Who has no fundamental understanding of the surge? Posted by Max Bergmann

I am catching this a little late, but this is important to correct. The McCain campaign attacked Barack Obama for saying that the surge would result in an increase in violence. Pointing to this quote from Obama:

"I am not persuaded that 20,000 additional troops in Iraq is going to solve the sectarian violence there. In fact, I think it will do the reverse."

McCain says that that was clearly wrong saying:

Sen. Obama said that the effect would be the reverse. So, he has no fundamental understanding of the entire situation that warranted the surge, which led to the success."

This is ridiculous. The surge DID increase violence in Iraq. Yes the last eight months violence is down - but the eight months before that were the most violent since the war began - making 2007 (the year of the surge) the deadliest year for American troops (see the chart from icasulaties below). Putting U.S. troops in the most dangerous neighborhoods of Iraq was bound to increase violence.

Violence has decreased since  - and while the troop increase and the change in strategy has had an important impact, other factors (factors not a part of the original of the surge plan) explain the decline in violence much more effectively. What are these:

1. We cut deals with the enemy. The Anbar awakening and the deals struck with Sunni insurgents were the most important factor contributing to the decline and violence. But its important to note that this was NOT part of the original surge strategy but was arrived at due to the escalating violence and the failures of Iraq's political leaders to make any headway on the political benchmarks laid out by the Bush administration as part of the surge.

2. Ethnic cleansing was more or less achieved in most neighborhoods. As in other ethnic conflicts - violence usually peaks at the outset, as integrated neighborhoods are forcefully segregated. As neighborhoods become segregated they are often walled off - creating more security for neighborhood residents by preventing outsiders from entering. This has been a tactic deployed by Petraeus and is a common counter-insurgency tactic. While this is effective at preventing violence, it also has the negative side effect of freezing sectarian divisions in place creating a significant long term obstacle to reconciliation (think Belfast).

3. We had a cease-fire agreement with Sadr, which has been extremely important in lowering attacks on the U.S.

Attributing the recent decrease in violence solely to the increase in troop levels and ignoring the fact that violence significantly increased during the first eight months of the surge is indicative of someone who "lacks a fundamental understanding of the entire situation that warranted the surge."

Comments

[Soldiernolongeriniraq]

That's so disingenuous. While all three of those points are true, the salient fact is that sticking 30,000 troops in a concentrated urban AO allowed the other factors to accumulate. None of the three could've been achieved without the increased troops and the tactics with which they were armed.

I'm a bit flummoxed that such idiotic prattle would have been managed above by a stated "expert" on security issues. What is the bar for competence in this forum?

I don't mean to appear cranky, but this is really too much. We know what Obama meant. A lot of people agreed with him, but he was wrong. There's nothing wrong with that. People are wrong all the time, especially when the subject is as complex and protean as Iraq at war.

McCain certainly has been wrong on OIF, too.

But this was just too much. Don't you owe your readers a better rounded understanding of national security issues? Or are we just going to get talking points from the Obama campaign?

[Rizzuto]

Mr. Bergmann, you are very transparent. Your analysis stands in stark contrast to the facts on the ground in Iraq.

You claim that because the first several months of the surge violence increased, McCain has a fundamental misunderstanding of the surge. However, McCain in fact warned of this in January of '07. This from MSNBC:

[McCain] warned that his recommendation “will mean more casualties and extra hardships for our brave fighting men and women” and that “the violence may get worse before it gets better. We have to be prepared for this.”

Unfortunately, your analysis of the surge over the past several months and years has been proven false Mr. Bergmann and predictably your attempts to justify it is growing more and more thin.

[peace]

The Surge was meant to secure a political settlement in Iraq and it has so failed in that mission. Instead the Bush adminstration and neo-conservatives thought of success in only military terms and rather than work for poliitcal settlement instead are presurring the Iraqi government to sign a defense treaty that let the Americans stay in Iraq indefintitely. The end result is that the truce that the Americans have worked with Shiite and Sunni militias appears to be faltering.

[peace]

The Surge was meant to secure a political settlement in Iraq and it has so failed in that mission. Instead the Bush adminstration and neo-conservatives thought of success in only military terms and rather than work for poliitcal settlement instead are presurring the Iraqi government to sign a defense treaty that let the Americans stay in Iraq indefintitely. The end result is that the truce that the Americans have worked with Shiite and Sunni militias appears to be faltering.

[peace]

sorry for the reposts

[A.B.]

"None of the three could've been achieved without the increased troops and the tactics with which they were armed."

Cutting deals with tribal chiefs and exploiting their turn against AQI predated the "surge" by nearly six months. It was possible due to a combination of factors, primarily the timely adjustment of tactics by U.S. commanders, AQI wearing out its welcome, and cold hard cash. It helped to significantly quiet Anbar, but I wouldn't pretend that the "surge" had much to do with it, no matter what Fred Kagan says. Whether it contributes to the Iraq's stability over the long term remains an open and serious question.

[Don Bacon]

Obviously, Max is erroneously confusing sectarian violence with US casualties. The surge did result in the purging of Sunnis from Baghdad and the segregation of sects thus reducing sectarian violence as Max has in fact noted. So Obama was wrong. The surge, while hard on Sunnis, and protested by many Baghdad citizens, did "solve the sectarian violence."

[Soldiernolongeriniraq]

Thanks for telling me what I helped initiate in Anbar, AB.

Here's the problem: Without the so-called "Surge" of troops (I hate the term because total OIF numbers didn't "surge" past what we had on hand for the 2006 elections), we couldn't have convinced the "Awakening" set that they could make the transition.

It started in December of 2006, when LTG Odierno showed up at MNF-I to become CMNC-I. The "Awakening" gains as seen in the Sufia operation were just becoming apparent beyond the Ramadi AO. In fact, it was only a few weeks before that the groundbreaking Battle of Sufia involving US and allied "Awakening" militias had been fought (late November of 2006).

Odierno made the call in February of 2007 that deals like the "Awakening" model in the Ramadi AO would become SOP for all units in all AOs. At that point, cultivating "Awakening" links to create security in Ramadi dated only to September of 2006 (some of us had been working on the same leads before that), and the Battle of Sufia was less than three months before Odierno made his crucial decisions.

The rudimentary strategy for the so-called "Surge" also was being practiced in Anbar before CMNF-I arrived in Baghdad. The COPs, JPs and other parts of the tactics of the "Surge" were being tested with IAs and IPs in Anbar, just as similar issues had been hammered out by COL McMaster in Tal Afar even earlier than that.

Without the influx of "Surge" troops to the Baghdad AO, the rapid and universal adoption of "Awakening"-type deal-making wouldn't have been possible. Had those 30,000 troops not arrived, the "Awakening" model would have remained a local concern, confined most likely to the east Anbar AO.

By June of 2007 we even could begin freeing the extra manpower to push through west Anbar and then Babil, Diyala and Salah-a-Din provinces, using "Awakening" deals as part of the "hold" and "build" after the "clear."

This is lost on laymen, but it's fundamental to understanding a bureaucracy like the military. Staff elites at the top serve as warehouses of information and a means to disseminate new ways of understanding and addressing a problem across a wide battlescape. LTG Odierno's decision to replicate the "Awakening" throughout the Sunni Arab enclaves of much of western and central Iraq only could have been achieved throughout Iraq with the "Surge" forces and structure.

He empowered local commanders to tailor their own "Awakening" agreements with organic Iraqi leaders. This helped spur a bottom-up institutionalization of security and governance, often with former enemies of the US.

This has absolutely nothing to do with Fred Kagan and everything to do with decisions made at the staff level of MNF-I (MNC-I) in Baghdad at the beginning of the "Surge" to make a local security gain manifest in the rest of Sunni Iraq.

This was covered by WAPO, Gannett's Military Times pubs and numerous other outlets at the time, not to mention within the Army.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/15/AR2008021503716_pf.html

[Soldiernolongeriniraq]

By the way, those of us who are Democrats either active duty or recent OIF/OEF veterans would take Democracy Arsenal a tad more seriously if some of the bloggers of military age might, you know, enlist.

While I sometimes agree with Ilan on his points, I fail to understand why he doesn't seek a commission.

Max feels competent to address the public on the so-called "Surge," but not so froggy as to seek out a recruiter.

"AB" is discussing military policy, but was an undergrad during the invasion and spent his days in CNN and Congress while the rest of us were trading rounds with AQIZ in the very province he cites in his analysis.

While I don't much like the "chickenhawk" epithet, it wouldn't be tossed around so much if those who fancy themselves military experts would, every so often, join the military.

Just a thought.