Running in Circles in Iraq Posted by Max Bergmann

The New York Times this morning has an analysis of the "fragile, and possibly fleeting" situation in Iraq.

Officials attribute the relative calm to a huge increase in the number of Sunni Arab rebels who have turned their guns on jihadists instead of American troops; a six-month halt to military action by the militia of a top Shiite leader, Moktada al-Sadr; and the increased number of American troops on the streets here.

The Kurdish Deputy Prime Minister described it as "more a cease-fire than a peace." The point about a cease-fire is that they can easily cease. Here is the rub:

 

all of these changes can be reversed, and on relatively short notice. The Americans have already started to reduce troop levels and Mr. Sadr, who has only three months to go on his pledge, has issued increasingly bellicose pronouncements recently. The Sunni insurgents who turned against the jihadists are now expecting to be rewarded with government jobs. Yet, so far, barely 5 percent of the 77,000 Sunni volunteers have been given jobs in the Iraqi security forces, and the bureaucratic wheels have moved excruciatingly slowly despite government pledges to bring more Sunnis in.

One of the major problems with both the surge and "Sunni awakening" strategy has been their long term sustainability. For the surge, we never had enough troops to adequately implement a counter-insurgency strategy over the long term. The ground forces are simply stretched too thin to make the necessary long-term commitment. Additionally, the Sunni strategy may have serious unintended consequences, as we have organized an armed Sunni group that the Shia-led government is loathe to incorporate. We have armed both sides in the civil war. And...

 

it is likely that the old divisions will rapidly resurface as the United States reduces its troop levels. If that happens, extremist Sunnis will renew their assaults on Shiites and Mr. Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia will respond in kind.

What sense did it make to institute a strategy that was not sustainable from the get-go?

Comments

[Don Bacon]

The US strategy in Iraq has been from the start to sustain turmoil and conflict, similar to the US long-term Palestine strategy. "No end in sight". Divide and conquer,and maintain a presence. Keep them killing each other. So it may look like a circle but it's a straight line to political and resource control.

[Howl]

//What sense did it make to institute a strategy that was not sustainable from the get-go?//

It does seem a bit strange to me that, pre-surge, certain segments of the political population had already decided that the surge could never bring any benefit, was a boondoggle to intentionally make things worse rather than better, and regardless, absolutely had to be limited to a certain troop strength and timeline.

Then, when it does seem to be improving things (mind you, I didn't say working--which I define as fundamental political shift--but improving conditions on the ground), the same folks ask questions like 'Why didn't we implement a strategy that was indefinitely sustainable?'

And we wonder why the Democratic anti-war message is lost on large parts of America, when it should be a slam-dunk. Even the most backward red-stater can see that a man can't stand on both sides of a fence.

[Luce Imaginary]

Max, what do you think of the recent stories about the Shi'ah run Interior Ministry pledging to incorporate the "awakening" militias, at least to an extent, into the security apparatus? More hot air?

[Zathras]

The Sunni Arab side of the civil war was already armed. It is likely that local Sunni Arab groups have become better organized in response to a combination of American coaching and a common enemy.

But it is worth pointing out that the common enemy for the last several months has been the Sunni Arab extremist groups that extended themselves repeatedly over the course of several years to make mass-casualty attacks on Shiite government workers, policemen, and civilians. A renewed civil war in Iraq, like a fire, requires both fuel and a match. The American policy under Petraeus hasn't added a great deal of fuel that wasn't already there, while it has poured water on the matches most likely to be struck.

Under the circumstances, the American tactics are probably the best available. They don't fix the problem, which is fundamentally an Iraqi problem having to do with the profound sense of Shiite grievance directed at Sunni Arabs who have not previously and do not now acknowledge it. Even a sensible response by the Iraqi government to American pressure to put local Sunni groups on the government payroll would not fix the Sadr problem, and whatever Sadr's public pronouncements it is men associated with his organization that have perpetrated some of the worst atrocities on Sunni Arab civilians. Sadr has reduced the exposure of his fighters to the American military during the surge, but as the risk of their being engaged by the Americans goes down his inhibitions probably will as well.

The point is that we aren't looking here at a situation made worse by American tactics, but rather at a problem the best American tactics can't fix. If our concern is about an end to the current conditions of reduced violence and a resumption of Iraqis killing Iraqis, we need to be honest enough to acknowledge that this is Iraqis' responsibility.

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