Some Army Relief Posted by Derek Chollet

A few months ago we wrote about a study by the policy group Third Way that detailed the crisis between the demand and supply of American troop strength, calling for adding 100,000 troops to the U.S. Army.  Last week several prominent members of Congress, including Senators Joe Lieberman, Hillary Clinton, Bill Nelson, Jack Reed, Ken Salazar and Representatives Mark Udall and Ellen Tauscher proposed legislation to do just that.  Entitled the “United States Army Relief Act,” this is a bold proposal to deal with the mismatch between the forces we need and the forces we have (the press release and text of the legislation can be found here).

This drew some nice media attention for the Hillary factor – with many stories using her work on the armed services committee and future aspirations as the news hook.  But the proposal was also (apparently coincidentally) timed with the release of a new report from RAND which explains that if the current tempo of deployments continue – and there is no reason to believe that it won’t for the next few years at least – we will have “serious problems” in active duty readiness.  This also coincided with an alarming study released last week by the GAO that provides a lot of detail about the crisis in the Army Reserves – pointing out that due to equipment and personnel shortages, it will be “increasingly difficult for [the Reserve] to provide ready forces.”

Given all of this, the politics of the Army Relief Act make a lot of sense: by calling for a larger army, this legislation allows key Democrats to be tough on defense while at the same time make the case for how badly the Pentagon has been managed (remember the days when the Clinton Administration was criticized for creating a “hollow army”?!?!).  This is a gutsy plan that puts the political opposition or those that defend the status quo, well, on the defensive.      

That said, some still have concerns on the substance.  Although these ideas have been endorsed by former Army generals (including two at the Congressional rollout, the former heads of West Point and the Army War College), as well as the New York Times editorial page, several civilian military experts I’ve spoken to (while sympathetic with the politics and especially the urgency of the supply-demand problem) argue that adding 100,000 troops is not the way to solve the problem.  They point to everything from the cost (at least $15 billion) to the difficulty of actually recruiting these new forces to the fact that such a move might actually hinder the Army’s continuing transformation.  Instead, they call for a troop increase of anywhere from 40,000 (which is what the Kerry-Edwards campaign proposed) to over 60,000.

I don’t have near enough military expertise to judge the merits of 40,000 vs. 60,000 vs. 100,000, but I am convinced that we need more.  And good for these members of Congress (and their friends at Third Way) for putting a serious idea on the table.         

Comments

[libertarian soldier]

I am with the civilian military experts all the way. If you have problems recruiting with a temporary increase of 30K, how will you make your numbers with a bigger, permanent increase? And they are right on the cost, as well--the defense budget is already too high thanks to the military industrial complex causing too much high tech equipment of extremely marginal utility (hello F/B 22).
The biggest reason for my opposition is the people calling for it have no vision of what they want the military to look like 5+ years from now when all that new force structure has been recruited, formed, trained and equipped. Where are they all going to be based--are we going to have to reactivate posts to make room for them, with the concommit multi-billion dollar investment in infrastructure? Where are they giong to train--modern weapons systems and equipment call for much larger areas than we needed in the 70/80s--and what would be the environmental impact? Are they going to be traditional AOE divisions or are we going to add another 15+ Brigade Combat Teams (UEy) What is their mission going to be? Do we really want to add another thousand GO/FO slots to the force structure (I believe the law calls for the GO corps to be 1% or less) for C4 (although I am sure many guys who are LTC/COLs now would love that!)
Or, will we look around five years from now and decide we don't need all this force structure after all (remember the divisions that were formed in the mid 80s and then were disbanded reduced less than a decade later) and then go thru another round of RIFs/BRACs to get rid of what we just bought?
Certainly what the last fifty years have taught us is that the world changes (and at an accelerating pace) and the one thing we can be reasonably sure of is that it won't change linearly (look at what teh Army has gone thru structure wise: triangular to combat command to pentomic to ROAD to TRICAP to Div86 to AOE with light and HTLD thrown in. Until someone can make a reasonable case to me that the current requirements are going to continue for 5 years or more, I won't be able to agree to spending another $10-15B on a requirement that maybe/possibly will exist (although that was the pitch for Comanche/Crusader/F-22/etc.).

[Dan Kervick]

..."That said, some still have concerns on the substance..."

Well, we wouldn't want to let a little substance to get in the way, when there are vitally important political points to be scored, such as allowing "key Democrats to be tough on defense while at the same time making the case for how badly the Pentagon has been managed" and "putting the political opposition or those that defend the status quo on the defensive."

I love the charmingly euphemistic name of this act - "The United States Army Relief Act". I'd like to suggest a few alternatives. How about the:

"Dangling More Money in Front of Reluctant Cannon Fodder Act"

or the:

"Throwing More Money at the Army to Peel Some Military Votes Away from the Republicans Act"

or the:

"Helping Hillary Grab the Center, Overcome the Gender Barrier and Get Nominated by Attaching Her Name to Some Vaguely Hawkish Defense Bill Act"

or the

"Keeping Our SUVs Full and Our White Kids Out of the Fighting By Recruiting More Black and Hispanic Kids Act"

or the

"Spending More Money on Advertising Tricks Designed to Overcome the Rational Resistance of Parents to Seeing Their Kids Come Home in a Box Act."

or the

"Full Employment for Political Hacks and Chickenhawk Foreign Policy Speechwriters Act"

or the

"Keeping Our Heads up Our Asses Act"

[Cal]

With the army unable to meet its current recruiting quotas, there's no sense talking about increasing those quotas -- whether by 30,000 or 100,000.

Really, for all the hawks' pride in their clear-eyed realism, they are unwilling to face the fact that we need to either start a draft or change our policies. Until you address this issue, Derek, you're not a hawk but an ostrich.

[Dan Kervick]

By the way, lest a reader think that “Third Way” is some sort of research-oriented think tank, devoted to independent scholarly research and searching, open debate on defense, international relations, national security and global affairs, I suggest that they examine the group’s web site. Third Way appears rather to be a pure political operation. Their output is political advice and “communications products”. They exist to provide marketable campaign strategies and sexy legislative proposals for Democratic candidates who are up against it in the “red” regions of the country. From the web site:

...“Third Way develops policy and communications products to help senators and other progressive leaders better advance their values in red states and counties where progressive ideas have lost resonance.”...

Their leadership does not consist of defense and security scholars. They are a group of lawyers, communications specialists, fundraisers and political operatives. There are no deep thinkers or global affairs intellectuals here. Rather they are “political entrepreneurs” and policy advisors:

..."The management team of Third Way, and its sister organization, the Third Way Institute, is composed of political entrepreneurs who have served in senior positions in Congress and the Clinton Administration and also have extensive experience running successful national advocacy groups."...

They only have one member of their leadership, Aaron Scholer, who has a professional national security or international affairs background. But that background appears to be mainly in the area of policy development as a political staffer. Like so much of the pseudo-intellectual bunkum that finds its way onto sites like “Democracy Arsenal” and the “Truman National Security Project”, their aim is to rehabilitate the Democratic “image” on national security by pandering to the mob, and throwing around their favorite buzz words like “muscular” and “gutsy” and “bold” and “tough”. They aim at:

..."Rebuilding progressive credibility on national security by producing policy and communications blueprints, hosting issue briefings, conducting strategy retreats and drafting legislation."...

So look for no global affairs brilliance from the “Third Way”. These are well-heeled policy hacks and political pros who develop Senate-level product for the political market. They hold their fingers up to the political wind, do some polling, figure out what will sell, craft a communications strategy for selling it, and produce their own in-house report with legislative ideas embodying these saleable ideas. Then so-called “progressive candidates” produce some “legislative product” appealing to the report itself as justification – as though the report had been authored by George Kennen and Dwight D. Eisenhower instead of coming out of a boiler room of political salesmen!

Third Way is all about selling: they’re focus is on marketing, re-branding, “strategy retreats” etc. They have about as much credibility and depth of knowledge in national security as a cereal box printer has in the area of nutrition.

[Lane Brody]

While I appreciate the gesture Libertarian Soldier has it exactly right. The problem is not only lack of force structure but lack of knowing what structure is needed. By the end of the Cold War the US, USSR, West Germany, and others had all arrived at the same conclusion that for sustained heavy combat a Brig of 4 batt was required (West Germany and South Korea going a step further by attaching a 5th reserve batt purely for rear area security). Today's US Army is busy converting over to a structure of small Brigades of 2 Batt that while perhaps adequate for colonial type wars are lacking the ability to engage in sustained heavy combat- the exact role one might imagine the US Army should always have foremost in mind.

The Army by creating all these new small brigades and attached small support batt is creating so many new HQ's it might be a ticket punching wet dream but history has not been kind to binary units- see Italian Army in WWII. The Army needs more trigger pullers and what it is getting is actually less and these few are even more spread out.

While it does seem obvious the Army needs at least 2 more active duty divisions it is less clear under the current structure which of our present units are going to get 3 or 4 or 5 of the new binary brigades (unit of action). We might be better off adding a UA to the heavy divs and bringing back an ACR than just adding two new divisions. The entire issue is exactly what force structure do we need and is someone going to stop the US Army from creating an entire army of small binary brigades that will not be able to survive sustained heavy combat? Lord help us if sometime in the next 20 years we have to fight a real enemy that both knows and is motivated to fight.

Our new Army. One up and one back or two up and no reserve. Every lesson from Iraq we've learned (not to mention recent Israeli and Russian combat experience) proves without deviation heavy armor is needed for modern combat and essential for urban combat. While Israel and Russia field heavy combat eng units and heavy infantry assault vehicles based on tank chassis the US Army decides the M1, M2, M109 team are just yesterday's news. The future is UA's of FCS? We are just going to get our young men killed in large numbers one day.

BTW the notion of a draft is just silly. Almost 20 years ago the Army was far larger (18 divisions vs today's 10) and from a smaller population base we had no trouble with recruiting. Maybe with an unemployment rate at 5% and a war going on we have to pay our soldiers more and spend more on recruiting and jail those who would prevent recruiting on schools. A draft would ruin the US Army. Essentially every infantry unit in today's army is elite. Unmotivated draftees simply do not perform and get themselves killed. Better one well trained motivated unit than two draftee units.

Lane Brody

[David Billington]

Lane: "The problem is not only lack of force structure but lack of knowing what structure is needed."

I agree. But we need to do more than just reset the bar of sub-optimization up a notch. We need to stop thinking that everything we do has to be "proportional" to some expected or actual threat. If we prepared for a World War II-style mobilization and then maintained a small part of this in peacetime, we could scale up quickly and our ability to do so might have a deterrent effect. Parsing whether to add 30,000 or 100,000 troops to our Army sends a message to countries that are big enough to wage guerrilla resistance against an Army that would still number only in the hundreds of thousands.

"Unmotivated draftees simply do not perform and get themselves killed. Better one well trained motivated unit than two draftee units."

In the current context this may be true. But in past wars draftees did not perform poorly unless and until it became clear that the war they were fighting was going nowhere. The war in Iraq hasn't reached this point but the recruiting situation is very serious.

Do you think that past counterinsurgencies have any lessons that were not and might have been applied to Iraq once it became clear that there was an insurgency?

[MNPundit]

Is paying a "civilian contractor" 100-200k a year when they can go home whenever they feel like it cheaper than equipping and training a new soldier? I think you need to look at it that way.

[Lane Brody]

Mr Billington I respectfully but strongly disagree with your point of view. The US Army in WWII did a lot of things very well but most units were really not capable of close combat. Those that could were called elite. In today's military all infantry units are elite. They are extremely well trained.

By far the largest cost factor in the military is people. All the services for years have been downsizing and are only trying to continue this trend. Certainly it's been allowed to go too far in some cases but we are simply never going to have the flexability with our active force structure to rachet things up and down. There will never be a WWII type of mobilisation simply because it is impossible- auto plants can not be converted to making tanks, period.

Thus knowing the proper force structure is essential in today's world. We can not well afford to get it wrong. We can not afford to simply add bodies to our military. It takes years to create, man, train, and ready for deployment a new unit. Even in WWII it was not a quick process.

I do take your point on the military and it's level of mobilisation reflecting our national will. I do not however think that is where the center of gravity lies. That lies in Iraq. Frankly, it is they who have to get totally fed up with suicide bombers killing Iraqi's, killing both shia and sunni, that they will stop it. The insurgency in Iraq IMHO is not sustainable. We shall see; however, the notion that what is needed is more foreign troops is IMO simply a fallacy- at this point. At this point we need to train Iraqi forces in the largest numbers as quickly as possible. Twice as many troops post war near term would have been extremely helpfull. IMO we are past the point of US troops being able to solve the problem for a variety of reasons.

From the perspective of force structure the Pentagon is already past Iraq. The assumption is that we will begin drawing down within a year- after the Dec elections and more Iraqi units come online. The real debate over Army force structure are those that think we need a larger active force because Iraq showed we've drawn down too far and those who see Iraq as an abberation covered by our reserves- which is why they see those existing. It also has a lot to do with the total force concept created in the early 1970's that ensured almost any sized conflict would require reserve forces- that was a rational response to Vietnam but far less valid in today's world. So we are not talking about the size of the Army next year but rather in 5 and 10+ years together with the types of forces in the active and reserve mix.

Lane Brody

[rosignol]

Today's US Army is busy converting over to a structure of small Brigades of 2 Batt that while perhaps adequate for colonial type wars are lacking the ability to engage in sustained heavy combat- the exact role one might imagine the US Army should always have foremost in mind.

Against who?

Any nation that has the industrial base to replace the losses that their side would sustain during even a month of heavy combat against US forces also has nuclear weapons.

[Lane Brody]

Rosignol among other considerations the many wargames that supported 2 batt brigades assumed near perfect to perfect intelligence. Little things like what the Brig commander does if the enemy manages to surprise him and threaten his flank or rear are missing.

Sustained heavy combat does not imply an enemy has an industrial base nor does it need assume an industrial enemy. According to one recently released US Army report urban combat highlights the need for heavy armor including more arm combat eng units. These lessons are not new, Israel and Russia recently relearned them, but they highlight the need for heavy arm units able to take and dish out punishment.

With both batt online a Brigade(UA) is extremely vulnerable for a myriad number of reasons. Force structure matters. Not having hev arm units for urban combat matters (Somalia and Les Aspin). The USMC has long used a 13 man infantry squad for the sole purpose of being able to take losses and still function. The future of warfare will more and more involve urban combat which almost by definition is sustained heavy combat.

A Brigade UA is essentially a tank and mech batt. That is on paper about 216 dismounts- it will be less in combat. The Brigade is too small to easily attach units as it's supporting units are geared for 2 batt not too mention the little problem of where you'd find a unit to attach if every Brigade becomes a 2 batt UA. All the Army is doing is creating many more HQ's to control less combat power- the exact same mistake Nazi Germany made in WWII. Flexability is totally gone with this structure. One sends X number of UA's and that is it. We didn't need a UA in Somalia we needed an armored company. Are you going to detach a company from a UA and reduce it's tanks by 25%? The entire issue is so problematic and wastefull it is stunning it's not generated a congressional firestorm.

Lane Brody

[David Billington]

Lane Brody: "Mr Billington I respectfully but strongly disagree with your point of view. The US Army in WWII did a lot of things very well but most units were really not capable of close combat. Those that could were called elite. In today's military all infantry units are elite. They are extremely well trained."

Thank you for your patient and detailed reply. It is certainly true that if the United States can meet its needs with the kinds of troops that we have today and with roughly the numbers that we currently expect we will need, then we should not have to rely on conscripts. We would not want to replace the present ground force with conscripts. But I'm sure you would agree that if we had to fight a war with a larger conscript force, we could and would do so.

It may not be practical to invest scarce resources to prepare for contingencies that are truly remote, but I do think we could do more to prepare for larger needs and that doing so could strengthen our deterrence.

"There will never be a WWII type of mobilisation simply because it is impossible- auto plants can not be converted to making tanks, period."

Couldn't tank assembly lines be created in existing plants by clearing out the robotics and replacing them with appropriate equipment for tank production that has been previously stockpiled and maintained? There may be short-term constraints having to do with labor force, transportation, and supplies but I wouldn't think these are insuperable.

"I do take your point on the military and it's level of mobilisation reflecting our national will. I do not however think that is where the center of gravity lies. That lies in Iraq. Frankly, it is they who have to get totally fed up with suicide bombers killing Iraqi's, killing both shia and sunni, that they will stop it. The insurgency in Iraq IMHO is not sustainable."

I agree on Iraq. My concern is with the fact that countries other than Iraq may be less deterred if we have no intermediate level of response between our existing forces and going nuclear. It is these other countries that we need to be planning for now.

[donkeyhawk]

A Fourth Way: Mandatory national service with the option to fulfill the requirement by enlisting in the military. Neither a true draft, nor a pure volunteer force. Would up the numbers to fill the gap without compromising the integrity or morale of the force.

[rosignol]

Couldn't tank assembly lines be created in existing plants by clearing out the robotics and replacing them with appropriate equipment for tank production that has been previously stockpiled and maintained?

If appropriate equipment for tank production hasn't been previously stockpiled and maintained, the question is moot.

[David Billington]

Donkeyhawk: "A Fourth Way: Mandatory national service with the option to fulfill the requirement by enlisting in the military. Neither a true draft, nor a pure volunteer force. Would up the numbers to fill the gap without compromising the integrity or morale of the force."

This might be a good way to augment the present force and if the Army is open to the idea then I would be too. But the contingency I have in mind would be a war in which we need (or need to threaten) to deploy a much larger force that could only be supplied by conscripts. I should add that I don't foresee a draft of this kind getting through Congress unless a war is truly non-elective. But I would like us to be better prepared for the possibility than we are today. An adversary may be more inclined to risk conflict if its leaders think we are unwilling or unable to mobilize on a large scale.

[David Billington]

Me: "Couldn't tank assembly lines be created in existing plants by clearing out the robotics and replacing them with appropriate equipment for tank production that has been previously stockpiled and maintained?"

Rosignol: "If appropriate equipment for tank production hasn't been previously stockpiled and maintained, the question is moot."

My proposal is that we begin to stockpile and maintain what is needed. We aren't doing this now as far as I know.

[Lane Brody]

A WWII type of national mobilization is impossible for a huge number of reasons. I did not wish to imply it only revolved around the defense industrial base. From that perspective the production of any modern technological weapon has become extremely complex with many more specialist parts with very varied lead times.

Even more importantly is the lethality of modern weapons. WWII bears very little relation to modern war. Literally hundreds of large bombers were needed to ensure a single bomb hitting a target. Today one bomber can hit dozens of targets. Modern tanks have an extremely hight first round hit probability and a higher 2nd round. Artillery is far more lethal than WWII. A WWII sized force in the modern world would be overkill on a massive scale.

Indeed the lethality of modern war is so mind-numbing the consensus is just about nobody (besides maybe Iran, North Korea, or China) would even attempt to fight tank to tank, plane to plane, or ship to ship with us. What we get instead are asymetric wars. Blowing up the Marine barracks in Beirut, in Saudi, ballistic missles, chem/bio/nuclear, terrorism, unconvential warfare in general, and urban combat (Somalia, Iraq, etc.). In part this type of warfare attempts to cancell out our tech and firepower advantage by forcing us to engage in close combat, generating losses, and forcing the Vietnam effect to force our leaders to pull our troops out (Beirut and Somalia).

This type of warfare requires many things but it does not requre a massive mobilization. Indeed, even during the Cold War is was little known but the huge mega clash over Germany between NATO and Warsaw Pact would have ended one way or another within roughly a month. This was due because both sides would have run out of ammo and munitions and neither side could remotely ratchet up production to a significant fraction of what each side was capable of spewing forth on a daily basis. Even today there is a world wide shortage of 5.56mm ammo simply because the US is using so much. It will take years to just fix this problem. It took almost 2 years to just fit 10,000 or so humvees in Iraq with an armor kit. The US Air Force is lucky to buy 100 or so planes a year now- the US in WWII build around 300,000 planes. WWII is not going to happen again for a whole host of reasons.

Lane Brody

[David Billington]

Lane,

"A WWII type of national mobilization is impossible for a huge number of reasons. I did not wish to imply it only revolved around the defense industrial base. From that perspective the production of any modern technological weapon has become extremely complex with many more specialist parts with very varied lead times."

I take your points about the immense change that has taken place in both the targeting precision and manufacturing complexity of modern weapons. WWII is clearly a wrong analogy.

The question I am trying to fathom is how we can lessen in the future the kind of strain on our ground forces that the commitments of the last three years have involved. I don't think we can safely assume that the number of simultaneous commitments will be reduced.

Warfare has changed a lot, even since the first Gulf War, and it is certainly true that for the same capability we do not need the same force. But I wonder how much more we could be prepared to support and if it would make a difference for us to be prepared to do so.

[Lane Brody]

David I fully support your goal or higher preperation for future conflict(s). My only caveat, albiet rather strong, are the extremely real problems increasing or decreasing force structure. While I fundamentally think the US Army needs 12, not 10, divisions over the long term one could easily gain more than that much combat power by increasing the size or existing divisions and/or adding more non-divisional units. Frankly I find losing the last hev arm cav reg horrifying.

On many levels we can not lower the strain on our military. Consider if the Army had twice as many active combat units. Iraq would have been no problem but over the long term such a force is largely unsustainable, outside of a Cold War level (% of GDP terms) of military spending. Thus a force able to deal with Iraq short-term would impose a far larger strain long term.

Obviously, however, we've gone too far the other way but consider if in 18 months the number of troops in Iraq is roughly halved. For many honest observers the reserve and guard would done it's job of helping out the active forces through a major conflict and the short term strain will probably be able to be dealt with in the near term.

Personally I don't agree with that nor do I think the 1970's Total Force concept is either still viable or desired. The entire active and res/guard force mix needs to be completely reviewed. We do need to make a choice to have a little more force structure than we think we need in order to have a little flexability and a proper strategic reserve to deal with unforseen.

That however is extremely problematic given how Congress funds the US Military. We as a nation do not rationally decide how large a military we need and then pay for it. We decide to spend a given number of dollars and the military bascially makes do as best it can while internally competing in an often cutthroat manner for very limited dollars. Personel costs by far is the most significant spending account (out of a budget of around 500 billion we spend around 65 billion on procurement).

This has resulted over the past years the military trying to save money to fund needed new weapon programs, not to mention simple operation costs, by cutting force structure. Indeed an excellent case can be made that the US military is organized more in response to Congress than any potential foe. Not that the Pentagon is not itself inherently irrational- frex, do we really need the Air Force, Navy, and Marines to all fly modern high performance fighter aircraft? Did the US Army really need to invent the attack helo and now arm it's UAV's simply because the US Air Force has never been institutionally interested in supporting the Army?

But I take your point it would be nice to be better prepared for Iraq and/or a future operation roughly the size of Iraq. Perhaps I am too focused on the entire structural problem(s)? To make it very simple the very strong fear the US Army has is being ordered by Congress to add end strength and over the next decades not have Congress provide enough funds for this larger force thus resulting in far less combat power and readiness than a smaller force that Congress is willing properly fund. It's not an irrational fear- the 1970's saw the hollow army.

Personally I'd begin with getting rid of the Air Force- the Navy and Marines could take over most of the roles, the Army most of the rest and everything else would remain under Space Command. Having Four seperate Air Forces is totally irrational and wastefull- I vote we start with going to three. Right now the Air Force, Navy, and Marines all operate C-130 transport planes and the US Army desperately wants to buy C-27's (2 engine equivilent of 4 engine C-130) because the Air Force will not let the Army have the number of sorties it needs.

Can't dump the Navy as they are the guys with all the ships. The Army has the boots on the ground everyone says we need more of so they can't go. The USMC could go but they actually do most of the nations conflicts pretty much on their own since the nation was founded- they do too good a job to be gotten rid of- they are also technically still just part of the Navy. The Air Force can live on in space which is where it really wants to go anyway. Now that would be a real progressive proposal. Just my opinion...

Lane Brody

[David Billington]

Lane: "We as a nation do not rationally decide how large a military we need and then pay for it. We decide to spend a given number of dollars and the military basically makes do as best it can..."

I'm afraid you're absolutely right about this. Your recommendations for reorganizing the armed forces also make a lot of sense. Technology may be the impetus for change. Strategic defense and the militarization of outer space may not advance more than incrementally in the next fifteen years, but I would expect to see more technological upheaval in the second quarter of this century. Under these conditions, the Air Force might indeed become an augmented Space Command, or perhaps both could fold into the Navy so that all of the high technology arms are under one service.

It would be very discouraging if the American people don't draw the lesson from Iraq that a higher end strength for the Army may be worth maintaining between wars. Maybe the rise of China will justify increasing the percent of GDP spent on defense, with some of that increase going to the Army.

I wonder if the Army's doctrine could also be better with respect to counterinsurgency. It isn't clear to me what lessons came out of the Vietnam War or what attention military officer education in the 1980s and 1990s gave to insurgency. Perhaps every insurgent conflict is too unique to permit any useful lessons to be drawn but I wonder if our counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq was as good as it could have been under the circumstances. If not, then we should change it so that we are better prepared in the future.

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