Clear, Hold Build: Not So Clear
Posted by Heather Hurlburt
In the last two weeks we've had a few more attempts to put forward explicit strategies for Iraq: Secretary Rice's "clear, hold and build," presented in Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony two weeks ago, and varied proposals for drawdowns from Senators John Kerry and Russ Feingold.
These are all good developments: let the American people understand what it is we think we're doing and what other options might be. So this post is going to ask questions of all of them.
First, Secretary Rice's three-part strategy, "clear, hold and build:"
We know what we must do. With our Iraqi allies, we are working to: Clear the toughest places -- no sanctuaries to the enemy -- and to disrupt foreign support for the insurgents. We are working to hold and steadily enlarge the secure areas, integrating political and economic outreach with our military operations. We are working to build truly national institutions by working with more capable provincial and local authorities. We are challenging them to embody a national compact -- not tools of a particular sect or ethnic group. These Iraqi institutions must sustain security forces, bring rule of law, visibly deliver essential services, and offer the Iraqi people hope for a better economic future.
Let's take this one piece at a time.
Clear: the U.S. military is conducting operations in the "toughest places" -- no argument on that. The casualty figures show it. But for a year now, military sources have been telling reporters that "it doesn't do much good to push them out of these areas only to let them go back to areas we've already cleared." Exhibit A has to be Fallujah. Have we now solved this problem, and if so, how? With Iraqi troops? I'd sure like to know.
Hold: See above. Also, Mike O' Hanlon and Brookings' Iraq Index say that while U.S. casualty rates are holding steady, Iraqi security force and civilian casualties have been high in recent months. Overall rates of insurgent attacks, O' Hanlon writes, are the highest they have been. That doesn't sound to me like a strategy of expanding safe ares militarily is working. And if we have, as military leader and leader has requested, a political strategy to blunt hte insurgency, it's not obvious to me.
Build: If, as the New York Times reports, 93 percent of U.S. reconstruction funds are now committed, but "hundreds of millions" are needed to complete and maintain what has been done, according to the special Inspector-General for Iraq reconstruction, exactly what are we "building" with?
Perhaps the upcoming parliamentary elections count as building "truly national institutions." It's hard to portray the flawed constitutional process as that. Is the constitution the "national compact" that we are "challenging" Iraqi leaders to embody? If not, what is the national compact that Sunnies, Shiites and Kurds all buy into, the one that will help de-fang the insurgents? If it doesn't exist yet, are we helping it come into being, and have we figured out a more effective way to "help" than we displayed in the constitution-drafting process?
So I'd like to ask Secretary Rice to come back and explain how we are really carrying out this strategy.
Now, to complete the bipartisan gloom, I have some questions for Senator Kerry as well. He said last week:
The way forward in Iraq is not to pull out precipitously or merely compromise to stay "as long as it takes." To undermine the insurgency, we must instead simultaneously pursue both a political settlement and the withdrawal of American combat forces linked to specific, responsible benchmarks. At the first benchmark, the completion of the December elections, we can start the process of reducing our forces by withdrawing 20,000 troops over the course of the holidays.
20,000, by the way, is one division. I looked and looked for some rationale on why one division and some explicit reasoning on why we can/should expect that the challenges the day after the elections will be 20,000 troops easier than they were the day before. (Assuming, of course, that we're not putting 20,000 extra troops in to police the elections and then just taking them out again.)
Mind you, I think there are reasonable arguments for both of these positions. In the best possible scenario, the elections are a resounding victory for Sunni political participation and drive a much stronger wedge between insurgent leaders and average Sunnis. This then leads to a sharp redution in insurgent recuritment and violence -- though I don't think it happens overnight. Maybe Kerry reckons the rate of progress in Iraqi military training allows for a 20,000 troop pullout by the end of the year. Smart people I know and lke advise Kerry on these issues, and I'm sure they were considered.
I can see -- maybe -- a rhetorical or polling-based arguemtn about not cluttering up an elegant, simple, understandable policy in a speech text. But surely there should have been some substantive stuff for the press, at minimum, to show that Kerry is thinking about the complexities and grasps the military and strategic concerns. Whigh God knows he does.
And while I'm at it, Senator Feingold, why is December 31, 2006 your magic number?
What are we doing that takes exactly 14 months to accomplish?
I know, I know, all of these folks are trying -- and I see all three statements as significant progress in letting Americans understand and judge exactly what it is we think we are doing in Iraq. But as I said last week, we are very short of hard facts. We need to be sure we know where our assumptions came from -- so we know when we need to change them. And progressives above all need to show that we are deploying facts and military experience wisely and strategically, not cynically and for short-term political advantage.