The World According to Gant Posted by Michael Cohen

Over the past couple of weeks, there has been a some rather interesting debate about Jim Gant, a 35-year old Green Beret, and his plan for tribal engagement in Afghanistan. Gant published a paper this past Fall called One Tribe at a Time that Sunday got the Washington Post treatment . . . with a glowing article about Gant's rising profile and the tag line, "The Green Beret Who Could Win the War In Afghanistan":

In recent months, Gant, now a major, has won praise at the highest levels for his effort to radically deepen the U.S. military's involvement with Afghan tribes -- and is being sent back to Afghanistan to do just that. His 45-page paper, "One Tribe at a Time," published online last fall and circulating widely within the U.S. military, the Pentagon and Congress, lays out a strategy focused on empowering Afghanistan's ancient tribal system. Gant believes that with the central government still weak and corrupt, the tribes are the only enduring source of local authority and security in the country. We will be totally unable to protect the 'civilians in the rural areas of Afghanistan until we partner with the tribes for the long haul," wrote Gant.

"Maj. Jim Gant's paper is very impressive -- so impressive, in fact, that I shared it widely," Petraeus said, while McChrystal distributed it to all commanders in Afghanistan. One senior military official went so far as to call Gant "Lawrence of Afghanistan."  

I'm not really in the best position to judge the merits of Gant's arguments, although I would note that smart people like Josh Foust, Christian Bleuer and the ever-astute Judah Grunstein have criticized the basic idea of bribing Pashtun tribes to turn on the Taliban. Beyond the problem of figuring out which tribes to support/bribe; Gant's advocacy of taking sides in tribal conflicts seems like it might risk involving the US in conflict that are tangential to the overall US mission in Afghanistan . . . and getting a lot of innocent Afghans killed at the hands of the United States.

But here's the part I really find confusing. A couple of months ago, after first reading the Gant paper, I also read this document, put out by the US military training and doctrine command (TRADOC). It is written by actual experts on Afghanistan . . . and it comes to a very different conclusion about the effectiveness of trial engagement:

Military officers and policymakers, in their search for solutions to problems in Afghanistan, have considered empowering “the tribes” as one possible way to reduce rates of violence. In this report, the HTS Afghanistan RRC warns that the desire for “tribal engagement” in Afghanistan, executed along the lines of the recent “Surge” strategy in Iraq, is based on an erroneous understanding of the human terrain.

In fact, the way people in rural Afghanistan organize themselves is so different from rural Iraqi culture that calling them both “tribes” is deceptive. “Tribes” in Afghanistan do not act as unified groups, as they have recently in Iraq. For the most part they are not hierarchical, meaning there is no “chief” with whom to negotiate (and from whom to expect results). They are notorious for changing the form of their social organization when they are pressured by internal dissension or external forces. Whereas in some other countries tribes are structured like trees, “tribes” in Afghanistan are like jellyfish.

Pashtuns’ motivations for choosing how to identify and organize politically—— including whether or not to support the Afghan government or the insurgency—are flexible and pragmatic. “Tribe” is only one potential choice of identity among many, and not necessarily the one that guides people’s decision-making.

So why if the Army's own Afghanistan experts concluded that tribal engagement doesn't work and may actually be counter-productive is Major Gant being feted in the Washington Post as the man who can win the war in Afghanistan, praised by P4 an M4 and being asked to return to Afghanistan to work on tribal issues? I don't really have an answer to this question, but it does seem curious. Doncha think?

Covering the Muslim Brotherhood's Election of a New General Guide Posted by Shadi Hamid

As some of you may have heard, yesterday, the Muslim Brotherhood announced the election of a new general guide, Mohammed Badie. It turned out to be a fraught and controversial internal election, pitting "conservatives" against "reformists" (for background see here and here). There has already been quite a bit of speculation on what these internal divisions might mean for the Middle East's largest and most influential Islamist movement. One hopes the Obama administration is watching carefully, particularly as Egypt is soon to hold both parliamentary and presidential elections.

I will have more to write on this in the coming days and weeks. In the meantime, I will be covering Badie's election, the aftermath, and, possibly, the fallout on twitter. You can follow me on twitter here. I will try to use the hash mark #MBegypt for my tweets, so feel free to use it as well to join the conversation.

The Navy Looks to the Future on Energy Security Posted by James Lamond

The Navy Times reports yesterday that:

The Department of the Navy is set to sign a deal with the Department of Agriculture that officials say will better enable both agencies to cooperate in developing alternative ways to power tomorrow’s fleet.

This is a great move for a number of reasons.  First, DoD is the world largest single consumer of energy and as a Brookings report from this summer by Pete Singer says:

Access to reliable and affordable energy resources is absolutely fundamental to the operations and readiness of the U.S. military. In recent years, rising costs, variability in supply, and a host of challenging technical and environmental objectives have elevated the issue of energy security for our armed forces.

This move by the Dep. of Navy is the most recent in a growing trend of national security organizations adapting to double challenges of climate change and energy security.  One of the first agencies was the National Intelligence Council, who in the 2008 "Global Trends" predicts that the national security implications of climate change will be one of the greatest challenges we will face in the coming years and decades.  This summer the CIA opened up a center on climate change and national security, which will analyze and coordinate  how the effects of climate change (desertification, rising sea levels, increased competition for resources, climate refugees and other population migration).  The CIA's center will also provide declassified images and information to climate change scientists to assist in their research. Additionally the Army is developing hybrid hummer. 

One hope for the Navy Department's -and the overall move by DoD -move is that it will increase production and technology of alternative fuels, eventually making it more efficient and cheaper for more widespread.  For years DoD investment in technologies have often led to this pattern.  Technologies like the airplane, the SUV, the internet and GPS have either been invented by the military, or the investments in those technologies by the military helped bring them into the main stream of society.  Hopefully as the military invests more in "green technologies" we will see similar effects. 

ClintonBushHaitiFund.org Posted by The Editors

A new site for former Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton's efforts for Haiti:  http://clintonbushhaitifund.org/  

The advice from organizations and officials seems to be to that cash donations are the best way to help.

Why a New START Will Make Us Safer Posted by The Editors

The following post is by William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation.

I'm glad to see that Ariel Cohen and Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation took the time to read my recent post on the security benefits of a follow-on to the U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).  My piece was a rebuttal of Mr. Cohen's recent New York Times op-ed on the issue, so I welcome their rebuttal of my rebuttal.  Perhaps this can be the start of a beautiful friendship.

I only wish that Mr. Cohen and Mr. Spring had read my post more carefully.  If I were to respond only to their references to arguments that were actually in my piece, this would be a short post indeed.  But I think it's worth addressing their main arguments in any case.

Cohen and Spring's main concerns about a New START are as follows: 1) modernization of the U.S. arsenal in a post-START environment; 2) verification of the treaty; and 3) a possible link between the "performance of the treaty" and limits on missile defense.  I will take these three points in turn and then address some of the other points they raise.

As referenced in my prior post, the United States already has an extensive nuclear weapons sustainment  program in place.  As we reduce our arsenal, we don't need new warheads; we just need to know that the existing ones work. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) already spends billions of dollars per year on "stockpile stewardship" - a science-based initiative that has done an excellent job of assuring the safety and reliability of the current U.S. nuclear arsenal without resorting to nuclear testing.  Specific components are refurbished or replaced as needed, and, as noted in my earlier essay, the widely respected JASON Group has indicated that the current approach can maintain the reliability of the U.S. stockpile for decades to come. A new warhead - which Mr. Cohen and Mr. Spring seem to desire - would actually be less reliable than current designs.  Current warheads have undergone hundreds of tests; a new warhead would not (and should not) be tested.

Mr. Cohen and Mr. Spring seem to want to trust our security to an untested (and unnecessary) new warhead - unless of course they are suggesting an end to the current moratorium on nuclear testing among the major nuclear weapons states. The fact is, the United States has not conducted a nuclear test since 1992--a policy supported by four successive administrations.  Reversing this position would be a disastrous development for arms control, validating the notion of testing (and then building) nuclear weapons at a time when we should be moving towards a global ban on all testing, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

As for verification of a New START agreement, it is hard to criticize the verification measures included in a treaty that has yet to be concluded.  Perhaps Mr. Spring and Mr. Cohen have a crystal ball, but I do not. I trust that the Obama administration is seeking procedures that will be more than adequate to detect any meaningful violations of a New START agreement, and I look forward to evaluating them once we have a treaty to analyze.  In the mean time we shouldn't be distracted by unsupported claims that we need to have inspectors near Russian ballistic missile factories. As I noted in my earlier post, we can develop adequate means to monitor Russian missile production without continuing a Cold War era practice that is no longer necessary.

Which gets us back to Mr. Cohen and Mr. Spring's embrace of the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), a three-page document with no verification procedures that is scheduled to expire in 2012. As one of my colleagues pointed out, this is not a treaty, it's "sort of" a treaty.  We deserve a legally binding, verifiable and enduring treaty to ensure our security, not an unverified handsake deal written on the back of an envelope after President George W. Bush stared into Vladimir Putin's soul (as the former president claims to have done).

As for missile defense, even Baker and Cohen admit that "it may well be true" that the text of a New START treaty will not include limits on missile defense.  I think it will be true, based on statements from Obama administration officials that missile defense is not on the table in the START follow-on talks.  Furthermore, the Obama administration has not abandoned missile defense in Europe, it has restructured it. He has shifted from a land-based system aimed at long-range Iranian missiles that won't  exist for a long, long time (according to the current intelligence estimates) to one built on sea-based and shorter-range land-based missiles that will address the more immediate concerns raised by possible development of medium-range missiles by Iran.  Given the recent statement by top intelligence official Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess that there is no evidence that Iran has made a final decision to build nuclear weapons, it appears that we have more time to address Iran's nuclear aspirations than many analysts have been suggesting. To be a threat to Europe Iran would not only have to build a nuclear weapon but it would have to build one that could be launched on a ballistic missile, a daunting challenge.

Rather than take Mr. Cohen and Mr. Spring's other charges one-by-one, I will just say that as an advocate of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, I advocate a step-by-step process that takes seriously the actions of other nuclear states and the need to verify any and all reductions.  President Obama has indicated his commitment to maintaining a "robust deterrent" until such time as we can safely move to zero, and that this goal may not be reached in his lifetime. That's hardly a "rush to disarmament," as Cohen and Baker claim.

A Defensive Egypt and US Foreign Policy Posted by Michael Wahid Hanna

First off, I wanted to thank the folks here at Democracy Arsenal for inviting me to join the blog. As for a very brief bio, I am a fellow at The Century Foundation in New York, and I work on U.S. foreign policy in the greater Middle East. I am also a lawyer, so every once in a while I might stray on to international legal topics as well.

For my inaugural post, I wanted to draw attention to yesterday’s article by Hamza Hendawi of the Associated Press discussing the recent political moves of Mohamed el-Barade’i, the Egyptian former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (with the added bonus that I am quoted in the piece). el-Barade’i has pointedly challenged the Mubarak regime and flirted with the notion of competing to be Egypt’s president. It is hard to imagine a scenario whereby el-Barade’i could become Egypt’s next president, but his provocative comments and his interest in fundamental reform of Egypt’s political superstructure are an important development − particularly in light of the reactions his recent comments have provoked.

The desperation among many Egyptians for any hint of an opportunity for a political breakthrough is indicative of the general malaise that has become Egypt’s status quo and is the reason for much of the hype surrounding el-Barade’i. Part of this is biography in that el-Barade’i is untainted by political corruption and is a compelling and competent figure of international stature. With all other avenues for political reform blocked, people understandably are drawn to the proverbial silver bullet.

But the harsh, defensive reaction of regime supporters has been equally instructive, with the government-controlled press attacking him and attempting to discredit him in the eyes of Egyptians. Issandr Amrani notes that “pro-regime newspapers immediately went on an offensive of insinuations (ElBaradei was accused of being a tool of both Washington and Tehran, out of touch, and secretly Swedish).”

Here in the United States, the issue of succession in Egypt is often understood through the lens of regime stability, which is seen as the paramount concern and the avenue by which to guard U.S. regional interests. This has been a hallmark of U.S. policy in the Middle East, particularly after the Iranian revolution and the overthrow of the Shah. But not enough thought is given to how the current defensiveness of the Egyptian regime negatively impacts U.S. interests. We should be as concerned with the here and now and not simply with the potentially destabilizing effects of a transition.

The regime’s increasing defensiveness, driven by the looming question of succession and the regime’s attempts to ensure a hereditary hand-off to Gamal Mubarak, has distorted the Egyptian regime’s worldview and narrowed its perception of its own interests. In addition to supporting U.S. regional diplomacy, our allies such as Egypt should provide us with a reality check based on their more textured and nuanced understanding of their own surroundings and current political dynamics. A true and useful alliance should incorporate channels for open and honest communication. 

Aside from Egypt’s diminished regional status, the Mubarak regime’s current defensive posture, driven largely by its own narrow domestic considerations, makes it a particularly poor regional reference point. Nowhere is this clearer than with respect to the issue of Gaza and its continued isolation. Setting aside the broader issue of U.S. policy with respect to Hamas, the current efforts to undermine their control over Gaza have created a humanitarian crisis that has undermined the President’s message of reconciliation with the Muslim world delivered in Cairo last June. The lack of any U.S. efforts to alleviate the suffering of Gaza’s people has helped to frustrate many of the hopes that followed the Cairo speech. It has also created a significant barrier to the administration’s efforts to revive credible Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

This policy has been carried out with unstinting Egyptian support. But the Egyptian regime is primarily motivated with undermining its own domestic opposition in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood and is concerned with the prospects of contagion from next door. This convergence of the Egyptian regime’s narrow interests with our current attempts to isolate and weaken Hamas has blinded us to many of the serious downsides of our current policy. While we have Arab support for our policy to isolate Gaza in the form of Egypt’s closure of its border crossings, we should be careful to understand the motivations behind Cairo’s decision-making and not draw overly broad conclusions about the wisdom, effectiveness, or sustainability of this policy due to Egypt’s involvement − the narrow, short-term desires of the Egyptian regime are not a good guide in determining our regional priorities. 

Please Welcome Michael Hanna Posted by The Editors

Democracy Arsenal's newest contributor is Michael Hanna.  Michael is a fellow at The Century Foundation where he focuses on issues of international security, human rights, post-conflict justice and U.S. foreign policy in the broader Middle East. His full bio and publications are here.

Will the Real Reinhold Niebuhr Please Stand Up? Posted by David Shorr

Despite having been a religion major in college, I won't try to dissect Joseph Loconte's interpretation of Reinhold Niebuhr's theology over in AEI's magazine, The American. But the ways Loconte blatantly contorts President Obama's foreign policy intentions? Well they're like fish in a barrel; I can't resist.

As with every other cheap dig at the new policy, we inevitably have the A word:

Supporters of Obama’s apologetic foreign policy devour Niebuhr’s trenchant analysis of America’s social and political failings. They forget that he repeatedly scorned the tactic of using America’s sins to avoid confronting dangerous ideologies. “When the mind is not confused by utopian illusions,” he wrote, “it is not difficult to recognize genuine achievements of justice and to feel under obligation to defend them against the threats of tyranny and the negation of justice.” [Boldface not in original.]

Here's what I've concluded: if the right wing can't have an actual liberal president who blames America first, they'll make one up. You have to be listening extremely selectively to miss the parts where President Obama's been telling the rest of the world that anti-Americanism is used too often as an excuse and that there's been a lot of free-riding on American hard power over the past 60 years. Would somebody please do a content analysis? How much apologizing has there been, and how much calling on others to help deal with Iran, climate change, Middle East peace, Afghanistan...?

There are just two choices, you see. You can insist that the United States does no wrong, knows better, and gets to tell everyone else what to do. (Done that.) Or you can show a little humility, make reasonable accommodations to the interests of others, and undercut those who argue the US is the source of the problem. Loconte himself notes the pitfalls of arrogance as a general matter and even cops to mistakes having been made in Iraq and Afghanistan. So what's his beef, then?

Ah yes, that other inevitable slam: lack of moral clarity with regard to the malevolence of the governing regimes in other nations:

What might Niebuhr say, for example, about Obama’s fruitless attempts to engage Iran to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon? He probably would caution against oversimplifying the character of the regime or ignoring the unintended consequences of military action. Yet surely Niebuhr would draw attention to Iran’s extensive record of repression, religious extremism, and support for terrorist atrocities. He would be clear about Tehran’s flagrant deception over its nuclear ambitions and its provocative testing of long-range missiles. And there would be frank talk about Iran’s vile anti-Semitism and threats to “wipe Israel off the map.”

This passage contain the shortest distance ever between the phrase "oversimplifying the character of the regime" and an actual oversimplification of the character of a regime. Pardon me, but I think President Obama's clarity about what's at stake with Iran's nuclear program is why he's conducting a diplomatic full-court press to deal with it!!!!   By the way, in the category of unintended consequences, an impressive array of regional experts last summer gave very clear warnings that making too flamboyant a show of Iran's repression would give the oppressors just the pretext they were drooling over.

To be perfectly frank, I'd rather engage in reasoned discourse than snark. But to do that, we'll have to talk about real foreign policy, not all these ridiculous cartoon depictions.

6 Minutes to Midnight Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists announced today that it had moved its Doomsday Clock from 5 minutes to 6 minutes before midnight.  The Doomsday Clock measures the progress being made to reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, climate change, and biotechnology—where midnight represents the total destruction of humankind, the end of civilization…a nuclear Armageddon.

It might sound a bit overwhelming but the Doomsday Clock has a long history, dating back to 1947. The same scientists, engineers, and other experts who had created the atomic bomb as part of the Manhattan Project helped create the Doomsday Clock.  The minute hand has been moved a total of 18 times and was closest to midnight in 1953 when the United States and Soviet Union had each tested hydrogen bombs. The minute hand was just two minutes to midnight. 

Today’s decision to move the clock one minute further away from midnight represents both optimism and a realization that graves threats persist and immediate action is necessary.  In a statement from the board, the members explained:

It is 6 minutes to midnight. We are poised to bend the arc of history toward a world free of nuclear weapons. For the first time since atomic bombs were dropped in 1945, leaders of nuclear weapons states are cooperating to vastly reduce their arsenals and secure all nuclear bomb-making material…

…By shifting the hand back from midnight by only one additional minute, we emphasize how much needs to be accomplished, while at the same time recognizing signs of collaboration among the United States, Russia, the European Union, India, China, Brazil, and others on nuclear security and on climate stabilization.

The move away from midnight makes sense in light of President Obama’s efforts to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons.  That only sixty seconds were shaved off is somewhat disappointing though it does represent a challenge to the administration, Congress, and the Pentagon to turn back the Clock even more in 2011. The President’s nonproliferation agenda is ambitious, but if partisan politics can be put aside officials will finally be able to focus on reducing the nuclear threat.

Chop. Chop.  In the words of the Bulletin’s Board…”The Clock is ticking.”

START Talks to Resume, Despite Verification Hysteria Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, Ellen Tauscher announced today that US and Russian negotiators will meet in Moscow this week and begin another formal round of START talks on Jan. 25 in Geneva.

Negotiators have kept a fairly tight lid on the details of the new agreement, which experts agree is standard protocol.  This secrecy has prompted some outsiders to erroneously suggest that the talks have gotten off track or that the negotiators will be unable to reach an agreement. According to the Global Security Newswire, however, “Tauscher confirmed reports that the deal is essentially complete but that some challenging treaty-verification issues remain unresolved.”

[Insert GOP hysteria here.]

The primary verification issues have surrounded telemetry—a data sharing verification provision that the Russian’s want to eliminate since the US isn’t testing new missiles—and concern over US missile defense programs. “While negotiations over this particular verification provision were left for last, telemetry is not necessarily more important than other points of disagreement that have already been resolved,” Tauscher told GSN. In part, the debate surrounding telemetry has been hyped because of alleged connections to US missile defense plans. Max Bergmann explains:

In other words, if telemetry is included, the Russians want to get something for it – and that something appears to be access to data on US missile defense tests. While US negotiators have been insistent that telemetry be included in a final agreement, they have also made clear that linking the START treaty to missile defense in any way is out of bounds for this treaty. Hence, the impasse.

The Cable quotes Tauscher as saying, "This agreement is about strategic offensive systems. Missile defense is a defense system.” That’s pretty clear cut:  not here, not now.  For those who are still quoting Putin, Kingston Reif rationalizes his remarks.

So what’s all the fuss about? Sure, telemetry is a difficult issue, but our negotiators know what they are doing and they’ve already successfully negotiated other tricky subjects. Furthermore, the US has made it clear that involving missile defense is a nonstarter.  Yet, the hysteria continues. That’s because the hubbub surrounding telemetry and missile defense has more to do with Jon Kyl and Co. attempting to derail Senate ratification than anything else.

Don’t let critics fool you. Verification issues will be worked out and a follow-on agreement will be reached. Mark my words.

Contributing to the Haiti Relief Effort Posted by The Editors

For those who want to help by donating to the humanitarian effort in Haiti the you can donate to the Red Cross here or by texting "HAITI" to 90999 for a $10 donation; the Center for International Disaster Information here; Mercy Corps here; UNICEF here; or the UN Foundation here.

Afghanistan: Where You Can Get Something for Nothing Posted by Patrick Barry

While I enjoyed Michael ‘Chekhov’ Cohen’s wry send-up of the Gromov\Rogozin op-ed in today’s New York Times, I do think it glosses over something pretty important. What Michael misses is that Russia really does have a legitimate interest in not seeing Afghanistan totally fall apart.  Say, hypothetically, that Central Asia does become a turgid sea of Islamic extremism following the collapse of the Afghan government.  There’s good reason to presume that such instability would likely touch Russia’s sphere of influence (another Chechnya?) before reaching European capitals.  And what about “the coffins of Americans and Europeans who were killed by Taliban heroin in their own countries?”  Last time I checked, which was 5 minutes ago, Russia still has a pretty bad heroin problem itself. 

So given that some of Russia’s interests in a stable Afghanistan are equal, if not greater than those of NATO and the U.S., why haven’t they been more helpful instead of hoodwinking General Petraeus on basing agreements? Is it as Michael (or was it Dmitry?) says, that Russia would rather European and American leaders be “bogged down in South Asia than poking their heads into the Caucuses or Ukraine?” Probably.  But I think what we’re really talking about here is not misdirection, but free-riding.  Russia simply doesn’t have much incentive to take better care of matters in its own backyard so long as the U.S. and NATO will do it for them.  The way things stand now, Russia can limit the flow of heroin into its borders, tie up militants who might otherwise turn against kleptocratic rulers under Moscow’s control, and keep potential rivals embroiled in endless conflict.  Sounds like a pretty good deal. 

As I’ve said before, this is the basic predicament facing the U.S. in Afghanistan, and it illustrates the silliness of thinking that we’ll get out of it it by signaling resolve or toughness.  Afghanistan’s long-term stability hinges on the productive involvement of its neighbors. This is indisputable. But there isn’t really much hope of that happening, so long as NATO and the U.S. give them what they want for free!

The Story of Boris and Dmitry - A Play in One Act Posted by Michael Cohen

Boris Gromov (governor of the Moscow region and commander of the 40th Soviet Army in Afghanistan) and Dmitry Rogozin (Russian Ambassador to NATO) are having a drink in a smoky Moscow bar.

Boris: So Dmitry you look well. How are things in Brussels?

Dmitry: Well you know Boris, Brussels is lovely this time of year but I am increasingly worried.

Boris: Tell me more Dmitry.

Dmitry: Well it seems the Europeans are increasingly concerned about the war in Afghanistan; they are no longer convinced that it is in their national interest to fight an intractable war with the Taliban. I worry Boris . . . they might want to bring their troops home.

Boris: You don't say.

Dmitry: Yes, it is very concerning. After all if NATO isn't bleeding themselves in Afghanistan they might turn their attention to Mother Russia. Better to be bogged down in South Asia than poking their heads into the Caucuses or Ukraine. 

Boris: Yes, yes. Quite true.

Dmitry: I have a thought. Let's write an op-ed for the New York Times in which we argue that NATO must stay in Afghanistan . . let me say . . . what's the right phrase . . .

Boris: How about, "until the necessary conditions are provided to establish state local authorities capable of independently deterring radical forces and controlling the country." 

Dmitry: Yes, that's it! And what's more, we could challenge the very manhood of NATO; call them "peace-loving" and selfish for not sending their young men to fight in a country that is of tangential importance to their national interests.

Boris: But Dmitry, that will take forever and cost the Europeans billions of dollars.

Dmitry: Precisely.

(Much laughing and guffawing ensues)

Dmitry: How about we say that if NATO doesn't stay and fight it will be a "moment of truth" for NATO and the alliance might not survive. We can ever use the phrase "raison d'etre." I love that expression!

Boris: You know maybe it's the vodka talking, but why don't we also write that a "pullout would give a tremendous boost to Islamic militants, destabilize the Central Asian republic and set off flows of refugees, including many thousands to Europe and Russia

(More merriment ensures)

Boris: You know Dmitry this is a brilliant idea. But as long as we are arguing that NATO should stay why don't we also whitewash the history of the Soviet occupation Afghanistan.

Dmitry: Interesting. What do you have in mind.

Boris: Well we could say that "we were fighting against the father of today's Taliban militants face-to-face, whereas Western armies prefer to fight from air."

(A long pause)

Dmitry: But Boris, this is not correct. Everyone knows that we dropped millions of mines on Afghanistan, specifically targeting civilians. We conducted air strikes and regular artillery barrages that killed ever more civilians. An estimated one million people died. The Americans try to do the opposite. Why would a fine paper like the New York Times allow us to make such an argument in their pages?

Boris: Dmitry, the Americans have short attention spans - our war was more than 20 years ago. Who remembers these things? 

Dmitry: Maybe you are right.  But you know if we're going to write something like that; we should really double down and also say that we "managed to deter the onslaught of Islamic fundamentalists for a full 10 years."

Boris: Oh Dmitry; now you go to far. Didn't our war in Afghanistan actually encourage and embolden Islamic fundamentalists?

Dmitry: Oh Boris, you're so naive.

It's 2010 - Must be Time for a Team B Posted by Patrick Barry

Josh Marshall rightfully throws water on Frank Gaffney and Fox News' idea that we need what's known as a 'Team B' to analyze the threat posed by Islamic extremism, in order to challenge the soft views held by the Obama administration.  For those of you who don't speak neocon, a Team B, put charitably, is an alternate intelligence assessment performed on a given threat (Islamic extremism in this case) meant to challenge the intelligence community's orthodoxy.  Put bluntly, it is the neoconservative equivalent of someone throwing a temper tantrum at their birthday party when it looks like they might not get their way.  Marshall's take below is spot on (though he misses the Rumsfeld Commission, as well as the uproar over the 2007 Iran NIE):

Frank Gaffney is on Fox right now making his argument that Obama needs to appoint a 'Team B' to come in and analyze the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to make sure that Obama -- as Gaffney thinks -- isn't radically underestimating the threat. The Fox spot goes on to draw the analogy to the first 'Team B' -- which emerging neoconservatives got appointed to double-check what they then deemed to be the CIA's grave underestimate of Soviet power. Really? You've got to be kidding, I thought. All the above is reasonable history up till that point. What they somehow failed to mention was that we later got a chance to do what amounted to a post-mortem of the Soviet Union -- something seldom wholly possible in intelligence work. And it turned out that the neocons and the fabled 'B team' hadn't the slightest idea what they were talking about. Not only were the neocons off base, even the CIA had greatly overstated Soviet military and especially economic power in the 1970s.

The CIA's failure to correctly diagnose Soviet economic decrepitude of course later became a tool for the neocons to further attack the US Intelligence Community. In other words, you couldn't trust the CIA because the CIA had to a small degree partaken of the crazy miscalculation that the neoconservatives had used to make their name.

The second incarnation of the 'B Team' was of course during the build up to the Iraq War. And we all know how well that worked out.

So by the most conservative measure this is like the third time the same folks have rolled out the 'B Team' concept, with the other times both being failures of almost unimaginable proportions.

Now, I know Gaffney's having to hawk the idea on Fox on day time. It's not exactly ripe. But how many crazy failures are required before this club is put permanently out to policy pasture?

 

The Soothing Words of Stanley McChrystal Posted by Michael Cohen

One of the many things that I really enjoy about reading and watching the practically dozens of interviews done with America's top commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, is their unvarnished and optimistic nature. I always feel reassured when I hear him speak and there is never any sense that what he is saying masks a more nuanced and complicated reality on the ground.

For example, consider the General's soothing words to Diane Sawyer in an "exclusive" interview: 

"The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan said he believes he is making good on his promise of a quantum shift on the battlefield. I believe we're doing that now. I believe that we have changed the way we operate in Afghanistan. We changed some of our structures and I believe that are on our way toward convincing the Afghan people that we are here to protect them.

"We've been at this for about seven months now and I believe we've made progress. It's not a completed mission yet," he said.

See, aren’t these words reassuring: don’t they make you feel like everything is going to be A-OK in Afghanistan. It’s almost like this stuff just never happened:

Ten civilians, including eight schoolchildren, were killed in an attack by Western forces in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai said Monday.

The second episode of civilian deaths within a week was under investigation Thursday by the Afghan government and NATO officials after reports that up to seven civilians had been killed in Helmand Province in a NATO missile strike.

Conservatives Can't Tell Afghanistan from Pakistan Posted by Patrick Barry

Over the last few weeks, conservatives have exhibited a gap in their understanding of foreign policy so massive it's hard to imagine how it could get worse.  But apparently it did.  Last week, it was arguing that using the word terrorism more would keep Americans safe. Now, it's confusing Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, Jim Hoft at First Things uses a flashy video setting Martha Coakley's debate statement that al Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan against footage of CIA bomber Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, to attack Coakley for being weak on terrorism.  Of course, one glance at the video reveals a BUNCH of really big problems with this accusation. Take a look:

See that guy to al-Balawi's right? That's Pakistani Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud. You know where he's based? Pakistan.  Where do you think the video was probably filmed then? I'd bet on Pakistan. Why might Mehsud be interested in attacking a drone base in Afghanistan? Perhaps it's because those drones have been targeting extremists now congregating across Afghanistan's border in PAKISTAN.   Don't believe me? Al-Balawi even says as much in the video.  ABC News:

In the 1 1/2 minute video, the bomber said he attacked the CIA to avenge the death of Baitullah Mehsud, the longtime leader of the Pakistani Taliban who was killed in August..

..."We will never forget the blood of our emir Baitullah Mehsud," said al-Balawi.

So let's get this straight, Conservatives are using footage taken in Pakistan, of a Jordanian suicide bomber collaborating with a group based in Pakistan, to attack a CIA base responsible for sending drones into Pakistan, in reprisal for the killing of an insurgent leader also based in Pakistan, in order to criticize Martha Coakley for saying the 9-11 terrorists are no longer in Afghanistan?   It's pretty clear who doesn't get the big picture here.

Update: Apparently Hoft also cut out the crucial part of Coakley's remarks where she said Al Qaeda had shifted operations to "Yemen and Pakistan," going on to call for the U.S. to "focus our efforts on where Al Qaeda is."  There are a lot of seasoned counteterrorism hands who think even the Obama administration has not sufficiently dealt with that complexity. Seems like Coakley meets their standard, just not the fantastical one set by certain conservatives.

A New START on Arms Control Posted by The Editors

The following post is by William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation.

Ariel Cohen's essay on the Obama administration's approach to nuclear arms reductions ("A Nonstarter on Arms Control," New York Times, January 8th) is both alarmist and misleading. It is alarmist because it suggests that even relatively small steps towards reducing the world's arsenal of over 20,000 strategic nuclear warheads could somehow put us in danger. And it is misleading because it understates the value and purpose of practical arms control measures like the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) now under negotiation between Washington and Moscow.

The bottom line with respect to arms control is that the fewer nuclear weapons there are, the safer we all will be.  In a world where Al Qaeda would like to get its hands on a nuclear weapon or the materials to make one, and where nuclear wannabes like Iran and North Korea threaten to spark a race to get the bomb in their own regions, getting rid of these devastating weapons as soon as possible should be our most urgent priority.  That's why a growing bipartisan roster of current and former presidents, prime ministers, defense and foreign ministers, and retired military officers are calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.  This shift in elite opinion began with a January 2007 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal by former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and former chair of the Senate Armed Services Sam Nunn making the case for a world free of nuclear weapons, and it has snowballed ever since, for good reason.

But enough about reality. Let's get back to the arguments made by the Heritage Foundation's Ariel Cohen in his article of last week.

Cohen's first false claim is that since the START agreement expired on December 5th of last year, we have somehow been cast adrift in a world without limits on nuclear armaments. He chooses to ignore the fact that Washington and Moscow have agreed to abide by the basic terms of the START agreement while they are putting the finishing touches on a new one.  Furthermore, even if they chose not to abide by START's provisions, it is absurd to suggest that either side could gain a strategic advantage in the few weeks (or in the absolute worst case, months) it will take to hammer out a new treaty.

Cohen makes much of a recent statement by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin suggesting that U.S. missile defense efforts can be seen as an "aggressive" act by Moscow.  This appears to be political posturing on the part of Mr. Putin, a way to suggest that he remains a proponent of a "strong" Russia.  In any case, it is irrelevant to the discussions of the START follow-on accord.  At the negotiating level - not the rhetorical level - there is nothing to suggest that any significant limits on U.S. missile defense efforts will be part of the new treaty.  The notion of giving up missile defense in exchange for a new START arrangement is simply not on the table. To suggest otherwise is misleading in the extreme.

Cohen then turns to the question of whether a new START treaty can get the 67 votes needed get it through the Senate.  But this is about politics, not about the merits of the agreement.  While it is true that 41 Senators (40 Republicans and 1 Independent) have written to President Obama indicating that they will not support a treaty if it sacrifices efforts to modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the letter ignores the fact that the U.S. already has a robust modernization program. The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Life Extension Program (LEP) continually refurbishes the U.S. stockpile of nuclear warheads. Delivery systems and production facilities are also regularly modernized and refurbished.

If the Senators think modernization means building new warheads like the ill-considered Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) -  a system that has been rejected by Congress several years running as well as by the Obama administration - that would be cause for serious disagreement.  But if it means making sure that existing U.S. warheads are reliable for the foreseeable future, this issue should pose no obstacle to either the START follow-on or to the next major item on the U.S. nuclear arms control agenda, the push for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  As a well-respected scientific advisory panel known as the JASON group has indicated, current U.S. nuclear weapons will remain reliable for decades to come, thereby eliminating the need for a new warhead.  If the weapons work, there is no need to build new ones, particularly not if the ultimate goal is to get rid of them. There's no question that there could still be heated debate on the modernization issue with respect to both the START and test ban treaties, but that doesn't mean either treaty is doomed to failure.

The rest of Cohen's arguments deal in one way or another with the unsupportable notion that there is a resurgent Russian bear out there, and that it cannot be trusted and should not be cooperated with in any substantial way.  They're going to cheat, Cohen argues.  They're going to build tremendous new missiles that we won't be able to defend against, even as they hide them from us, he claims. They're going to make nuclear weapons the centerpiece of their national security strategy, says Cohen. They're going to win a new nuclear arms race (this is the ultimate subtext of Mr. Cohen's argument). This is all old Cold War thinking that bears little resemblance to the world we now live in.

Even if these overheated claims were true - which they are not - they would be arguments for a new arms control agreement, not against it.  The best way to know what the other side is doing is to conclude a legally binding, verifiable agreement for mutual reductions in nuclear weapons.  Under such an agreement, Russia could not "cheat" in a way that would shift the strategic balance. It could not build new missiles at levels that could possibly threaten the United States and its unmatched arsenal.  And Moscow would begin the process of devaluing nuclear weapons as an instrument of national security policy.

It is ironic that many of the critics of the Obama administration's efforts at concluding a new START agreement had no argument with the Bush administration's 3-page Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), an agreement with no verification procedures.  Similarly, with respect to Mr. Cohen's concern that the U.S. will be withdrawing from a monitoring station near Russia's most important ballistic missile plant, this was already agreed to under the Bush administration, and drew little criticism from President Obama's current anti-arms control critics.  This suggests that perhaps Mr. Cohen and his colleagues are playing politics with arms control rather than assessing the Obama administration's approach on the merits.

In conclusion, new START agreement is not a "gift" to Russia as Mr. Cohen seems to suggest; it is a step that is in both America's and Russia's interest.  As the nations that possess 95% of the world's nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia need to make reductions if they are to persuade other nations to curb their nuclear aspirations or reduce their nuclear arsenals.  And given their mutual vulnerability to nuclear terrorism, Washington and Moscow should be equally committed to the goal of reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles to the lowest possible levels, and, ultimately, to zero.  This will be a long-term process that involves many practical and verifiable steps along the way.  We need to get down to work, and not get hung up on ill-considered arguments like those presented in Ariel Cohen's essay.

Nigeria is the New Yemen Posted by Patrick Barry

Just kidding!  Josh Rogin notes that while many are discovering that the U.S. actually has a policy toward Yemen, the State Department is expanding its gaze to include Nigeria:

...according to a new report made public Monday, Nigeria is at risk of becoming the same type of breeding ground for violent extremism that America is now battling in so many other places around the globe.

"Government neglect is provoking disaffection that, if left unchecked, could lead to the growth of insurgency or even terrorism," the report states. "Increased desertification in the North and a growing population mean increased competition for already scant land and water resources. In the South, where unemployment among youths is widespread, vandalism against infrastructure such as pipelines is almost a way of life. Newly armed groups of youths readily join in the sabotage activities and kidnappings, upping the stakes for control of the energy resources of this area. Nigeria is also haunted by ethnic and political conflicts that have erupted in violence on multiple occasions in recent years. Despite all these issues, Nigeria is crucial as a U.S. partner and regional leader."

The problems Nigeria faces are no doubt serious, and instability there does raise concerns about the country turning into an extremist hot-spot, but what I think this story illustrates more than anything is the problems of extremism-centric thinking.  If the U.S. has interests in Nigeria, it is primarily because Nigeria is one of 22 emerging markets in the world, the 2nd largest economy in Africa (not including Egypt) and the U.S.' second largest trading partner south of the Sahara.  Extremism in Nigeria is important to the extent it impacts these other things, but not so much as something independent from them. 

What If Everyone Hyped an Attempted Terrorist Attack And Nobody Cared? Posted by Michael Cohen

Interesting results from a recent CNN poll on the American people's reaction to the attempted terrorist attack against a Northwest flight on Christmas Day. The verdict is in: yawn

Nearly two-thirds of people questioned in the poll say they have a moderate or great deal of confidence in the administration to protect the public from future terrorist attacks, up 2 points from August. Thirty-five percent say they have not much or no confidence at all, down 1 point from August.

A number of Republicans have criticized the president over his handling of the attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit. But according to the survey, 57 percent approve of the way President Barack Obama's responded, with 39 percent disapproving of how he handled the situation.

The poll also indicates no increase in overall concerns about terrorism. "In October, about a third said they were worried that a family member would become a victim of terrorism, and that number is unchanged in the wake of the attempted attack in December," Holland notes.

"The public seems to react calmly to individual incidents, possibly because most Americans believe that the government cannot prevent every single terrorist plot from occurring."

Six in 10 say the terrorists will always find a way to launch an attack, no matter what the government does, he adds - identical to the number who felt that way during the Bush administration.

"The public seems to react calmly to individual incidents!" What is wrong with these people - don't they know we're at war with Islam! It's these types of mature reactions to one-off terrorist incidents that speak to the real danger is America facing.

Crikey, don't the America people know that Republicans need a campaign theme for the 2010 election?

Afghanistan Confusion Watch - The Civ-Mil Version Posted by Michael Cohen

Over the weekend we had more evidence that the White House and the military are not on the same page on Afghanistan - and apparently things are getting kind of ugly:

Senior White House advisers are frustrated by what they say is the Pentagon’s slow pace in deploying 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan and its inability to live up to an initial promise to have all of the forces in the country by next summer, senior administration officials said Friday.

Tensions over the deployment schedule have been growing in recent weeks between senior White House officials — among them Vice President among them Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Gen. James L. Jones, the national security adviser, and Rahm Emanuel, the White House chief of staff — and top commanders, including Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the senior commander in Afghanistan.

One administration official said that the White House believed that top Pentagon and military officials misled them by promising to deploy the 30,000 additional troops by the summer. General McChrystal and some of his top aides have privately expressed anger at that accusation, saying that they are being held responsible for a pace of deployments they never thought was realistic, the official said.

So there are a ton of things here. First of all tensions have gotten so bad between the military in the White House that now bad sides are freely leaking their dirty laundry to the New York Times. When you have administration officials telling the Times that the brass misled the White House . . . well that's a pretty serious and damning accusation.

And clearly someone is not being completely honest. Consider this quote from a senior administration official. "Gates and Mullen made a clear statement that this (deployment of 30,000 more troops) would be achieved by summer's end." And then this from the Pentagon, "military officials acknowledged that they were taken aback by the president's initial insistence that the troops be in place within six months. Last fall, military officials repeatedly said that it would take as long as a year to 18 months for all the troops to be in place."

So we have one of two possibilities here: that the Pentagon basically exaggerated its ability to get 30,000 troops into Afghanistan and misled the White House about how quickly it could be done OR the White House misled the American people about the quickness of troop deployments to Afghanistan in what has to be considered an effort to minimize the political price of increasing US military engagement there. 

You know, I was under the impression that the President's speech in December was supposed to clear up all the confusion around US-Afghan policy and ensure that the military and civilian leadership were all on the same page.

Guess not.

"Enemy Combatant" is an Enemy to Justice Posted by Adam Blickstein

It's been nearly 3 weeks since the underwear bomber tried to blow up Flight 253 and instead incinerated his own manhood. And while Abdulmutallab's self immolation thankfully failed to cause any mass casualties, it has inflamed the Republican hysteria that actually emboldens al Qaeda's central goal of inciting American panic and terror. But crucial to GOP histrionics is the notion that America's constitution and legal system are not an adequate means for detaining and prosecuting Abdulmutallab. The common refrain as inanely elucidated by Rudy Giuliani, John McCain and Liz Cheney is that by detaining and trying Abdulmutallab through America's judicial system, we are giving him the same rights as Americans, and therefore cannot decipher the crucial intelligence that will keep America safe. Never mind the fact that we have already received "useable, actionable intelligence” from Abdulmutallab and that abrogating our legal system further plays into al Qaeda's hands, but their declarations that he must be named an "enemy combatant" does not comport with the actual history of naming terror suspects "enemy combatants." Their logic is simple but horribly flawed: designate Abdulmutallab an enemy combatant, use whatever means necessary to get information out of him (whether or not that information is actually usable and actionable seems secondary) then try him in a military tribunal, not civilian court. Here's what John McCain said yesterday:

Second of all, I don't think the president's action matched his rhetoric when we send this individual to a civilian court. That person should be tried as an enemy combatant, he's a terrorist. And if we are at war, then we certainly should not be trying that individual in a court other than a military trial. To have a person be able to get lawyered up when we need that information very badly, I think betrays or contradicts the president's view that we are at war.

This doesn't betray the President's stance on going after al Qaeda; it betrays history. Only three terrorists designated as enemy combatants have been convicted and sentenced using military commissions, all at Guantanamo: Salim Ahmed Hamdan, who was subsequently released to Yemen, David Hicks who was subsequently released to his native Australia, and Ali al-Bahlul, who is now serving a life sentence at Guantanamo Bay. Meanwhile, nearly 200 terrorists have been tried, convicted and imprisoned using American courts.

But more importantly, the two men who have previously been charged and detained as enemy combatants on America soil, José Padilla and Ali al-Marri were later transferred to the civilian judicial system and tried, convicted and sentenced using American courts. Not only were the "enemy combatants" Padilla and al-Marri not tried in military commissions but rather civilian courts, but they were also the last terrorists detained in America to be designated as enemy combatants. And that was in June of 2003. So Republicans who clamor for Abdulmutallab to be named an "enemy combatant" want him to enter a flawed system that even the Bush administration couldn't successfully use, that currently only has one convicted, imprisoned terrorist, that hasn't been utilized since 2003, and has never been used to bring a terrorist detained on American soil to justice.. Following Cheney and McCain's callous and partisan desire to do so wouldn't just be unprecedented, it would also be dangerously incompetent.

The bottom line is out of all the hundreds of terrorists designated an "enemy combatant" only one is currently being imprisoned under the hollow framework as envisioned by the Republican Party. It's really telling that when it comes to bringing terrorists to justice, they advocate a system that is not only defective, but simply statistically has nearly the worst track record possible when it comes to actually convicting terrorists. Makes you think that convicting terrorists isn't really their first priority, but that defending the severely flawed system, dangerous to our security, that they instituted is more important than keeping America safe.

A Bit More on the Flynn Report Posted by Michael Cohen

I noticed today that Secretary of Defense Gates endorses the conclusions of the recent report by Maj General Michael Flynn criticizing the way the military gathers intelligence in Afghanistan. 

For what it's worth, this now means the chief of military intelligence in Afghanistan, the commander of US and ISAF forces and the Secretary of Defense all think that the military does a poor job of understanding the "people" in Afghanistan . . . several weeks and months after pushing for a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan that focuses on those same "people." Hmm.

In other news, I wanted to pass along some rather insightful comments about the Flynn report from a colleague, who will remain anonymous. While I understand it is helpful to judge such comments with the author's identity in mind, the best I can do here is attest to his sterling reputation as a soldier and scholar who served in Afghanistan (in other words, trust me):

There are some good suggestions in the paper, but I was left wondering whether MG Flynn understands what variables have changed in the months since he (and the rest of GEN McChrystal's hand-picked, well-resourced group along with thousands of troops) have arrived in country.

His argument - that "eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy" - is inaccurately based on two rolling markers: first, what the strategy/goals have been; and second, what the "intel community" has been doing and why.

The first is how we went from a punitive expedition to creating and stabilizing a nation-state. 

It's the second that I believe MG Flynn either misses or consciously discounts - not understanding that it isn't that folks have been doing it wrong, but that the resources just have not been there to ensure security for either the troops or the population.  Brigades and battalions have definitely been thinking about all sorts of different ways to do things over the years - but they simply have not had the luxury of considering his tweaks and recommendations.

Consider his "grassroots" vignette - the situation in Nawa, Helmand province.  He notes that in June 2009 "...a small number of Marines and British soldiers were the only foreign forces...the troops could not venture a kilometer from their cramped base without confronting machine gun and rocket fire from insurgents."

But in July, 800 additional Marines arrived and began "sweeping across the district.” He then jumps to five months later, when things are great - and proceeds to detail the different way the intel officers and analysts did things.  But he skips over a big part - the fighting that had to go on before Nawa became such an oasis.  He makes passing reference - "...with few shots fired by Marines after their initial operation..."

That "initial operation" was a few months of the Marines taking it to the enemy - with a cost in friendly killed and wounded.  Yet MG Flynn hones in on what the analysts and intel officers were able to do after the security was established.  Could the S-2 from that "small group" in the "cramped base" have done something similar?  Was it just because he wasn't enlightened, or guided correctly from his battalion or brigade?  Nope.

To me, this is the huge point that MG Flynn misses - as he disparagingly notes how we've been "doing it wrong" for the past eight years.  I disagree - and it's important, I think, because it goes to the central question:  are training and institutions organizationally broken, or have troops been holding on in a dangerous environment with insufficient numbers and an ever-changing "strategy" that veers from "can't commute to work" to "securing the population" to...whatever comes next.

Leadership has constantly been searching for ways to do much of what MG Flynn discusses - different ways to measure stability, working with agriculture development teams, human terrain teams to strengthen the other means of information gathering, restructuring intel support to give commanders and troops the best perspective - but it was all overshadowed by security concerns.  When the overriding issue is that COPs and OPs would be overrun by the enemy, or that polling stations, bridges and district centers would be blown up or burned down - and a too-small amount of force or analytic power is available to do it all - lots of that other stuff drops by the wayside.

The addition of the extra brigade into RC-East in spring 2009 had an immediate effect - as did the addition of the Marines into RC-South in the summer.  But none of this is noted or acknowledged by MG Flynn.  His argument is about why we just need to *think* differently, be creative, be *better*.  I'm sorry, but there's another key part - if we're going to do this whole "build a country to deny a safehaven" thing - lots of troops and lots of fighting to get that security needed (yes, we should be encouraging the Afghans to fight as well - but if we want an immediate effect, more U.S. brigades helps). 

At the same time, USFOR-A has been completely revamped - a strong well-staffed structure, new 3-star command to ease the span of control issues, new joint ops centers, more bandwidth...all of this has come into play since this summer.  But MG Flynn again doesn't acknowledge how this - and all the additional troops - have enabled folks to (perhaps) think about doing different things besides tracking "insurgents" or "IED cells."

His implication that focusing on the enemy is an "understandable" but ultimately emotional response by commanders is, to put it politely, insulting...as if commanders in years past had a choice where to place their ample resources, and they simply misused them.

I'm glad that - given our expansive goals in Afghanistan - more troops are there and USFOR-A is injected with energy and resources to guide the effort.  But MG Flynn gets it wrong when he asserts we've simply "overemphasized detailed information about the enemy at the expense of political, economic, and cultural environment."

His argument - and much of the COIN/population-centric thesis - glosses over the cost of the security that is necessary as a foundation to these efforts.  Simply calling for "COIN analysts" or "stability operations information centers" doesn't cut it.  

Does Afghanistan Need a Big Army? Posted by Michael Cohen

A couple of days ago I highlighted a recent Pentagon report about the weakness of the Afghan Army; and a few DA readers e-mailed me off-line to suggest that things were a bit more nuanced than that otherwise desultory report suggested. As one person put it to me, "Are they a competent, First World force? Hell, no. But they don't have to be. There's a small--very small--ray of hope there, but the ANSF isn't quite as disastrous as many reports make them seem." Point taken. 

But it raised for me another issue that perhaps doesn't get enough attention.  Everyone (this blogger included) seems to take for granted the notion that we need to build up the Afghan Army and police force. General McChrystal has talked about a force of 240,000 soldiers and 160,000 police; in congressional testimony last month General Mullen slightly trimmed those sails with a call for a force of 170,000 ANSF by July 2011. 

The issue here is that, as I pointed out the other day, these numbers are completely insane. Even my offline interlocutors agree that these numbers are utterly unrealistic - and what's worse police training lags even further behind army training (even though from the perspective of fighting a counter-insurgency, police training is probably more important). 

Afghanistan is a country with staggeringly high levels of illiteracy; it's the second most corrupt country in the world; it has little tradition of a professionalized military and most important the Afghan government doesn't have close to the revenue to pay for a military of the size being considered. The current ANSF is approximately 90,000 - and there lots of problems with them like they've been unable to in any significant way support US operations in Southern Afghanistan. What makes anyone think that we can easily double the size of the force . . . or more important that we even should?

Does Afghanistan really need a 170,000 man army or a 240,000 man army or a 400,000 army - or do they perhaps need a better trained 90,000 man army that can protect the country from an enemy that seems to be no bigger than 20,000 fighters? If the US and ISAF are going to rely more on local militias than what is the strategic rationale for a big, centralized Afghan Army? Granted those big numbers look rather sexy, but one can't help but fear that we are building a paper tiger military with potentially unreliable units that will be unable to protect the country once we leave.

And let me ask another question to which I don't really know the answer - how does Pakistan feel about the idea of a 170,000 man army on their Western border possibly commanded by a government that many in Islamabad seem to think is an Indian stooge? I haven't really seen any serious commentary on this issue, but I can't imagine this makes the Pakistanis very happy or terribly inclined to crack down on the Afghan Taliban safe havens in their country.

 

In the end this gets back to the issue of what we are trying to accomplish in Afghanistan; is our goal to stabilize all of Afghanistan? Is it to defeat the Taliban insurgency? Or is it to leave a central government in Kabul that can maintain a semblance of authority and hold off a Taliban take-over of the country?

It seems to me that if the latter is your goal, a smaller, more competent army is what Afghanistan needs. But if you have ambitious goals, then you want a big army with gaudy six figure numbers. But then how would you square those ambitious goals with a political leadership (the White House) that wants to send no more troops and wants to start handing over responsibilities to the Afghan military in 18 months? You can't . . . and that is the problem.

Once again it seems that we have a crucial disconnect between ends and means with well-worn military tactics driving strategy. The White House seems focused on a more restrained mission and the military - as is its wont - wants to go big with ambitious goals for Afghanistan's future. And so the strategic incoherence continues.  

Peter King is a Genius .. . A Genius I Tell You! Posted by Michael Cohen

I'm a bit late to this story, but Peter King voiced such an ingenious idea for combating terrorism the other day on Good Morning America that I would be remiss if didn't mention it here on DA (H/T to Steve Benen):

"You are saying someone should be held accountable. Name one other specific recommendation the president could implement right now to fix this," host George Stephanopoulos said to King.

"I think one main thing would be to -- just himself to use the word terrorism more often," said King, the ranking Republican on the Homeland Security Committee.

You know I think Peter King makes a brilliant point here. Think about it for a second. In the nine months before September 11th, George Bush never mentioned terrorism; his Administration was barely focused on the issue and basically disregarded intel warnings in the summer of 2001 about an impending attack. And then 9/11 happened.  But after that, George Bush never stopped talking about terrorism - and guess what, America was terror free. 

Clearly Barack Obama needs to mention terrorism every day; that's the only way he can truly protect the country. Just to be on the safe side though he might want to also invade a medium-sized Arab country, illegally wiretap his fellow citizens and destroy the US economy. 

After all, you never can be too careful!

Thank you Peter King! Will you be my Senator?

To My Conservative Friends (or 'Dear Shadow Government') Posted by David Shorr

Now is the political season of our disappointment. So many in the pundit class feeling let down after the high hopes of a year ago. Me too. You see, I actually believed in -- and still hope for -- the possibility of post-politics. I expected that our conservative policy wonk counterparts would work with us on the basis of at least a shared diagnosis of the problems. But as much as I believe in bipartisanship, I also believe in the facts. Blaming the governing party for the partisan tenor of our political discourse is about as accurate as claiming the economy would be better off without the stimulus or that our system of private health insurance is peachy keen. So I feel really let down that our politics are still mired in petty bickering instead of rising to the formidable challenges of our times.

It was the debate over "declinism" that got me started on this today, particularly the juxtaposition of a Dan Twining post on Shadow Government and an Orville Schell op-ed in the LA Times -- with Twining telling America to cheer up and recognize its strengths and Schell giving a balanced but sobering accounting of our strengths and weaknesses. I have genuine sympathy for a lot of Twining's argument; he's right that we shouldn't lose sight of the United States strong strategic 'fundamentals.' But he gives a cursory look at the negatives, and echoes the ubiquitous talking point that the fiscal deficit is our chief problem:

We have plenty of problems at home, from inadequate infrastructure to an underperforming educational system and, perhaps most disturbingly, a growing burden of national debt that, if not corrected, will increasingly undermine our welfare at home and our leadership abroad.

Strategic about the strengths, off-handed about the challenges. So here's my question to my conservative friends, after you've read Schell's piece, can you tell me we've spent the last year debating the real challenges to the country's position in today's world?