Steve Simon's new piece in Foreign Affairs is a must-read for anyone concerned with the long-term consequences of the United States arming tribal factions in Iraq. His argument is similar to the ones made by Marc Lynch and Brian Katulis over the past few months - that the administration, by prizing security gains over political consolidation and compromise, has actually worsened Iraq's long term prospects for achieving an open, functional society.
Simon does a pretty good job cataloging the history of the surge - though it was originally intended to be matched by a top-down political strategy of consolidation and cooperation, US leadership grew so frustrated with the apparent lack of political movement that it quickly substituted in a new policy, which embraced a series of local developments and cobbled them together under the dubious label of "bottom-up reconciliation." I agree with Simon's argument, namely that this pursuit is dangerously short-sighted because it has stoked "the three forces that have traditionally threatened the stability of Middle Eastern states: tribalism, wardlordism, and sectarianism."
Of course, chief among the local developments latched onto by the administration, has been the phenomenon of Sunni tribes turning on Al-Qaeda in Iraq, a move largely precipitated by the AQI's use of poisonous methods to subjugate Sunni communities. But when it comes to tribalism, we're tinkering with an especially complex and dangerous dynamic, one that has been a force for instability in the Middle East broadly, and Iraq specifically since at least the 19th century. Here are some key passages from Simon's article, highlighting the tribes' tumultuous past:
Under the Ottomans:
"The Ottomans attempted forced sedentarization of the tribes, weakening tribal authorities by disrupting settlement patterns and replacing tribal sheiks with smaller cadres of favored leaders who became conduits for patronage."
Under the British:
"Thus, the tribal system that Ottoman rule sought to dismantle was revitalized by British imperial policy, and the power of the nominal Iraqi government was systematically vitiated."
Under the Baathists:
"When the Baathists took power in 1968, they explicitly rejected
"religious sectarianism, racism, and tribalism ... the remnants of
colonialism." The tribes, in their minds, were inevitable rivals of a
centralizing state."
Under Saddam:
"Selected tribal leaders were allowed to enrich themselves by any means,
fair or foul, and in return they were expected to defend the regime.
Saddam, in effect, fostered a process of retribalization in Iraq."
Now one would think that given the obstacles posed by these tribes, that we would look for lessons from neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which have successfully withstood similar challenges by subordinating "the tribes to the state." But once again, we're guilty of shirking history's lessons:
"Now, U.S. strategy is violating this principle by fostering the retribalization of Iraq all over again. In other countries in the region, such as Yemen, the result of allowing tribes to contest state authority is clear: a dysfunctional country prone to bouts of serious internecine violence."
