Darfur's day in court Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Today the International Criminal Court officially opened its investigation into war crimes in Darfur.   This was made possible by the U.S.'s historic decision to abstain in a UN vote referring the Darfur killings and abuses to the tribunal.  Now the question is whether the U.S. will cooperate with the ICC prosecutors in helping them build the case, or give succor to the Khartoum government which is trying to argue that the Court's involvement will undercut a "peace process" now underway.  The Sudanese government also claims to be assembling its own local tribunals, an effort to push the ICC to the sidelines.

The U.S.'s abstention on the ICC referral was the camel's nose under the tent of an admission that as the world's most powerful democracy and best champion for the rule of law, the U.S. cannot afford to stand outside an international criminal court that's gradually building credibility.  The court's not perfect, but ignoring it and hoping it will go away isn't the solution.  Working with its members to remedy U.S. concerns is.  Cooperation with the Darfur prosecution is a next step that the Administration can quietly take, consistent with its stance that what's happening in Darfur constitutes genocide.   Let's hope Bush keeps moving forward on this.

For measures short of sending in U.S. combat troops to help stop the killings in Darfur read here (no, I don't believe and ICC investigation will do much to halt the slaughter and abuses).

Democracy Bites Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Daily Kos asks the question in response to Hezbollah's triumph at the polls in southern Lebanon:

So what happens when extremists win free elections throughout the Middle East? Do the wingers still crow about "Democracy is on the march"?

It's a key question.  After all, Hezbollah is now claiming a democratic mandate to hold on to its weapons despite a UN resolution calling for disarmament, and to continue its attacks on Israel.

One argument is that  after the initial flash of success, extremist parties will often find their political fortunes withering under the hot lights of democratic accountability.  While people may vote for them out of religious or political fervor, as democracy takes hold they will be judged on their ability to maintain order and address problems, forcing them to modernize and temper their worst impulses or be run out of office.   

This is the case made by Egyptian human rights activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who maintains that Islamist groups ought to be invited to participate in democratic processes, provided they agree to adhere to certain minimum standards, including respect for the constitution, for minority parties, and for women.  But in a country with politics as corrupt as Lebanon's, its hard to be sure that the real concerns of ordinary citizens will prevail, even through an ostensibly democratic process.

Hezbollah's victory points to a key part of the GWOE (Global War on Extremism, which is gradually replacing the war on terror as the professed organizing principle of the Bush foreign policy) where Administration has proven woefully deficient:  going beyond the promotion of democracy to position the U.S. and its allies to win the war of ideas that will continue to be waged even in a liberalizing Middle East.

We are losing ground badly on this front.   The Administration seems to have given up on improving America's image in the region (still no sign of Karen Hughes).   Our detention officers, prison guards and interrogators are the de facto frontline of the U.S.'s public diplomacy effort, because we've failed to own up to their misdeeds and we've put forward little in the way of an alternative face for the U.S.

The Administration claims to be convinced that American-style democratic values and the rejection of terror will win out of their own merits.  Meanwhile, extremists are using everything about America's approach to the Arab world to delegitimize these concepts, while at the same time buttressing themselves with demonstrations of popular - and even electoral - support.

The Administration would argue that there's no way of putting a lid on all extremists at once (it was Paul Wolfowitz who called the Iraqi insurgents "a small number of bitter enders"  . . . in October of 2003).  That's true, and it might be comforting provided there was any sign that the U.S. is gaining ground in terms of popular opinion anywhere in the Arab world.

Hezbollah's victory is a powerful illustration of the idea that elections alone do not a true democracy make, and that a push to promote democracy must go far beyond simply holding votes.   The Administration's failure to figure to convincingly implement a much broader strategy for seeding democracy is yet another reason why progressives need to reclaim and redefine democratization as a foreign policy goal.

Divest from Sudan Posted by Derek Chollet

Suzanne has provided a fairly exhaustive list of what, short of military intervention, the United States can do -- and should do -- to end the slaughter in Darfur.  It’s right to avoid the either-or trap between massive military intervention or doing nothing.  With the demands our military faces right now in Afghanistan and Iraq, I don’t support a massive American military intervention.  And I also don’t believe that that’s what is needed (in fact, my impression is that the African countries don’t want one).  But there’s a lot we can do now to help the AU force – this would involve military assistance and some kind of intervention, preferably through NATO, but not a major troop commitment.

Thinking about what other tools are available, I’d like to draw attention to one more idea that we should all get behind.  Again, this comes from the good folks at the International Crisis Group:  Americans should demand that colleges and universities divest themselves from companies that are operating in Sudan.  Harvard did so earlier this year, and other major universities are being pressured to follow suit.  Last month, ICG’s John Prendergast and Harvard’s Samantha Power sent a letter to 100 university presidents urging them to examine their portfolios for links to Sudan and divest.  Student groups have sprouted up and have done good work (the group STAND -- Students Taking Action Now: Darfur – has 80 chapters nationwide), but with school out for the summer, progressives should work to pick up the slack.      

And a few weeks ago, the Illinois legislature took this one step further: it passed a law to make Illinois the first state to prohibit doing business with Sudan.  Illinois’ five pension systems have about $1 billion invested in 32 companies that work in Sudan, which this bill will put an end to.  It will also prohibit the state from investing in foreign government bonds of Sudan and investing in companies doing business in or with Sudan. 

Illinois might be the first, but it is not alone: A related measure has passed the New Jersey House but is bottled up in the Senate, California’s legislature has a version bouncing around, and just last week, legislation was offered in Ohio’s state Senate proposing something similar.   

I think this is an inspired idea, one that deserves greater attention (a place to start is here).  Imagine if more states followed Illinois’ lead?  For those of us who believe that we should be doing much more to end the genocide in Darfur, the divestment option is a two-fer: it puts meaningful pressure on the Sudanese government to stop its support of the janjaweed militia, and it keeps the political fires stoked here at home for the U.S. government to do more. 

Oh A S! Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Yet another sign of the U.S.'s waning influence in the OAS:  the body is set to reject a U.S. proposal for monitoring democracy in the hemisphere as a thinly veiled jab at Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.  The news report makes this proposal sound a little like a lite version of the Greater Middle East Initiative, a lofty program that was announced in early 2004 and summarily rejected by Arab governments that mistrusted the U.S.'s motives and had not be consulted on its content.  Like that idea, this one was made-in-the-USA and seemingly put forward with little or no consultation among others in the region.  Perhaps the Administration has concluded that, though it might initially raise hackles, given the steps forward in Lebanon and Egypt over the last year, a little high-handedness can go a long way.   

Its worrisome that the U.S. can come off as tone-deaf relative to its backyard of South America as it can in the Middle East.   The state of democracy in the hemisphere is a legitimate concern.  An American foreign policy focused on democracy promotion needs to address democracies that have stagnated or are sliding backwards as a result of economic and social pressures.  But when it comes to working with a group of democracies on how to fortify democracy within their own ranks, the U.S. may have to be a little more democratic in its own methods.

Top 10 Things To Do for Darfur Short of U.S. Military Intervention Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Kevin asks whether we ought to be prepared to send in armed troops to stop genocide. My answer is yes, provided we think we can get the job done and there isn’t an equivalent or better alternative to get the killing stopped. Given the weaknesses of the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed, I assume the operation would ordinarily be eminently doable.

But one of the worst things about our single-handed Iraq invasion is that for the first time in recent memory a legitimate question can be raised about whether the U.S. is over-extended to the point where we cannot assume new military obligations. As a political matter, Iraq has also made it tough to contemplate mounting another challenging military intervention. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t do it, but it does suggest that we won’t.  Progressives need to look beyond the a false dichotomy of either proposing a military intervention that is a political non-starter, or keeping a low profile on the Darfur tragedy out of an abashed sense that we don't know how to fully solve it.

If we right away did everything possible short of sending combat troops, we’d save a lot of lives, and make an eventual U.S. military role more feasible (and maybe even less necessary). I am no expert on Darfur, but those that are suggest that these are some places to start:

1. Put the heat on NATO to buttress the AU – The US, UN, EU and NATO have been passing the hot potato when it comes to taking action in Sudan. NATO has its limitations, but its better positioned than any other organization to become the focal point for partnering with the AU to try to make that mission effective. The U.S. should take the lead in pushing the alliance to prove its relevance by getting involved. NATO should take the lead in negotiating terms with the AU, instead of waiting until broader help is asked for. This month’s G-8 meeting in Scotland would be a good opportunity to make the case (though other G-8 members may turn the tables wanting support for their anti-poverty plans in Africa).

2. Put NATO troops on the ground – It will be impossible to turn around Darfur without putting substantial numbers of competent and equipped troops on the ground quickly. That’s an impossibility for the AU, so partnering effectively with them means sending in a portion of the 17,000 troops NATO supposedly has at the ready. All else under discussion – airlift, training, advisers – are half-measures. But in doing this, we need to realize that a NATO "bridge" until the AU is ready to take over may wind up lasting a long while.

3. Enforce a no-fly zone – The need for a no-fly zone to stop air raids on civilians has been discussed for upwards of a year.It was contained in the Darfur Accountability Act, which the Administration opposed.

4. Making it clear that preventing genocide trumps intelligence cooperation – The Sudanese government must love the fact that the U.S. is being reported to have toned down its outcry on Darfur so as not to interfere with Khartoum’s help in the fight against terrorism.The Administration has never disavowed this, and needs to if its other efforts to end the genocide are to be taken seriously and attract support.

5. Impose sanctions and an arms embargo – These are also parts of the moribund Darfur Accountability Act. Particularly if they targeted core sectors like the oil industry, sanctions would demonstrate that the U.S. means business, and would raise the cost of the Sudanese government’s indifference. In addition to full implementation of bilateral sanctions, the U.S. should push the UN Security Council to press ahead with its stalled sanctions effort. (Sudan’s defeat in today’s World Cup qualifier made me think sports sanctions should be considered too – they worked in South Africa).

North Korea: The Military Option Posted by Michael Signer

A smart, tough, and thought-provoking WaPo op-ed today by Susan Rice (a former Clinton assistant secretary of state) on the North Korea situation.  Her most provocative graf:

At this late stage, the United States has three options.

First, we could strike North Korea's suspected nuclear facilities or use force to change the regime. Military options must remain on the table, but all of them are problematic. U.S. intelligence on North Korea is poor. Overstretched in Iraq, the United States does not have ground forces for an invasion. South Korea and China vehemently oppose military action. Worse still, North Korea could retaliate with a nuclear or conventional strike on nearby Seoul, on our more than 30,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, on Japan or even on the United States.

Her point is made more powerful and problematic against the backdrop of an astonishing press conference earlier this week  by President Bush.  Here's how he answered a question about North Korea:

Q Good morning, Mr. President. This morning you reiterated diplomacy as the way to deal with North Korea. With all due respect, some people say that's precisely the wrong approach because diplomacy has produced nothing, while at the same time it has allowed North Korea to progress in its nuclear program.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q How do you -- what do you say to them?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then let's see -- if it's the wrong -- if diplomacy is the wrong approach, I guess that means military. That's how I view it -- it's either diplomacy or military. And I am for the diplomacy approach. And so, for those who say that we ought to be using our military to solve the problem, I would say that, while all options are on the table, we've got -- we've got a ways to go to solve this diplomatically.

BEWARE -- if you think a dovish analysis is coming, you will be disappointed. 

I don't want to be intemperate.  I'm certainly not bellicose.  I just want to think this through.  And I would like to start from a blank slate, meaning I have no ideological investment in any prefabricated policy conclusion.  I'm just interested in America's security.  From this beginning point, the President's blanket statement in his press conference triggers two questions. 

One:  Why should the military option be off the table as a matter of policy?  Why are we already committed to this binary choice? 

Two:  Why is the Administration getting away with gross illogic and hypocrisy in its contrary approaches to Iraq and North Korea?

Because these two questions are related, let's take them together.

The problem to many people in Iraq was that the underlying motivations of the war seemed to be much more about retrospective grievances than about prospective calculations.  This was why John Kerry said last year (with a typically tortured syntax):

[I]t is critical that this president gives life to the notion that the United States of America never goes to war because we want to. We should only go to war because we have to.

All the diplomatic and journalistic evidence (rather than the WMD evidence) suggested that Iraq had actually retreated into a relatively non-bellicose stance over the last several years, and was hardly currently threatening the United States.

In talking about "wanting" to go to war, Kerry was speaking to the idea that our approach on Iraq was colored by desire:  desire for revenge, desire for a fantastic, neocon guinea pig for democracy, desire for easy oil revenues. 

It was for all these reasons that the Administration did exactly the opposite of what the President is urging now:  they overtly and consistently chose the military rather than diplomatic option. 

Now, turn to North Korea.  President Bush is saying, as a matter of policy, we must choose the diplomatic rather than military option. 

Why?

As I see it, there are two ways to think about this in light of Iraq, and they have to do with whether we take Iraq and North Korea separately or apart. 

First, we can abandon any hope for logical consistency or ideological follow-through and instead approach the Administration's decision in Iraq as a kind of outlier. 

If we ignore Iraq, and look at North Korea with (somehow) fresh eyes, then North Korea becomes a test case for whether the Bush Administration has become all dewy-eyed and Clintonian in its appreciation for the power of soft power.  Then the question becomes, simply, whether or not their approach will work.

The second option is a little harder.  If we instead try to view the two situations together, as part of an integrated foreign policy, then the question becomes why we shouldn't be actively considering military along with diplomatic options -- especially if, applying the same logic we used in Iraq, North Korea is more of the same type of threat Iraq presented.

Let's go back to Rice's op-ed:

Military options must remain on the table, but all of them are problematic. U.S. intelligence on North Korea is poor. Overstretched in Iraq, the United States does not have ground forces for an invasion. South Korea and China vehemently oppose military action. Worse still, North Korea could retaliate with a nuclear or conventional strike on nearby Seoul, on our more than 30,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, on Japan or even on the United States.

We faced similar problems (regional instability, continuing attacks on our troops) going into Iraq.  But we went in anyway because of the rationales underlying what was a new American foreign policy of pre-emption.

The greatest irony is that the single greatest problem, in this crazy Catch-22 universe of the Bush Administration, is that our mismatch of rhetoric and reality in Iraq has hamstrung us for the reality in North Korea -- and so our rhetoric (with Bush looking embarrassingly weak in pleading for diplomacy with Kim Jong Il) has to play catch-up. 

As a nation, we should have some consistency to our foreign policy.  I know that the hallmark of realpolitik is intellectual flexibility based on context.  But I thought the whole point was that this Administration had moved beyond hard power calculations. 

The Bush Administration doesn't just speak for itself -- it speaks for the nation.  The Administration is tangled in a web of its own making and is trying to present Iraq and North Korea as two separate cases.  But they're not. 

Sudan - Don't Give Up So Fast Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Kevin Drum questions whether there's any truth to Derek's contention that the American public supports greater action on Darfur, and whether there's any option on the table for ending the crisis short of sending in American troops, something the public is hesitant to countenance.

As the resident night owl, I offer a few thoughts in response, with the hope that Derek adds some more in the AM:

- While Kevin's right that in the Zogby/International Crisis Group poll on U.S. public opinion toward Darfur, just 28% of Americans described themselves as "very aware" of the crisis, when the crisis was described to them large majorities nonetheless supported action: 70% thought the international community should respond and 84% thought the U.S. should use its "military assets" (short of troops) to stop the tragedy unfolding.  Under the circumstances, with the military stretched to the breaking point in a far-flung conflict that many Americans view as endless and unnecessary, its remarkable that fully 38% of survey respondents do support putting U.S. soldiers on the ground.  After all, that's 20% more than said they know what's really going on in Sudan.  Were it not for our entanglement in Iraq, that number might be a lot higher.

- Second, there are alternatives to U.S. boots on the ground.  Kevin is right that the Darfur mission is highlighting the AU's weaknesses in terms of capabilities, equipment and funding.   The most obvious short-term solution is a hefty NATO backstop to an AU force, likely going beyond the logistics, transport and training they are providing today to include actual troops in country (over the long-term, we ought to be thinking about measures like those outlined here, including a long-term investment in developing capable military leadership for a standing AU force).  This is what Derek, Madeleine Albright and others have been urging.  A large amount of U.S. energy has been expended over the last decade in sustaining and expanding NATO in preparation for a post-Cold War role.   With Europe chaotic but essential secure and peaceful, right now its hard to imagine a better use of the capabilities amassed than Darfur.  It's also a chance for the many European countries that are not entangled in Iraq to share some of the burden of keeping the global peace, something they profess willingness to do.  Building consensus for a robust NATO mission won't be easy, but the U.S. is obligated to try.

- A third option is stepped up UN peacekeeping.  The UNSC voted to establish a 10,000 person strong peacekeeping mission in Sudan back in March, but the peacekeepers have only just begun to deploy.  The UN forces will share some of the AU limitations, including lack of rapid-deployment and sophisticated airlift capabilities.  Over the long-term, a standing UN force would be one way to remedy these shortcomings, and strengthen the alternatives to U.S. intervention.  There are also political constraints on UN involvement, including most notably China's ties to the Sudanese regime.    But the Chinese are not above the kind of pressure that global acknowledgement of a genocidal crisis brings to bear.

So its not enough to throw up our hands even if we reject U.S. ground troops as a serious option.  There are alternatives.  Its the Administration's job to make them work, and our job to push them to do so.

Iraq and Democracy (theirs and ours) Posted by Lorelei Kelly

Last week, I posted about a House amendment calling for the president to submit a plan for troop withdrawal from Iraq.  One DA reader commented: What consequences do you see flowing from such an amendment, were it to be adopted as US policy? How would you justify them as good for Americans or for Iraqis?

I'd like to start to answer that question with a quotation from Richard Holbrooke.  "We need exit strategies--but they must be in the context of getting the job done."  One step forward to that end that would be both healthy for American and Iraqi participatory democracy would be to engage both publics more actively in discussions about the future (theirs and ours intermingled with theirs). Though the amendment may be a clumsy tool, it has started an important discussion in  Congress--the very body that is supposed to have authority over key decisions on war and peace.

I have queried military friends who believe that any mention of an exit strategy is detrimental. But they also agree that this aversion should not eliminate the need for some kind of plan. Well, the amendment doesn't even mention the words "exit strategy".  In order to not fuss about language, let's call it a "blueprint for viable peace" including publicly discussed achievement benchmarks.   One of my military skeptic friends also said "no matter what we call it, there has to be a way to consolidate the process."  This need is especially urgent today because of our leadership's absolute lack of conflict termination planning in the lead up to the war (a colleague with extensive time  in the Balkans named this behavior"calculated inexperience", the cousin of willful ignorance) Most of all, however,  even a generic set of issues as benchmarks will create a more effective American presence, as these items will routinely be integrated into intelligence gathering and planning. 

So in order to not to use divisive language, the discussion could be framed as a question: What would be a militarily satisfactory vision of success in Iraq? In military-speak, what are the "desired effects"?  The Bush Administration actually does have a plan: to create capable Iraqi forces and to move Americans into increasingly peripheral roles.  Yet this needs to be articulated clearly so the American public sees the meaning of the strategy and can understand the challenge that we've undertaken as one that will require long-term commitment and perserverance--but that will also--one day--end.  An example from the past to illustrate: Decades ago,  the promise of nuclear abolition brought nations to the table in support of the non proliferation treaty,  the far distant ideal of nuclear abolition turned the skeptics and potential spoilers into productive participants.  In order for both the American and the Iraqi publics to remain interested and maybe even hopeful stakeholders in the process of democracy, this kind of inspiration is vital. To live free of military occupation is a healthy ideal for the Iraqi people. To support a long-term plan for viable peace in Iraq is a healthy aspiration for the American people. But we still need an intentional plan. The additional benefit of Congress discussing troop withdrawal is that it may be an end-run way to expose the completely inadequate priorities that we allocate for the civilian tools needed for today's wars.  A healthy public discussion will also reveal more clearly the fact that the Iraq conflict, ultimately, will not be solved militarily.  The military knows this--which is why the Defense Department should answer the above questions. Then we'll have a starting point.

A wonderful book that delves deeply into the this topic The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation was just published by the United States Institute of Peace (although the origins of the book are with the Association of the US Army)  Two out of three of the volume editors have military backgrounds and the contents cover everything from how to make a peace process the guiding principle for all policy decisions during an intervention to how to deal with extremists-- including use of force. One author, British officer Ben Lovelock calls this combination of policy requirements "Fourth Generation Peacekeeping"-- necessary because in today's wars there is no "post" conflict stage.  The violence never stops.  The authors also discuss the four simultaneous and ongoing transformation strategies needed for today's wars:  moderating political conflict, defeating militant extremism, institutionalizing the rule of law and developing a legitimate political economy.

Troop withdrawal amendment or not, the administration would do well to consult this book   I thought one of the authors summed it up well when he clarified some jargon.  "Transition" he said, is what we Americans do to phase ourselves into a less intrusive role. "Transformation" however, is what they (the Iraqis) do. Its when the locals make progress and achieve civil peace. War delivers for the insurgents. How do we help make peace deliver for the Iraqi people? That could be the first sentence of a blueprint for viable peace in Iraq.

A dollar short for Africa Posted by Suzanne Nossel

A while ago we here made a list of 10 things the Bush Administration could do with no change in policy that would help improve America's image around the world .  Number 1 was getting behind Britain's initiative to dramatically up aid to Africa, making good on commitments the G8 adopted starting in 2001.

As part of the very same press conference with Thabo Mbeki in which, as Derek discusses below, Bush called the situation in Darfur genocide, the President also make clear he has no intention of being more generous to Africa because "it doesn't fit our budgetary process." 

Meanwhile the EU's original 15 members agreed Tuesday to increase official aid for immunizations, sanitation, education, and other programs for the poor to the equivalent of 0.7 percent of GDP by 2015.  The 10 newest EU members pledged to ''strive for'' 0.33 percent.  That's more than double the .16 of GDP the U.S. currently spends.

The purpose of Mbeki's trip to the U.S. was, at least in large part, to try to build support for the anti-poverty meeting in preparation for an upcoming G8 confab in Scotland.  While Mbeki tried to put a positive spin on the President's response, the absence of any new commitments means he was pretty much shut out.

The problem is not that Britain wants to shower aid willy-nilly.  They too have demanded strict accountability and anti-corruption measures as part of their proposals.  In fact, the Bush Administration's failure to support the UK is becoming a source of real friction between Bush and Blair.  Blair is considering imposing a tax to fund the program, a concept that's unimaginable here.

The EU is in chaos, but has still managed to agree that it wants to be on the forefront of the global battle against poverty, motivated partly by morality and partly by pragmatic concerns about the chaos and spillover effects that desperation breeds. 

The Administration has made the promotion of freedom a centerpiece of its policy, but won't put up the money to help lift up countries for which the biggest threats to freedom are disease, hunger, and poor education.   As the EU moves forward without us, a measure that could have boosted America's image will now hurt it. 

The end of today's press conference was a recitation of tired arguments on Zimbabwe.  Bush decried Mugabe's abuses and reckless ransacking of his country, concluding that "it's a problem."  Mbeki tripped over his own claim that the regime needs "support . . . to overcome these problems," almost saying that its the opposition that deserves the help.  Meanwhile, the despot has been rounding up tens of thousands of political opponents, burning their homes and running others out of the country's big towns.   

It's not too late for Bush to change his mind in advance of the July G-8 Summit.  Why not offer the aid, but link it to a genuine partnership on promoting democracy in Africa - including an end to Mbeki and others' support for Mugabe.  Zimbabwe now seems to be on its way to complete mayhem, which could necessitate lengthy and costly international intervention and recovery effort.  Given the choice between billions more in aid or standing by a friend who is starving his own people, African leaders might budge.

Missed Opportunity Posted by Derek Chollet

In today's Oval Office press availability with South African President Mbeki, President Bush uttered, apparently for the first time, that what is happening in Darfur is genocide (he had only "said" such in a written statement issued last year). He was also asked what he thought of the poll discussed below showing the American people's overwhelming support for stronger action to end the genocide in Darfur.  Here's the exchange in full:

Q:   And, Mr. President, on the issue of Darfur, Sudan, a new survey came out by the Zogby International Poll that finds 84 percent of Americans polled feel that the U.S. should not tolerate an extremist government committing such attacks and should use its military assets, short of using military combat troops on the ground to protect civilians there.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Let me first say something. We are working with NATO to make sure that we are able to help the AU put combat troops there. And as a part of that, I believe a transport plane of ours, for example, will be a part of this mission.

I think later on today I'm going to speak to the Prime Minister of Canada, who has also been very strong about dealing with Darfur, and I will thank him for his contributions.

Ok.  Thanks are in order.  But how about asking for more?  Seems like a missed opportunity.  In addition to Mbeki and the Candian PM, Bush also talked about Darfur today with the NATO Secretary General.  Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick is on his way to Darfur now.  Let's hope this is the beginning of something...