No One is Talking About Withdrawal Posted by Michael Cohen

Of the many frustrating elements of the debate on US-Afghan strategy few others are as pernicious as the canard that there are two options in Afghanistan - full-on counter-insurgency or complete and immediate withdrawal. As near I can tell, no one in the Administration and no one in serious policy circles is arguing for a such step. Indeed, there are a myriad of options that lie between these two extremes. Over at FP's Af/Pak channel, Austin Long does a nice job of laying out one possible scenario and offers a pretty compelling idea of what a smaller, more focused counter-insurgency terrorism strategy might look like:

To use a military term of art, the bottom line up front is that the United States could successfully transition to an effective small footprint counterterrorism mission over the course of the next three years, ending up with a force of about 13,000 military personnel (or less) in Afghanistan.

Long goes on to recommend that the US maintain a presence at three major bases at Bagram, Jalalabad and Kandahar; rely more heavily on Tier 1 special operations forces; utilize three Army Special Forces' battalions that "would partner with local forces to collect intelligence and secure specific areas;" and  increase the military's reliance on unmanned aircraft as well as robust human and signal intelligence.  I recommend reading the entire article, because it really does put some flesh on the bone of what at CT strategy would look like.

Over at the New Republic, Alex Rossmiller takes the argument a step further by pushing for a political compromise with Taliban forces:

Rather than trying to evict the Taliban from the territory of the largely supportive Pashtun population, the United States and the Afghanistan central government should acknowledge that renegade Pashtuns--not groups of international terrorists, but nationalist insurgents--have earned the right to participate in government in some capacity . . . In some areas, the Taliban has acted as a local government--keeping order, providing services, mediating disputes, etc.--and, in others, it is confined to anti-government propaganda and violence. But, through participation in government, its actions can be evaluated by the people and observed by the global community.

I'm not sure yet if we're at the point that such a strategy would work. With the Taliban on the ascendancy I'm perhaps a bit less sanguine that the opportunity exists for near-term political compromise - all the more reason, I would argue to put greater military pressure on the Taliban. But Rossmiller's overall point is spot on; we're not going to militarily defeat the Taliban (even if McChrystal gets 40,000 more troops). The only viable long-term solution is a political compromise that for better or worse imagines a Taliban role in Afghanistan's political future. The sooner we acknowledge that point, the better.

But even more important, the sooner we acknowledge that the options for Afghanistan's future are broader than just leave or double down the more robust the debate on US-Afghan policy will be.

Comments

[GullyFoyle]

Why should we try to finesse some sort of "other strategy" for our policy in Afghanistan? We've blown it! And we blew it because there was never any good reason to occupy the country in the first place. It's way past the time to walk away.

I don't get how all you armchair generals can ask someone to be the last person to die in Afghanistan when our purpose there has never been intelligent or meaningful or brought about any semblance of stability or hope for the people of Afghanistan.

"No one is talking about withdrawal" Well, I'M TALKING ABOUT IT. The people in Portland, Oregon are talking about. NOT ONE person I know thinks this war is worth one more person...one more dollar.

You want to put more military pressure on the Taliban, Mr. Cohen? The I suggest you put on a uniform. Or better yet, get your son(s) or daughter(s) to put one on too.

[dom youngross]

In 2008 Candidate Obama trumped up Afghanistan as 'neglected' to catch an anti-Bush campaign gnarly. Now President Obama in 2009 is inevitably wiping out on it -- as inevitably forced by events on the ground and McChrystal's inevitable escalation pressure.

The two main elements of support for PO's 'war of necessity' are 1) his reality-challenged supporters, who at this late date STILL think twice-as-bad/4x-more-expensive PO is better than Bush and are increasingly desperate to prove to themselves they were/are right; and, 2) the flag-waving pseudo-patriotic war mongrels McCain and Palin, who want PO -- and all of us -- to go even deeper into the no-win abyss.

Okay, there are three main elements of support for PO's 'war of necessity' when you include Karzai, who needed a foreign power's help and rubber-stamp approval to get elected. Thanks to Candidate Obama, Karzai now is to President Obama what Ahmadinejad is to Khamenei.

Well, make that four main elements of support for PO's 'war of necessity', when you include organized crime and heroin addicts around the world who jointly need the Afghan poppy fields and Afghan 'farmers' to continue bidness as usual.

Yeah, okay, make that five main elements of support for PO's 'war of necessity', when you include what Eisenhower described as the M-I-C -- military-industrial-complex.

Hey Candidate and/or President Obama supporters: Look at the company you are keeping re Afghanistan: McCain, Palin, Karzai, Organized Crime, Heroin Addicts, and the M-I-C. If you are too dense or unwilling to figure out on your own which end is up, at least look around to see who you are rubbing elbows with.

[replica watches]

Well, make that four main elements of support for PO's 'war of necessity',

[replica rolex]

ey Candidate and/or President Obama supporters:

[muhtar]

Thank you for your sharing.! seslichat seslisohbet

[cheap coach bags]

Great comments! You are so nice, man! You never know how much i like'em!

[cheap coach purses]

Yes, that's cool. The device is amazing! Waiting for your next one!

[m3 real]

Obama, who argued during the US election campaign that George Bush made a strategic error in switching resources and attention from Afghanistan to Iraq, told the crowd the mission was to stabilise Afghanistan enough to allow Afghan troops to take over security, allowing the US to pull out.