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« January 13, 2008 - January 19, 2008 | Main | January 27, 2008 - February 2, 2008 »
This is somewhat of a cheap shot, but I can't help myself. Harper's magazine has the gem of the week. If you want to leave the office today and laugh all the way home, have a look at this.
Short version: Bush’s favorite painting, from which he draws great religious inspiration, is actually a painting of a horse thief about to be re-captured by a lynch mob. Irony is not dead.
here.
As we say goodbye, at least for now, to an all-Iraq all the time media environment and replace it with all-economy all the time, I get to go back to one of my pet hobbyhorses: how little we know about how voters understand the nexus among energy policy, national security, the economy and global warming.
Or, to put it another way: wonks think that this is one interconnected ball of issues, and that talking about one gets you points on another.
The latest Pew poll suggests that the public thinks otherwise. Thanks to Matt Yglesias for posting the relevant chart, even though his post is about something else.
67 percent of Democrats say "protecting the environment" is a top priority, 59 percent say "dealing with energy problems" and 47 percent say "dealing with global warming."
For Republicans, those numbers are 39, 53 and 12, respectively.
Strengthening the nation's economy, in case you wondered, gets 76 percent from both.
There's an interesting problem/warning lurking there on the global warming piece. Have people decided it's hopeless? Or is it not that important? Or do they include it in environment? Or in energy??
Today Charles Krauthammer wrote a piece slamming the demagogic and dishonest campaign of John Edwards and quite uncomfortably I find myself agreeing with virtually every word of it.
Today he plays the avenging angel, engaged in an "epic struggle" against the great economic malefactors that "have literally," he assures us, "taken over the government." He is angry, embodying the familiar zeal of the convert, ready to immolate anyone who benightedly holds to any revelation other than the zealot's very latest.
Nothing new about a convert. Nothing new about a zealous convert. What is different about Edwards is his endlessly repeated claim that the raging populist of today is what he has always been. That this has been the "cause of my life," the very core of his being, ingrained in him on his father's knee or at the mill or wherever, depending on the anecdote he's telling. You must understand: This is not politics for him. "This fight is deeply personal to me. I've been engaged in it my whole life."
Except for his years as senator, the only public office he's ever held. The audacity of the all-my-life trope is staggering. By his own endlessly self-confessed record, his current pose is a coat of paint newly acquired. His claim that it is an expression of his inner soul is a farce.
A cynical farce that is particularly galling to authentic and principled left-liberals. "The one [presidential candidate] that is the most problematic is Edwards," Sen. Russ Feingold told the Post-Crescent in Appleton, Wis., "who voted for the Patriot Act, campaigns against it. Voted for No Child Left Behind, campaigns against it. Voted for the China trade deal, campaigns against it. Voted for the Iraq war. . . . He uses my voting record exactly as his platform, even though he had the opposite voting record."
Yeah, I don't have a real problem with anything Krauthammer has written here, which I have to admit gives me a sort of queasy feeling.
Just to reassure my loyal Wacky, Wacky Krauthammer readers, I'm not going soft on the man. I still think he is a fundamentally dishonest polemicist, but I suppose today's op-ed proves the old adage that on some days, the sun shines on a dog's ass.
Enjoy the rays Chuck!
As is often his way Matt Yglesias makes a great point today about the economic stimulus proposal agreed to by Congress:
Chris Hayes looks at the pretty disappointing stimulus package that's apparently been agreed to and argues "I think progressives have to do some very long, deep, sustained thinking about why this congress has been such a failure." I dunno about that. The man's not single-handedly to blame for every problem with this congress, but the main reason the congress has been so disappointing has been that George W. Bush is still President.
The initial Democratic proposal was much better than what eventually got agreed to. . . .But the reason it's not very good is the Republicans not some mystifying failure on Nancy Pelosi's fault.
I have my own mystification on why more progressives don't realize this. George Bush and his obstructionist minions in the Senate have pretty much opposed everything Democrats have tried to accomplish over the past year. This at the same time that Democrats are trying to avoid overreaching and protect their slim majorities in both Houses. Anyone who expected that Dems were just going to overturn everything George Bush had done in the first six years of his failed Presidency were smoking something that smelled like Otto's jacket. For all those progressives upset over the performance of the Democratic Congress I want you to imagine what today's stimulus package would have looked like in a Republican Congress.
I don't offer this post as a defense for everything Congressional Democrats have done. Indeed I have been quite critical in the past, but the notion that a Democratic Congress would put in place significant change in the face of President Bush's unceasing obstructionism was simply never realistic. Newsflash to progressives: the revolution will not happen overnight.
The Asia Times has an excellent piece chronicling the history of the Anbar Awakening. Apparently, the military had been trying to pursue this strategy of co-opting the insurgency for four years, but every time they made some inroads it got shot down by the White House.
"Don't let the quiet fool you," a senior defense official says. "There's still a huge chasm between how the White House views Iraq and how we [in the Pentagon] view Iraq. The White House would like to have you believe the 'surge' has worked, that we somehow defeated the insurgency. That's just ludicrous. There's increasing quiet in Iraq, but that's happened because of our shift in strategy - the 'surge' had nothing to do with it."
In part, the roots of the disagreement between the Pentagon and White House over what is really happening in Iraq is historical. Senior military officers contend that the seeming fall-off in in-country violence not only has nothing to do with the increase in US force levels, but that the dampening of the insurgency that took hold last summer could have and would have taken place much earlier, within months of America's April 2003 occupation of Baghdad.
Moreover, these officers contend, the insurgency might not have put down roots in the country after the fall of Baghdad if it had not been for the White House and State Department - which undermined military efforts to strike deals with a number of Iraq's most disaffected tribal leaders. These officers point out that the first contact between high-level Pentagon officials and the nascent insurgency took place in Amman, Jordan, in August of 2003 - but senior Bush administration officials killed the talks.
A second round of meetings, this time with leaders of some of al-Anbar province's tribal chiefs, took place in November of 2004, but again senior administration officials refused to build on the contacts that were made. "We made the right contacts, we said the right things, we listened closely, we put a plan in place that would have saved a lot of time and trouble," a senior Pentagon official says. "And every time we were ready to go forward, the White House said 'no'."
The tragedy here is that four years ago, this strategy might have made a difference. But since then the country has split apart along sectarian lines. You've had massive fits of violence followed by complete political deadlock. Even though we've now managed to temporarily co-opt the elements of the former Sunni insurgency, it's probably too late to try and put humpty dumpty back together again.
Ezra Klein, Kevin Drum, and others have been having an interesting back-and-forth on the electabiilty question. Ezra writes:
Via Kevin Drum comes yet more evidence that there's no open-and-shut case for Obama's electability. "The detailed results of the latest LA Times poll have now been posted," he writes, "and they show that Hillary is indeed the tougher candidate: she does at least as well as Obama against every leading Republican, and in a hypothetical matchup with McCain she wins by 4 points while Obama loses by a point."
Of course, other polls show other things. The point, though, is that the evidence folks are using to prove Obama's electability is weak indeed. Favorability ratings have a very tenuous relationship to votes. Obama, with a +27 favorable rating, seems to do little better than Clinton, with a +4 favorable rating, in match-up polls, and often does somewhat worse. Liking someone is not the same as voting for them.
Obama's favorability ratings may not translate into winning hypothetical matchups now, but that's not really the point. Higher favorability ratings mean that more people would be likely to consider voting for Obama in the future. In other words, if Obama wins the nomination and has a chance to make his case to the American people, a significantly higher number of voters will be at least open to his pitch. On other other hand, Hillary's ceiling of support appears to be somewhat lower.
Ezra says that "liking someone is not the same as voting for them." Well, no it isn't. But if you like someone, you will, all other things being equal, be more likely to vote for them.
This is an important bill and a good first step. Points for Reps. Alcee Hastings (D-FL) and John Dingell (D-MI). When people talk about the moral obligation to the Iraqis, it shouldn't
be based on keeping hundreds of thousands of American troops in Iraq
with no clear strategy. It should be based on what steps we can
meaningfully and constructively take to improve the lives of the Iraqi people.
.
Two key members of Congress yesterday asked President Bush to add $1.5 billion to his spending next year on the Iraq war to help pay for several Iraq refugee programs, including the one that would bring as many as 5,000 former interpreters or translators for U.S. forces to this country over five years.
Reps. Alcee L. Hastings (D-Fla.) and John D. Dingell (D-Mich.) said in a letter sent to Bush that "our government has a moral responsibility to provide leadership" with more than 4.5 million Iraqis either internally displaced or in neighboring countries because of the war. "Iraqis are now the third-largest displaced population in the world and the fastest-growing refugee population globally," they said and thus have "grave potential to lead to a regional crisis."
The lawmakers said the U.S. government should provide $80 million to pay for transportation to the United States and settlement of former Iraqi interpreters; another $80 million for other Iraqi refugees seeking to come to the United States; another $130 million to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which provides health care and financial support to Iraqi refugees; $200 million for displaced Iraqis inside that country; and $700 million to Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon to support Iraqi refugees in their countries.
Some second-hand hearsay twice-removed from someone associated with Mayor Bloomberg leads me to make the following prediction:
If Hillary wins, Bloomberg will run.
If Obama wins, Bloomberg will not run.
So, if we're talking about the electability of Obama vs. Hillary, that's something worth considering. Regardless of whether such speculation is to be believed, it's also fairly intuitive. The raison d'etre of a Bloomberg insurgency crumbles almost entirely if Obama is the nominee. But if we're running headlong into a Hillary-McCain or particularly a Hillary-Romney faceoff, then a Bloomberg run has a much better chance of gaining traction with Americans - an outcome which would probably hurt Democrats more than Republicans.
Ok I'm starting to feel bad that Shawn and I are ganging up on Max so I appreciate Ilan weighing in! In his last post Max argues "the problem with Michael’s moral obligation argument is that it implies that we actually have this power to make things significantly better" in Iraq. Actually, my argument is quite different. I don't believe that we have the power to make things demonstrably better in Iraq . . . but I do believe that we have the power to make things a heck of a lot worse.
My argument from the beginning has been that Democrats are ignoring the very serious repercussions of a hasty departure from Iraq. In fact, in the Democratic debate on Monday, John Edwards foolishly challenged his opponents to "commit to having all combat troops out and ending combat missions in the first year." John, this isn't a contest to see who can withdraw fastest; it's to see how we can do it most effectively with the least loss of life and the least further damage done to Iraq. But Edwards comment is indicative of the blase attitude many progressives seem to have toward departure.
I realize for some it may seem difficult to believe that we could make things worse in Iraq, but that certainly seems the case. What's more, we seem to already be washing our hands of responsibility for future problems there. There is something that is beginning to trouble me about the fact that we have done enormous damage to Iraq; we have unleashed tribal and radical forces that threaten to break apart the nation and yet all three Democratic candidates for President seem to be putting the entire onus on Iraqis to affect political change. Guess who will get blamed when things fall apart? Yes, Iraqis have to solve these problems on their own, but we are not blameless and simply announcing that we are departing doesn't end our responsibility.
As for Max's and Ilan's point that our "leverage" in Iraq may not necessarily being results; well he's absolutely right about that. But it seems to me that the process Shawn lays out, namely that "America should begin – finally – to make our security, economic, and diplomatic aid conditional on demonstrable efforts at real political progress in Iraq" has a stronger chance of success than the approach most Democrats seem to be advocating, namely that by threatening to leave it will force the Maliki government to move forward with political reform. Now that approach may bring results, but then again it may not. There is certainly a reasonable chance that it may lead the Shiites to simply bide their time, build up their forces and then once we begin our drawdown seek to wipe out the Sunnis. Exercising our political leverage is not a panacea, but it might be the least bad option available to us. At the very least, it will give us greater flexibility if things either improve or get worse. Announcing a timetable for withdrawal actually diminishes any political leverage we might have over Iraq's future.
For example, what if we announce our departure and the Maliki government chooses the latter course? Will we just sit by and begin to withdraw troops as both sides prepare for a bloodbath? Moreover, will we have the political will to send troops back into harm's way once they've been taken out. I seriously doubt it. Actually this sort of scenario reminds of what happened in Afghanistan after the Soviets left. There was no effort to bring the various warlords together after withdraw and instead you had absolutely vicious fighting, which of course led to the Taliban taking over, AQ finding safe haven . . . and you know how this story ends.
(I wrote much of this post before seeing Ilan's latest missive, but I'm having a hard time finding a lot of daylight between his and Shawn's plan At the very least, the two seem to adopting a similar approach, just placed on a different timeline, although I'm not so sure Shawn wouldn't find Ilan's timetable acceptable.
Finally, there's another point that Max raises, which I want to address. He argues that we need a diplomatic surge to manage our departure. Initially this seems absolutely correct to me, but then I started thinking about it - after the President's disastrous trip to the region (which laid bare our diminishing influence over friends or allies) why would countries in the region (particularly our enemies) want to engage diplomatically with us about Iraq's future?
Think about it, Iran has never been stronger; they have enormous influence over the Maliki government, they are strengthening relations with the Gulf States and it seems to me, they have little reason to make any deals with the United States. Wouldn't Shiite efforts to wipe out Sunni political influence kind of play in their favor? I'm not convinced that this political equation changes under President Obama or President Clinton. Now granted many in the region don't want to see regional instability, but that doesn't they are necessarily going to sign off on a diplomatic effort if they believe they can maximize their influence on other ways.
To be sure, a regional diplomatic approach might have been successful a few years ago, but I'm a bit skeptical that it would necessarily bring positive results today, especially if it comes after we announce we are leaving. Now, I certainly could be wrong here and I invite Max, Shawn or anyone else to tell me that I am.
In the end, I'm glad we're having this debate; getting into the details of withdrawal is critically important and long overdue for progressives.
OK, I’m going to weigh in late here on what has been a high quality debate.
Ultimately, my views are much more in line with Max’s, but I think that Shawn makes some pretty good points that can be incorporated into a withdrawal plan. The ultimate flaw in Shawn’s approach is that the probability of success under any scenario is extraordinarily low (Like 1-2% in my view), and I don’t think you will see a major difference in outcomes inside Iraq, whether a drawdown occurs over 3-10 years or over 12-18 months. What you will see under Shawn’s plan is a much greater cost to the United States and further regional destabilization as the U.S. is unable to recalibrate and focus on other major strategic objectives both in the Middle East and across the world. It’s one thing if there were no costs. But the opportunity costs are huge and the potential benefits are unlikely to occur.
The reality is that we are sitting on an unstable balance of power inside Iraq, supported by localized cease fires that are unlikely to last. No one has any idea how to convert these cease fires into actual institutional stability. All it will take is one major event: a second Samarra, a well placed assassination, contested elections, something that ignites the powder keg and causes everything to once again explode. Shawn’s prescription to solving this problem seems to be way too optimistic.
Second, we condition the remaining mission on Iraqi political progress. During 2009 we would expect to see real progress on oil revenue sharing, a provincial power law, elections, and integration or affiliation of the CLCs into the Iraqi Security Forces. I would expect that we would continue a robust training mission as well.
Every one of these actions by the Iraqi Government is the equivalent of passing Universal Healthcare Reform in this country. It is a massive legislative and political undertaking and the likelihood of it happening is extraordinarily low.
That being said, I agree with Shawn’s point that the only leverage we have is the American presence.
So, what should a new President do? Early on I’d appoint either one or a number of high level special envoys. I would send them out to all of the key players both inside and outside the country: ISCI, the Sadrists, KRG, CLCs, Awakening Councils, Sunni Greenzone politicians, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, etc… The United States would make clear to all of these players that we are leaving. The plan should be to pull most of our forces out in roughly 18 months or whatever the military feels is doable, given the difficult logistics. But then I would also make clear that if the Iraqis, with help from us and their neighbors, make major political progress and come back and ask for more American support, we would reconsider and leave troops in longer. In other words, a genuine leave-on-failure stay-on-success strategy that exercises the same type of leverage Shawn is talking about, but with a smaller American commitment and more pressure.
As part of this approach, I think it’d be wise to go to all of the players with at least a suggested outline of what a solution might look like. Not because we want to dictate a solution but because there needs to be a starting point for discussions that they could react to. I’d also scrap the whole piecemeal benchmark concept. Trying to do this operation one benchmark at a time is silly. If you are dealing with the oil law today, then you are going to take the maximalist position, because you are just negotiating on this one piece. You have to negotiate a package that includes the oil law, provincial elections law, constitution, etc… This will force the parties to prioritize and decide which of these issues really matter and on which they can be more flexible. Everything needs to be on the table at once.
If phase one of these diplomatic discussions goes well, and it looks like an agreement might be possible, then you move on to phase two. Through careful negotiations you pave the way for a prolonged peace conference that brings all of the parties together to negotiate an agreement that settles how the various parties in Iraq will share power and what the state will look like. This just can’t be done piecemeal in the greenzone. If it’s going to work it needs to be done all at once.
At the same time. I agree with everyone that we have a moral commitment to the Iraqi people. That moral commitment should not involve keeping thousands of troops in Iraq indefinitely in an intractable situation that we cannot control. That doesn’t help them and it doesn’t help us. But the moral commitment should involve a massive humanitarian aid program, helping refugees and IDPs resettle and get their lives back together. We should be much more welcoming to these people in our own country and work with our allies to find more places for refugees to resettle. I don’t know if we can save Iraq. But I do know that we can do a lot more to help millions of Iraqis deal with the consequences of what has happened. This is an element that has been shamefully neglected.
Anyway, is this plan likely to work? No. But it’s as likely to work as anything anyone else has suggested, and the benefits of this plan are that if it doesn’t work, at least we are out.
I think Michael and Shawn are making the right points. But I still disagree.
First, on Shawn’s argument. He argues that by gradually withdrawing we gain “leverage” over Iraq’s combatants. This is probably true, but leverage to achieve what? The fundamental problem I have with this argument is that he is ultimately trying to engineer a political outcome. I don’t have a problem with this in theory, but this is not a short to medium term strategy. If you are going to leverage a political outcome you have to stick around to make it stick. Again, as I mentioned before, any power-sharing agreement that we initiate through our “leverage” will ultimately be highly forced and as a result will be highly fragile and prone to collapse, because any such agreement is not going to have built up any significant level of inter-ethnic trust to sustain it.
But this leads to a separate point about the difficulty of getting a deal done. Iraq’s different ethnic groups, with the exception of the Kurds, are hardly cohesive. There is a very high likelihood that efforts to broker an agreement between Sunni and Shia would cause splits within each group. This is actually pretty standard – while moderates are willing to make a deal, hardliners go to the mattresses. But a lasting deal can’t really be reached until the hardliners are willing to come to the table and it usually takes a long time to get them to the table. The point being that Iraq’s internal politics are really messy and that those not on board with a possible brokered deal are going to work aggressively to undermine it – and will likely succeed – which will only leave us back where we started, just five years down the road.
I know I am sounding pretty defeatist here. But there are points that are reached in which there just aren’t any good easy solutions. This leads to Michael’s main point about our moral obligation. I agree we do have a moral obligation to the Iraqi people. But the problem with Michael’s moral obligation argument is that it implies that we actually have this power to make things significantly better. I just don’t think we do. Even a superpower has things that it cannot solve. So how is it morally defensible to continue a policy that one believes is doomed to failure and that results in the continued deaths of American citizens? Kinda feels like McNamara all over again.
But I don’t just think we should withdraw our troops and turn our backs on the problem of Iraq. I think during the process of withdrawal we must seek to manage our departure. This would entail actual diplomatic engagement with all relevant countries, including Iran. And let me just say, while this may seem like a contradiction, we should try to leverage a political outcome in Iraq that Shawn has talked about. But here is the thing – I don’t think we need to wait five to ten years to try to force an agreement down Iraqis throats that is likely to fail after we leave. I think we can do this more immediately by setting a date certain for withdrawal within the next 12 to 16 months and use that to leverage a deal. But during this time we should actually engage in a real diplomatic surge to attempt to manage our departure.
This won’t solve Iraq. This won’t make up for us having invaded. But what this will do is save this country another five to ten years of a pointless occupation.
This is an important debate, and I’m pleased that Democracy Arsenal is helping to facilitate it. As we approach (finally!) the point when we will have a Democratic nominee for President, this debate will enter a new and very important phase. It is critical that we as a party begin to think about governance, and with all due respect to all concerned, I simply don’t buy the idea that a Democratic President will pull the plug on our effort in Iraq and begin to withdraw our forces without calibrating the speed or nature of our departure to the situation on the ground.
Without going over my case for a middle way again, I want to respond to Max’s argument that:
the problem therefore with a more middle of the road approach is that in my view we will still be in virtually the same place five to ten years from now.
I disagree with that characterization. The point I’m trying to make is that nearly every political actor in Iraq (with the exception of AQI) has, at one point or another, manipulated America for their own particular purposes. It is time we use the very real leverage we have over several actors in Iraq.
The Kurds desire an enduring relationship with us, ISCI is posturing to further their designs on more robust regional power, Sadr is using us to help reign in elements of JAM that are not response to him and erode his legitimacy, Dawa and the secular elements of the Shiite ruling class who desire a unitary Iraq are desperate to retain the help we provide in training the Iraqi security forces – the list goes on and on.
To be clear though, the United States is losing leverage by the day. Every day the Bush administration has provided a blank check to the various Iraqi actors, and every day they imply through the ongoing SOFA talks that we will be there unconditionally for the foreseeable future is a contribution to the erosion of America’s strategic position in Iraq and the region. The “all in” for perhaps “all time” approach is not really a strategy, but the absence of strategy, as it abdicates the imperative to make real choices.
I hope and expect that a Democratic administration would fundamentally change this equation.
My position (and I should mention that my colleague Colin Kahl is also a leading proponent of this view) is that America should begin – finally – to make our security, economic, and diplomatic aid conditional on demonstrable efforts at real political progress in Iraq. To take this position actually requires that we be willing to pull out troops if progress is not made. In fact, if this strategy has any chance of succeeding, an American President must be willing to play hardball.
Will this work? It is impossible to tell, but at least we could say that we tried an integrated approach that used both carrots and sticks. A withdrawal that is not connected to the situation on the ground leapfrogs from our current “all in” position to the “all out” position without at least trying a “middle way.”
So again, this strategy would require two things.
First, it needs to be sustainable, hence my recommendation that a new President continue a measured drawdown until we reach the point that our military commanders believe can be sustained for the long-term. I expect this number would somewhere in the neighborhood of 75,000 troops. If commanders on the ground think it prudent to take all of 2009 to get to that point, so be it.
This isn’t chump change. The next President will inherit somewhere between 115,000 to 130,000 troops in Iraq – perhaps more. I think the country would accept a withdrawal to 75,000 over the course of a year. That is a lot of our people coming home in the first year of a new administration.
Second, we condition the remaining mission on Iraqi political progress. During 2009 we would expect to see real progress on oil revenue sharing, a provincial power law, elections, and integration or affiliation of the CLCs into the Iraqi Security Forces. I would expect that we would continue a robust training mission as well.
If the Iraqi government makes progress on these vital issues, America should be willing to stay in Iraq at a sustainable level for some time. Iraq is, after all, perhaps the most geopolitically important place in the whole world – at least for the next decade.
However, if the various actors continue their intransigence and even the threat of our total departure – now made credible by a new president – fails to jump-start a renewed and real effort at political compromise, the United States should shift to containment posture that would be geared toward preventing spillover and intervention by Iraq’s neighbors. This would be the “all out” posture that others have recommended.
The position I have outlined is not a blank check, is not Bush-lite, and does not keep American troops fighting in Iraq forever. I think this is a pragmatic strategy that a new President should at least attempt in 2009. I think this approach remains true to our moral responsibility to Iraq, and remains wedded to America’s enduring national interests in the region.
Max and Shawn have posted excellent comments below on the question of what happens after America leaves Iraq.
On the one hand I am very sympathetic to the perspective put forward by Max: there is little that we can do to change the fundamental political equation in Iraq so our best course of action is to leave - and leave soon. But in the end, I'm not sure that this makes sense from either a strategic perspective and is borderline indefensible from a moral perspective. (For those intrepid commenters intent on finding inconsistencies in my position, I should say for the record that I have long been a proponent of immediate withdrawal, but my views have evolved in recent weeks).
Now I think we all agree that to stay in Iraq forever is simply unsustainable. Such a course will never move the Iraqis toward political reconciliation and we run the very real risk of fundamentally weakening the US military. Short of a military draft it seems unrealistic that we can stay in Iraq at current troop levels over the long-term.
But, I think Shawn has put his finger on why leaving soon and withdrawing fully is also a mistake; it eliminates any possible leverage we might have over the Iraqi leadership to enact real political reform. Indeed, Shawn is quite correct that the strategy of surge advocates is all carrot and no stick. Thanks to the Bush Administration, there is really zero incentive for Iraqis to compromise. I like what he says below about what a Democratic Administration might do to find a middle ground:
My best guess is that if a Democrat wins in November, he or she will begin to withdraw enough troops to accomplish two immediate goals. First, to reduce our military presence to a point that is militarily sustainable. Second, to demonstrate to the Iraqi actors that we will not be around forever, but are willing to stay to provide the types of assistance they want as long as they make real political progress.
This is clearly a tricky dance, but one that I think represents a better and more effective scenario then "all-in" or "all-out." Moreover, ignoring the possible humanitarian catastrophe that might accompany our withdrawal for a moment, I am taken aback by how blase many progressives (including Democratic presidential candidates) are about the political vacuum that our departure will cause in Iraq. This isn't just a question of strengthening Iran's regional position; our hasty withdrawal could bring even more actors into the Iraqi mix, not to mention creating a potential safe haven for Al Qaeda. It's bad enough that we have done enormous damage to Iraq and turned it into a training ground for AQ, when none existed before, but to leave the country in even worse position then we found it, doesn't strike me as a very intelligent foreign policy. As much as I want to get our troops out, this shouldn't be a minor concern. In the end, all progressives have to recognize that our departure from Iraq could create a cascading series of events that will make the war to date look like a walk in the park. Does that mean we should stay forever? No. But it certainly means that we need to be very careful how we get out in order to minimize the realization of worst case scenarios.
Finally, Shawn makes the point that of course America has a moral responsibility to the people of Iraq and I'm actually surprised that this is a point of contention. Some of the commenters to earlier posts actually claimed that because progressives opposed the war we can wash our hands of responsibility to the fate of the Iraqis. This sort of moral obtuseness is hard to fathom particularly among progressives who have long complained about the humanitarian crisis that we have caused in Iraq.
For progressives to act as though we have no responsibility to the Iraqis simply because we were right about the war from the beginning is, I'm sorry to say, terrible.
I agree with a lot of what Shawn and Michael write below. Michael Gordon's piece does raise the problems with both the "get out" approach and the "stay forever" approach. And Glenn Greenwald's characterization of those arguing for a more middle of the road position is wrong.
But I think there is a real problem in this debate in thinking that because those are two positions at opposite ends of the spectrum that there must be a viable middle course.
I understand the temptation. Both positions sound totally unreasonable. On the one hand, the get out now position ignores the fact that we have an obligation to the Iraqis to stay and help them build a better country. On the other hand, the notion that we are going to be there indefinitely for possibly 50 years and the resulting costs in lives and treasure also seems incredibly unreasonable.
The problem though, from the way I see it, is that the two “extreme” positions are actually the two most reasonable positions. And the "middle" position of a medium term, 5-10 year commitment, is the one that actually is the most incoherent.
I commend Michael Cohen for his recent post on Iraq. I find the characterization many make to any proposal short of rather rapid withdrawal as simply the ramblings of “very serious people” to be short-sighted in the extreme.
We absolutely have a moral obligation to the Iraqi people. We invaded their country, destroyed much of their infrastructure, and spent several disastrous years stumbling around making things worse. Does this obligation require us to stay forever? Absolutely not, but it does require that we be as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in.
The “surge” was not a success – there is no evidence I have seen that the political deals essential to preserve a semblance of sustainable security have or will be made anytime soon. The recent de’Baathification law looks like the legislative equivalent of Swiss Cheese, and I certainly don’t think it is evidence of real political progress. What the Kagan/Keane/O’Hanlon position gets wrong in my view is the notion that if we just commit to sticking around long enough, the political actors in Iraq will at some point work out their differences enough to maintain a level of security which would allow America to withdraw most if not all of its troops. The assumption is that all the ingredients are there – we just need to stick around long enough for the solution to bake itself. Of course, it’s possible this would occur at some point in the near or far future, but hope is not a plan - certainly not worthy of the sacrifice demanded of the troops we put in harm’s way, and certainly not worthy of the added risk we incur to our other national interests.
However, I think many Democrats swing too far in the other direction. Their assumption is that our presence either makes things worse, or makes no material difference other than to simply prolong or delay the inevitable civil war. Pulling out quickly (which I define as 1 or 2 brigades a month until “all combat troops” are out) is libel not only to simply erase the real security gains that have been made (some surge related and some not), but would threaten to upset the precarious nature of Iraqi politics even further, and dramatically accelerate the centrifugal sectarian tensions back to - or worse than - 2006/2007 levels.
Both these positions – “all in” or “all out” – surrender any bargaining leverage the United States has in Iraq. It is unconscionable to me that the Bush administration has absolutely refused to use the very real leverage we have in Iraq toward pushing through some meaningful progress on the political front. Even a cursory read of the draft “Statement of Principles” (the precursor to the ongoing status of forces agreement that the White House is pursuing) reveals that the Iraqi government desires continued economic, diplomatic, and security assistance – especially continued support of the ISF and a protection against external aggression. This provides us with real leverage that we need should have started using many months ago. The Kagan/Keane/O’Hanlon position is all carrots, the “all out now” position is all sticks – a middle way that attempts to use both is long overdue.
Michael Gordon has an important article in yesterday's New York Times that examines the "parallel universe" between what is being said on the campaign trail about Iraq and what is actually happening in that country.
The American officers I met were hardly of one mind on how to proceed in Iraq, but they were grappling with decisions on how to try to stabilize a traumatized country with a hard-headed sense that although there have been significant gains, a long and difficult job still lies ahead — a core assumption that has frequently been missing on the campaign trail.
The politicians, on the other hand, seemed more intent on addressing public impatience with an open-ended commitment in Iraq, either by promising prompt withdrawal (the Democrats) or by suggesting that victory may be near (the Republicans.)
. . . In the meantime, some senior officers seem utterly puzzled by the debate at home. “The one thing that befuddles is I have not heard any candidate describe what their short and long term goals are for Iraq, how it fits into their regional goals for the Middle East and transnational terrorism,” said the American officer. “Is their goal just to withdraw troops as fast as possible?”
In Gordon's piece lies an important critique of the Democratic position on Iraq. Democrats are clear about wanting to bring the troops home from Iraq, but none of them are particularly clear on what America should do after we leave. (I won't even get into what Republican candidates are saying about Iraq because it is, in general, so unhinged from reality and so vacuously presented that to do so would be the blogging equivalent of shooting fish in a barrel).
I mention this article in part because Glenn Greenwald, who for many is a voice for the progressive left, has written an 1800-word screed trashing the allegedly "pro-war" Gordon. because, According to Greenwald, Gordon is arguing "that the Only Serious Option is to remain in Iraq for a
long, long time, and any politicians who refuses to accept this is
being -- for that reason alone -- irresponsible and Unserious." I've long given up trying to understand the peculiar psychology behind Glenn Greenwald's incessant and occasionally unhinged attacks on the "serious foreign policy community," but this analysis is not only wrong, it's quite misleading.
Whether Greenwald wants to admit or not, Gordon's raises "serious" issues about American engagement in Iraq that not only progressives, but Americans of all political stripes, have been far too reluctant to address. (Until recently, I would have included myself in this analysis).
While I have been an adamant supporter of withdraw for some time I cannot escape the notion that the manner in which Democratic candidates are discussing the war is leaving out an important part of the equation: the aftermath.
For example, consider Hillary Clinton's plan for dealing with withdraw: Among other things she would, "support the appointment of a high level U.N. representative -- similar to those appointed in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo -- to help broker peace among the parties in Iraq" and "convince Iraq's neighbors to refrain from getting involved in the civil war." Good luck with all that. That's not a plan; that's wishful thinking.
Obama's plan isn't much better, but at least he appears to be contemplating the notion that the US might have to send troops back into Iraq if civil war breaks out. In general, however, it's hardly surprising that both candidates would want to avoid these tough questions.
For example, if we leave Iraq what happens to counterinsurgency efforts, which have largely been dependent on American arms and which have, at least in the short term, brought some success in stabilizing the country? What if the threat of American departure does not lead the Maliki government to move forward with real political reforms as all the Democratic candidates for President claim it will? If Iraq devolves into an orgy of sectarian violence what are America's responsibilities to stop the killing? Does America have a duty to stay in Iraq and protect Iraqi civilians? Are Americans willing to accept the fact that our departure from Iraq may further destabilize not only Iraq but also the entire Middle East?
Interesting NYT op-ed today by military historian David Crist on Iran's recent provocations in the Persian Gulf. He's right of course about the importance of preserving the open sea lanes in the Gulf, and he has some good ideas about mobilizing international support. We need to take a close look, though, at his ideas about how an escalated confrontation can be controlled and kept from mushrooming into a full-blown war. Our own Max Bergmann last week picked up on Fred Kaplan's point about the dangerous lack of communication channels with Tehran.
I have a few questions about the moves that Crist considers measured responses:
Recently I saw a preview of an interesting new documentary, "Virtual JFK," by Errol Morris and the makers of "Fog of War." The film focused on Pres. Kennedy's repeated caution in avoiding military moves that could be escalatory. Seems to me we could use that kind of prudence.
