What Happens After We Leave Pt III Posted by Michael Cohen

Ok I'm starting to feel bad that Shawn and I are ganging up on Max so I appreciate Ilan weighing in! In his last post Max argues "the problem with Michael’s moral obligation argument is that it implies that we actually have this power to make things significantly better" in Iraq. Actually, my argument is quite different. I don't believe that we have the power to make things demonstrably better in Iraq . . . but I do believe that we have the power to make things a heck of a lot worse.

My argument from the beginning has been that Democrats are ignoring the very serious repercussions of a hasty departure from Iraq. In fact, in the Democratic debate on Monday, John Edwards foolishly challenged his opponents to "commit to having all combat troops out and ending combat missions in the first year." John, this isn't a contest to see who can withdraw fastest; it's to see how we can do it most effectively with the least loss of life and the least further damage done to Iraq.  But Edwards comment is indicative of the blase attitude many progressives seem to have toward departure.

I realize for some it may seem difficult to believe that we could make things worse in Iraq, but that certainly seems the case. What's more, we seem to already be washing our hands of responsibility for future problems there. There is something that is beginning to trouble me about the fact that we have done enormous damage to Iraq; we have unleashed tribal and radical forces that threaten to break apart the nation and yet all three Democratic candidates for President seem to be putting the entire onus on Iraqis to affect political change. Guess who will get blamed when things fall apart? Yes, Iraqis have to solve these problems on their own, but we are not blameless and simply announcing that we are departing doesn't end our responsibility.

As for Max's and Ilan's point that our "leverage" in Iraq may not necessarily being results; well he's absolutely right about that. But it seems to me that the process Shawn lays out, namely that "America should begin – finally – to make our security, economic, and diplomatic aid conditional on demonstrable efforts at real political progress in Iraq" has a stronger chance of success than the approach most Democrats seem to be advocating, namely that by threatening to leave it will force the Maliki government to move forward with political reform. Now that approach may bring results, but then again it may not. There is certainly a reasonable chance that it may lead the Shiites to simply bide their time, build up their forces and then once we begin our drawdown seek to wipe out the Sunnis.  Exercising our political leverage is not a panacea, but it might be the least bad option available to us. At the very least, it will give us greater flexibility if things either improve or get worse. Announcing a timetable for withdrawal actually diminishes any political leverage we might have over Iraq's future.

For example, what if we announce our departure and the Maliki government chooses the latter course? Will we just sit by and begin to withdraw troops as both sides prepare for a bloodbath? Moreover, will we have the political will to send troops back into harm's way once they've been taken out. I seriously doubt it. Actually this sort of scenario reminds of what happened in Afghanistan after the Soviets left. There was no effort to bring the various warlords together after withdraw and instead you had absolutely vicious fighting, which of course led to the Taliban taking over, AQ finding safe haven . . . and you know how this story ends.

(I wrote much of this post before seeing Ilan's latest missive, but I'm having a hard time finding a lot of daylight between his and Shawn's plan At the very least, the two seem to adopting a similar approach, just placed on a different timeline, although I'm not so sure Shawn wouldn't find Ilan's timetable acceptable.

Finally, there's another point that Max raises, which I want to address. He argues that we need a diplomatic surge to manage our departure. Initially this seems absolutely correct to me, but then I started thinking about it - after the President's disastrous trip to the region (which laid bare our diminishing influence over friends or allies) why would countries in the region (particularly our enemies) want to engage diplomatically with us about Iraq's future?

Think about it, Iran has never been stronger; they have enormous influence over the Maliki government, they are strengthening relations with the Gulf States and it seems to me, they have little reason to make any deals with the United States. Wouldn't Shiite efforts to wipe out Sunni political influence kind of play in their favor? I'm not convinced that this political equation changes under President Obama or President Clinton. Now granted many in the region don't want to see regional instability, but that doesn't they are necessarily going to sign off on a diplomatic effort if they believe they can maximize their influence on other ways.

To be sure, a regional diplomatic approach might have been successful a few years ago, but I'm a bit skeptical that it would necessarily bring positive results today, especially if it comes after we announce we are leaving. Now, I certainly could be wrong here and I invite Max, Shawn or anyone else to tell me that I am.

In the end, I'm glad we're having this debate; getting into the details of withdrawal is critically important and long overdue for progressives.

Comments

[Dan Kervick]

To be sure, a regional diplomatic approach might have been successful a few years ago, but I'm a bit skeptical that it would necessarily bring positive results today, especially if it comes after we announce we are leaving. Now, I certainly could be wrong here and I invite Max, Shawn or anyone else to tell me that I am.

As I mentioned in my comments on Ilan's post, Iraq's neighbors seem increasingly eager to engage with each other on a cooperative approach to the stabilization of Iraq. The US is actively hindering these efforts by promoting divisions among Iraq's neighbors, and really needs to get out of the way. The idea that these efforts will only take place as a result of a US diplomatic effort has it backward. US diplomacy is currently focussed on preventing regional peacemaking and preserving the US presence and stake in Iraq.

I also don't understand the worries about the Shia "wiping out the Sunnis". From what I have seen over the past 5 years, the inexperienced Shia government forces have shown little capacity to operate effectively inside the Sunni-run areas of Iraq, especially without American assistance. And the militias seem more interested in protecting their interests in Shia-run areas. The military sophistication and experience in Iraq seems concentrated in the Sunni populations that were the backbone of Saddam's military. And of course the bulk of the violence connected with the insurgency is perpetrated by Sunni groups. So they seem quite capable of handling themselves.

[Mike M.]

I guess there's a trust issue here that we're ignoring. You might be right that we can make things worse with a quick withdrawal. But it seems to me that this occupation has a certain inertia to it. We were told for years that we just needed another 6 months or another year. Remember all of those Friedman Units? Sorry, but my impulse is to say "no more." The American people have been lied to too many times by war supporters from both parties. At some point we have to say "No more extensions" because one extension always leads to another. Honestly, it's always something and it's been that way for going on 5 years now. Enough.

[masaccio]

So just what is it that US soldiers are accomplishing? Both sides are armed (and we provide arms to both sides). We provide targets and we keep the armed sides apart. By your argument we can't ever leave.

[Cal]

I also don't understand the worries about the Shia "wiping out the Sunnis". From what I have seen over the past 5 years, the inexperienced Shia government forces have shown little capacity to operate effectively inside the Sunni-run areas of Iraq...

Another fact that supports Dan's point is that there isn't much Sunni territory left that the Shiites covet. Baghdad is already their's. Why would the Shiites kill and die for the wastes of Anbar?

It should also be pointed out the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad happened right under our guns, and accelerated during the surge. There's little evidence that our presence can prevent these atrocities. If the Sunnis and Kurds fight for Kirkuk, one ethnic group will probably be forced out, whether our troops are there or not.

[Peace]

The real humanitarian problem once or if we leave Iraq would be the Iraqis who worked with the American military and the fact that they would be the targets for both the Sunni and Shiite militias. As to date the United States has been relunctant to grant them asylum.

[David Tomlin]

The 'after we leave' question reminds me of an anecdote. The editor of some east coast publication wanted an article to relate to the upcoming launch of a Mars probe. He sent a telegram to one of his favorite science writers on the west coast: 'Is there life on Mars? Cable one thousand words.' The reply was 'Nobody knows', repeated five hundred times.

I don't know what happens after U.S. forces leave Iraq, and I call bullshit on anyone who claims they do.

In the long run, improving stability in Iraq depends on the Iraqis themselves arriving at arrangements that reflect their interests and the balance of forces among them. The presence of foreign troops distorts the balance, probably delaying any such process. That is why I think immediate withdrawal is the best course of action for the Iraqis as well as for the U.S., notwithstanding any negative consequences that may (or may not) happen in the short run.

Bad things will happen in Iraq whether U.S. forces stay or leave. Once they have left, war propagandists will of course point to every bad thing that happens and claim it wouldn't have happened if the forces had stayed.

We have seen this in regard to Vietnam. For example, it has become routine to claim that the fall of Cambodia to indigenous Communist forces would not have happened if U.S. forces had stayed in Viet Nam, despite lack of any plausible scenario for how such forces would have prevented that outcome.