MEMO: START is Urgent, Legitimacy Matters, and Afghanistan is Difficult Posted by Patrick Barry

Christian Brose makes two smart, if contestable, points: A) there is a disconnect between all that was accomplished or promised at the Moscow summit and the looming challenge of building a joint U.S.- Russia consensus on Iran; and B) the U.S. should not expect to pivot easily from its limited cooperation with Russia to pricklier issues like Iran's nuclear program.  But then Brose makes a series of not-so-smart points that leave me scratching my head.

First, its a little troubling to see Brose argue that negotiating an update (or bridge) to START is "not a pressing issue." Spearheaded by Reagan, and signed by George H.W. Bush, START is the most significant arms-reduction agreement in the last 20 years.  It is set to expire THIS YEAR.  For that to happen without a follow-on would deal a serious blow to the nonproliferation regime.  Suggesting the issue is not urgent is just naive.  I have to assume that Brose just didn't mean to say it.   

Also, no one seriously thinks that the Obama administration was ever hanging its Iran policy on the hope that a U.S. - Russia nuclear deal would persuade Iran's leaders to "give up their nuclear aspirations," an accusation Brose falls just short of making.  But it is true that part of harmonizing diplomatic pressure is lending legitimacy to your actions.  By recommitting to the international nonproliferation regime, the Administration signals to allies, enemies, and fence-sitters alike that it intends to take international agreements seriously.  Is this the magic bullet for building a coalition to solve the Iran problem? Or course not.  But the Obama administration is right to calculate that upholding the nonproliferation regime (as opposed to gutting it...Bush...cough, cough) is a surer way of pressuring Iran to denuclearize.

That leaves Afghanistan and Russia's agreement to open up its transit routes for military goods headed there, a move Brose likens to Moscow's petrol politics in eastern Europe and Ukraine.  While I suspect that Russia's concession on transit rights is partially rooted in a desire to set the terms on which goods and people move through its sphere of influence, I ultimately agree with Christian Bleuer - Russia's fear of seeing insurgents overrun Afghanistan is the dominant explanatory factor.  Besides, with so much murkiness and uncertainty surrounding the flow of goods through central asia, its tough to see how getting the Russians to expand the scope of allowable items passing through their territory is anything but shrewd policy. 

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That leaves Afghanistan and Russia's agreement to open up its transit routes for military goods headed there, a move Brose likens to Moscow's petrol politics in eastern Europe and Ukraine. While I suspect that Russia's concession on transit rights is partially rooted in a desire to set the terms on which goods and people move through its sphere of influence, I ultimately agree with Christian Bleuer - Russia's fear of seeing insurgents overrun Afghanistan is the dominant explanatory factor.
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