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March 28, 2008

Can't Tell the Players WITH a Scorecard
Posted by David Shorr

Courtesy of Ilan, we have Tony Cordesman's reminder that the fighting in Iraq is not what it seems. The central-government-versus-renegade-militias narrative doesn't fit neatly. Excellent point. Cluing into the power struggle dynamics is indeed critical to understanding what's going on.

But here's another reminder. Isn't the fact that the Center v. Militias story line doesn't fit itself highly significant? I don't usually go in for simple binary good guy / bad guy breakdowns, but isn't this a situation where it should actually be appropriate? If a governing authority is legitimate, then the government should have a legal monopoly on force. And if Iraq's rulers are one more set of contestants for power rather than truly being at the helm of the state, can I ask what the hell we're doing there?

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"What the hell we're doing there" is just keeping the pot stirred and the dollars flowing using "woo-hah" fired-up US soldiers who are "protecting America's freedoms" by fighting, killing and dying on behalf of an Iran-allied Iraqi government which is threatened by renegade political foes just prior to provincial elections (October). "Democracy" comes at a cost, but there are no costs without benefits from just keeping the pot stirred and the dollars flowing, the protests from surrender monkeys notwithstanding.

There you go again, asking logical questions. How unpatriotic. How cowardly. How downright treasonous. Real men don’t ask questions—they act. Just like to The Decider. And Mussolini, come to think of it. Never mind. Everyone rise to salute the flag.

And so we have my personal favorite theory of Bush foreign policy -- which we shall call the Suskind Theory, in honor of the author of The One Percent Doctrine. I always thought "we're history's actors" (from the same quote as 'reality-based community') had the most explanatory power of all. They're resolute, decisive, morally clear, and ready to do what needs to be done. Messy unintended consequences are distractions from the geostrategic, historic stage on which these statesmen (men with one exception) act -- such details are morally relativist 'nuances' with which pointy heads amuse themselves.

"If a governing authority is legitimate, then the government should have a legal monopoly on force."
So if the other guys are gonna clean up in the elections, you attack. That's what you call a monopoly on force.
Just brilliant.

"And if Iraq's rulers are one more set of contestants for power rather than truly being at the helm of the state, can I ask what the hell we're doing there?"
To have a new base of operations in the middle east.

We're not leaving.

..."the fighting in Iraq is not what it seems. The central-government-versus-renegade-militias narrative doesn't fit neatly."

Of course not: except that that hasn't stopped the Administration, or its media enablers, or its cheerleading section in the blogosphere from doing exactly that. Framing the current strife in Iraq as a simple Good-v-Evil fight may be overly simplistic, and largely incorrect: but as long as the current criminalistical regime is in power (in Washington, that is) that's all we're going to get.

Yep, they're "history's actors" all right: it's just too bad that the show they're putting on is a bloodstained mix of tragedy and buffoonery. And they don't care in the least about bad reviews.

“The United States, of course, will provide them help if they ask for it and if they need it,” Bush said.
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49405

Peter Osborne: "Already at the Basra air base, I can reveal, the British subsidiary of U.S. construction giant KBR is building four huge dining facilities - known to the American army as DFACs. These are capable of feeding 4,000 men and suggest that the U.S. Army is contemplating a massive deployment to southern Iraq - including a major presence inside Basra itself."
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/columnists/columnists.html?in_article_id=548593&in_page_id=1772&in_author_id=382

Basra anchors the south of Iraq and the US military main supply route from Kuwait. It also happens to be the Iraqi gateway to the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzestan, which was the scene of heavy fighting 25 years ago when Iraq invaded Iran (with US assistance).

Let's be careful where we go with this, and let's get our Weber right: it is a "successful monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force" that makes a state, and it is precisely the failure of the Baghdad government to enforce that monopoly that allows for civil war. The legitimacy of a government, for Weber, is based on either tradition, charisma, or law. Iraq is still in the grip of charismatic authority -- "the elected war lord, the plebiscitarian ruler, the great demagogue, or the political party leader."

Of course Iraq is violent -- it is engaging in state-building. There was every reason to believe it would be violent (and this was why almost every political scientist and sociologist believed that post-invasion Iraq would be a disaster in the making even if the initial victory was swift).

This was why US unilateralists opposed 1990s peace-keeping: state-building and nation-building are cruel and messy.

  • "[Bosnia's] rulers [were] one more set of contestants for power rather than truly being at the helm of the state";
  • "[Haiti's] rulers are one more set of contestants for power rather than truly being at the helm of the state";
  • "[Somalia'] rulers are one more set of contestants for power rather than truly being at the helm of the state".
  • Let's not through babies out with the bathwater.

Max Weber's thesis that physical force makes a state, just like Mao's "All political power comes from the barrel of a gun," has been thoroughly disproven by nationalists all over the world and is currently being re-disproven by Muqtadr Sadr's followers in Iraq. People power, not physical force, is the essence of a democracy, and democracy is the purported US goal in Iraq.

The US has frequently allied with anti-democratic forces in its own perceived national interest and is doing so again in Iraq, even if it means defending a puppet "government" aligned with its arch-enemy Iran. Sadr has the allegiance of the people against the Iranian-allied Islamic prelates and the merchant class, that's what this present conflict is about.

Obviously "reconciliation" was not a viable option for retaining a US presence in Iraq, so it has been discarded for conflict instead. Reconciliation in Iraq was a principal goal of the surge. Why has its demise not been decried by the victory-in-Iraq crowd? My answer: Their definition of victory is the continued US subjugation of a divided Iraqi people, and reconciliation was never really an option. So much for democracy.

I don't think that's their definition of victory. Their real preference would have been to be victorious in 2003 and long since out of there by now. Their definition of victory is to avoid domestic and international political embarassment -- in other words, avoiding defeat or any appearance thereof. All they've been doing is doubling down, and down, and down on their original bet of a big tough demonstration effect of American strength and righteousness.

"We will . . . turn them one against another,"--GW Bush, Sep 20, 2001

Every US action in Iraq, from fomenting internal strife to arming the "dead-enders" to building mega-bases and a mega-embassy, has been keyed toward an enduring US presence with the full compliance of the congress and now the presidential contenders. Turning "one against another" is an important component toward justifying a continued US presence. Divide and conquer is the policy, and so when one Shi'ite sect attacks another it is declared to be a sign of progress in the goal of everlasting war.

Their real preference would have been to be victorious in 2003 and long since out of there by now.

I can't believe that, David. The plan for the bases was there from the beginning, their construction started almost right away, and it has never been interrupted as far as I know. And big US plans for Iraq's oil industry were present at the beginning. These plans have been modified since then, but are still ambitiously pursued. It sure likes like the idea, in addition to making an impressive display of US force and power, was to turn Iraq into a political and military client under direct US military protection; into a reliable resource supplier, trading partner, and home for US assets; and into a base for further US military operations and force projection in the region. Given the aggressive pattern of US force and investment in Iraq, it doesn't seem realistic to think that "getting out of there" was ever seriously considered.

No doubt the administration hoped for a much easier and less costly victory. But their ultimate plans have succeeded despite the high cost. None of the three remaining candidates is really talking about "getting out" of Iraq, and thereby just writing off the massive investment that has already been made in the permanent US military presence in the country, or in abandoning the US stake in Iraq's oil to other equally greedy players. All of the candidates are planning on staying at some level or another, and the debate is mainly over how that reality is to be sold to the public, given that the parties have different domestic constituencies with different attitudes toward US imperial activity abroad.

Response to Don: Consciously conceived divide-and-conquer maneuver or made-up-as-they-go response to realities and forces they do not understand? You decide.

Response to Dan: The only way to know whether Dems want to get out is to wait and see.


Their real preference would have been to be victorious in 2003 and long since out of there by now.

I can't believe that, David. The plan for the bases was there from the beginning, their construction started almost right away, and it has never been interrupted as far as I know. And big US plans for Iraq's oil industry were present at the beginning.

Huh? The US was planning to pull forces out almost as soon as Baghdad fell and expected that a multinational force would replace it. This is why Rumsfeld forced the military in w/ so few troops.

What power-projection bases in Iraq are there? Where are the naval facilities and the long-range aircraft bases? The US does quite well with its facilities in Bahrain (navy), Qatar (air force), Kuwait (army), and Diego Garcia. It doesn't need bases in Iraq to project its power in the region.

David: "You decide."
As long-time readers will remember, I've decided. There is method to their madness. The destruction of the Shiite Askariya (Golden Dome) Mosque in Samarra, revered by both Shia and Sunni, on Feb 22, 2006 resulted in civil conflict which the US government, including the president, has repeatedly used to justify a continued US military presence in Iraq.

General Pace: "What happened in between was the bombing of the holy mosque in Samarra. That created enormous sectarian violence, which is exactly what al Qaeda [sic] wanted it to do. As a result of that unknown enemy action, the projection of being able to come down in size during the -- 2006 was not executable."

President Bush: "This changed the nature of the conflict in Iraq. We still faced the threat from al Qaeda [sic], but the sectarian violence was getting out of hand, and threatened to destroy this young democracy before it had a chance to succeed. So last fall, I ordered my national security team to conduct a comprehensive review of our strategy in Iraq. We devised an approach that is markedly different from previous efforts."

The Samarra tragedy was accomplished, I'm convinced, with US complicity. There is ample circumstantial evidence to support this (I still haven't convinced Dan K. though). This was done while the US was constructing 14 enduring bases and the huge US embassy in Iraq. It's difficult for outsiders to realize the immensity of this effort. Suffice to say that Balad Airbase, 45 miles from Baghdad, is second in the world for its level of air traffic, after Heathrow.

We see continued promotion of divide-and-conquer with the arming of the Sunni "dead-enders," the emergence of an Iraqi Kurdistan and cheerleading for the Shia strife in Basra.

Cheney referred to the Salvador option in his VP debate with Lieberman. US-trained death squads in Iraq are not much different from the death squads in El Salvador during the 1980s - subordinated to the same "divide and rule" tactics. This is the "civil war" dirty secret: let the Arabs kill one another with the US posing as "victims".

Forces they do not understand? They make their own reality.

Finally, I will grant that Donald Rumsfeld has claimed that he was a Jay Garner get-in-and-get-out guy, and that he claims that he was blind-sided by the Bremer appointment. That's what Rummy claims, and perhaps that's why he's gone. But Rumsfeld, useful though he was, was not A Decider.

My mistake -- it was the Cheney debate with Edwards, not Lieberman, that the Salvador Option came up.

Cheney/Edwards debate
Oct 5, 2004
CHENEY: Twenty years ago we had a similar situation in El Salvador. We had -- guerrilla insurgency controlled roughly a third of the country, 75,000 people dead, and we held free elections. I was there as an observer on behalf of the Congress.
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/10/05/debate.transcript/index.html

Newsweek
Jan 8, 2005
Now, Newsweek has learned, the Pentagon is intensively debating an option that dates back to a still-secret strategy in the Reagan administration's battle against the leftist guerrilla insurgency in El Salvador in the early 1980s. Then, faced with a losing war against Salvadoran rebels, the U.S. government funded or supported "nationalist" forces that allegedly included so-called death squads directed to hunt down and kill rebel leaders and sympathizers
http://www.truthout.org/docs_05/010905V.shtml

AlterNet
Jan 12, 2005
The U.S. counterinsurgency tactics used in El Salvador are at best a case study in how to prolong an insurgency, not end it. And it won't be any different in Iraq.
http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/20962/

truthout
Feb 13, 2006
And indeed, in early 2005 - not long after Bush's directives loosed the "Salvador Option" on Iraq - the tide of death-squad activity began its long and bloody rise to the tsunami-like levels we see today.
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/021307J.shtml

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