Playing Politics in Iraq Posted by Suzanne Nossel

The Bush Administration has waxed often and loftily about the importance of the democratic process in places like Iraq and the Palestinian territories.   After Hamas was voted into office, President Bush intoned: "Democracy can open up the world's eyes to reality by listening to people."

Yet now the Administration is mounting a full court press to get duly selected Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafaari to step down.  There's no question Jafaari is bad news:  his biggest supporter is notorious radical anti-American sheik Moktada al-Sadr; he has renounced the need to crack down on sectarian militias, instead promising vaguely to integrate them into the state security forces; he is closely aligned with Iran; he has done a poor job running Iraq's ministries and has made little progress toward forging multi-ethnic common ground.  The margin of support he holds is a thin one, having one the Shiite nomination for his post by only one vote.

But here's the problem:  after an invasion and occupation that were both seen as illegitimate, the U.S. - the self-proclaimed champion of Middle East democracy - now finds itself in an open battle to oust a rightfully chosen leader.   Here's Jafaari's complaint:

"There was a stand from both the American government and President Bush to promote a democratic policy and protect its interests . . . But now there's concern among the Iraqi people that the democratic process is being threatened.  The source of this is that some American figures have made statements that interfere with the results of the democratic process."

If the US succeeds in pushing Jafaari aside, and that Iraqi people perceive the ouster as such, it may only make life more difficult for the 130,000+ soldiers serving in Iraq, as well as for Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad and others who are trying desperately to help patch together a government that can withstand the drag toward civil war.

What's the right approach in this situation? 

Should the US be true to its principles and let Iraq's fledgling and highly imperfect democracy work its own will, even if the results are manifestly disastrous?  Or should we intervene at the risk of further inflaming local resentment of American interference, and doing further damage to what little remains of our legitimacy? 

The answers aren't easy.  But in a situation like this involving an official who has been selected by party leaders rather than elected by the public, surely the better approach is to use the contacts and relationships we have to work behind the scenes to get the party apparatus oust the errant leader. 

If we were able to convince the Shiite leadership that Jafaari is not their man, not least because he won't enjoy American support (though the value of such support is at best double-edged in today's Iraq), their decision - while influenced by Washington - would be freely arrived at.  If such backstage efforts fail, it becomes clear that a frontal assault will be seen as trying to upend the will of the people and may cause more damage than good to American interests.

Is it really any better for the US to operate in the shadows than out in front?  I think yes.  Working effectively behind the scenes - as long as we don't pay people off or threaten them - requires persuading other leaders to our point of view.  It also avoids creating the public perception in Iraq that the US is dictating to the Iraqi people who should lead them.  Perceptions of that kind cause lasting damage to America's reputation and to the image of American-backed democracy around the world.   A subtler approach should also avoid backfiring in the way the assault on Jafaari may wind up empowering him as a David against the overweaning American Goliath.

Some will say we need not worry about the US's credibility as a force for democracy being torn to tatters, because it was shredded long ago.   That's true, but we need to rebuild it rather than further damaging it.

Comments

[Dan Kervick]

If the US succeeds in pushing Jafaari aside, and the Iraqi people perceive the ouster as such, it may only make life more difficult for the 130,000+ soldiers serving in Iraq, as well as for Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad and others who are trying desperately to help patch together a government that can withstand the drag toward civil war.

It's the first point that most concerns me Suzanne. The recent tilt in the direction of the Sunnis, and modest crackdown on some Shiite death squads, though in reality only slight, and hardly the "betrayal" or "realignment" it is portrayed as being by Shiite propagandists, might nevertheless cause enough of an uproar to turn a lot of areas of Iraq that are relatively safe for our troops into dangerous hotbeds of Shiite revolt. If Shiite communities decide that the American presence is no longer serving their interests, they will turn against us with vigor. And our soldiers will be getting it from the front and the rear at the same time.

However, I would like to hear on this from someone who knows more than I do about the details of US deployment and positions in Iraq. Is this concern serious?

As for patching together a government that can withstand the drag toward civil war, I doubt anything the US can do in the political arena can hinder that momentum. The Shiites seem determined to consolidate their power, and seize firm control of the state, guaranteeing that the military and security forces are made up of their own people. Rejecting Jafari might be part of the US effort to build a government of "national unity". But there is no national unity in Iraq, and there will be and no real national army one way or the other. Sticking with Jafari, though a gesture toward democracy and majority rule, is unlikely to halt the trend toward open armed conflict. It just means that one of the sides in that conflict will be calling itself the "Government of Iraq", and they will have more US funds at their disposal.

Nor is switching to another figure likely to help much. My guess is that whether a worse civil war is averted will depend more on the balance of military power among the competing parties than on the talk taking place in the Green Zone.

[Dan Kervick]

Is it really any better for the US to operate in the shadows than out in front? I think yes. Working effectively behind the scenes - as long as we don't pay people off or threaten them - requires persuading other leaders to our point of view. It also avoids creating the public perception in Iraq that the US is dictating to the Iraqi people who should lead them. Perceptions of that kind cause lasting damage to America's reputation and to the image of American-backed democracy around the world. A subtler approach should also avoid backfiring in the way the assault on Jafaari may wind up empowering him as a David against the overweaning American Goliath.

Gosh, I think we are well past the point where we can afford to refrain from paying people off or threatening them.

I tend to agree mildly that if the business must be done, 'twere best it be done secretly. Yet in the end I doubt anybody will be fooled. If the politics suddenly moves in the direction of known US preferences, few will doubt that some key parties received offers they couldn't refuse from Uncle Sam.

The concerns about "the image of American-backed democracy" seem a bit fussy to me at this stage. I think the world is mainly looking for us to stabilize Iraq somehow, and to keep the place from blowing up. We have to cut the red wire or the green wire. If we cut the right wire, one way or another, we can try to fix the political damage later. If we cut the wrong wire, it won't matter whether we used pretty democratic clippers or rusty non-democratic ones.

[Cal]

There's no question Jafaari is bad news: his biggest supporter is notorious radical anti-American sheik Moktada al-Sadr; he has renounced the need to crack down on sectarian militias...; he is closely aligned with Iran; he has done a poor job running Iraq's ministries and has made little progress toward forging multi-ethnic common ground.

Aside from Sadr's support, every single one of these complaints can be made against the only other alternative -- Adel Mahdi and his Islamic Revolution party. I understand that Mahdi is more amenable to privatization than Jafaari, but this is hardly worth the cost of further delegitimizing the Iraqi gov't.

I disagree with Dan about the need to maintain "pretty democratic" niceties. It's precisely because the situation is so perilous that we have to be sensitive to the Shiite views. If we strong arm our candidate into power, we're likely to split the Shiite coalition -- which probably won't help stability or democracy.

[JP]

Even if we're in the "shadows," they're going to know about it. So we are still left with promoting "Democracy" while actively working to change the result. Did we THINK about this before we acted?

[Katie]

Bush has no right to stick his nose in who they decide on pm.

[J Thomas]

We ran into this same sort of thing in vietnam, and even more so. We had to decide about whether to let them get rid of Diem, and Thieu, and so on. They kept right on having elections, of course, even after the coups. South vietnam had a real army, an army that was strong enough to pull off coups. And south vietnam lasted a lot longer than the current iraq government is likely to.

I've noticed people say that we should just throw out the whole iraqi government and start over. Give it a brand new try. The result of that is likely to be pretty disastrous, but on the other hand probably no worse than trying to work with the existing government.

Remember back when Bush was saying the elections would happen on schedule, and the constitution would be complete on schedule, and so on like that? Maybe if the iraqis had spent more time thinking out how they wanted things to go, they might have gotten better results. The US constitution set up a Senate where small states had disproportionate power, so they'd have a chance to block legislation that otherwise might hurt them. It made a big difference in the early days. Sunnis and kurds might like the government a lot better if they had a chance to block things, out of proportion to their numbers. But it didn't happen.

Bush had no choice but an about-face on early elections. But his other top-down scheduling was mistaken.

[Bob Gaines]

If the mess Bush has created in Iraq weren't so tragic (for the region as well as for the Iraqis), it would be mildly amusing to see you all mulling over ways the US might affect the current power struggle there. Talk about rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic!

Although the US can surely continue to do damage, and possibly even help avoid some of the more baleful effects of its past decisions, the outcome for the Iraqis is pretty well set: years and probably decades of strife and impoverishment. Not to mention the turmoil in the region.

In light of the probable state of the region five years from now, all you are really talking about is whether the US will get a "decent interval" to make its exit.

[PrchrLady]

Well said...

"The answers aren't easy. But in a situation like this involving an official who has been selected by party leaders rather than elected by the public, surely the better approach is to use the contacts and relationships we have to work behind the scenes to get the party apparatus oust the errant leader."

Yes, but this would only make sense, it would seem, and yet do we have the intelligence capabilities left within the agencies that is needed to accomplish this goal?

The current cabal has no diplomatic or common sense to do anything positive for this country, and they will not hesitate to destoy anyone, or anything that gets in the way of their goals. Witness what they did to Valerie Plame, and how many others that we might not be aware of, or able to speak about?

I pray that this nightmare will soon be over, and that my sons and daughters who serve this country in uniform during these trying times, will not be forgotten. As a military 'mom', a veteran nurse, and concerned citizen, I ask... Do not forget those that serve. They continue to need our support.