With Civilian Agencies Like These . . . Posted by Michael Cohen

I like the State Department; I really do. I used to work there in the 1990s and even though it has corridors that feel like you're in an intensive care unit, it's impossible to get to via public transportation, there are no good places to eat lunch or even get a good cup of coffee nearby and the people who worked there regularly wore short-sleeve dress shirts . . . I have a soft spot in my heart for old Foggy Bottom. But having said that, it's becoming increasingly clear that the State Department as an institution has become so beaten down that it's simply not serving the needs of the American people as effectively as it should. Case in point, this new report, courtesy of the New York Times, from the State Department Inspector General on the agency's failures in counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan:

“The department has not clarified an end state for counternarcotics efforts, engaged in long-term planning, or established performance measures,” 

Well that can't be good. But there's more:

Among other things, the report found that the military and civilian lacked clear delineation of roles; that civilian contracts for counternarcotics work were poorly written and supervised from thousands of miles and many time zones away; and that the United States embassies in Afghanistan and Pakistan did not coordinate well on the problem.

Poor contract supervision and oversight; lack of coordination between not only the military and civilian agencies, but even amongst civilian agencies. Jeez, where have I written that before. I don't mean this to be an indictment of the fine men and women who work at the State Department, but they simply lack the capacity and resources to take on a job as ambitious as the nation building exercise that we are trying to execute in Afghanistan.

For all of the President's glowing words at West Point we continue to see more and more evidence that the United States mission lacks the right partners, the right civilian resources and even the right approach for effectively fighting a counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. My only question is at what point will this reality become evident to policymakers; and by the time it does will we be able to change course?

 

Copenhagen and the Future of International Cooperation Posted by David Shorr

Over at RealClearWorld's The Compass blog, Greg Scoblete weaves together thoughts from Les Gelb, Walter Russell Mead, and himself to glean what the Copenhagen summit tells us about the prospects and limits of future international cooperation. While Gelb and Mead give astute analyses of the dynamics between different players and blocs at the summit itself, Scoblete's own piece from back in July does an especially good job at juxtaposing the hopes and ambitions of the Obama administration against the diplomatic messiness of trying to get things done:

Time and time again, the vision of America rallying the world to confront common dangers blurs into the less-than-thrilling reality of a world with more important things to do. This should not surprise anyone. During the Cold War, when U.S. leadership was arguably at its apex, even allied nations (most famously France) bucked America's will. While the Obama administration has sought to paint the 21st century's threats in menacing terms, climate change and nuclear proliferation haven't quite sharpened as many minds as the Red Army.

This, then, is the terminus of America's global leadership. If the U.S. proceeds along the course set by the Obama administration and defines leadership as the ability to bring other nations along its preferred path, then they should be prepared to define success down. "Solving" the world's problems, as Secretary Clinton suggested, is altogether a bridge too far. Instead, finding a globally acceptable, lowest-common-denominator outcome will be the order of the day (and even that won't be easy).

This captures the dynamic quite nicely. It's not that other nations necessarily have sharply divergent interests or are fundamentally at cross purposes with us. They're at least faintly aware of common global interests -- enough to be dragged along, if not serve as full problem-solving partners. Scoblete is correct that appeals to urgency have yet to concentrate the minds of others, and yet I'm reluctant to "define success down." On the one hand, the lowest common denominator could yield slow and steady progress, as Greg predicts; on the other hand, the price of watering down our collective responses could be steps that fall short of alleviating the problems at hand.

Whither US Commitment to Human Rights Posted by David Shorr

Given the worries from Shadi and others over President Obama's commitment to democracy and human rights, it's very helpful to have Ted Piccone's analysis in Global Post of the emerging policy. Ted takes as his text both the president's Nobel speech and Secretary Clinton's recent speech on human rights at Georgetown. In their tone and the way they capture the genuine foreign policy dilemmas of human rights, Ted says they got it just right.

But I was even more interested in his description of the day-to-day challenges of executing such an approach:

...it means that solutions to the inevitable conflicts between human rights principles and hard national security interests will be hatched on a case-by-case basis, with an open willingness to try new approaches when old tactics fall short. This is wise, given that the political context in each country is unique and requires tailored strategies. This means our diplomats in embassies around the world really need to do their homework and get out of their secure compounds and cocktail receptions. It also means a much more well-resourced development policy with a fortified battery of analysts, practitioners and aid experts who can sustain the long-term work of investing in legal reforms and strengthening civil society.

A wise and pragmatic policy indeed requires not only hard decisions but hard work -- particularly when you measure success in terms of the rights actual people can actually exercise. This is the walk-and-chew-gum problem; or as Secretary Clinton more eloquently put it in another speech: the need "to deal with the urgent, the important, and the long-term all at once." This is really important, and I hope the QDDR explains how we will rise to this challenge.

The Coalition's Coalition Posted by Patrick Barry

When will General McChrystal know that he has achieved optimal coordination of all the countries under the NATO-ISAF umbrella? How about when the dudes in the French Foreign Legion are on the same page as the rest of his command?

"The result is one of the fiercest units in Nato’s arsenal. But their current mission, much to the soldiers’ frustration, is to befriend the population, not fight them. 'Most guys here are looking for a gunfight — we’re looking for a war,' said James. 'It doesn’t matter who’s war, or for what reason.'"

Apparently Michael isn't the only one looking to get out of the COIN game.

Read the Whole Sentence Posted by James Lamond

Today, Bill Gertz at the Washington Times writes:

All 40 Republican senators and one independent wrote to President Obama on Wednesday reminding him that the current defense authorization law links modernization of the aging U.S. nuclear arsenal to further U.S.-Russian arms reductions.

The law applies to the not-yet-finished successor to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expired on Dec. 16.

The 41 senators - enough to block formal ratification of a new treaty, which requires 67 votes - stated in the letter that they agree with the defense legislation's language that says modernizing the aging U.S. nuclear stockpile is critical to further U.S.-Russian arms cuts.

"In fact, we don't believe further reductions can be in the national security interest of the U.S. in the absence of a significant program to modernize our nuclear deterrent," the senators stated.
A Republican Senate aide said the letter is intended to put the White House on notice that formal ratification of a new START accord must include specific plans and funding for upgrading U.S. nuclear weapons outlined in Section 1251 of the Democrat-drafted 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, which was signed into law by Mr. Obama on Oct. 28.

The problem? The Defense Authorization Bill only says that if you move the end of the sentence up one word.  The actual language from the bill reads says, “modernization of the nuclear weapons complex” and “modernizing the infrastructure.” The original language in the bill can be seen here (PDF) on page 394.

Jon Kyl and some neocons have been sounding alarm bells about the need for "modernizing" the nuclear arsenal for a while.  But modernization of nuclear weapons, simply means more, newer, nuclear weapons.  What the bill calls for in terms of midernization is for the nuclear complex and infrastructure, meaning better and newer labs, workforces, and facilities –not more weapons.  

The Middle East and the 'Paradox of Engagement' Posted by Shadi Hamid

A new article of mine on Obama's Middle East strategy has just come out in Democracy: A Journal of Ideas. You can read it here (or in pdf). It looks at the internal contradictions inherent in any policy of "engagement" with the Arab world: how do you appeal to Arab regimes and Arab publics simultaneously? It then proposes what I call a “re-orientation” in U.S. policy based around two policy "pillars": positive conditionality and targeted Islamist engagement.

Among other things, I argue the following:

1. The Obama administration decided to make the pursuit of Arab-Israeli policy a centerpiece of its Middle East policy. According to this approach, once the conflict is satisfactorily resolved, a refashioned relationship with the people of the region will be possible. This assumption is not necessarily problematic. However, believing that a resolution to the conflict is the missing piece may lead us to attribute greater importance to the peace process than is appropriate.

2. America needs - or thinks it needs - Egypt’s help on Israeli-Palestinian peace. The more it needs Mubarak to play a leadership role there, the more unwilling it will be to put pressure on his regime to democratize: This is the paradox of engagement.

3. The pursuit of peace has often come at the expense of Arab democracy, but does it have to be this way? In understanding how to balance competing priorities – by promoting democracy without prejudicing key U.S. interests – there is little history to draw on because, with only one real exception, the U.S. has never made a serious effort to support Middle East democracy. 

4. That one exception is the Bush administration circa 2004-5. Beyond rhetoric, symbolic gestures, and relatively small increases in democracy funding, the Bush administration did not do much. Yet, even a relatively small amount of pressure can go a long way. And it did. This brief period of pressure demonstrates that pressuring friendly regimes to democratize does not necessarily harm our strategic interests. When Bush put pressure on Cairo to reform, Mubarak did not withhold cooperation on key American concerns. 

Taking all of this into account, how can the Obama administration "re-orient" its policy toward the region, and what would that look like in practice? To find out, you'll have to, as they say, read the whole thing here.

With Allies Like These . . . Pt. 4 Posted by Michael Cohen

You know, it's getting to the point where I could write one of these every day. In the latest installment of "With Allies Like These," comes words - via the New York Times - that the Pakistani government is not a big fan of the United States these days.

Parts of the Pakistani military and intelligence services are mounting what American officials here describe as a campaign to harass American diplomats, fraying relations at a critical moment when the Obama administration is demanding more help to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda

The campaign includes the refusal to extend or approve visas for more than 100 American officials and the frequent searches of American diplomatic vehicles in major cities, said an American official briefed on the cases.

The problems affected military attachés, CIA officers, development experts, junior level diplomats and others, a senior American diplomat said. As a result, some American aid programs to Pakistan, which President Obama has called a critical ally, are “grinding to a halt,” the diplomat said.

What the Whiskey Tango Foxtrot is going on here? This is our key ally in the fight in Afghanistan; this the country that we are nominally in Afghanistan to ensure doesn't de-stabilize; this is the country that is the newly minted recipient of $7.5 billion in US foreign assistance.

And it doesn't appear that the Pakistanis feel particularly chastened by their behavior:

Pakistani officials acknowledged the situation but said the menacing atmosphere resulted from American arrogance and provocations, like taking photographs in sensitive areas, and a lack of understanding of how divided Pakistanis were about the alliance with the United States.

The harassment has grown so frequent that American officials said they viewed it as a concerted effort by parts of the military and intelligence services that had grown resentful of American demands to step up the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Though the United States has been sending large amounts of military assistance to the Pakistani Army, and helping its premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, the campaign shows the ambivalence, even “hatred” toward the United States in those quarters, the American official said.

A Pakistani security official, who has kept a tally of many of the incidents, was not sympathetic, saying the Americans had brought on the problems.“Unfortunately, the Americans are arrogant,” the Pakistani security official said. “They think of themselves as omnipotent. That’s how they come across.”

This is the country of which President Obama said the United States is "committed to a partnership . . . that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect and mutual trust. As my friends across the pond would say, "Bollocks!"

I hate to say this, but the gap between what President Obama sketched out in his West Point speech two weeks ago and what is happening on the ground in Af/Pak seems to grow wider every single day.

Retrospective Justifications for Controversial Wars, Part II Posted by Shadi Hamid

Spencer Ackerman and Eric Martin both strongly object to my post on “retrospective justifications” for the Iraq war, and call attention to one sentence in particular: “I think it’s undoubtedly true that Iraq – and the Middle East – is better off now than it was under Saddam and than it would have been had Saddam not been removed from power,” which, granted, could have been worded differently. Spencer:

Shadi says he wants to engage in a thought experiment about what would make the war retroactively justified. Yet he lists precisely none of these relevant considerations in his post. This is neither history nor philosophy. It’s blithe indifference to the overwhelming human costs of war masquerading as concern for human rights.

And when Eric Martin started off by saying that he “enjoy[s] immensely” my work, I knew that I was in for some trouble. He says I “whistle past one enormous and awe-inspiring graveyard” and “elide the enormous human tragedy" and later says that I am "unrepentant" (Hmm. I was against the war all the way through, so I'm not sure what it is I have to repent for).

Unfortunately, Spencer and Eric both seem to misunderstand the whole point of my post, which was that even though Iraq and Iraqis are better off now than under Saddam, this does not justify the war. Saying that Iraqis are better off is not the same thing as saying the war was justified, and it is precisely this “conundrum” that provokes a number of interesting questions, both philosophical and practical, about how we conceive the “just war.”

Many progressives, including those in the blogosphere, initially supported the war and, to their credit, admitted early on that they were wrong; their position evolved as they saw the horrors of war. It evolved precisely because they saw the consequences – tens of thousands of lives lost, untold destruction, and the pernicious effects the war had on our other interests in the region. So, the consequences are what caused many proponents of the war to turn against it.

But what if the consequences had been different? What if there was minimal loss of life; what if sectarian violence had remained limited; what if the transition to self-government had happened relatively smoothly, with the support of the vast majority of Iraqis; what if AQI never gained a foothold; and, finally, what if the insurgency never happened? Would they have turned to opposing the war, or would they have continued to support it? This is, and was, the problem with consequentialist (and retrospective) arguments against the war. They were based, too often, not on the war itself, but on what the war had become, but to oppose the latter is not necessarily to oppose the former.  

With Allies Like These . . . Pt. 3 Posted by Michael Cohen

My apologies for beating a dead horse, but today in the Wall Street Journal comes further confirmation that the Pakistanis have no real interest in going after the Quetta Shura or any other Afghan Taliban safe havens in Pakistan:

The success of the U.S. surge in Afghanistan hinges, to a significant extent, on whether U.S. officials can persuade Pakistan to crack down on Afghan insurgents on its side of the border, senior U.S. officials said.

But while the U.S. is stepping up pressure on Pakistan to widen the scope of an offensive against the Taliban, Pakistani officials say the militants attacking their own people must be their primary focus.

This point is bolstered by similar report in the Washington Post and McClatchy. This whole discussion reminds me in part of some of the discussion BWP (Before West Point) about how the US needed to stay in Afghanistan in order to steady the Pakistanis hand - and provide support - for their fight against jihadist terror. Well the Pakistanis seem quite interested in going after Pakistan Taliban who continue to wreak havoc in their country. The Afghan Taliban who wreak havoc in another country. Not so much. For some reason people seem to be forgetting the fact that the Pakistanis have agency here - and just like the US they are able to assess their national security interests and act accordingly (actually you could say they do a far better job of it than the United States does).

For the past two months, Pakistan's military has been driving against the Pakistan Taliban -- an offshoot of the Afghan movement -- in the tribal area of South Waziristan, in what U.S. officials describe as a welcome campaign. Afghan Taliban havens in Pakistan's northwestern tribal areas and southwestern province of Baluchistan haven't been attacked.

With those sanctuaries intact, "our fear is that no matter how many boots we put on the ground [in Afghanistan], the enemy still has a place from where it can regroup, rearm and strategize," said a senior U.S. military commander overseeing operations in Afghanistan.

But Pakistan so far has no plans to move against Afghan Taliban havens in its territory.

Pakistani officials say their first priority is to consolidate control in South Waziristan -- and that doing so will weaken the Afghan Taliban taking refuge in neighboring areas.

They also fear the U.S. surge could further destabilize Pakistan by angering the 27 million ethnic Pashtuns who straddle the border. The Taliban is overwhelmingly a Pashtun movement.

"The U.S. wants the Pakistani military to fight all Taliban factions ... without an understanding of the ground reality," complained a senior Pakistani military official.

Yes and the 'ground reality' is that the Pakistani government views the Pakistan Taliban as an existential threat; it views the Afghan Taliban as a strategic asset. I give the Obama Administration all the credit in the world for pushing the Pakistanis on this issue, but the resistance we're getting should tell us something about the possibilities of success in Afghanistan. If the Pakistanis don't move against the Afghan Taliban safe havens this whole thing isn't going to work. But look don't believe me - believe David Petraeus:

(To make) the really significant progress in Afghanistan that will be necessary over time... it would be very helpful if additional pressure could be put (by Pakistan) on the leadership of the elements that are causing problems in Afghanistan"

A Dissent on Obama's Nobel Speech Posted by Shadi Hamid

To my surprise, I found myself feeling quite uncomfortable during certain sections of Obama’s Nobel speech. It included the kind of soaring rhetoric I generally have a weakness for, but, this time around, that was precisely the problem. Maybe it was a great speech for Americans and perhaps it was a greater speech for American progressives, as Jim Arkedis' post on Progressive Fix suggests.

But how we see ourselves is not how others see us. When react we positively to a speech like this, we are speaking from the distinct perspective of Americans, but this was a speech addressed to the world, to those have been on the receiving end of U.S. policies.

When an American president speaks to an international audience and proclaims us a force for good, others are more likely to either shrug or, worse, to have experiences so divergent from this particular characterization that the comment doesn’t even begin to register. I may agree that the U.S. is a force for good, but just because I want it to be so doesn’t mean that it has been and, even less, that others will believe it for themselves.

Take for example this part of the speech:

The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans. We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest -- because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.

In a recent article, I wrote the following in regards to Arab perceptions of us and I think it’s relevant here:

Too many Arabs and Muslims hold the inverse of America’s opinion of itself: It is not a force for good, or even a burdened, yet flawed, protector of the international system, but rather an actor that has worked, in remarkably consistent fashion, to suppress and subjugate the people of the region.

Are Arabs and Muslims – or to a lesser extent Latin Americans and Europeans – justified in thinking this? It doesn’t matter. This is what they think. For them, that is the reality. So when Obama says something like “no matter how callously defined, neither America’s interests – nor the world’s – are served by the denial of human aspirations,” I like it and I want to hear more of it. It actually reminds me of Bush’s early 2005 speeches, and I mean that as a compliment, because they were great speeches (at least in written form) that promised a move away from our longstanding policy of unquestioning support for Arab dictators.

But Bush’s rhetoric introduced a cognitive dissonance that became so blatant that the whole edifice crumbled. I'm all for soaring rhetoric on human rights and democracy, and fashioning a more just international system, but only if we’re willing to back it up with real policy changes on the ground. And clearly we're not. There were quite a few lines in Obama's Nobel speech about standing by those who fight for freedom, and the importance of human rights, but Obama's Mid-east policy (after the almost pitch-perfect Cairo speech) has downgraded democracy on the list of priorities - and as others have argued, this de-prioritization of democracy has extended to other regions. For me, in listening to the Nobel speech, the dissonance was similarly striking and I imagine a lot of non-Americans were reading certain parts of the speech and wondering if the America Obama was speaking about bore any resemblance to the reality as they - not we - understand it.

UPDATE: Greg Scoblete at RealClearWorld responds.