Should We Give Civil War A Chance in Iraq? Posted by Ike Wilson

Anniversaries are times of reflection.  As this month marks the three-year anniversary of the US invasion of Iraq we should take some time to honestly assess where we are and where we may be heading in our war-policy and war-strategy toward Iraq.  Part of that hard assessment must be a consideration of whether or not our strategic course -- how we have approached the intervention so far -- has been more of a helping-hand or a hindrance in the Iraqi's quest for a national state . . . a democracy.  An honest assessment considers all possibilities.  And so, on behalf of a full and honest accountability, should we ask ourselves the uncomfortable question: could it be possible that how we are intervening may have reached a point where we are actually stifling democratization in Iraq?  As we strive to assist the Iraqis in the construction of their own democratic republic and to avoid a fall into civil war, might we be inhibiting democracy itself?  In short, should we be giving civil war more of a chance?            

Even the thought of giving war a chance, civil war in particular, rings of warmongering -- of advocating violence, pain and suffering.  The thought of such a thing is anathema to everything we, citizen and soldier alike, want to believe of war and our roles and purposes in war.  But if we were to put all these traditions aside for just a moment and think -- reconsider -- the functions and purpose of warfare itself . . . that is, why we go to war and how we go to war, we might be surprised at what we realize; that war actually can play a legitimizing role in the nation-building and democratization process.  Ironically, for Iraq as tragic as it may be, a true and sustainable "democratic" future may come in the aftermath of the very sectarian-based civic strife -- civil war -- that we,  for the last three years (and running), have been dedicated to avoiding.

War and its Role in Politics --

In essence, it is possible to think of war in three ways, namely (1) as an instrument in the hands of policy, (2) as an end in itself, and (3) as both a negation and a combination of the two. Each of these ways leads to important conclusions as to the way in which war ought to be conducted. (See, "War")

According to the military theorist and historian considered the father of modern Western military thought and practice, Carl Von Clausewitz, war is an act of force to compel one's enemy to do your will.  Clausewitz further described war (warfare) as a continuation of politics by other means, and in so doing did more than simply intimate war as a form of policy, with a particular political purpose.  Wars of Clausewitz' age were of two kinds, limited and unlimited, distinguished in their forms and functions (practices and applications of power), but the same in terms of their political purpose ("object"): the attainment of some quality of peace endstate, be it through coercion resulting from limited application of force, or, through unconditional surrender resulting from complete military conquest -- annihilation of the enemy regime.  A legitimate peace settlement, no matter what type of war, was the intended goal of warfare -- its point and defining purpose; and for Clausewitz, outside of the political purpose, war was pointless and devoid of all sense. In his own words:

We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase "with the addition of other means" because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different . . . if that is so, then war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense. (See, Vom Kriege)

In this light, we must reconsider our war-policy toward Iraq: what our original agenda was for the war; how we formulated and legitimized our war-strategy; how that war-strategy has (or has not) changed over the last three years; and where that war-strategy may need to go from this point forward.

By more than this author's opinions and analysis, a military aim far short of a political aim of creating a stable and secure, liberal democratic future Iraq of no threat to its neighbors is what defined and drove the US war policy. (see Trainor and Gordon, Cobra II, or, Wilson, "Thinking Beyond War") Ours was a war of limited military object -- a war of choice premised on the riddance of Saddam Hussein and whatever threats to regional or international security that might have emanated from that regime.  Since getting our war-calculus wrong back in 2003, the US war effort has refocused and reoriented toward helping build and secure a united Iraq nation-state. So far, we have considered the avoidance of civil war as a key and essential element of a successful nation-rebuilding effort; we have determined civil war as anathema to a future democratic nation-state.  And since the bombing of the golden Dome Mosque in Samarra last month, we have been holding our collective breadth hoping that this bombing will not prove the harbinger of civil war to come.  US senior military leaders have begun to carefully, yet publicly, prepare the US and Iraqi publics of civil war's possibility.

Democracy In America . . . Born of Insurgency & Legitimized Through Civil War ~

After 231 years of democratization it is all too easy to forget that our own United States of America was born of rebellion -- ours was an insurgent's war against what was at that time, the legitimate and recognized sovereign governing authority over the American colonies: the British government. (See, John Shy's A People Numerous and Armed).  As an insurgent's war, our way of warfare was not limited to the "gentleman's" way of war, but was a mix of conventional and unconventional irregular tactics. (See, John Grenier's The First Way of War) As it turned out, our insurgent claim of legitimacy over our British "occupiers" won the day . . . an argument won more through the "politics of the gun" than diplomacy.

Winning the early battles of insurgency was only the beginning of a long and rocky path toward democratic republicanism. For twelve years following our war of independence, we lived as a confederation of separate states and regions, under the Articles of Confederation. Existing under a "confederation" may have been a necessary transition stage toward a future united nationhood.  We tend to forget the highly contentious Constitutional Convention that crafted a shaky US Constitution . . . the three-years of heated Federalist "versus" Anti-Federalist arguments for and against a "united" states of America, a debate that barely resulted in a ratification of the US Constitution.

Perhaps one of the most tragic of our collective memory-losses and our revision of American history has been our discounting of our own American Civil War, and the vital role this civil war played in redressing some of the major contentious issues of our Founding period and in reaffirming our commitment to "One Nation. . . with liberty and justice for all."  The American Civil War was a continuation of a stalled political discourse we began back in 1787 at the Constitutional Convention -- a continuation of these earlier politics . . . by "other means." The Framer's, for better or for worse, determined that on behalf of uniting a nation, some ideas of democracy would have to be "tabled" for a later discussion.  The notion was simple, albeit unsavory: an imperfect (illiberal) democracy was better than no democracy. The issue of slavery, combined with concerns over states' versus Federal rights, was the divisive issue that could have spelled an early doom to the Nation even as it was struggling to be born. The secession of the Southern States and outbreak of civil war in 1860 was a continuation of an illiberal politics that had been left open and unresolved 73 years earlier. Until the American Civil War, the United States of America was a Promissory Note . . . a Potemkin village . . . a facade, and a promise of not what was, but of what "could be." 

No one can, or should, discount the shear carnage of the American Civil War (over 600, 000 dead). But from the sacrifice of blood and treasure, our Republic was confirmed; legitimized on our own terms.  The politics of the gun -- turned upon ourselves -- was a necessary part of our "successful" democratization.  What if "foreign hands" had weighed in on the ground and intervened in our American Civil War?  Moreover, what if a foreign government had intervened and denied a free-play American civil war?  Surely, there were foreign "observers" to both sides of our Civil War -- British, Prussian (German), and French observers.  But by most historical accounts, this foreign presence remained limited to observation, advisory functions, and tactical level logistical support. Surely, these nation's economic futures lay in the balance of the war, but again, most historians do not make mention of a heavy-foreign hand influencing the American Civil War. 

Democracy In America . . . Still In Progress

The American Civil War was a necessary part of our democracy-building . . . a legitimizing experience.  But it was not enough to seal-the-deal.  Ours is a democracy-in-progress, that since our civil war, has thankfully (and with a lot of luck) been maintained at a low-boil . . . short of a return to another politics of the gun. While we have been rather successful in avoiding a return to full-scale civil warfare over those contentious issues that still threaten to divide us as a united nation, it would be pure hubris for us to deny the bare and bald facts: there have been many illiberal moments and episodes over the decades in the American democratic experiment. 

Following our Civil War, our nation went through its own flawed Reconstruction (and Stabilization) experience -- an effort that lasted 12-years, before being all-but abandoned.  Our failure to complete Southern Reconstruction left many of the race and class cleavages that still threaten to divide our nation, regionally. Though the war ended slavery, emancipated the slaves, and rang in liberty (freedom) for all, the civil rights designed to assure "freedom and equality for all" did not come about right away.  The Civil Rights Movement has been a Long War in this country ever since the Civil War, with some phases successfully completed (i.e., Civil Rights Act of 1968), some stalemated (i.e., ERA), and still others outright defeated (i.e., Gay Rights).  Our democracy has more days of illiberalsim under its belt than liberal days -- just recall the days of Tammany Hall, the party machine and ward boss politics of the early 1900s ("Gangs of New York"), and the realities of back-door politics (Chicago-Land, Mafioso-style patronage politics). This more honest memory of our own democratization is a healthier frame of reference for us to mirror in our efforts to assist the Iraqis.

How To Control For "Faction" (Madison's Dilemma)

Factionalism was an early threat to democratic republicanism; the threat of single-interest groups continue to threaten the United States.  In Federalist Papers No. 10 and 51, James Madison addressed the dilemma: how to deal with (and limit) the ill-effects of 'faction' (i.e., sub-national associative relationships) without killing the cause of factionalism . . .the very liberty (freedom) that defined our democracy and justified our reasons for revolutionary war?  Federalism, separations of power, and a system of checks and balances was "our" solution.  Likely, a similar set of processes will be a part of the eventual democratic solution-set for Iraq.  The Iraqis will need to find an effective and acceptable way of acculturating its long tribal, sectarian, and religious histories and traditions into a united national state that is capable of legitimately and reliably providing and protecting assurances for civil rights and civil liberties for Sunni, Shia, Kurd, (etc.) alike.  When we reflect back, again, on our own experience, we see a long and precarious process; a mix of liberal and illiberal moments.  Two key ingredients to our American "success" seems to be: (a) the isolated nature of the American democratic experiment and (b) ample time to complete the "experiment."

An Iraq Of There Own . . . What Can (Should) The U.S. Do To Help? 

I agree 100% with General John Abizaid, and many others, who now (finally) call this enterprise in Iraq what by its nature was always destined to be -- a Long War.  I disagree 100% with arguments calling for a US strategy that "stays the present course." While staying the fight (i.e., finishing what we started in Iraq when we invaded in 2003) in my opinion is a moral and pragmatic obligation (jus post bellum; preservation of U.S. reputation as a "suasive" intervention force), staying the fight does not have to equate with sticking with an intervention strategy that has so far failed to "win the peace," and in fact, might now be actually (though unintentionally) curtailing democracy in Iraq. 

Many, including myself, still find our present approach to counter-insurgency in Iraq as still more a series of uncoordinated acts of "anti-" insurgent (i.e., capture and kill tactics) "battles" rather than a coordinated and synchronized series of integrated operations . . . a counter-insurgency, or "democratization," campaign.  I offer that a better US strategy toward Iraq should begin by placing our role (past, present, and future) into a historical context.

For a quick but accurate history of Iraq Nation and State-hood, the Iraq History Page is a useful source.  A quick review of that history reveals a history of an Iraq "under" various occupiers or interveners (liberators):  . . . under the Persians and Greeks (ca.539 BC to 637 AD); . . . under the Arabs (637 AD to 1258 AD); . . . under the Mongols (to 1432 AD); . . . under the Turkmen Tribes (to 1508 AD); . . . under the Safavids of Iran (to 1534 AD); . . . under the Ottoman Empire (to 1918); . . . under the British (1918 to 1932).  The "modern" State of Iraq became independent fr a short period of time, achieving a republic (the First Republic) in 1953 that ended in 1958 with the rise of the Baathists. We can literally count on one hand the number of years where Iraq was not either under some occupation or host to some semblance of an "intervention presence."

Our current presence, born of invasion, legitimized at first and fleetingly as a liberation, and now increasingly viewed as a necessary but unwanted occupation in the eyes of the Iraqi people, is the latest in a long line of foreign involvements (interferences) in Iraqi futures. The history of Iraq is one of self-determination denied.  Today, the United States -- with no bad intentions -- is trying its best to avoid civil war in Iraq.  But again, is our denial a denial of Iraqi self-determination? Are we being illiberal in our way of bringing "liberty" to Iraq?

The next thing the United States needs to reconsider is how best to support an Iraqi War "For" Iraq?  In short, the United States needs a new strategic posture toward this war.  A US-led "oil spot" strategy ,in my (and many other's) estimates is a bridge-too-far at this late stage in the game -- two years ago, when the US intervention still retained more of its suasive power, an oil-spot approach may have had promise, but not today.  Such an approach is slow-going (likely requiring more staying power than the American public is now willing to invest) and must at this stage be an Iraqi initiative.  A strategy of "Strategic Redeployment" offered by Representative John Murtha, D-Pa, is intriguing in its over-the-horizon repositioning of US military forces; a strategy apropos for a force of size, complement, and capacity of an expeditionary force like the U.S. Marine Corps. But the realities of the situation in and around Iraq, both the insurgency-counterinsurgency (democratization) war within the interior of Iraq AND the transnational terrorists-antiterrorist war on the fringes (periphery) of Iraq demand a robust ground presence of US and International troops in Iraq . . . if not only to provide one of the two essential conditions for a "successful" democratization: a "contained" environment where a fair-play democracy-building enterprise (of and by and for the Iraqis) can perhaps take place, take root, and flourish. 

The "isolation" of Iraq (and the reestablishment and assurance of Iraq's territorial borders -- an Internationally-recognized precondition for recognized nation-state status) from the unwanted and unwarranted influences of external forces could become a key variable in the potential success of legitimate democratization in Iraq.  Until Iraq can prove its capacity for stabilizing its territorial boundaries, questions over the legitimacy of the Iraqi Nation will persist.  The threat of external incursions by external forces directly threatens the internal war "for" Iraq -- the nation-building and democratization process itself. Part of America's "special providence" was it's insularity from outside influences.  Iraq, geographically, does not benefit from such a natural providence. But such a providence could be artificially induced, through the right size, type, and quality of US and International civil-mil force packages (integrated packages) postured along the periphery (border regions) of Iraq as well as around key infrastructure nodes throughout the country. In this way, International / US forces could be used, at the request of the Iraqi government and the endorsement of the American public, to "isolate" the democratization process -- protecting the internal political discourse from external threats, as well as taking certain "cleavage" issues (key terrain) off of the table of political discourse, initially, so as to avoid or at least minimize the politics of sectarian guns.

America's best help to the Iraqis at this late date in the war effort may be to set the best conditions it can to give the Iraqi people the best chances available for a democratization of their own, on their own terms. This is a future that Iraq, as  Nation-state, has never had before.  That future may bring civil war. But war rages in Iraq at any rate, doesn't it?  So, if war is to be in this country, shouldn't it be a politics of their own cause for liberty? Our own Thomas Jefferson said it best, placing the sacrifice of blood and treasure in war, particularly civil wars, into its tragic yet "democratic" perspective:

"The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants."

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Comments

[Jeff Laurenti]

Ike Wilson has combined a provocative question about the Iraqi present with a thoughtful meditation on the American past. Aside from hinting at a curious question of counter-factuals (might Americans on balance have done tolerably well under the more decentralized Articles of Confederation?), he poses a repugnant premise -- a drenching of blood in civil war could, like the leeches prescribed by 18th century doctors, do the patient good.

Let me offer a different premise (although perhaps compatible with Ike's proposal to let Iraqis battle each other till death and exhaustion have produced a single winner): The nationalist insurgency is essentially directed against the alien invader and those who have assumed the trappings of power behind the invader. Take the alien invader out, and give the Arab League the lead in brokering and guaranteeing an internal Iraqi political settlement. The US certainly cannot talk to the Iraqi resistance, but the Arab League can. We've pursued a failed policy of US intervention for 3 years, one that has plunged the country into chaos and that manifestly cannot succeed. The Arab world may not do better, but there is a chance that it might.

[chew2]

Turgid thinking and turgid prose, and turgid conclusion. You need an editor and to refine your ideas.

"By more than this author's opinions and analyses, that a political aim less than a stable and secure, liberal democratic future Iraq of no threat to its neighbors drove the US war policy has been confirmed (see Trainor and Gordon, Cobra II, or, Wilson, "Thinking Beyond War") Our's was a war of limited military object -- a war of choice premised on the riddance of Saddam Hussein and whatever threats to regional or international security that might have emanated from that regime."

Huh? I can guess at what you mean, but I can't know for sure. Maybe that is because you don't know for sure.

Your possible meme. We don't have the stomach to impose democracy (as if). So we'll let them kill themselves, and call it a necessary step to their discovering their national identity.

We are careless and immoral democratizers. Let them eat civil war. This war was commenced on a lie and fear, that Sadaam was a threat to us, democratization was just a figleaf and one for which Americans are not willing to die.

[Souldrift]

Essentially you're implying that it may take a few more years of bloodshed to give the Iraqis a solid state. While this may be true, we actively destabilized the country--and so all this bloodshed is the result.

Could we have removed Saddam and left a stable country immediately? Doubtful.

Therefore, can we say that removing him--and the civil war that follows--is better than leaving him be? Also doubtful, given that he really wasn't a threat to the U.S.

Just my thoughts.

[J Thomas]

Could we have removed Saddam and left a stable country immediately? Doubtful.

I had a plan that might have worked.

First, point out to Saddam that he has no chance.

Second, offer to pay him X billion dollars for the country. Let him emigrate to the country of his choice, along with his family, trusted staff, trusted bodyguards, body doubles, etc.

Third, announce to the iraqis that we have bought their country and they are now a US territory, and after a period of time they will have elections to decide whether they want to stay that way, become independent, or petition to become a US state.

Keep the iraqi army and police etc intact, and do slow careful purges. Start immediate reconstruction, with essentially no recent war damage.

I think this covers most of the basis. Much harder for Ba'athists to be patriotic when Saddam has sold out, and they will be allowed to continue as one political party among many. Much harder to fight the occupation when it's proposed from the beginning they'll get to vote us out if they don't like us, just like puerto rico. Start reconstruction early (easy to pay for when we aren't paying for such a big military push) and start aligning the legal system etc to american standards in small digestible steps. The more it looks like US law and US property rights the easier it is to get foreign investment. The more momentum we build up for progress the harder it is for malcontents to stop it.

There's the question whether Saddam would have sold. But we've seen now he was depressed, basicly planless. He might quite likely have.

Oh well. It didn't happen. It's all water over the bridge now.

[Dan Kervick]

The fanaticism on display in this post truly astonishes me.

People are dying in Iraq, horribly and violently, and they are dying at a rapidly accelerating clip. Decent human beings are thinking about how to save their lives, not how to nourish the roots of the "tree of liberty" with their blood.

Given the carnage, misery and brutality that are unfolding daily in Iraq, I am sickened that some Americans are still rattling on fantastically about the "legitimacy of the Iraqi State" and the "democratization process". Wake up! There is a cruise ship sinking into the ocean, and you're fretting about how they are going to choose the captains on the lifeboats!

[kamil]

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