We Interrupt This Optimism... Posted by David Shorr

Until recently, I have maintained an attitude of resolute optimism about the myriad challenges of today's world. I told myself, that in trying times, politicians around the globe will surely summon their inner statesmen and women and commit themselves to the arduous search for solutions. A more complex world of dispersed power requires new styles of leadership, and the dynamism in the American cultural DNA will help us develop them, in cooperation with others.

Because this is our only hope, I have no alternative but to remain in touch with my inner optimist. So consider this post a pessimistic interlude -- a release valve for darker thoughts, maybe worthwhile if only to remind us what's at stake. In other words, what if we tried to build an international community, and nobody came? I love how people in other countries feel so great about President Obama. It's not clear, though, that they understand how dependent his success is on their help. One of the distinguishing features of Obama's campaign was the prominent use of the first person plural; he ran on a platform on what we needed to do, because he couldn't do them on his own. In the international realm, unless Obama's calls for help are met with greater responsiveness, the Nobel prize really will be a poison chalice. Here's what I mean...

Your Sobering National Security Thought for the Day Posted by Michael Cohen

Sometimes it's worth putting American foreign policy - and the military decisions we have made and continue to make since 9/11 - in a proper and sobering context.

Eight years and two months since America was attacked on September 11th, and 3,000 Americans were killed, the United States has approximately 168,000 soldiers stationed in two Muslim counties, In neither of these countries is there any al Qaeda presence - and there has not been any such presence since 2002. Indeed, since the fall of 2001, al Qaeda has not launched a single major attack on US targets or the US mainland.

Yet, instead of having a national debate on how we got ourselves into such a bizarre and pointless predicament -- and squandered so many lives and so many billions of dollars in the process -- the current debate in Washington is focused on how many more troops we will send into harm's way to pursue an enemy that is down to about 200 core operatives.

Do you ever get the queasy feeling sometimes that somewhere in a cave in Pakistan, Osama bin Laden is having a bit of a chuckle about this?

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - The Price of Escalation Version Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at the American Prospect Tim Fernholz makes a smart argument:

As the debate over Afghanistan has progressed, voices within the administration, military commanders like Gen. Stanley McChrystal, former officials like Gen. Colin Powell, and pundits like Fred Kaplan have argued that the focus shouldn't be on how many troops are sent to Afghanistan but what they will do when they get there. This is a misleading formulation that eliminates vital strategic options. In reality, the resources the U.S. commits in Afghanistan, in both troops and treasure, should be at the crux of this debate.

This is both right and wrong. On a very basic level, whichever strategy the President decides upon is vitally important to the success of the mission, irrespective of the number of troops he sends. For example, if Obama decides to send more troops in pursuit of General McChrystal's goal of a full-fledged, nationwide counter-insurgency campaign it would be an unmitigated disaster (in my view of course).  If he decides to send more troops in pursuit of the short-term strategy of regaining the military initiative from the Taliban and building up the Afghan security forces that is a more defensible approach; although one fraught with danger (again, in my view of course). In other words, not all military footprints will look the same on the ground.

But where Tim is on to something is the extent to which troop levels are inextricably tied to the politics of US policy in Afghanistan and to a larger degree, its impact on US national security writ large. This idea was really brought home in Spencer Ackerman's article in WINDY on the challenge of getting 30-40,000 more troops into Afghanistan (and on an unrelated note though Spencer is morally deficient because of his love for the Yankees and hatred of the Grateful Dead, his reporting on the Afghanistan debate is crushing):

If President Obama orders an additional 30,000 to 40,000 troops to Afghanistan, he will be deploying practically every available U.S. Army brigade to war, leaving few units in reserve in case of an unforeseen emergency and further stressing a force that has seen repeated combat deployments since 2002.

In addition, those troops that General McChrystal claims are vitally needed in the next 12 months probably won't be fully available until the fall or summer of 2010. That means that we could be looking to 2011 or later before we have any clear sense of how these additional troops are affecting the war effort. And of course, even if we decide to leave then getting those soldiers out of Afghanistan will not be easy or immediate. The point here is that if President Obama agrees to General McChrystal's request for more troops, Afghanistan will come to completely dominate his first term foreign policy agenda. Politically, this would create all sorts of problems, particularly with progressives. But I think the real challenge will come to Obama's larger foreign policy agenda.

All that talk in the campaign about changing the mindset of American foreign policy  . . . well you can pretty much forget that. One of the things we saw in the Bush Administration and it was certainly my experience in government, presidential administrations have a hard time walking and chewing gum at the same time. In other words, 100,000 troops in Afghanistan will suck up so much oxygen that it will almost certainly short-change other important efforts, and what's more, will subvert other goals. Instead of rebuilding AID, you will probably see more of its resources devoted to nation building in Afghanistan instead of long-term development in non-kinetic environments. Shifting the civil/military balance back to the civilian capacity side - good luck with that.  Getting more money out of Congress, which is already allocating $65 billion a year for the war in Afghanistan and facing mushrooming budget deficits for those civilian agencies. Not going to happen. Focusing the attention of policymakers on these key issues: even less likely.

In the end, this is the real reason why troop levels matter. There are severe opportunity costs in ramping up our commitment - the most important one will be the dream that Barack Obama could truly transform American foreign policy. We need a President who is thinking about America's post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan future. And that's going to be awfully hard to do in an environment where 100,000 troops in Afghanistan are dominating our foreign policy debates and diverting the attention of policymakers.

I really hope that this thought is in the back of the President's head as he makes a decision on what to do in Afghanistan.

Thank God for Somalia! Posted by Michael Cohen

Courtesy of Andrew I see that Afghanistan just beat out Somalia as the most corrupt country in the world (by the way, this is two points worse than last year). This sort of reminds me of the old joke about Alabama's state motto - "Thank God for Mississippi."

But let's not cower in fear at the notion that a counter-insurgency with a government that is the second most corrupt in the world is a fool's errand - Hamid Karzai is about to clean up his act:

Afghan officials launched a new anti-corruption unit and major crime fighting force Monday amid stiff international pressure to clean up the government following a fraud-tainted presidential election.

The Afghan government has been dogged by corruption for years and this is the third formal launch of a unit promising to rein in rampant graft and bribery. But Afghan government officials told reporters this attempt has a better chance because of a real desire to succeed and strong international backing.

But this time does appear to be different as the Obama Administration is making clear that "they will consider the Afghan government's commitment to reform in deciding how many more troops to send to fight the resurgent Taliban." But this isn't really true since the US is on the verge of agreeing to send more troops to Afghanistan so in fact we're not really waiting for genuine progress.

Shouldn't the cart come before the horse here? Shouldn't we wait for the Afghan government to get serious about dealing with corruption as well as a host of other issues before agreeing to send a single additional soldier? I mean, it's not as if 60,000 US troops can't effectively hold off the Taliban in the meantime - and it's not as if the US will even have an additional 30-40,000 troops on the ground any time soon to make much of a difference in the counter-insurgency fight.

I've said it before and I'll say it again; if we really want to force the Karzai regime to change - or if we want to figure out whether they even have the capacity to clean up their act - we need to use troop levels as the ultimate lever. Of course, we could just give up dreams of waging population centric counter-insurgency in Afghanistan . . . But to pretend that the Karzai regime is really serious about taking the steps they've avoided taking for the past 8 years is no way to run a war.

The Pentagon's Got Your Back - Ish Posted by Michael Cohen

After interviewing Anne Marie-Slaughter, the head of policy planning at the State Department, about the growing diminishment of USAID's effectiveness and influence Matt Yglesias make the correct point that part of the development agency's problem is that it doesn't have the prestige or resources of the armed forces. But in looking for a glimmer of hope, he makes this argument:

One promising sign, however, has been that figures like Robert Gates and others from the Pentagon side have increasingly shown some indication to use some of their clout to help build up AID capabilities as they more and more find themselves convinced that more robust civilian partners are what they’re looking for.

This is true - the Pentagon wants AID to work as an effective partner in national security operations. And that's the problem.

As I noted a few weeks ago in the pages of Dissent, While Secretary of Defense Gates caused a buzz in 2007 when he declared the need for a “dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security" nowhere did he call  or the Pentagon to shed any responsibilities. Indeed, in his next breath, Gates made clear “I’ll be asking for yet more money for Defense this year.” 

It's not that the Pentagon doesn't want to see a strong AID - it's that they want to see a strong AID that helps the Pentagon carry out its responsibilities, i.e military operations. The idea of an independent AID that is focused on the long-term goal of development and democracy promotion in non-kinetic environments is perhaps a bit less pressing of an agenda item. This is one of the reasons, by the way, why Stuart Bowen's notion of creating an independent agency for post-conflict operations is so inspired.

Frankly, I don't blame the Pentagon for wanting to see a strong AID; it will make it easier for the military to focus on its core responsibilities as a national security agency and not all the post-stabilization, reconstruction, development responsibilities that their civilian overseers have asked them to do.  But what America needs is a strong development agency . . . geared toward long-term development and development; not just an agency dedicated to doing post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

Part of the problem of what we've seen over the past 8 years - and continue to see today - is the subordination of all other foreign policy interests to "national security." As a result, a disproportionate amount of AID's budget is used in promoting democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan as opposed to helping civil society groups in fragile or emerging democracies where tens of thousands of US troops are not stationed. And it means US assistance is spent to train African armies (to fight the war on terror), instead of African police forces, which if you happen to be a African citizen would likely be much preferred.

The bottom line is that if AID is going to be return to being a truly effective and well-resourced development agency don't look for support from DoD to make it happen - it needs to come from the country's political leadership; from the President and Congress. But considering that it took about 9 months to find someone to run AID - and he's a 36-year old doctor with minimal management experience and likely very little influence on the Hill - I'm not brimming with confidence that that is going to happen.

Mark Kirk's Gitmo Flip Flop Posted by Adam Blickstein

For the first time in 8 years, America is actually going to bring the 9/11 terrorists to justice. Whether transferring them to NYC for trial, or sending them to Illinois for possible detention, the Obama administration will hold terrorists accountable for their heinous act. It will also make America safer by shutting down Guantanamo, long a top recruitment tool for extremists.

But instead of supporting this effort to replace the broken Guantanamo system (which has only yielded three convictions since 9/11 while civilian courts have convicted nearly 200 terrorists) with a judicial system we know has worked in the past, many Republicans have fallen back on their customary and caustic partisanship. In doing so, they are working overtime to undermine our national security by politicizing and fearmongering this critical issue.

Rep. Mark Kirk, fighting to be elected to Obama's former Senate seat, is leading this dangerous and counterproductive charge. Case in point, Kirk said the following in a letter he sent to President Obama reacting to the reports of detainees being transferred to the Thomson, Illinois prison facility:

"If your Administration brings Al Qaeda terrorists to Illinois, our state and the Chicago Metropolitan Area will become ground zero for Jihadist terrorist plots, recruitment and radicalization...As home to America’s tallest building, we should not invite Al Qaeda to make Illinois its number one target...The United States spent more than $50 million to build the Guantanamo Bay detention facility to keep terrorists away from U.S. soil...Al Qaeda terrorists should stay where they cannot endanger American citizens."

Unfortunately, the Mark Kirk of this week disagree strongly with the Mark Kirk of last month. In October, he actually supported the Obama administration's position that certain detainees should be transferred to American soil for prosecution:

Last week, we got another slap at reality when Kirk apparently forgot he “supports” the Republican position on keeping Guantanamo Bay open. The U.S. House voted this week on H.R. 2892, transferring prisoners out of Gitmo. A large majority of House Republicans opposed it, but a faction of them did not. In the Illinois delegation, for example, Peter Roskam strongly opposed the legislation. However, Mark Kirk voted ...to allow the Obama administration to move foreign terrorist suspects from the Guantanamo Bay prison to the United States mainland.

Clearly, this sensible vote to strengthen America's national security in October has morphed into reckless and fear-based rhetoric as pressure on Kirk to acquiesce to the GOP's increasingly erratic base continues to possess his campaign.

The bottom line is Kirk was for bringing terrorists to America for prosecution before he was against it. And under his skewed logic from this week, the Mark Kirk of October seems to have voted to "invite Al Qaeda to make Illinois its number one target" and "endanger American citizens." Is this really who Illinois wants to send to the Senate?

Rising China: Not Ready For Its Close-Up Posted by David Shorr

As President Obma urges China to be a "source of strength for the community of nations" -- i.e. help with the heavy lifting on international challenges such as global warming and nuclear proliferation -- Chinese leaders prefer to downplay expectations. They're not witholding their support and assistance, but they are parcelling out their contributions quite cautiously, rather than putting themselves at the forefront of global problem solving. Think of it as a tendency to do positive things for negative reasons. Unfortunately, it may not be enough to deal effectively with 21st century international challenges.

I spent several days in Beijing last week taking part in discussions co-organized by the Stanley Foundation with the Centre for International Governance Innovation and the China Institutes on Contemporary International Relations. This Chinese ambivalence about providing leadership was expressed in a variety of ways, including the description of China as "a global actor, not a global power." Indeed, the true aim of key Chinese strategic concepts such as peaceful rise or harmonious world seems to be a frictionless foreign policy to conserve every ounce of effort for the challenges of domestic stability and economic growth.

And that's what I mean by negative reasons. Even when China plays an undeniably constructive role, the main impulse isn't to solve the problem but to stay out of the hot seat of looking like the obstacle. We've all had those fights with a spouse, boyfriend or girlfriend where the other person wants us to do something not to placate them but because we ourselves really want to. They can drive you crazy, those fights. I'm sorry to say it, but here we have a foreign policy equivalent where this actually matters. If China merely tries to keep the United States happy enough, its policy will fall short of the contribution the world really needs.

Take North Korea, for example, where Beijing's other (understandable) consideration is the stability of a brittle and potentially volatile bordering neighbor. It's one thing to calibrate a policy to avoid alienating either Washington or Pyongyang, the apparent current approach, and another thing to push for a denuclearized North Korea through any means of pressure that wouldn't be destabilizing. Chinese leaders need to decide whether their priority is nuclear nonproliferation or friendly neighborly relations because their North Korean counterparts will read the signals, and any tentativeness will in effect serve as a green light for North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. (Similar hard choices between priorities, by the way, go for South Korea and Japan as well.) It's absolutely appropriate to choose means of pressure that will avoid instability in North Korea, but it's counterproductive to inflate such risks and overestimate the impact of some tactics.

I sympathize with Chinese worries that they're not ready for the full weight of attention and expectations to play the role of a global leader. It's just that the world and a set of very high-stakes problems can't really afford to wait. The scene and lighting are set, and the camera is starting to roll.

GITMO Detainees to Illinois Prison Posted by James Lamond

The LA Times reports this morning that:

"A near-empty prison in rural Illinois has emerged as "a leading option" to house terrorism suspects currently held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, an Obama administration official said Friday."

Apparently the state of Illinois built this huge prison eight years ago, but due to budget constraints it has remained largely unused.  There are 1,600 cells, but only144 inmates.  The administration is considering buying the Thomas Correctional Facility and to house the Guantanamo Bay detainees.  It remains unclear whether this would be the sole facility where they are  brought, but with all the open beds, there seems to be plenty of room for the 215 Gitmo detainees. 

One thing that is really interesting about this choice is that with all the hysteria over the idea of bringing Guantanamo detainees to the US and all the people yelling "not in my back yard!", where do they end up? Thats right in the president's home state. 

After all, why wouldn't they go to Illinois.  This seems like a solution to several problems.  One being that Thomas, IL has suffered a great deal from the recession and could use the influx of federal dollars.  So it is a win for the municipality of Thomas. Second, there is an empty prison in rural Illinois that has plenty of room to house the detainees.  This would assuage the neurotic concerns among some, that Gitmo detainees will come and radicalize American prisoners with Islamist ideology. Since the prison is empty, and presumably the Gitmo detainees will not have contact with other prisoners, this should not be an issue and the American prison system has demostrated for decades that it can handle housing terrorists successfully.  So it is a win for those concerned with bringing the detainees to American soil.  Third, and most importantly it is a major step in the process to finally close Guantanmo Bay, which has served as the best possible recruiting poster for al Qaeda. So  it is a win for the country.

With Illinois being the home state of both the president and the Senate's second most powerful Democrat -Dick Durbin, who has been supportive of closing Guantanamo -I don't understand how conservatives will be able to go on the political attack about bringing the detainees to US soil. Though I am sure they will find a way.

UPDATE: Reponse from residents in Thomas, IL is pretty positive.

Everybody Grab a Four-Star Posted by Michael Cohen

Courtesy of Mike Crowley at the Plank, I thought Marc Ambinder's take on who leaked the Eikenberry memo is pretty interesting:

But I do have a hunch that the leak today that our ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, a retired Lt. General and commander in Afghanistan, is wary in the extreme of a big buildup there wasn't an accident. You could see it a few ways. One is that opponents of a buildup, fearing that Obama is leaning toward a bigger influx of troops per the advice of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, leaked this as an effort to strengthen their hands. My Washington-trained gut says it's the opposite, a trial balloon because Obama will go with a smaller buildup, and putting Eikenberry's concerns out there serves as a counterweight to McChrystal. It, in effect say, "Look I have smart generals who don't want a buildup."

This makes a lot of sense. And as someone who opposes a troop buildup in Afghanistan my view is, 'any port in a storm.' But there is something deeply depressing about the idea that President Obama needs the imprimatur of a four-star general to justify acting in, what he believes, is the country's national interest. Crikey, the man is Commander-in-Chief! Ask yourself, if Karl Eikenberry had never served in the military - and was a career diplomat - do you think his words would have the same impact as they seem to be having right now? I think not.

Indeed, the fact that Obama may feel the need to use the cover of a retired general to justify NOT sending 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan is at pace with what has to be one of the most depressing recent poll results that I've seen in a very long time:

While Americans oppose Gen. Stanley McChrystal's proposal, they want U.S. generals to make the decisions when it comes to troop levels. A full 62 percent said they had more confidence in "the generals running operations in the country," while only 25 percent said they had more confidence in the president and the secretary of Defense, when it comes to troop decisions.

To hell with the McChrystal leak; this is truly a crisis in civil-military relations! By more than two to one Americans believes the military - and not their civilian overseers - should be making decisions about how US troops are deployed overseas. That is a recipe for unceasing and perpetual military conflict and a dangerous indication of exactly how powerful and influential the military has become in American society. It's not just a co-equal branch of government (as dangerous as that may be) it may end up becoming the most powerful branch of government.

Hey President Obama, remember when you said that you wanted to change the mindset that got us into Iraq in the first place? This might have been what you were talking about at the time. There are more reasons than I can name here for not sending more troops to Afghanistan, but the simple reminder to the body politic that it is civilians and not generals who make decisions about war and peace in this country isn't a bad one to add to the list.

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - The Chutzpah Version Posted by Michael Cohen

Apparently a few folks in the armed forces are miffed that Karl Eikenberry - our Ambassador in Afghanistan who deals with President Karzai on a regular basis - hasn't jumped on the COIN bandwagon:

The public disclosure of his views has heightened existing tensions between senior military officers and General Eikenberry, who left the military in April to become Mr. Obama’s emissary. Several military officials complained bitterly that his latest cables were part of a skein of pessimistic and defeatist memos the ambassador has sent since taking over in Kabul.

Hmm, I wonder what sort of pessimism these military officials are talking about - do you think it might sound something like this:

Some GIRoA officials have given preferential treatment to individuals, tribes and groups or worse, abused their power at the expense of the people . . . the Afghan government has been unable to provide sufficient security, justice and basic services to the people.  These problems contribute to the Afghan government's inability to gain the support of the Afghan population.

The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government.

As you might have guessed I am quoting from General McChrystal's own strategic review, which cataloged the many problems with the Afghan government and its limitations in supporting a counter-insurgency operation. There is something deeply strange here in military officers complaining about Eikenberry's reporting. As I have said ad nauseum on this blog, according to counter-insurgency doctrine, host country support is utterly essential. Without it, the chances of success are limited. But instead of listening to our Ambassador when he says host country support will in fact not be forthcoming military officers deride it as defeatist. Indeed, as near I can tell they have done precious little to integrate it into their military plans. It's simply amazing that McChrystal would argue in his review that "success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign" at the same time that Ambassador Eikenberry is sending repeated cables saying that the US can't rely on President Karzai to support that mission.

You know it's almost as if some military officers had decided ahead of time that counter-insurgency was the best tactical approach, facts on the ground be damned . . .

But this isn't even the best part: kudos to the Times for uncovering this little tidbit of gossip.

A few days after General Eikenberry sent his cable to the State Department, top military and civilian officials gathered for a regularly scheduled meeting at the embassy, where General McChrystal pointedly addressed many of the issues in the Eikenberry memo.General McChrystal did not refer to the cable directly, but specifically challenged General Eikenberry’s conclusions, according to one official familiar with the meeting. General McChrystal, he said, said that no alternatives had been offered besides “the helicopter on the roof of the embassy,” a reference to the hasty American withdrawal from Saigon in 1975.

It might be helpful in this situation if General McChrystal thought back on how the US got to that inglorious point.