completely change the political dynamic of the 2008 nominating process on both sides, as well as the general election.   

The potential Republican nominees can try to choose what part of the Bush legacy they can embrace and what part they can distance themselves from.  If Bush were riding high, we’d see a competition for who could carry the mantle (and a massive effort to court his endorsement).  But the way things are going, it is hard to imagine any Republican trying to stake a claim to be Bush’s “successor” – who would want to carry all his baggage on Iraq, the incompetence of the Katrina response, the massive deficit, the energy crisis, or (for social conservatives) his recent Supreme Court nomination?  This distancing has already begun – and it is not just a McCain thing. 

Many of the Republicans thinking seriously about running in 2008 (including two of the most formidable, George Allen and Sam Brownback) have begun to tack away, and as we get closer to the 2006 midterms, when Republican members of Congress are going to be increasingly worried about reelection and unwilling to defend a lame-duck President, this will only get worse.  Without any Bush heir to defend the legacy – and impose discipline to ensure that the intra-party criticisms don’t ramble out of control -- there is little left to regenerate the President’s political capital.  The only thing that I can think of is the desire not to have him leave office as a universally despised and failed President – but that’s hardly a ringing endorsement or anything a potential Republican candidate would want to run for office on.

For progressives, this means that the next few years present a different kind of challenge.  Rather than simply stand against the incumbent or rail against the status quo – which was the prevailing political dynamic in 2004, and I think still today – progressives must prepare for an opponent that, to a certain degree, will also be running against the old order.  In 1952 both Stevenson and Eisenhower worked to distance themselves from Truman's legacy.  So it won’t be enough to make the next election a referendum on the incumbent – because there won’t be an incumbent or anyone who was part of the prior Administration in the race (no, Condi is not running).  This means, as we’ve often said here at DA, that progressives have to do more than stand against things, and that a political strategy has to be more than just bashing Bush.  We have to have positive ideas about how we are going to move the country forward.

This is especially true when it comes to America’s role in the world and how we are going to meet the global challenges we face.  We not only need to show that we have better ideas – but that we have the creativity, guts, and vision to carry them forward.  And, as Richard Cohen writes today, we can’t allow our anger about the way Bush has governed – and our rush to embrace his critics from within his own party (like Scowcroft) – drive us into positions that move us away from our traditional progressive values (like, for example, standing up for promoting democracy), ceding our idealism to conservatives.

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