What Ignatius J. Reilly Tells Us about Pakistan Posted by Patrick Barry

If Ignatius J. Reilly, corpulent sloth-King of Confederacy of Dunces, was tweeting to the Af-Pak Channel right now, he’d probably say that fortune’s wheel is spinning up right now when it comes to Pakistan. (Although, come to think of it, Ignatius probably wouldn't think much of Twitter)

First, there was last week’s capture of Mullah Baradar. Then, yesterday, Newsweek blew the lid off another arrest: Pakistan had captured two Taliban shadow governors, Mullah Abdul Salam and Mullah Mohammed (revised from just Abdul Salam), possibly with the assistance of the CIA.  Now, Dawn, GEO and AP are reporting the arrests of as many as 9 more individuals with links to either the Taliban or Al Qaeda (The AP article makes it sound as if they’re including the two governors, so I can’t be sure.)  

What gives? Why has Pakistan suddenly gotten so good at arresting Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders and associates? Perhaps it’s one of the possibilities I discussed? Perhaps it’s as Spencer speculated yesterday, that the U.S. is using intel plucked from an Al Qaeda operative traveling between Pakistan and Yemen to its advantage?  Or maybe Josh Foust’s whiff of optimism if correct. Maybe this really is a “sea change” moment in the U.S. – Pakistan relationship?  

Even if Pakistan’s and America’s interests are inching toward greater alignment - an observation I made yesterday and Tuesday- it's important to not get carried away. Pakistan's history of support for militants, and its pattern of double dealing the U.S. extends way past the more positive development of the last week. It remains the case our motivations and their motivations, synced as they may be for the moment, are not the same.  Fortune’s wheel won’t spin up forever.

Test Ban Treaty -- Golden Opportunity for Republican Bipartisanship Posted by David Shorr

With bipartisanship being the political order of the day, this is a good time to identify foreign policy issues that are ripe for bipartisanship. Luckily, Vice President Biden is highlighting a tailor-made issue in a policy address at National Defense University today: ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The CTBT meshes perfectly with the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries. The United States and the other established nuclear powers don't need to set off more underground nuclear explosions and have observed a unilateral moratorium for many years -- in our case dating back to the first President Bush. Recent experience with North Korea and Pakistan, on the other hand, reminds us that nuclear tests serve to announce a country's arrival as a nuclear-armed power. (I like to call them a 'lagging indicator' of nuclear proliferation.) So while we shouldn't expect North Korea to sign the CTBT any time soon, the United States has every reason to solidify a treaty saying that test nuclear explosions are a bad thing.

Yet, modern bipartisanship, unfortunately, is a game with moving goalposts. It's like the domestic political equivalent of the neoconservative approach to international negotiations -- instead of give and take, conservatives want all take and no give. As a result, the center of gravity for compromise has moved steadily rightward. When it comes to arms control, Ronald Reagan's policies look so moderate on the contemporary political spectrum that they would certainly come under scathing criticism from today's right wing.

What worries me the most is that there has probably been a rightward shift even in the last couple years, with 2007-08 maybe having been a high water mark of bipartisan comity between moderates. Take for example this May 2008 policy address by presidential candidate John McCain, which voices his explicit openness to CTBT ratification. I sincerely hope Senator McCain still believes these things he said back then, but my reading of the political climate is less optimistic.

One thing that hasn't changed, and leaves me somewhat optimistic, is the reliable moderateness of the old-line Republican establishment. I have to assume that the administration's strategy for CTBT ratification includes the deployment of the lions of the Republican foreign policy community. Watching them vie against contemporary far-right ideology should be fascinating.

If China Supports Iran Sanctions Posted by David Shorr

If China lends its support to a new set of Iran sanctions in the UN Security Council (or its tacit acceptance via an abstention), then I'd like to see retractions from all those who have confidently ruled this possibility out. After the mea culpas, we'd come quickly to the question of why China relented. The flurry of diplomacy currently under way gives an opportunity to preview different possible explanations for such a decision by Beijing, with the help of Greg Scoblete and Kevin Sullivan of RealClearWorld's Compass Blog, who aggregate and add to the analysis of Chinese motives.

In other words, if we start with China's countervailing interests -- keep oil flowing from Iran, maintain good relations with a key supplier, not sharing US concern over Iranian nukes, maybe even relishing political / strategic problems for the US -- what would explain Chinese support for sanctions? Our Compass Blog colleagues delve interesting questions about China's strategic interest in energy security in connection with the Obama administration's diplomatic message of the week. Washington is trying to shift Chinese leaders' focus from the oil they import from Iran to their broader dependence on the overall stability of petroleum supply on the global market (and, by extension, Middle East regional stability). The contracts China preserves in Iran will be cold comfort if Iranian nuclear progress leads to heightened conflict in the region, which then leads to supply constraints and huge price hikes.

The United States' partners in this diplomatic message are the Arab oil exporting countries, reportedly backed by promises to make up for any lost supply. [Hmmm, wonder what this says about mercantilism versus a single global market? I digress, sorry.] For Greg Scoblete, this means all credit for Chinese support goes to the Saudis, and none to the Obama administration's policy of engagement. I can understand the argument that the Saudis get credit for pushing the sanctions across the finish line, but this analysis applies a pretty steep discount to all the earlier diplomatic work.

What Kevin Sullivan finds interesting is to watch China become ensnared in the same geopolitical trap of oil addiction as the United States:

Hint, hint: the more you invest in the Middle East, the more you have to invest in keeping the region safe and secure. Or, in short, the Biggie Smalls Doctrine. See U.S. foreign policy (1980 - present). Does Beijing wish to embed itself in the region as the United States has? Does China want its consumption costs tied to that instability?

Sullivan calls this an "anti-hegemonic" appeal from the US to China, i.e. that China shouldn't want the job of hegemon for that region. The short answer -- well, long-term answer -- is to reduce the addiction to oil, and that goes for both of us. But the real short-term message to China is the same one as it is for a lot of issues: no more free-riding.

Beyond the hazards of this region's political thicket, I think the generic lesson is a positive one. The United States' strategy should be for all major powers to be status quo powers -- influential nations that share the responsibility for essential stability and a basically functioning world, as opposed to a more chaotic one. For all the screwed-up things about the Middle East, some of them with America's name on them, it could easily be more screwed up. Foreign policy shouldn't be entirely about stability; it should also be about progress and justice. But stability shouldn't be presumed or discounted either (see Iraq, invasion of).

Many criticisms of US policy are valid. Many others evade any responsibility for consequences and make blithe assumptions about how one international situation or another could either be changed or left alone. So if China supports sanctions against Iran, I'll interpret it as a sign that China recognizes the larger dangers of mounting regional tensions and not just the bilateral relationship with a trading partner.

Looking Back at the Baradar Capture Posted by Patrick Barry

After a second look, my analysis from yesterday seems like it would have benefitted from a complimentary examination of the dynamics that might have precipitated Pakistan to take action against a militant hiding within its borders.  While Colin Cookman is right that “we should be cautious about extrapolating too much from the detention of a single commander,” evidence and analysis is beginning to suggest a range of possible interpretations for why Pakistan acted as it did.

One view is that Baradar’s capture is related a possible political settlement of the Afghanistan conflict, a perspective expressed in today’s New York Times story analyzing the capture. “Pakistan has effectively isolated a key link to the Taliban leadership, making itself the main channel instead,” said the Times. 

Within this view are a range of possibilities. One variant is that by capturing Baradar, whom some have called the Taliban leader most interested in a settlement, the Pakistanis can set him up as a conduit for negotiations, even while he is imprisoned (see Spencer and Thomas Ruttig).

But that opinion of Baradar is far from universal, and contrary evidence indicates he’s opposed to talks.  If that’s correct, then another way to look at Baradar’s capture is that Pakistan still wants to control the terms of a settlement, but views the Taliban leader as an impediment to its involvement, either because he’s opposed to the idea, or because it can’t control him, and would preferr to empower say, the Haqqanis, who might be more easily influenced by handlers in the military or ISI (See Coll).  Either way, Pakistan’s desire to carve out a role for itself in a political settlement of the Afghan conflict is not in itself a bad thing.  It’s really the kind of involvement that matters.  If the U.S. treads carefully, it may be able to use this convergence around negotiations to its advantage.

On the other hand, it’s also possible that the Pakistanis don’t want a settlement with the Afghan Taliban at all, perhaps seeing an Afghanistan under threat from the Taliban as a useful check against India’s activities in Afghanistan (See Wall Street Journal).  With a few Talibs on record as saying that Baradar’s capture basically mucks up any chance of peace talks, this too remains a plausible interpretation, and would bode ill for the U.S.

Yet another view is the U.S. forced cooperation from Pakistan through either the steady accumulation of evidence linking the ISI to the Taliban or the presentation of specific evidence of Baradar’s exact location inside Pakistan. Such evidence, were it to become public, would be embarrassing for Pakistan, particularly as it heads into negotiations with India.  Far better to be seen as a U.S. partner, even if it's an unwilling partnership.  As Spencer notes, breaking news about another joint U.S. – Pakistan operation to capture a Taliban leader hiding in Pakistan adds to the weight of this interpretation.  For people hoping that Baradar’s capture was a sign that the U.S. and Pakistan were suddenly seeing eye-to-eye this isn’t very satisfying. But it at least shows that the U.S. intelligence is improving, and that it can use that intel to persuade the Pakistanis to be more cooperative.

A final interpretation, which only a small minority appears to have taken, is that Baradar’s capture is a result of months of diplomatic, military and economic activity by the U.S. intended to persuade Pakistan that it is within its interests to go after the Afghan Taliban.  Skeptics rightfully argue that this position overstates the degree to which the U.S. has influence over Pakistani decision-making.  I’m sympathetic to that argument, but as I said yesterday, I think it’s foolish to say categorically that the flurry of U.S. activity played no role in opening up avenues for this kind of joint-effort. 

Looking at this range of possibilities, I still see some good mixed with the bad.  Pakistan is clearly exercising its agency here, but it may be doing so in a way that compliments some U.S. objectives.  Baradar’s capture also comes after a year in which trends in the U.S. – Pakistani relationship were roughly positive, at least by comparison to the previous 8 years.  If nothing else, the arrest will keep the trend lines positive, which is good when you consider how hugely unpopular the U.S. is in Pakistan right now. 

What Makes America Ungovernable Posted by Michael Cohen

So two weeks ago I wrote a piece for Newsweek in which I described the United States as an increasingly ungovernable country. In the Wall Street Journal, Pete Wehner has responded by defining my argument as “unserious,” because I described the Republican Party as a “party of nihilists” focused on the achievement of political power above all else.

By a unique scientific principle known as the Wehner Paradox (which is an offshoot of Jon Chait’s Wehner Fallacy) a charge of unseriousness from Pete Wehner is actually proof of the fundamental seriousness of ones argument. So thanks Pete! I’m only hoping that soon Pete Wehner will soon describe me as being “un-wealthy” in the pages of the Wall Street Journal . . . or declare that the Detroit Red Wings will NOT win the Stanley Cup this year.

But jokes aside, today’s New York Times provides even more evidence of our fundamentally broken political system and the unique role played by the Republican party in perpetuating that cycle of dysfunction.  Part of the problem here is the seeming incapacity of reporters to state the obvious: we have a broken political system that is undermining America’e economic competitiveness and sapping American power and influence on the global stage - and Republicans are overwhelmingly to blame. Consider this quote from the Times story:

Yet rarely has the political system seemed more polarized and less able to solve big problems that involve trust, tough choices and little short-term gain. The main urgency for both parties seems to be about pinning blame on the other, before November’s elections, for deficits now averaging $1 trillion a year, the largest since World War II relative to the size of the economy.

I wonder if Jackie Calmes really believes that the main urgency for Democrats is to pin blame for the deficit on Republicans . . . when the main urgency of Democrats seems to be passing health care reform, which would go a long way toward resolving the country’s long-term debt issues, and Republicans are doing everything in their power to obstruct it (and it should be mentioned did nothing to deal with the country’s health care crisis during the past eight years when they controlled wide swaths of the federal government).  Even the notion that Democrats don’t want to deal with entitlement spending is undermined by the fact that the party’s health care reform legislation would help put Medicare on a more secure financial footing and reduce health care costs in general (not that this stopped the GOP from accusing the Obama Administration of wanting to cut Medicare spending).

Indeed Calmes counts the many ways in which Republicans have made “bipartisan compromise” impossible – or created the current problem:

“Republicans today see opposition as a way back to power in November, and their party is more ideologically antitax than in the past.”

“Conservative activists so oppose compromise of any sort that several lawmakers have drawn primary challengers for working with Democrats.”

“Sensing political advantage, Republicans are resisting President Obama’s call for a bipartisan commission to cut the debt, although recent studies have implicated the tax cuts and spending policies of the years after 2000 when they controlled Congress and the White House. Even seven Republican senators who had co-sponsored a bill to create a commission nonetheless voted against it recently.”

In searching for examples of Democratic obstructionism to deficit reduction, Calmes only cites President Obama’s admittedly ill-advised declaration in the 2008 campaign that he would not raise taxes over anyone making less than $250,000. What goes unnoted here is that even with that pledge – even with the hundreds of billions of dollars in tax cuts in last year’s stimulus package - Republican leaders continue to falsely claim that Obama HAS raised taxes - and most Americans believe them. I wonder if this had something to do with Obama making that pledge.

Finally, only at the end of the article does Calmes make perhaps the essential point about the failure to tackle America’s growing debt - voter incoherence on the issue:

Yet politicians’ failure to reduce deficits has long reflected voters’ opposition to the necessary steps. By a two-to-one ratio Americans oppose cutting health care and education; 51 percent oppose lower military spending.

The CBS/NYT poll she cites doesn’t ask about raising taxes or cutting entitlements, but take a wild guess what those numbers might look like. 

But none of this should be a surprise; forty years of anti-government rhetoric that taxes are evil, cutting “wasteful” spending is easy (even when consistently it's not) and reducing our bloated military budget or paring back our international commitments will put America at risk has fundamentally narrowed the governing options for America’s leaders.  And on this front it’s not just Republicans who are to blame – it’s folks like the “centrist” Evan Bayh, who on the one hand preaches fiscal sanity and then supports tax cut giveaways for the wealthiest Americans. To sound a bipartisan note here, Bayh and other pseudo-centrists are absolutely complicit in helping the GOP grind the wheels of effective governance to a halt.

Generally speaking I have been trying to avoid sounding an overly partisan note here at DA; and as any long-time reader will attest I have not been shy in criticizing the current Administration for some of its foreign policy decision-making. But there is nothing partisan about stating that “Party Gridlock” is not fueling America’s debt crisis, it’s the Republican Party. That’s a fact. 

A party that is unable to fathom the very notion of raising taxes on any American, that treats any efforts to curb military interventionism and spending as a treasonous act, and has consistently demonstrated a fundamental unseriousness about reducing spending – and has actually in positions of political power perpetuated the country’s addiction to deficit spending – IS THE PROBLEM. That Democrats lack the confidence in their own beliefs to stand up to this obstructionism is not helping; but it's hardly the root of the issue.

And look, one can certainly make the argument that such an approach is completely consistent with a conservative ideology that looks askance at the overweening influence of government. One can argue that the GOP approach is consistent with the belief that the most effective government is one that does not provide for its citizens or perhaps more charitably, is one that does not try too deeply to influence their lives.

Fine. I'll buy that. As long as everyone accepts that this is the defining source of gridlock in American politics today. Deal?

Sea Changes Don't Just Happen Overnight Posted by Patrick Barry

Or at least in the case of Mullah Baradar they don't.

So far, analysis I’ve seen on the stunning capture of Taliban commander Mullah Baradar (here, here and here) has largely focused on the implications for U.S. operations in Afghanistan.  But the capture is potentially just as significant because of what it reveals about the condition of the U.S. – Pakistan relationship, and what that relationship is likely to look like going forward.  With the necessary caveat that the opacity of U.S. – Pakistan relations can make analysis subject to speculation, this capture still strikes me as significant on a number of levels.  

Most immediately, as the New York Times notes, “[t]he participation of Pakistan’s spy service could suggest a new level of cooperation from Pakistan’s leaders, who have been ambivalent about American efforts to crush the Taliban.” Indeed, Bruce Riedel, who led the Afghanistan and Pakistan policy review version 1.0, welcomed the raid as a “sea change in Pakistani behavior.”

There can be little doubt that this is a significant shift.  Pakistan has never proved this cooperative when it comes to the Afghan Taliban, something Pakistan watchers, myself included, have long taken as a sign of fundamentally divergent interests.  Still, is it as surprising as Riedel says? I’m not convinced.  Leaving aside the rough absence of previous cooperation related to threats to Afghanistan, it’s not as if there haven’t been examples of American-Pakistani cooperation in other areas.  If Saturday you had looked back on the uptick in drone strikes over the last year, the presence of U.S. Special Forces trainers in Pakistan, and the Pakistani military’s offensives in places like Swat and South Waziristan, would it have been so hard to imagine a point in the not-so-distant future when the two countries would team up against the Afghan Taliban? In fact, there actually has been a recent example of the two countries’ Afghanistan policies drawing into closer, if far from perfect, alignment: last week’s hint that Pakistan was prepared to use its leverage over the Haqqanis to get them to the negotiating table for an Afghanistan political settlement.

It seems to me the important question here is what changed that made the Pakistanis suddenly willing to go take action on the Afghanistan issue, when, as the Times notes, “American officials have speculated that Pakistani security officials could have picked up Mullah Baradar long ago?” 

Josh Foust thinks it could be a quid-pro-quo, hypothesizing that “We paid a price for this,” and urging Pakistan watchers to look for reciprocation in the weeks to come.  While I don’t doubt that this raid cost us something, why should we leave out the range of factors that might have plausibly induced or pressured Pakistan’s government into making this shift? Come to think of it, this seems like exactly the sort of coordination that billions in foreign assistance, military advising and equipment, as well as months of agonizing diplomatic activity are supposed to achieve.  I won’t yet declare this a victory for U.S. diplomacy, but the overall trends do seem to be a lot better than they were when the GAO said the U.S. basically didn’t have a Pakistan policy. 

Finally, without drawing too much of a causal connection here, I do want to point out that this is exactly the kind of action the U.S. should want to derive from signals to Afghanistan’s neighbors about an eventual end to American involvement in the region.  I’m one of those people who thinks that Pakistan’s actions in Afghanistan haven’t been the most helpful and may end up hurting Pakistan in the future.  But I also recognize that up until this point, American efforts to convince the Pakistanis of that fact haven’t been tremendously successful.  Continuing to convey a message to Pakistan that they can’t expect the U.S. to be the guarantors of Afghanistan’s stability forever seems like a decent way to alter that dynamic, especially since there now appears to be a correlation between more helpful action from Pakistan and the first explicit Presidential announcement of a transition to American disengagement.

Update: Ahh, I see Spencer beat me to the argument that Baradar's capture validates the Obama administration's Pakistan strategy to a considerable extent.  Shame on me for not heading to the Windy amidst my other morning activities.

Storming the ISA Posted by Michael Cohen

Ok, in fairness there won't be a lot of storming going on - these are academics after all! But I'll be down in New Orleans this week at the ISA Conference leading a discussion on Thursday morning about Afghanistan and Thursday afternoon on the Outsourcing of American Power. The rest of the time I'll be eating crawfish etouffe and perhaps some alligator cheescake.

If any DA readers are planning on attending and want to meet up, please drop me a line.

I Take It All Back! - UPDATED Posted by Michael Cohen

Well sort of, but this is huge news:

The Taliban’s top military commander was captured several days ago in Karachi, Pakistan, in a secret joint operation by Pakistani and American intelligence forces, according to American government officials.The commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, is an Afghan described by American officials as the most significant Taliban figure to be detained since the American-led war in Afghanistan started more than eight years ago. He ranks second in influence only to Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban’s founder, and was a close associate of Osama bin Laden before the Sept. 11 attacks.

Not only is this enormous as far as the US war in Afghanistan, but it suggests for perhaps the first time that the Pakistan government is willing to cooperate with the US in going after the Afghan Taliban.  One can only imagine the impact on Taliban feelings of security and reliance on Pakistani support: that safe haven ain't feeling so safe anymore. One has to think this will affect the drive toward political reconciliation in a dramatic way - because if you're the Taliban this news suggests that time is no longer necessarily on your side.

I don't think it's an exaggeration to say this may be the most important to thing to happen to the US war in Afghanistan - as Leah Farrell suggests this might be the more significant US capture since 9/11. This has the potential to change the entire complexion of the war in Afghanistan - and for the better. For the first time in a very long time, there is reason for optimism.

UPDATE: Greg Carlstrom has warned against over-optimism about reconciliation and he's right, it's probably a bit early to get too far ahead since we don't know all the reasons why the ISI moved on Baradar - and we don't know what's happening behind the scenes. But the combination of the US surge, increased military pressure on the Taliban, even the Shinwari deal and now this capture - for the first time in a while there is evidence that the Taliban may be losing the military initiative.  That may have the potential to move the reconciliation ball forward.  We may have to wait a while and see how this plays out, but there weren't many events that had the potential to really change the political equation on the ground - and this is one of them. 

BTW, if this was in the works before Obama's West Point speech - and was done in concert with the surge - could someone please direct me to my plate of crow.

Thoughts on Marjeh: The Jury is Still Out Posted by Michael Cohen

I've been wanting for a few days to say something smart and profound about the US offensive in Marjeh. While generally I struggle with smart and profound, the more difficult problem is what to say. 

As Josh Foust points out, reporting is, how shall we say . . . all over the map. It seems that US troops have encountered sporadic resistance; but even with the focus on not harming civilians, there seem to be several different incidents of civilians being killed. 

Yesterday, 12 were killed when an artillery shell went astray; another 5 killed today in an ISAF airstrike. As I noted the other day, none of this should be surprising - civilians die in war. If the US really didn't want to see civilians harmed (if that was our number one priority) we likely wouldn't be in Helmand in the first place. We've made the decision to place our interests above those of Afghan civilians. There's nothing inherently wrong with that; it's the very nature of war, but at least we should be honest in acknowledging it.

A couple of interesting points that did jump out in some of the coverage. There are some early indications that significant numbers of Taliban slipped across the border to Pakistan, which has always been one of the problems with trying to hold and build in Helmand, in general. Also, it's been very hard to figure out how many Afghan units are actually involved in fighting, but I thought this tweet from Atia Abawi, who is embedded in Marjeh, was interesting:

Afghan soldiers supposed to be a big part of Op Mushtarak. Some are motivated, but most that I've seen like to sleep as the Marines fight.

(And since I'm not obsessed with Twitter, you can follow me here: http://twitter.com/speechboy71) 

But in the end, what happens now won't be terribly revelatory. I think the Guardian did a nice job of summing up the issue:

The withdrawal of Isaf forces from Marjah will be more significant than their insertion. If this operation is designed to be as important to the Afghan surge as the capture of Falluja was for the Iraq campaign, then the objective is not to kill the insurgents so much as make it impossible for them to come back.

This is exactly right. It's way too early to draw any serious conclusions on the effectiveness of the Marjeh offensive. If the US is able to clear the area; if together with Afghan Army and police they are able to provide security and if the Afghan government is able to offer effective governance then maybe this whole thing works. Considering their lack of success in the past in doing effective "hold and build" in the past - not to mention the fact that US troops are on a pretty short leas before withdrawal - I'm a bit skeptical.

But time will tell; and until then the verdict on Marjeh is still pending.

Longing for No-Drama Obama? Check Out Iraq Drawdown. Posted by Heather Hurlburt

There's plenty of drama in Iraq these days, surrounding the upcoming elections and the banning and unbanning, de-Baathification and un-de-Baathification of candidates, the emergence of new political coalitions. 

But on Sunday, Secretary Clinton announced that the US troop presence has fallen below 100,000,That is almost a 25% cut in seven months -- and a faster pace of withdrawal than the Administration announced last summer, when the commander of US forces in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, said the US intended to get to 120,000 by the end of the year. 

Did you even look up from the Nordic combined final to notice?  I didn't think so.  But don't feel bad.  Iraqis, as noted above, were too busy running their national affairs to be very concerned.  Even Dick Cheney  couldn't squeeze a word about Iraq into his politicized Sunday show litany.

(*An ironic note:  we are now heading, in 2010, toward the 30-50,000 troop level that Bush Administration pre-war planning predicted we would hit in 2003.)

It's fun to be snarky about this on a blog.  And of course the Administration is properly concerned not to draw too much attention to the troop moves in order not to embolden either its domestic or regional opponents.  In fact, making the announcement in a regional forum, as Secretary Clinton did in Doha, is just right -- because the regional Arab and Muslim audience is the one that most needs to see the US keeping our word and withdrawing troops from a Muslim country.

But it's worth asking what is wrong with the way we report on and debate national security here at home.  A leader can draw endless praise for starting a war, or escalating one.  Students of history and politics know that it's considerably more difficult to end a war than to begin one (this is where I regret the inadequacy of my education and my inability to provide a suitable reference from antiquity, but the French and Americans in Indochina alone ought to make the point).  We were told ad nauseam from 2005 onwards that pulling out would have unthinkable consequences for stability in and around Iraq, for human rights, and for the safety of our troops.  I don't at all wish to downplay the uncertainty surrounding the Iraqi elections, and the potential negative consequences.  But I have not seen a single arugment which suggests that more troops could have prevented or solved the problem -- or, more importantly, that Iraqis want it to be solved by American intervention. (Check out Marc Lynch on this.) I also realize that the most significant danger point for our troops lies ahead, when we really have gotten down to that mythical 30,000-50,000 level.

Wouldn't it be good to see endless columns of Washington Post tick-tock of the decisions to disengage, and how Iraqis have stood up at each one?  Or to see a fight break out between CAP and FPI over who deserves more credit for setting the foundations of this sage withdrawal policy, Obama (for demanding it for 4+ years) or George W. Bush (for negotiating the status of forces agreement that set it in motion)? 

In sum - we need a national security discussion which recognizes that wars have an end as well as a beginning, though not many will end with surrenders on battleships.  We need to accustom ourselves and our public debate to different ways the end may look, as well as the beginning.  And we need to praise and value leaders who have the wisdom and foresight and, yep, bravery, because it takes that too, to plan for the ending.  For it is likely that not all of this withdrawal, or the one from Afghanistan that will come in five or ten years, will be this "easy."