New START Daily Wrap: Day 2 Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

Military leaders continued to express support for prompt ratification.  Today the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright, dismissed GOP attempts to delay New START and urged prompt ratification of the treaty at a White House press conference, insisting, “We need START, and we need it badly.”

Sen. Isakson appeared to break with Sen. Kyl, suggesting that the junior senator from Arizona is becoming increasingly isolated.  Sen. Isakson made an emboldened defense of the treaty and stressed the need to reinstate the verification regime, saying, "I went through interviews with Sam Nunn, listened to the chairman and the ranking member, listened to the testimony, read the documentation which everybody else can read, in the secure briefing room, I came to the conclusion that verification is better than no verification at all. Transparency is what prevents things like 9/11 from ever happening again.”

Republicans wasted time, failed to offer amendments to treaty.  Sen. John Kerry opened debate on New START with repeated calls for amendments. After Republicans failed to offer a single amendment, Sen. Kerry called out his Republican colleagues who were wasting time, saying, “We're ready to vote on the treaty. The only thing we're waiting for are the people who say we don't have time.”

The Afghan Strategy Review That Wasn't Posted by Michael Cohen

So I just got done reading the White House's Afghan Strategy Review and it is as depressing as it is unserious.  In general, this is a report intended more for public consumption than a serious reading of the situation in Afghanistan; and frankly its goal is more to deceive the public than to level with it. (Considering that now 60 percent of Americans believe the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting it's not difficult understand the White House's motivation).

Reading this review one would not know that Afghan governance remains a serious obstacle to this US strategy, relations with the Karzai government are badly frayed, training of the ANSF and Police is showing, at best, halting progress, the Taliban have made significant inroads into Northern Afghanistan, in effect nationalizing the insurgency and as Rajiv pointed out the other day, the tactical gains that the US has made are a result of overwhelming US military power that is likely not sustainable or able to be replicated across the country.

These are all serious impediments to the achievement of US goals in Afghanistan and they go unmentioned in the review. Consider this paragraph:

While the momentum achieved by the Taliban in recent years has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in some key areas, these gains remain fragile and reversible. Consolidating those gains will require that we make more progress with Pakistan to eliminate sanctuaries for violent extremist networks.

Unmentioned here is that in Northern Afghanistan and elsewhere the security situation has significantly worsened or even that in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan while security in places where US troops are located has gotten better, overall civilian casualties and American military deaths have jumped significantly. 

On the subject of Afghan Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan yes more progress needs to be made in dealing with them, but unmentioned in the report is any sense of how that might happen. I see no reason to believe that Pakistan is on the verge of dealing with this problem and if the White House does, it's not saying.

Now I obviously get the fact that the White House wants to put a positive spin on things, but this report presents the American people with a completely one-sided - military-centric - view of the situation in Afghanistan that highlights the halting tactical successes and largely ignored the strategic roadblocks that are undermining US policy objectives. This, to put it bluntly, is not change I can believe in.

Moreover, the report's focus on Pakistan is telling - the report is certainly correct in suggesting that additional pressure is being put on al Qaeda in Pakistan, but what any of this has to do with the war in Afghanistan is not clear. None of the gains made in Pakistan have much of anything to do with the war in Afghanistan - and they could just as easily be accomplished with a smaller military footprint on par to what Vice President Biden was suggesting last year. If anything, the large US troop presence is probably roiling US-Pakistan relations as much as it is helping them. 

Nowhere in the report is a larger explanation for how the giant US presence in Afghanistan is furthering US national security or frankly is necessary to uphold these interests. 

When I read this report I see an Administration searching fitfully for a way to argue progress is being made in Afghanistan and justify a continued US presence and the President's decision to escalate the war- against a lot of evidence to the contrary.

In other words what I see here to coin a phrase from the 2008 campaign is, more of the same.

 

New START Myths Debunked, Missile Defense Edition Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

As the Senate moves to offer the advice and consent of Congress, legislators need to distinguish between dangerous myths and reality.  Here are the facts:

Myth:  New START limits our ability to deploy missile defenses.

Reality: New START preserves our ability to deploy effective missile defenses.  New START does not limit U.S. missile defense systems or in any way diminish our ability to protect and defend our allies.  Our leading uniformed officers have repeatedly stressed that New START does not constrain the missile defense plans of the United States.  In fact, the U.S. now has the freedom to conduct certain tests that were limited by the previous START agreement. 

Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A. Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger and Colin L. Powell:  “The testimonies of our military commanders and civilian leaders make clear that the treaty does not limit U.S. missile defense plans. Although the treaty prohibits the conversion of existing launchers for intercontinental and submarine-based ballistic missiles, our military leaders say they do not want to do that because it is more expensive and less effective than building new ones for defense purposes.” [Kissinger, Shultz, Baker, Eagleburger and Powell, 12/2/10]

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates: “The treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible nor impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses.” [Sec. Gates, 6/17/10]

Reality:  It is quicker and less costly to construct new launchers for U.S. missile defense systems.   The U.S. has no plans or desire to convert additional ICBM silos into missile defense interceptors, or vice versa.   Article V, paragraph 3 grandfathers in the five ICBM silos at Vandenberg AFB that were converted into missile defense interceptors and prohibits these sites from being inspected by the Russians.  As Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly testified, it costs $20 million less to build new Ground-Based Interceptors.  Gen. O’Reilly further concluded that converting ICBM or SLBM launchers would not be “prudent or operationally effective.” [Lt. Gen. O'Reilly, 6/16/10]

Myth: A unilateral statement by Russia will allow Russia to veto U.S. missile defense.

Reality: Unilateral statements are not legally binding. Such statements have accompanied treaties for years and do not affect the bounds of the treaty. As Sen. Lugar has explained, because the missile-defense statements are outside the main text, “they are in essence editorial opinions.” As the administration has explained, "The Russian government made a statement about missile defense with which the United States did not, and does not, agree.  If we had agreed to it, the issue would be put into the treaty text, or issued as a "joint" statement.  In fact, the United States issued its own unilateral statement, indicating that it plans to continue to develop and deploy its missile defense systems in order to defend itself.  Neither the Russian statement nor the U.S. statement is legally binding on the other party.  But each side is making its intentions clear -- to the other party, and to the world."  [Sen. Lugar, 3/24/10. White House, 4/8/10]

Myth:  The treaty's preamble ties the hands of the U.S. and limits our missile defense options.

Reality:  Perambulatory language is merely a statement of fact.  As in previous U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control agreements, New START contains perambulatory language that acknowledges the “the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.”  This is a matter of reality, not a limit.

New START Daily Wrap: Day 1 Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

Key procedural vote on New START passes strongly.  The final vote count was 66-32, which represents a two-thirds majority of the 98 senators who were present-enough to ratify the agreement, and far more than the 51 votes that were required to begin debate.  Nine Republican senators -- John McCain, Lindsey Graham, Robert Bennett, Lisa Murkowski, Scott Brown, George Voinovich, Susan Collins, Olympia Snowe and Richard Lugar - all voted to bring New START to the Senate floor.
 
Delay tactics unsuccessful.  Sen. DeMint called off his threat to force the Senate to read the entire treaty out loud after the White House rebuked him, saying "This is a new low in putting political stunts ahead of our national security, and it is exactly the kind of Washington game-playing that the American people are sick of."
 
Echoing Brig. Gen. John Adams, Majority Leader Harry Reid blasted Senators Kyl and DeMint after they suggested working into Christmas week was offensive to Christians.  As Brig. Gen. John Adams said, "We have one-hundred-and-fifty-thousand US warriors doing their job over Christmas and the New Year; the U.S. Senate should do its job - and ratify this treaty." Sen. Reid denounced the duo, saying, "People who are lucky enough to have a job in these trying times need to work extra hours to make ends meet. So it's offensive to me and millions of working Americans across this country for any senator to suggest that working through the Christmas holidays is somehow sack sacrilegious. If they decide to work with us, we can all have a happy holiday. If they don't, we're going to continue until we finish the people's business." 
 
Looking ahead, tomorrow's threatened attempts to kill the treaty by amending the preamble are stunts that can be easily defeated.  As our military leaders have explained, the perambulatory language is merely a statement of fact and in no way inhibits U.S. missile defense plans.

Kyl: Doing My Job Would Be Offensive to Christians Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

About a month ago, Sen. Lugar (R-IN) sharply rebuked members of his own party for attempting to delay the ratification process for New START.  "Every senator has an obligation in the national security interest to take a stand, to do his or her duty. Maybe people would prefer not to do his or her duty right now," he said. "Sometimes when you prefer not to vote, you attempt to find reasons not to vote."

Jon Kyl’s latest excuse to delay?  Working would be offensive to Christians.

"It is impossible to do all of the things that the majority leader laid out," Kyl said today, "frankly, without disrespecting the institution and without disrespecting one of the two holiest of holidays for Christians and the families of all of the Senate, not just the senators themselves but all of the staff."

New START is a matter of national security.  Every day, the men and women who defend our country do their job.  Jon Kyl and his fellow Republicans should consider doing theirs. 

As Brig. Gen. John Adams explained on Dec. 13th: 

“We have one-hundred-and-fifty-thousand US warriors doing their job over Christmas and the New Year, the U.S. Senate should do its job – and ratify this treaty.”

The Emerging Consensus on Afghanistan Posted by The Editors

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Paul Eaton and DA's own Heather Hurlburt have written an op-ed in Politico laying out eight points of agreement that constitute a growing consensus on the way forward in Afghanistan. Basically, if the think tank community had done an interagency review, here's what it would have looked like:

As the Obama administration prepares to release its third strategy review of the war in Afghanistan, discussion of U.S. policy focuses on three conflicts. First, the actual military campaign against Afghan and Pakistani insurgents. Second, the political jockeying among Afghan President Hamid Karzai, his countrymen and international groups attempting to get a handle on massive corruption and poor governance. And third, the Washington shadowboxing between factions supporting “double down” or “out now.” 

Meanwhile, a growing progressive-realist-centrist axis of agreement has emerged. This fall, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for American Progress, the Afghanistan Study Group and theCenter for a New American Security all issued reports on Afghanistan that share a stunning amount of agreement. As a group, they offer a way forward that could be effective, affordable and sustainable.

Read the whole thing here.

Richard Holbrooke: A Memory and A Charge Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Before he went into the Obama Administration, Richard Holbrooke served on NSN's advisory board.  He is already being remembered as a brilliant diplomat and a larger-than-life figure.  We had the chance to see him in a rather different light -- as mentor and guide to those who came behind him, something I also saw in his outreach to foreign policy students at Brown University, where he was an active alumni presence while I was an undergrad research assistant in the late 1980s.

One day in mid-2008, he paid a visit to NSN's offices.  Let's just say that we haven't received too many Secretary-of-State hopefuls in our little warren.  He strolled magesterially into one office where three very young staffers were clustered around the computer.  (A side note:  two are now in Administration jobs, and a third is rumored to be headed that way imminently.)  What are you working on, he asked.  Oh, we're coming up with a policy for Afghanistan, my confident team of millenials replied.

Having seen both the brilliant and the savage sides of Holbrooke during the Clinton Administration, I winced and ducked for the door.  But Holbrooke was urbane.  "Oh, really?  When were you last there?"

Embarrassed silence from my team.

"No, really, how much time have you spent there?"

"Umm, none" someone finally said.

"Well, I just got back, and..." was the opening to a masterful ten-minute diagnosis of all that was wrong in the region, and that years of neglect in favor of Iraq had done to worsen the political and military situation.  After about the second minute, all you could hear was the frantic scratching in notebooks.  People from other offices gathered round to listen.

Two weeks ago, I spoke to someone who'd briefed Holbrooke's team, and commented on their courage and determination in keeping going even when they didn't necessarily have the resources or attention or priority they needed to create the civilians-first vision of Afghanistan that many of us hoped for.  That, too, is a credit to him.

In so many ways, Holbrooke personified 50 years of American foreign policy, and 50 years of struggle, failed as often as not, to use our brains as often or as well as our brawn.  He never gave up.

 

Rooting for Dick Holbrooke Posted by David Shorr

Democracy Arsenal being what it is -- and with the founding mother who started it off -- if DA was capable of having sentiments of its own, it would really be pulling for Ambassador Holbrooke to pull through. In fact, counting on him to do so.

China's Nobel Ceremony Loyalty Test Posted by David Shorr

A good post from Mark Lagon on China's reaction to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to dissident Liu Xiaobo, and particularly what it means for China's international image. As Mark notes, there was a lot of potent symbolism in Oslo in terms of who was absent from today's award ceremony.

The ceremony was noteworthy for its empty seats, especially those for Liu himself or any relative to be permitted by the winner's country to travel to Oslo to receive the award (the first time since Nazi Germany prevented a dissident from attending to receive his prize in 1936).

Symbolism matters in the responses of other world leaders too. So the empty seats at today's ceremony, reportedly including those of representatives from U.S. allies Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, speak volumes.

What Lagon alludes to is the diplomatic full-court press Beijing mounted in an attempt to persuade other governments to boycott the ceremony. It's worth emphasizing how this international bullying compounds the prior infractions of Liu's imprisonment and the travel ban on his family. Chinese leaders have only underscored rather than reduced their legitimacy problem.

In fact, I'd say there's an axiom of international legitimacy in this episode. When a powerful nation appeals for support on the basis of testing others' loyalty, it has already conceded the weakness of its case. If your argument is that you're verifying who are your real friends, you're only telegraphing that in the court of world opinion, your influence is made of very brittle stuff.

How Afghanistan Is Like The Ex-Girlfriend That Broke Your Heart Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at abumuqawama, Andrew Exum has just returned from Afghanistan and in his trip report he makes a rather startling discovery

"We have two "Achilles heels" in the current strategy: Afghan governance and insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan."

Huh, you don't say? Calling these two Achilles heels is a bit like asking Mrs. Lincoln,"other than that how was the play?"

Moreover, while these are two of the Achilles heels in our mission in Afghanistan, I would add two more - lack of an effective military and police force as well as a coherent justice system. But these two are insurmountable enough that they are a useful jumping off point for a discussion.

Indeed, Exum follows up on this declaration by making the following depressing statement, "I'm going to be honest and say that I do not see a coherent or otherwise effective strategy for dealing with the sanctuaries in Pakistan."

Couldn't agree more. But here's the problem, Exum is the author of a new report that makes the following recommendation to the US government

"The United States should use greater political,military and economic leverage over its allies in Pakistan to drive more aggressive action against violent extremist organizations in the region." And the report also says this, "The United States must now take a tougher stand with Pakistan – if necessary, in public."

Huh? Why exactly do we think this would be successful when for the past, not two years, but 8 years, we've never been successful in putting pressure on Pakistan to do this. The only times Pakistan has acted against extremist organizations is when they've threatened the Pakistani state (and then only begrudgingly). In other words Pakistan acts against extremist groups when they feel it is in their best interest - not when the US pressures them. The only possible exception being September 2001 - and that is a rather limited, pretty hedged exception.

Only compounding the confusion is that while there is a recognition above that governance in Afghanistan is a major problem the other key political recommendation of Responsible Transition is  . . . . to improve governance in Afghanistan.

Now granted the CNAS solution is to focus on local governance rather than top down governance, but why would that be any easier to carry out? In fact, wouldn't trying to improve local governance be demonstratively more difficult and require a longer trajectory? At the very least it requires a level of sophistication in US operations in Afghanistan that we've basically never witnessed.

So to sum up: governance and Pakistan support for insurgents are huge problems; they don't lend themselves to easy or quick fixes (or maybe any fix at all) . . .

. . . but going forward, with the political clock ticking, let's focus on governance and eroding Pakistani support for Taliban insurgents.

Sometimes when I read this stuff I feel like Afghanistan is like an ex-girlfriend that broke up with you. You're still really in love with her, but she has clearly moved on and you keep coming up with ways to win her back, and maybe for a brief time you patch things up . . . but in the end she kicks you to the road because she just really doesn't think you're the one. So instead of moving on to greener pastures, you keep trying to convince her that she made a huge mistake all the while failing to recognize reality.

Yup, that's my analogy for Afghanistan! We keep thinking of new ways and new ideas to try and do something that simply can't be done there. But instead of recognizing that our new ideas and ways aren't going to work; that Afghanistan really isn't interested in reforming its governance structure, that Pakistan really doesn't want to crack down on Afghan Taliban safe havens we keep hoping against hope that maybe the next time will be different.

Or we come up with a few discrete examples of tactical progress: "things in the Arghandab River Valley are really looking up;" "we're getting really good at COIN," but that have absolutely nothing to do with the obvious strategic roadblocks that are preventing us from making progress.

As Andrew points, "if you are winning "tactically" but losing "strategically," you are ... losing."

Exactly. So that means you should change the strategy and yet for some reason this sort of connection never seems to get made. We keep trying to fix problems that clearly can't be fixed and that have never lent themselves to US-led solutions in the outside hope that again "this time will be different."

At some point you just have to realize that Afghanistan is really not that into you.