Don't Dismiss Obama's role in Lebanese Elections Posted by Max Bergmann

This has been tossed around on the internets today and I think it is very much an open question. There was a wide expectation that Hezbollah was going to win the parliamentary elections, instead the more pro-western March 14th movement was victorious. The AP framed the elections as "the first major political test in the Middle East since President Barack Obama called last week for a "new beginning between the United States and Muslims." So presumably Obama passed the test - but is this right? Could Obama's speech have had such an impact that it contributed to a March 14th victory?  In short, while there are plenty of reasons to be very cautious injumping to that conclusion given Lebanon's politics, Obama's impact definitely shouldn't be dismissed by observers either.

Many Lebanese experts have dismissed the impact of the speech pointing to a variety of domestic reasons. Lebanon political expert Dr. Omri Nir told the Jersualem Post that

 "I didn't see an impact of the speech [from Cairo] on the elections campaign," he added. Nir attributed the unexpected outcome to internal politics among Lebanon's Maronite Christians. Lebanese citizens usually cast their vote based on the people running and not according to party lines, he explained.

Christopher Dickey at Time also makes the useful point that "The fact is, Lebanese politics are uniquely treacherous... when elections take place, that old adage, 'all politics is local,' comes into play at every level and in very particular ways."

But although many Lebanese political experts dismiss the impact of Obama, sometimes issue-area experts are so immersed in their area that they really can't see the forest from the trees. The fact is that atmospheric changes in political environments matter and are often really hard to detect at the time.

One thing I found bizarre about the literature on democratic transitions was how most of the theories were on the causes were focused almost exclusively on specific internal developments and largely neglected outside factors, such as the international movements or events. For instance, concerning Spain's transition most theories focus on internal dymaics and often totally ignore the demonstration effect of having a successful democratic club in the European Community next door. While each of the southern European transitions happened as a result of their own internal political dynamics, it wasn't a coincidence that Spain, Greece, and Pourtugal all transitioned at the same time. Additionally, it is not a coincidence that there are often particular years at which revolutionary change happens suddenly - such as 1989 and 1848. Each successive revolution in those years evolved due to its own particular circumstances - but the demonstration effect contributed to the snowball of change that occured.

Now what happened in Lebanon was no revolution. We are talking about a small shift in the electorate. But just as the atmosphere of 1989 or 1848 created an impetus for change, the same principles apply to 2009 - albeit on a much much smaller scale. President Obama's efforts beginning with his inaugural address, continued with his overtures to Iran, his engagement in the peace process, leveling with Israel on settlements, his speech in Cairo, and the nature of his story and background - may not be revolutionary - but they have no doubt changed the climate of American engagement with the region.

It would follow thent that if Bush's approach and his policies had a negative impact in this regard, then dramatically changing the tone and approach would surely have to have some impact. For instance, under Bush, it was clear that American support for a particular candidate or party was likely a death blow in the Middle East. So the fact that the side that the Obama administration was clearly pulling for did better than expected - or at least wasn't hurt by that stance - would seem to suggest that there was some impact, since Obama's speech was last week, Biden did go to Beirut, and Ray Lahood was there today. Therefore, former Cheney advisor David Wurmser deserves to have a significant amount of egg on his face after tell the WsJ before the election that "The Lebanon vote could mark a major strategic shift for the region...Iran could increasingly be viewed as pre-eminent, while U.S. influence wanes."

Instead, the vote, at the very least demonstrates that Obama's approach is a vast improvement over the Bush administration. The Telegraph quotes, Rami Khouri, of the American University of Beirut,

"This was the first real victory by pro-American groups in the ideological battle that has defined this region in the last 10 years. Every time the US tried to help somebody in the region, it hurt them and they lost." A 25-year old software designer from West Beirut, said: "It was 'you are either with us or against us' before and both sides had this attitude. Now it is something in the middle with Obama and I think there is more freedom there."

However, despite all of this, it is really hard to tangibly assess the precise impact of Obama's engagement with the region on the election. And the fact that many point to the Iranian elections as the big test maybe very unfair to the Obama administration, since local issues may very well dominate and even though we may think otherwise the world does not alway revolve around the United States. Nevertheless, while a great deal of politics is local, not all of it is. The international atmosphere matters and the approach by the Obama administration it seems has definitely helped change it - the question that we are all wondering is by how much.

Metrics, Oh Metrics Posted by Michael Cohen

Andrew Exum is right! I'm not thrilled by the editorial in the New York Times today that says:

Protecting Afghan civilians, and expanding the secure space in which they can safely go about their lives and livelihoods must now become the central purpose of American military operations in Afghanistan.

But my displeasure is not necessarily for the reasons that he assumes. My concern here, as its been from the beginning, is what the NYT doesn't say: namely what's the end game in Afghanistan? I understand the argument for why protecting civilians fulfills the goals of a counter-insurgency operation, but I'd curious to know how long the New York Times thinks we need to be in Afghanistan - and what level of protection we need to guarantee - before US troops can come home? What is the metric not by which we measure short-term tactical success; but the metric by which we determine that US strategic objectives have been met?

Moreover, as the always astute Judah Grunstein argues and as Jari Lindholm suggests, civilian casualties are perhaps not the best metric for judging success in Iraq Afghanistan. (And I think I have some credibility citing Jari since in this same blog post he called me an "ass.")

The NYT also says, "Washington must step up the pace and quality of training so that expanded Afghan military and police forces can take over that mission as soon as possible." Absolutely, but how long is the NYT prepared to wait to see the realization of this goal? Five years, ten years etc. Is our goal with the Afghan security services to increase their strength so they can ensure the Taliban is unable to take over the country and create a safe haven for Al Qaeda - or is it to expand the secure space in which civilians can safely go about their lives and livelihoods? I don't think those goals are one and the same.

What the NYT editorial leaves out - and what many of these debates about COIN tactics seem to ignore - is the larger question that I am fitfully trying to ask here at DA: what are our national interests in Afghanistan? What does victory look like? If we go forward with a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan is it realistic to believe that the goals of such an operation are achievable?

And if our goal in Afghanistan is as, the President said, "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future" then how does a fulsome counter-insurgency effort geared toward eradicating the Taliban's political influence further the achievement of that goal? Is there a mismatch between objectives and tactics? This question seems particularly relevant in light of General Petraeus's comment a month ago that Al Qaeda isn't even operating in Afghanistan today?

For some reason, asking these questions is highly controversial or can be blithely dismissed because they show a lack of familiarity with counter-insurgency doctrine. But before we find ourselves mired in another political and military quagmire isn't it better that we ask them now before it's too late?

On that last point, I think even Andrew and I might agree.

Obama the Counter-Insurgent Posted by Michael Cohen

I've been thinking quite a bit about President Obama's speech in Cairo speech andI keep coming back to the notion that Obama's words were perhaps the most effective actions taken by a US President against the global Al Qaeda movement since the Fall of 2001.  If you subscribe to the notion that the war with Al Qaeda is a global counter-insurgency then Obama dealt his enemy a difficult blow.

This may seem like an odd sentiment coming from someone who spends a lot time critiquing the efficacy of utilizing counter-insurgency tactics. But from the US perspective there should be a clear distinction between "local" insurgencies -- where outside of Pakistan US interests are fairly limited -- and the global insurgency that is represented by Al Qaeda. Indeed, the greatest threat to the US has always been Al Qaeda and not the insurgent conflicts that we have found ourselves engaged in over the past few years.

This is not to suggest that there is no military solution to the problem of Al Qaeda. Far from it: the leaders of AQ and the architects of mass terror attacks must be eliminated or at least placed on the run so they cannot launch 9/11-style attacks against US civilian and military targets and Al Qaeda safe havens must be destroyed. The Bush Administration deserves some limited praise for doing much of that work in 2001 and 2002 (and I say limited because they didn't quite finish the job).  But as counter-insurgent advocates like to tell us, a good counter-insurgency is 80% political and 20% military. And while I would argue that not every counter-insurgency is the same, that ratio probably applies here.

Indeed the political means of combat ting Al Qaeda is the most challenging part - drying up the swamp and reducing the number of adherents to Al Qaeda's toxic ideology. It was a tactic that the Bush Administration not only didn't master, but actually made worse and primarily by viewing the military and armed force as the most effective tool in the US arsenal against Al Qaeda.

But as Obama showed on thursday in Cairo you can kill a lot more flies with honey rather than vinegar. There were three key elements to his speech that probably did more to weaken Al Qaeda than anything done by the Bush Administration since the fall of Kabul.

First, Obama spoke to the Muslim as equals and as partners. He didn't lecture or talk down or even ignore unpleasant truth. Instead he mixed empathy with realpolitik and highlighted not only shared values but shared interests:

I've come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles — principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.

 . . . Of course, recognizing our common humanity is only the beginning of our task. Words alone cannot meet the needs of our people. These needs will be met only if we act boldly in the years ahead; and if we understand that the challenges we face are shared, and our failure to meet them will hurt us.

To be fair, this was a rhetorical approach often utilized by George W. Bush, but let's face it, Barack Obama is not George Bush. The first part of the battle for any American leader after the wreckage of the Bush years was to change the discussion between the United States and the Arab world. Obama's speech restored US credibility in the Muslim world and more important ensured that those prepared to believe the worst of the United States will hear the other side. Al Qaeda and others will continue to portray the US in an unfavorable light, but Obama's Cairo speech will no doubt serve as an important counterweight to this message.

But beyond the fancy rhetoric, Obama delivered two other very important messages. For more than a generation, US support for Israel has been obviously a key rallying point for anti-American voices in the region. Obama's words raised the profile of US concern for Palestinian suffering and articulated America's key policy differences with Israel's leaders over settlement policies while also reaffirming the US commitment to Israel's security.

The result is that Obama made clear that the United States is going to be an even-handed negotiating partner:

But if we see this conflict only from one side or the other, then we will be blind to the truth: The only resolution is for the aspirations of both sides to be met through two states, where Israelis and Palestinians each live in peace and security.

That is in Israel's interest, Palestine's interest, America's interest, and the world's interest. And that is why I intend to personally pursue this outcome with all the patience and dedication that the task requires. The obligations — the obligations that the parties have agreed to under the road map are clear. For peace to come, it is time for them — and all of us — to live up to our responsibilities.

Of course these are just words and they must be followed with actions, but what's striking from Obama's speech was the balance he sought to strike between the two sides. There are those who will certainly argue that Obama did not go far enough in criticizing Israel's settlement policies - and there will be pro-Israel voices who will argue that Obama threw the Jewish State under the bus. My response: good. Let the extremists push their self-interested arguments. I would imagine that for most individuals who listened to the President the takeaway is that the US is serious about pushing a political resolution that recognizes the interests and concerns of both sides.

I think Ami Ayalon makes the point quite well:

We are witnessing the beginning of new American diplomacy in the Middle East whereby it will no longer appear to be very, very pro-Israel, but, as was obvious in the speech, it will be more balanced. Israel has to now understand that this president really believes that there is a common denominator of moderate Arabs, Americans and Israelis. It is a new phenomenon in Middle East diplomacy because we have long believed that the US and Israel represented one side of the conflict and the Arab world and Muslims the other side. But unlike previous administrations where the world was divided by an axis of evil, particularly that of President Bush, Mr. Obama divides the world by an axis of pragmatic forces.

An "axis of pragmatic forces!" I love it.

Next, the President made clear that there must be a political space for Islamist movements in the Arab world.

America respects the right of all peaceful and law-abiding voices to be heard around the world, even if we disagree with them. And we will welcome all elected, peaceful governments – provided they govern with respect for all their people.This last point is important because there are some who advocate for democracy only when they are out of power; once in power, they are ruthless in suppressing the rights of others. No matter where it takes hold, government of the people and by the people sets a single standard for all who hold power: you must maintain your power through consent, not coercion; you must respect the rights of minorities, and participate with a spirit of tolerance and compromise; you must place the interests of your people and the legitimate workings of the political process above your party. Without these ingredients, elections alone do not make true democracy.

I really don't know if you can downplay the importance of these words in the context of the global fight against Al Qaeda. The implication of the President's words is clear: we have no war with Islamist movements that reject violence and pledge to abide by democratic practices. If that is not a shot across the bow not only to Al Qaeda, but also to ossified Arab regimes that reject any role for Islam I don't know what is.

But the combination of pledging even-handedness on Israel/Palestine and a recognition that America will accept partnerships with Islamic political movements that reject violence is perhaps two of the most effective weapons in the counter-insurgency toolbox for the United States (and of course let's not forget the fact that he reiterated his intention to have US troops out of Iraq by 2012). Where one can quibble is in Obama' failure to reach out to the Arab world - beyond the governing cliques - to the people themselves. Here I think Obama missed an opportunity to hit the anti-AQ trifecta by pledging greater US support for civil society and political activists across the Arab world. Hopefully that rhetorical and substantive outreach will come in time.

But Obama has shifted the terms of the debate - and placed Al Qaeda and its jihadist allies on the defensive. And above all he has made clear to the Arab world that our interaction with the region will be based not on the force of our arms, but by the power of our diplomacy. Now of course, if there is no follow-though on the part of Obama and if deeds do not match words than the speech will be for naught.

But he has done a nice job of laying the groundwork for the diplomatic and political counter-insurgency against Al Qaeda that is, hopefully, on its way.

Hey Krugman, Sometimes its not the "economy stupid" Posted by Max Bergmann

Paul Krugman's column today goes too far in blaming Gordon Brown's problems on the economic crisis.

In his column titled "Gordon the Unlucky" (yes often columnists have no control over the title), Krugman attributes Brown's political difficulties to the souring economy. Krugman's column is definitely worth a read as it demonstrates how British and American economic approaches alligned and how all political parties supported the same approach. Good stuff. But his conclusion that the economic meltdown is why Labour and therefore Brown are in deep trouble is way, way too simplistic. Krugman writes:

If Democrats had been in power when the bad news [economic crisis] arrived, they would have taken the blame, even though things would surely have been as bad or worse under Republican rule. You now understand the essentials of the current political situation in Britain.

Actually, no you don't. The Labour party and Brown were in trouble long before the economic crisis. It is not a case of being "unlucky." Tony Blair did not exactly cruise to victory in the last election. The Labour party has been hurt by the war in Iraq, constant political scandals - the recent expense scandal being particularly damaging - and the simple fact that they have been in power so long that they have become staid and boring.  Labour and Brown have failed to really inspire anyone with their ideas and direction for the country and after a decade in power there just isn't much energy. On top of this, David Cameron has rejuvenated the conservatives. Cameron has energized the party, put forward some innovative positions, and has sought to bring the conservatives into the 21st century (except when it comes to the EU - his approach is more about taking the UK back to the 1970s). All of these factors, have helped make a Labour defeat look inevitable.

Now, the economic downturn has definitely hurt Brown and undermined his record as the steward of the British economy when he served as Chancellor of Exchequer (Treasury). But Brown got high marks at home and abroad for his inital response to the crisis and - ironically - has used the economic crisis as the very reason for continuing on as Prime Minister. Its a factor. But it is by no means the only one contributing to Brown's troubles. Yet Krugman implies that it really would make no difference who was in power:

Still, if an election were held today, Mr. Brown and his party would lose badly. They were in power when the bad stuff happened, and the buck — or in this case, I guess, the quid — stops at No. 10 Downing Street. It’s a sobering prospect. If I were a member of the Obama administration’s economic team — a team whose top members were as enthusiastic about the wonders of modern finance as their British counterparts — I’d be looking across the Atlantic and muttering, “There but for the disgrace of Bush v. Gore go I.”

Krugman is spot on in his economic point that the Obama administration should be more wary of the "wonders of modern finance." But the state of the economy is not the sole determining factor for political success or failure. It contributes, but there is every reason to believe that if the econmic crisis never happened Brown would still be in trouble even if everything were rosy economically. Just as the economic crisis ended up hurting McCain and helping Obama, it wouldn't be right to say that Obama won simply because of the economic meltdown. A lot more went into it. Additionally, Krugman points to Bush vs. Gore - but that election demonstrated that even with a roaring economy the party in power could be put into jeopardy.

This may sound like quibbiling, but Krugman's implication that nothing else matters then the state of the economy strikes me as a crude form of economic determinism - which I guess can sometimes be expected when an economist does politics. Krugman is dead on about the economic lessons, but the political lesson that the Obama administration should internalize from Brown's troubles is that political movements - such as New Labour - after a period of time lose energy and inspiration and therefore must evolve and develop and bring in new blood.

NSN Daily Update 6/8/2009 Posted by The National Security Network

See today's complete daily update here.

What We’re Reading

Center-right, far-right and anti-immigration parties made gains in Europe’s parliamentary elections.  Voter turnout was the lowest ever.  The results are particularly bad news for embattled British Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

Harsh talk escalates as the Iranian presidential election approaches.  The Washington Post profiles main challenger Mir Hussein Moussavi.

Military spending increased 4% worldwide in 2008 to a new record high.  The U.S. remains the largest spender at 58% of the world’s total, but China has reduced the gap.

Commentary of the Day

Henry Kissinger writes that all major world powers must come together to check nuclear proliferation and North Korea.

The New York Times says that protecting Afghan civilians must become the measure of U.S. success in Afghanistan.

Bill Powell explains why North Korea’s sentencing of the U.S. journalists “isn’t shocking."

A "Captive" Audience Posted by Michael Cohen

For those who might have missed it, perhaps my favorite reaction photo from the President's speech in Cairo.

Masked Palestinian Hamas militants watch the televised speech of US President Barack Obama in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, Thursday, June 4, 2009.

Axis of Evil Bowl Posted by Max Bergmann

Iran is playing North Korea in World Cup qualifying in Pyongyang. This game is actually huge. North Korea sits in second place in their group behind South Korea and if qualification were to end today would qualify for the world cup. There are only three games left to play and a win would put North Korea well on there way to South Africa. Iran is in fourth and this game is essentially a must win.

Who should you root for? Well Iran is coached by an American so they might have the edge... but I wouldn't shed a tear over a tie.

The game is on Fox Soccer Channel.

The Terrorist Co-Op Posted by Patrick Barry

In a sign that Pakistan's recalcitrant attitude toward terrorist groups it defines as assets may be coming to roost, Bill Roggio reports that that according to US military intelligence sources, al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba and elements of the Taliban (both the Mehsud and Haqqani networks) are conspiring to assassinate key Pakistani officials:

Al Qaeda has transferred seven operatives from the Iraq theater to target senior Pakistani leaders. The targets of the planned attacks are President Zardari, Prime Minister Gilani, General Kiyani, and other senior military officers, cabinet ministers, and provincial leaders.

The seven operatives, who were behind deadly attacks in Iraq, reportedly met in Afghanistan's eastern province of Paktia on May 3 to plan the operations, according to a report in the Daily Times. The al Qaeda operatives are assigned to cooperate with the Pakistani Taliban, led by Baitullah Mehsud...

...A US military intelligence official has confirmed the report in a conversation with The Long War Journal, and said that some of the operatives are members of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba.

The location of the meeting, in Paktia province, also indicates involvement with the Haqqani Network, which controls operations in the eastern Afghan provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost.

Yikes!  This might as well have been the annual conference for the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Association of Terrorists (APRAT). I hear the lunch buffet at the Paktia Airport Comfort Inn is not to be missed.

Ok seriously now, if true, this report is a pretty strong illustration of Pakistan's long-time cultivation of ties with terrorist proxies beginning to backfire.  Each of these groups falls somewhere within the taxonomy sketched out by Bruce Riedel (HT Spencer) in that the Pakistani government has either 'fought,' 'ignored,' or 'supported' each of them, and yet as Spencer observes, the groups "see little problem cooperating with one another," in this case, to eliminate Pakistan's civilian and military leadership. 

In this context, its still not clear whether the latest offensive signals that Pakistan's establishment grasps what they're up against.  For folks like a Riedel, the real test will likely be whether the military turns its sights to South Waziristan - closer to the heart of militant territory, where there tends to be more terrorist\insurgent co-mingling. So far, indications that an expanded offensive will take place have been inclusive, with Zardari announcing, then backpedaling.  Reuters attributes this to the Pakistani military's reluctance to prompt a 2nd refugee crisis in the FATA - completely understandable given the displacement brought on by the Swat offensive.  At the same time, by not acting against insurgent\terrorists gathered in the FATA, Pakistan makes their argument that what's happening in Swat represents a definitive break from past behavior more difficult to chew.

Apathy and EU parliamentary elections Posted by Max Bergmann

There is a lot of concern over public apathy over European Parliamentary elections. Many worry that this is another signal of Europe's growing "democratic deficit" and another indication of its struggles. This is true. But ask yourself: Do you care about state house elections? Or if you are in DC your Ward elections? You should, I tend to, but many people don't, despite the fact that state legislatures have tremendous power and influence over peoples lives. Voter turnout for these elections in the U.S. - particularly when they don't correspond with voting dates for national elections - is often abysmally low. Yet in the United States we don't constantly debate whether these bodies are important or not and few sane-people argue that they should be scrapped. Unfortunately, that is not the case in Europe, making public apathy a much bigger problem.

While European apathy has grown toward the EU, the European Parliament - often seen as merely a place to give long speeches - has become much more substantively important. My old professor Simon Hix, who is at the forefront of studying the European Parliament and Europe's emerging political system explains that:

The European Parliament is now a very powerful legislative body. The EU passes many laws which affect our daily lives, and most of these laws are amended and passed by the European Parliament. The European Parliament also influences how our taxes are spent in Brussels, and plays a role in the election of the European Commission - the EU executive...So, European Parliament elections matter... Most voters in Europe care about these policy choices, yet they are not presented with them in European elections. This is because national parties have an incentive to treat these elections as national contests. For example, the Conservatives will try more to embarrass the Labour government, rather than to win more seats in the European Parliament.

The current public focus of politics in Europe is the nation-state, since that is after all what the national press cover - and it is probably somewhat inevitable that these elections will be reflective of the national politics of individual states for a while. Popular interest in the confusing political system of the EU is also likely to be much less for some time to come, since a higher levels of apathy and disinterest are somewhat inevitable in Europe's large multi-layered political system. Just as public interest in the federal level in the U.S. maybe higher than the state or local levels, in Europe the nation-state will draw more interest than the supra-national level. The problem however with European apathy is not so much in how it affects the actual European parliament - as Yglesias notes, when the MEPs get into office they act like legislaters - but in how it impacts the European project as a whole.

Europe's movement toward a more federal union is incomplete and currently stalling.While public apathy is not good no matter where you are, this is a particularly acute problem because for a more cohesive Europe to emerge it will continue to need to evolve and strenghten its federal political system, which will require public support.  European apathy and disinterest has been a real obstacle to efforts to streamline the EU, as seen by the inability to push through a new constituion or the Lisbon treaty. So while I don't think public apathy is neccessarily that huge of an institutional flaw within the EU on its own, Yglesias is dead on then when he worries about the implications of the EU's inability to fix its institutional flaws:

I increasingly worry that the fairly problematic institutional framework that governs the European Union is going to be a problem for all of us. Without anyone really digesting this information, over the past 10-15 years the United States has been eclipsed by the EU as the world’s most significant economic actor. But the EU in various ways lacks the capacity and legitimacy needed to respond in a forceful way...It’s pretty conventional in American punditry to write about the indispensability of American leadership. But normally the point is that we’re indispensable because we’re so damn big. Now it’s more like we’re indispensable because even though we’re only second-biggest, the other guys can’t really do anything. It’s not a good situation.

 

NSN Daily Update: 6/05/09 Posted by The Editors

For today's complete daily update, click here.

What We’re Reading

Taliban tactics are starting to alienate regular Pakistanis as debate continues over the Pakistani Army’s offensive against the Taliban in the Swat Valley. A suicide bombing in the northwest part of the country kills 30.

European Union interior ministers agreed to cooperate on sharing information regarding accepting detainees from Guantanamo Bay.

British Prime Minister Gordon Browns reshuffles his Cabinet as the latest Cabinet member, the Defense Minister, resigns. The Labour government continues to face turmoil over the expenses row, as it got trounced in local and European elections..

Russia seeks membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Trade Organization, despite the dismal conditions within the international economy.

Commentary of the Day

The NY Times, the Washington Post and the LA Times discuss how Obama’s speech in Cairo is opening new opportunities between the United States and the Muslim World. Israeli opposition leader Tzipi Livin discusses the importance of democratic participation, not just holding elections in the region.

Amir Taheri outlines Hezbollah’s chances in the upcoming Lebanese election.

Albert Grimaldi and Charles Clover discuss the US’ role in preventing the overfishing of the world’s oceans.

Craig Hooper discusses the US’ waning navel influence in the Pacific Ocean.