A Friendly Missive From Messr. bin Laden Posted by Jeffrey Stacey

While terrorism detecting eyes are averted to the stunning Hamas performance in Israel, in the campaign against terrorism the state of Al Qaeda is of far greater importance—particularly with regard to the ramifications of this month’s successful U.S. strike inside Pakistan. Not only thereafter did we hear from Osama bin Laden (OBL) for the first time in over a year, but in the course of threatening attacks in the U.S. heartland he also offered something of an olive branch.

Al Qaeda did offer a sort of truce with European governments a couple of years ago, but OBL’s offer constitutes an intriguing departure. Why such a message and why now? With a trove of American analysts suggesting the U.S. is losing the campaign against terrorism—and Al Qaeda’s success in broadening their recruiting, influencing moderate Muslim opinion, and OBL’s remaining at large—why would the leader of Al Qaeda do something that smacks of weakness?

It appears that OBL is feeling newly vulnerable, and he has reason to be. Certainly he could be motivated to snatch back some of the limelight that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (AMZ) has been hogging in Iraq, and OBL has consistently shown himself to be an able media manipulator—e.g. by making an overture he knew the U.S. would reject he comes off somewhat statesmanlike.

And no doubt by rattling the saber a bit he set off a fresh round of concerns about the post 9-11 Al Qaeda chimera’s ability to strike at will deep inside the West. But OBL has been comfortable in having his chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri (AZ), act as the public face of Al Qaeda for a couple of years now; moreover, he has an interest in remaining out of view to stoke those mythical fears even though he is becoming more frail. Granted, the OBL tape could well have been made prior to the strike, but the Al Qaeda death knell is sounding.

Al Qaeda has not only a significantly reduced direct capacity to carry out attacks but also a new reason to feel that OBL and AZ are not as safe in their Pakistani tribal refuge as they are accustomed to feeling. I am in no way writing the epitaph of Al Qaeda, nor foolishly dabbling in any “they’re in the last throes” rhetoric. Rather, evidence points to success against the top drawer terrorist organization even while its affiliates are achieving increased success of their own.

While the Madrid and London bombings indicate a continued threat of local motivated Islamic extremists in the West—the principal threat these days—Al Qaeda itself has been degraded.  By the end of December, in addition to OBL, AZ, and AMZ if he counts, only 5 other major operatives were still at large (in May top commander Abu Faraj al-Libbi was captured).

As of the strike this month, aimed at AZ, two of the other five were killed—Abu Khabab al-Masri and Abu Ubayada al-Masri, other top commanders—along with AZ’s son-in-law and another. It was a sizable blow to Al Qaeda and highly ominous for the remaining leaders. For the strike inside Pakistan itself was a departure.

That Pakistan allowed the U.S. strike to take place upon request is significant (President Musharraf’s delayed complaints are purely due to the protests spawned around the country) and presages future success as the U.S. et al. move toward eradicating 90% of notable Al Qaeda leaders. Moreover, the numbers of fighters who went through pre 9-11 Afghan training camps have been exaggerated, as is the report of vast new camps there.

I will say more in a future post about the specter of continued attacks from affiliated groups—including a proposal to open up a Pacific front in the global campaign against terrorism—but the steady eradication of Al Qaeda itself is significant and the day of OBL’s demise may be closer than we think (and especially if he is captured instead of killed, the effect on his followers will be less malign than most imagine).

'The Sky Is Black With Planes?' Posted by Heather Hurlburt

In my bucolic 70s-80s suburban childhood, that was how the execs at the Fortune 500 media company where my dad worked described the cascading chains of management transfers among media properties.

Today, though, I'm looking at some of the CIA-torture-plane reporting coming out of Europe, counting up the national inquiries -- the BBC and Le Monde between them report eight into CIA activities on or over their territories -- and thinking two things.  First, the scandal is going to stay alive and bedevil our relations with Europe for a long time, as these national inquiries feed off each other.  In addition to the eight above, questions have been raised in Austria, Italy, Germany and the UK that I know of.   Der Spiegel and The Guardian reported 437 CIA flights to Germany since September 11, and 210 into Britain.

Second, that sounds like a lot more activity and many more flights than would have been needed for the 26 "ghost detainees" Human Rights Watch has listed.  The Washington Post said earlier this week that there had been eight prison facilities, which seems to suggest rather more than 26 individuals.

Euro-Leaders to Rice: Thanks, We Needed That (Not.) Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Ever have a life partner, colleague, or friend who interrupted your brilliant storytelling at cocktails with the words, "that's not how you told it last time?"

That's more or less what Secretary Rice, who had been getting oodles of good press for her diplomatic abilities,  did to our European allies this week.

But today in Germany it seems that two can play at that game.

"We are losing." Posted by Heather Hurlburt

"We are losing. Four years and two wars after September 11, 2001, the United States is no closer to victory in the 'war on terror.' In fact, we are unwittingly clearing the way for the next attack."

So opens the new book by my old colleagues Dan Benjamin and Steve Simon, The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right.  (They're the guys who brought you The Age of Sacred Terror a couple years back.)

You can check out their argument -- and poke holes in it, if you like -- tomorrow, when Dan Benjamin will hold forth live at 5pm EST on Monday, December 5 over at Campusprogress.org.**  I haven't read this one yet, but anybody who's not afraid to come out and say that we aren't winning deserves attention.  In addition to being a leading terror wonk, Dan is a former reporter AND fellow recovering speechwriter, which means his books are if not enjoyable (given the subject) at least highly readable.

But don't take my word for it -- check Dan out tomorrow.

**and yes, Campus Progress is, like Democracy Arsenal, an initiative of/with the Center for American Progress.  If you like us, you'll love Campus Progress.  If you love to argue with us, you'll love arguing with Dan in real time.

Bush Speech: Now We Know Posted by Heather Hurlburt

This morning's speech is not the smoothest-running piece of prose ever produced by the Bush White House -- it loops around how evil and nasty (but officially not "insane" -- that's progress, I suppose, if we understand that our enemies are also rational actors) Islamic radicals are before getting to what I think is meant to be the point -- a five-part anti-terrorism agenda.  (Aspiring speechwriters note:  there's no signpost or "nut graf" at the top of this thing, so I am really flummoxed if I only listen to the first 5 minutes before nodding off, or need to tell you what it's about without reading all of it.)  I don't have anything to add to my earlier commentary on the level of rhetoric, so I'll move to the agenda.  Its five items cover much of the rhetorical ground of fighting extremism, but we get almost nothing on how the government is pursuing items 1-3, and no mention at all of anything that requires diplomacy, coalitions, negotiations or compromise.  Hmmm.

1.  prevent attacks before they occur.  Here we get some numbers of attacks and surveillance operations prevented, no details, which I gather are supposed to be new.  coming after several pages of fulminating about how evil our enemies are, I certainly didn't find the numbers reassuring.  But then, I guess I'm not supposed to be reassured.

2.  deny weapons of mass destruction to outlaw regimes and their terrorist allies.  Best they can do here is claim credit for A.Q. Khan again, in a paragraph so rote that it was probably lifted straight out of some office-level talking points.

3. deny radical groups the support and sanctuary of outlaw states.  sure sounds like a good idea to me.  so when will we be sealing the iraq-syria border, or the afghanistan-pakistan border?  And, umm, there's that little matter of radical groups that find support and shelter in allied states.  You'd never know from this speech that attacks had been planned and carried out from European cells and bases, yet those have been the most successful and bloody ones of late.

4.  deny the militants control of any nation.  Here we have, at long last, a rationale for Iraq:  "the terrorists want to overthrow a rising democracy, claim a strategic country as a haven for terror..."  What's odd about this Iraq segment (which circles around to this exact point twice, as if maybe we didn't get it the first time) is that it inflates the "elected leaders of Iraq" to great rhetorical heights -- "strong and steadfast" -- and assures us that "democracy, when it grows, is no fragile flower; it is a healthy, sturdy tree." (Ummm, Mr. President, see Nicaragua.)  Yet his argument seems to assume that if we withdrew, Zarqawi would be in control in Baghdad tomorrow.

5.  deny the militants future by replacing hatred and resentment with hope and opportunity across the broader Middle East.  here we learn that "America is making this stand in practical ways.  We're encouraging our friends in the Middle East, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to take the path of reform..."  a perfectly reasonable paragraph that could have been written at any time in at least the last 15 years, maybe longer.

So what I see as new here is yet another explicit rationale for Iraq:  we have to stay the course because "would the United States and other free nations be more safe, or less safe, with Zarqawi and bin Laden in control of Iraq, its people and its resources?"  (The next time your lefty friends tell you it's all about oil, they'll have heard it from the President here first.)

Bush at NED: If a speech falls in the forest... Posted by Heather Hurlburt

So I really wanted to watch the President's newly-ballyhooed (as of this morning) speech at NED and share my impressions with the blog.  Scott McLellan promised us the speech would contain "new details" about our strategy and actions in the war on terror. 

It's being broadcast on CSPAN-3.  I didn't know there was a C-SPAN 3.  MY cable provider doesn't appear to know there's a C-SPAN 3.

So I'll be back when I can figure out what's in the speech...

11:15 update:  We'll look more closely at the text later today.  But here's what I didn't see:

New strategy, or even "new details" that would convince me there is a strategy.

New details of actions we're taking.  Huh?

This looks like another dip into the "let's frighten civilians" pool.  Two problems here:  first, the excerpts I've read so far manage to take the extremist, caricatured doctrines of Al Qaeda and make them sound even more caricatured.  Second, if the President ratchets up the rhetoric like this in response to a bad couple of weeks, what are we going to do on the day that Al Qaeda gets a nuclear weapon or something else really, really bad happens?  This kind of cheap speech-making is producing a "boy who cried wolf" effect.  People flinch when they hear the rhetoric; it has the (intended?) effect of driving them further out of politics and public life; and then nothing happens.  So people are at once deeply afraid and deeply cynical.  That's a dreadful place for our national life, regardless of who's president.

1:00 update:  Judd Legum over at ThinkProgress agrees and has a nice list of some of the better fearmongering bits.

Being Alternative Means being Realistic: Means and Ends in Iraq Posted by Michael Kraig

Responding in part to Heather’s great piece “Open Floodgates Pt. 1: Plans for Iraq,”

First, we have to be honest with ourselves – events on the ground are too fluid and chaotic to have a stable, democratic, and highly centralized Iraqi state entity as a short- or medium-term goal.  Odds are that it will fragment, because we destroyed the Iraqi state by de-Ba’athification, and in the void have jumped all the sectarian and ethnic groups, who have their own militias – which the US military has given up on de-arming and de-mobilizing. 

The Kurds have no real interest in a real Federal Iraq; if you listen to their leaders’ statements, they basically want a confederal Iraq not too different from what our 13 American colonies started out as – a loosely knit collection of 13 autonomous states, with one central Capitol that had little power but which represented the confederation abroad.  In addition to the Kurds, it increasingly appears that top Shi’ite leaders have the same overall goal in mind.

Would such a loose confederation really constitute a functioning state?  Odds are that all things would exist simultaneously (a confederation Capitol alongside the reality of regional autonomous rule), as they do right now.  To whit:

1)      A largely autonomous Kurdish region, secured by militias, with representatives in Baghdad whose central mission is to preserve Kurdish autonomy and use central state resources and international political legitimacy to fend off any predations by Iran and Turkey next door.  In short: use the central diplomats of the state, and use the budget of the state, but use them toward the goal of an autonomous Kurdish region.

2)      A largely autonomous Shi’ite region, secured by militias, with representatives in Baghdad….etc. etc…..using central state resources to fend off predations by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other neighbors of southern Iraq.

3)      A largely autonomous Sunni region, secured by militias….you get the idea.

This would reflect the military, social, political, and economic realities on the ground already.  Yes, a new Iraqi economy could theoretically emerge that is not based on sectarian divisions; yes, a strong central military could take on the militias.  But the Sunni guerrillas (the fighters who are truly indigenous, not from far-flung South Asia or Southeast Asia) are simply not going to let either of these things to take shape because of the very understandable fear that de-Ba’athification means de-Sunni-fication in practice, and “central Iraqi economy and state” means a state run by a coalition of Kurds and Shi’ites, who agree to a bargain to keep the Sunnis down and out, as well as out of their own business in their respective sub-regions of Iraq. 

In sum: militarily, economically, and socially, Iraq is now being run on a day-to-day basis by different politico-religious groupings based on well-defined neighborhoods in urban areas and longstanding tribes in outlying areas.  It is starting to border on fantasy to assume this will change. The best hope to avoid this de-centralized, district-based rule was to avoid wholesale de-Ba’athification.  The damage was done in 2003 and now we have to live with the consequences.

If unity happens on a more substantial basis, it will likely happen as a slow evolutionary process of complex micro-level interactions between different tribes, sects, and groups, as was true of state building in many other parts of the world.  It isn’t pretty, but it is how today’s stronger states have historically evolved. 

This leads to the basic question: how to make such an arrangement stable, peaceful, and secure, in a way that doesn’t undermine regional security and the global economy?  On this, I agree with most of Juan Cole’s suggestions.

First, a confederal Iraq (with a bunch of Sunni tribes in outlying border areas doing pretty much what they want) can only be stabilized and regularized if every single neighbor is brought into the process. 

This means finally admitting that Iran is not the primary supporter of Iraqi internal terrorism or insurgency, and in fact, that Iran has played its cards cautiously and pragmatically since March 2003, as pointed out by the International Crisis Group in various reports.  Iran has been schizophrenic, like the U.S. (and like all other neighbors of Iraq) in supporting various factions here and there so as to avoid all worst-case outcomes while at the same time giving relatively higher support to like-minded groups. 

So, Iran has aided virulently pro-Tehran leaders and groups, but not nearly to the extent monetarily or militarily as some analysts would have you believe.  Further, Iran has aided secular groups and even the current central government, in large part because in the end, Najaf is not Qom and Baghdad is not Tehran, and Ayatollah Sistani does not care at all for the Iranian melding of the Koran with authoritarian religious rule (believing that Shariah law must have a central moral role in law-making is not the same as iron-fisted rule by theocrats). 

So, Iran actually is spreading its various forms of aid in ways that avoids an overly strong, overly sectarian, overly-ideologized central grouping that could grow to challenge Iran on religious as well as political grounds. 

Sound familiar?  It should.  It is basically the strategy of all Iraq’s neighbors: keep Iraq together, but keep it weak.  If you believe that America’s six Arab “friends” in the Gulf are acting any differently from Tehran in this regard, then there is a bridge I could sell you in NY.   

Put another way: the balance of power and Realpolitik are not just concepts for international relations; they are the central concepts being applied to internal Iraqi affairs by Iraq’s neighbors.  Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Kuwait, and other Gulf Arab Monarchies are playing balance-of-power politics in Iraq, just as Syria and Israel and others once did in Lebanon with various factions. 

Within this paradigm, Saudi Arabia will of course give more relative support to those Sunni groups that accept the Saudi version of Wahhabi Islam, just as Iran will support similar groups in its favor.  And the Turks will aid the Turkomans to the extent possible to provide challenges to Kurdish militia leaders.

But, neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran, nor any other neighbor, is interested in a strong Iraqi state dominated by any such groups.  Hence the sly practice of aiding other forces as well.  If this sounds familiar, again, it should, because it’s what major corporations do in aiding politicians during election campaigns: relatively higher support goes to Republicans, but the Dems get a fistful of dollars as well.  It’s called playing the odds and spreading your bets, and Iran and Syria are no more “rogue-ish” in doing this within Iraq than any of the other neighbors. 

This reality of neighborly love for confederal fragmentation can work to the benefit of stability or against it.  It is the US job to use its muscle and pull to make sure that the neighbors’ strategy is coordinated (or at least constrained) in a way that supports a stable confederal arrangement rather than leading to all-out civil war, as happened in Lebanon. 

As Juan Cole points out, a much worse civil war could still break out, and if millions die because of it, the blood would be on our hands.  And, of course, such a war would severely disrupt oil supplies in the Gulf, leading to all sorts of nasty international outcomes. 

So what does this mean in practical terms?  First, it means customs, customs, customs, and border patrols, border patrols, border patrols.  It means defining a new military mission for the US that puts all of its gee-whiz high-tech gadgets to use with not only friends and allies, but also enemies such as Iran, in the region, to avoid a very real scenario of highly-trained Islamic insurgents leaving Iraq and destabilizing all neighboring states. 

At a recent Stanley Foundation off-the-record dialogue in Dubai, involving experts and officials from all 6 Arab monarchies, one of the main central security concerns expressed was this scenario: newly trained insurgents-cum-terrorists leaving Iraq when it finally stabilizes and destabilizing everything they can around it. 

I would venture to say that the same fear holds true for Syria (which has secular Ba’athist rule, not radical Wahhabi Islamic rule) and Iran, whose Shi’ite religious basis is antithetical to the radical Islamic insurgents being trained in terrorist methods in Iraq.  In fact, the most radical Sunni sects (which have followers in Iraq originating from far-flung areas such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asia) believe that if you kill a Shi’ite child, you go to heaven. 

In sum: The first recommendation is that the US does everything in its power to aid all of Iraq’s neighbors in setting up a customs and border security “firewall” around Iraq. 

Second, see Juan Cole’s full column, which makes acid points about America’s dysfunctional and infeasible policies toward Syria and Iran, as well as good military and logistical points about how to get US troops out. 

What Juan doesn’t do is admit that the current reality is the future reality; he still holds out hope for a strong and meaningful centralized Iraqi state.  At this point in the game, though, the option of a stable confederal state – with an internationally recognized government that handles diplomacy but which has few real powers internally beyond coordinating common security policies between militias where common interests exist – should be studied further as a potentially more realistic and feasible goal of US policy. 

But this is not as pragmatic as it sounds: it means dumping decades of rogue-state strategies based on coercive diplomacy toward Iran and Syria, and actually engaging them, Richard Nixon-goes-to-China style.  This would constitute a radical policy shift for both Dems and Republicans, but it is one that is necessary and long overdue (see for instance the Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, “Realistic Solutions for Solving the Iranian Nuclear Crisis.”) 

Michael Kraig

The Stanley Foundation

Foiled by Idealism? - The US Foreign Policy Pendulum Posted by Michael Kraig

Foreign Affairs Managing Editor Gideon Rose recently wrote a very provocative column in the NYT on August 18, appropriately titled, "Get Real."  It is a Realpolitik bashing of America's proclivity for swinging wildly between unrealistic ideals in international relations and prudent balance-of-power pragmatism. He's definitely on to something, but I question his description of current policy realities.

Rose's argument is compelling: the United States has swung back and forth for decades between getting into international messes because of ideals/culture/nationalism, after which pragmatic policies reign and the US extricates itself, only to repeat the idealist debacle again under another Administration.  This pattern, according to Rose, does not respect partisan lines; Dems or Republicans are both prone to the errors of idealism, and both sides have had their chance to extricate America from its unrealistic messes.

There is one problem, however: we are not swinging back to pragmatism this time around - at least, not yet. 

First, Rose forgets what all of DC and much of America have "learned" from their supposed past Realpolitik misdeeds during the Cold War: namely, it was not idealism that led to 9-11, according to this argument, but rather Realism itself that is the cold-blooded culprit.   In the new DC Consensus, our active aiding and abetting of all sorts of authoritarian nasties during the Cold War is what got us into the current mess and made us a hypocrtical sham the world over.  According to both Dems and Republicans, it is time to make things right.

Thus, despite the debacle in Iraq, there is still a largely unquestioned assumption - growing increasingly popular to the point of becoming received wisdom - that the US can only be secure through spreading and supporting true democracy and economic liberalization the world over.  In this new Consensus, the path to Realism is Idealism.   To lessen one's ideals in the name of pragmatism is to invite disaster. 

For this reason, authors such as Reinhold Neibuhr and Hans Morgenthau, and the halcyon Wise Men of post-WW II international system building  (Marshall, Acheson, Kennan, etc.), are no longer being held up as revered historical gurus.  After Vietnam, these Realists felt vindicated in their earlier assessment that our failure was due to an overzealous application of an unrealistic "domino theory" of communism based on the obsessive need to spread systems like ours throughout the Developing World.   There is no similar vindication occurring now; rather, criticism tends to be on the Bush Adm.'s bad methods and faulty original rationales (WMD arguments), rather than criticism of the core assumption of "transforming the Middle East."

More to the point, there is no indication that Condi Rice's State Department is prepared to implement a truly "balance of power" policy of Realpolitik pragmatism and/or a progressive policy of reciprocal engagement and cooperation with the enemy (i.e., detente or rapprochement).   Rose makes much of the new and improved operation at State, but here's what's missing in our actual security policies:

--support for a new security consensus, or common security vision, between the Developed and Developing World at the upcoming negotiations in NY for UN Reform (see Thursday's Washington Post story to see what I mean);

--support for new confidence-building measures (CBMs) toward "rogues" such as Syria, Iran, and North Korea, all of which essentially say, "We recognize you as a sovereign state with legitimate security concerns, interests, and anxieties, and we will talk with you about security guarantees that will meet the interests of both of us without undermining the other." 

--(in other words: a balance of interests, which is what the Realist's balance-of-power is meant to create);

--statements to the effect that our goal toward these 3 states is not regime change, preemptive, preventive, or otherwise, but rather is one of reaching detente or a "grand bargain" that meets the interests of both sides without endangering either side's security;

--allowance of our friends and allies in these respective regions to engage the rogues, invest in them, and trade with them, without punishment from us (for instance, allowing India to negotiate with Iran on a new oil pipeline for South Asia);

--engaging Iran to better manage the threat of a disintegrating Iraq, which would make both Iran and the US massively insecure;

--in sum: the idea of Nixon going to China, with a view of transforming things gradually through achieving a balance of interests and values, rather than radical transformation through winning a competition and delivering outright defeat via coercive methods (i.e., one side's values/interests overturning the other);

--all of this based on the assumption that North Korea, Iran, and Syria are not expansionist powers chomping on the bit to kick out the Americans and win aggressive wars against their neighbors, but rather are insecure regional powers who feel under constant threat of extinction - an assumption that is neither idealistic or realistic, but is simply the truth (see for instance Leon Sigal's argument in Arms Control Today concerning North Korea's motivations and intent, based on actual behavior).

Whatever the current realities, is Rose right in his prescriptions?  Yes.  I do hope that Rose's pragmatic turn will happen soon, as laid out above, because as recently argued by Realpolitik Middle East analyst F. Gregory Gause in Foreign Affairs,

"Is it true that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? In other words, is the security rationale for promoting democracy in the Arab world based on a sound premise? Unfortunately, the answer appears to be no....Terrorism appears to stem from factors much more specific than regime type. Nor is it likely that democratization would end the current campaign against the United States. Al Qaeda and like-minded groups are not fighting for democracy in the Muslim world; they are fighting to impose their vision of an Islamic state. Nor is there any evidence that democracy in the Arab world would "drain the swamp," eliminating soft support for terrorist organizations among the Arab public..."

Michael Kraig, Director of Policy Analysis and Dialogue, The Stanley Foundation

Foiled by Assumptions Posted by Michael Kraig

I am writing in my capacity as a temporary replacement for Lorelei Kelly as she takes a much-needed vacation.   And as a new voice, I would like to comment on some assumptions about international security that centrists and progressives hold in common with the conservatives, which consequently undermines attempts to arrive a truly different security paradigm that can be held up as a strong, coherent alternative.

First, David Adesnik said in a post about Cindy Sheehan, "And what if the Ba'athists and their Al Qaeda allies prevail in that war and transform Iraq into a staging ground for international terrorists attacks, a la Afghanistan except with oil?"  This is a mischaracterization of what's happening in Iraq, and it is an error that points to larger US policy community assumptions in general about connections between groups, and between states and groups.  The fact is that there are multiple fights, battles, and mini-wars going on in Iraq, by myriad groups, and though the Ba'athists and Al-Qaeda fighters may indirectly benefit from the chaos and fear that each is creating, they are NOT creating this chaos and fear with an eye to helping each other (and, they are not the only ones doing it; representatives from nearly every group are involved).  Nor is there any compelling evidence that they are actively planning and coordinating their activities together.  The Ba'athists are fighting for their once Sunni-dominated homeland; the foreign insurgents are taking the opportunity created by Bush to cause as much chaos and pain as possible in the cause of overturning the globalizing status quo in the Middle East.  Rest assured, if the Ba'athists were to finally win (even if just over a slice of the original Iraq), they will ruthlessly root out the foreign insurgents -- of any kind, creed, ideology, religion, or national origin - and rest assured, the foreign insurgents will fight them to the death (or, go next door to Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, where they can cause more trouble for years to come for those governments).   For instance, at a recent Stanley Foundation dialogue in Dubai, it was made quite clear that the biggest fears of Iraq's neighbors is not an alliance of insurgents within Iraq, that then make a strong Iraqi state that supports terrorism, but rather, an eventual return of foreign insurgents to the lands from which they first originated.  In short: they fully expect the foreign fighters to be kicked out at some point in the foreseeable future, because they do not assume that these foreign fighters agree with any other group, or ally with any other group.  Rather, the assumption (which I believe is correct) is that these groups are opportunists, quite separate from the Ba'athists, who simply wish to wreak as much havoc as possible -- and when Iraq gets its act together, whether in Sunni or Shi'ite form, then these foreign terrorists will raise literal hell elsewhere.   

With this in mind, I'm not sure it really matters whether the centrists and leftists be seen as appeasers in 2008 elections, because the entire threat and entire problem is being defined incorrectly from the beginning, by both conservatives and liberals alike -- much as Vietnam and the infamous "domino theory of communist expansion" were ruled by misconceptions on each side of the DC spectrum throughout that entire war.   The question is not whether we stay or go, but whether we are willing to admit just how big a mess it really is, and recognize the true costs of cleaning it up, and admit what kind of transnational (not national) terrorist legacy it is going to leave behind.  Iraqi stability and unity should be a goal -- but this goal will not be reached if characterize the problem incorrectly.

Another example: I find on Democracy Arsenal (and other blogs) a certain amount of agreement with the status quo policy conception that the anger in the Middle East is due to internal, domestic repression/oppression/injustice under autocratic governments, and that the anger toward Israel, the West, the US, and the globalizing world order is a byproduct of this, or an escape valve for this.   Indeed, I've heard this from numerous US officials and non-officials throughout my work for the Stanley Foundation; you could almost call it a standing epistemic agreement in the US policy community. 

Unfortunately, it's wrong -- or at least, half-wrong.  There is of course an "escape valve" factor at work here.  But after traveling to the Near East and the Persian Gulf for a combined total of two months this year (in a cross-country outreach tour for a Stanley product translated into Arabic), what I found was nearly everyone saying that "democracy" is not just about internal practices -- there is also an international dimension to justice, development, and democracy.  And this is where anger toward perceived neo-colonialist aggression, not too different from the British mandate in Egypt and the French mandate in Lebanon and Syria, comes in.  The truth is that people feel oppressed at one in and the same time by their own governments (internally) AND by perceived anti-Islamic, anti-Arab forces at the international or global level (externally), and neither of these exists in a vacuum apart from the other.  There is a palpable feeling throughout the Middle East that their values and way of life are potentially or actually under assault by hostile attempts to subvert true Arabism and Islamism and turn it into a Western template.  Israel's actions fall under this umbrella, but by no means is it just Israel alone; Israel is just sort of the lead "indicator", if you will, of overall Western intentions, especially US intentions. 

Put another way, and a bit more broadly: a Chinese analyst complained to me some years ago that Americans talk about democracy all the time, but they subvert it all the time.  I asked what he meant.  And he sincerely said that international institutions, and international rule of law, were the international equivalent of domestic democracy within sovereign states.  He said that China had finally bought into the conception promulgated by the Clinton Administration in the 90s that the NPT, the CTBT, the ICC, etc. and so on, were legitimate institutions to join and adhere to -- and the internal Chinese debate had been won on this score in part because it was "sold" by analysts within China as "international democracy" -- with soveriegn states as the individuals comprising the electorate.  But, this analyst complained, now the US is abusing the UN, failing to ratify the CTBT, disregarding key obligations of the NPT, and is slowly but surely weaponizing outer space.   In this analyst's view, this was "undemocratic" behavior at the international level, even though it was all being done due to democratic decisions made by the US within its own domestic level of politics. 

Long story short: this is how many Arabs feel about Iraq, Palestine, and about globalization in general.    And this is why the assumption mentioned above is a very dangerous one to hold, particularly for progressives trying to lay out true alternatives to the current policy status quo.  Yes, it is necessary to support democracy internally within Middle East states; yes, if people were not repressed domestically (and were not as poor economically, for some countries) in the Middle East, they probably wouldn't hate Israel, Europe, or the US as much as they currently do.  But would this anger and hate disappear if the Middle East were democratized at the domestic level?  The answer is, simply, no.  Because the feelings about lack of justice, or lack of democracy, at the INTERNATIONAL level are just as acute and just as real for many citizens and officials alike throughout the Middle East, and only the US supporting the rule of law at the international level will appease this anger and truly bring about a sea-change in relations and perceptions.  We may not see ourselves this way, but many in the Middle East (including rigorous analysts) really don't make much of a distinction between colonial Britain in Egypt, colonial France in Syria, and now today, the US in Iraq and Israel in Palestine.   It's all pretty much the same to them: international repression against pan-Arab and pan-Islamic identity (and for many citizens in the Middle East, they still even today feel just as much allegiance to pan-Arab culture as they do to the culture of their own sovereign nation; hence, purely national-domestic efforts at democratization are not meeting the culture of the region as it actually exists, in a transnational/international as well as national context).  Unless the progressive community in the US comes to grips with this reality, we really aren't offering true alternatives to the accepted assumptions of US foreign policy today.   

10 things that matter more to the fight against terror than a new acronym Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Anne-Marie Slaughter at America Abroad, Fred Kaplan on Slate, Sid Blumenthal on Salon and the mainstream media have been buzzing this week about President Bush's pivot away from the language of Global War on Terror (GWOT) and toward the so-called Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism, aka GSAVE. 

For the record, led by Derek Chollet, we here at DA were writing about this months ago, opining here and here about what was - until Madison Avenue had its way - known as the Global War on Extremism (I personally think we all ought to stick with the Elmer Fuddish but factual GWOE rather than buying into the boosterist GSAVE).

Most commentators judge the rebranding of the fight against terror to be more politics than substance.  So, in a month of dastardly attacks from London to Sharm el Sheikh to Baghdad,  let's not let this bit of spin doctoring obscure all that needs to be done to shore up an anti-terror fight that is targetting an ever more complex, and constantly changing enemy.  Here are 10 priorities:

1. Wage the War of Ideas in Earnest - The Administration has until now resisted calling the war on terror is a fight over values and purposes.  That ideas play a role is, after all, potentially in tension with the view of Islamic terrorists as nihilistic and devoid of reason.  But while the core of extremist terrorist groups may be a fanaticism too deep and immutable to be tackled with reason, beliefs and viewpoints certainly do matter in the outer spokes of terrorist support networks, to the ordinary people who either grant or deny terrorists the funds, political support and safe harbor they need to operate.  These are the people we need to appeal to and pry away from their terrorist sympathies.

2. Recognize that U.S. Soldiers and Prison Guards are the Frontlines of Public Diplomacy - In waging a battle over ideas and perceptions among ordinary populations, what we do matters more than what we say.  Like it or not, our military, our prison guards, and our private contractors are on the frontlines of public diplomacy.  They do us proud much of the time, but the lapses that have occurred - some more than accidental - have hurt us badly by playing right into the worst fears and misperceptions about the United States.  But the Administration remains in denial on this score.

3. Get Politics Out of Homeland Security - The shameless pork-barrelling of this month's Homeland Security budget dealt a blow to the anti-terror efforts.  Whereas the 9/11 Commission and Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff made a compelling case that funds be strictly apportioned on the basis of threats, the Senate decided on its own formula that shortchanges New York, California, and our ports and nuclear facilities for the benefit of unlikely terrorist targets like Wyoming, Idaho and Maine.

4. Put Forward A Clear Strategy For Iraq - Without a strategy to achieve U.S. goals in Iraq, no matter what we call the fight against terrorism, many Americans will fear that we are losing on the most important front.  This is not because we are fighting terrorists in Iraq to avoid fighting them here.  Rather, inadequate planning, a shaky justification for war, and inadequate global support have enabled America's enemies to use the struggling Iraq effort as a rallying cry for terrorist recruitment.   Bush claims to be committed to seeing Iraq through to stability, yet this week's talk is of a pullout.    More on what needs to be done here and here.

5.            Refocus on Counter-Proliferation - Everyone agrees that the gravest terrorist danger is that posed by a nuclear weapon in terrorist hands.  Yet as Peter Scoblic writes in the latest New Republic (tip to Matthew Yglesias) the Bush Administration is doing a dismal job responding to this threat.  To encapsulate, the Administration's focus on countries' intentions (good or evil) has eclipsed efforts to hold in check their capabilities, with the result that while we've deliberated over the potential for regime change in places like North Korea and Iran, they've continued to build their nuclear capabilities unfettered by the flawed non-pro regimes that Bush has done little to try to improve.