We Know Not What We Do in Pakistan Pt. 2 Posted by Patrick Barry

Yglesias makes the point that ongoing problems with the ISI reflect the failure of the U.S. to encourage rapprochement between Pakistan and India:

However much the war in Afghanistan may be termed a “necessary war,” the United States has the option of leaving the region. Pakistan does not. It will always be between Afghanistan and India. A responsible Pakistani official’s first concern is bound to be with India. Consequently, the main objective of Pakistani policy in Afghanistan will always be to secure Pakistan’s interests vis-a-vis India. And the Pakistanis have been consistently convinces—for years—that a stable Afghan government headed by anti-Taliban elements is not consistent with those interests. Unless Richard Holbrooke can conjure up some way to change that larger regional calculus, it’s difficult to see how we can achieve an ambitious set of goals in Afghanistan.

I think that's half-way right.  But just critical as a factor in explaining why ISI factions continue to bedevil the U.S. is Pakistan's civilian government's inability to exercise authority over the military. Even if there were better relations between Pakistan and India, you would still have to face the reality that neither the government nor the Military is able to prevent ISI elements from collaborating with insurgents who have come to threaten not just Afghanistan, but also Pakistan itself. In this case, the failure of U.S. policy might be ever greater, since for years we supported an autocrat whose policies eroded civilian rule, whilst doing almost nothing to push for reform that would bring the ISI under the government's writ.  Remember, Musharraf took action that helped to diffuse tensions with India, and yet you still had the same problem with the ISI. 

Benchmarks are as solid as the ground they’re built on Posted by The Editors

This post is by NSN intern Luis Vertiz

U.S. Army General John Craddock, NATO's supreme allied commander Europe, recently testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning United States European Command. Not so surprisingly, reporting on his testimony focused much more on Afghanistan:

General: Obama's new Afghan plan needs benchmarks

NATO can't measure Afghan war performance: General

The AP and Reuters elaborated:

But Gen. John Craddock warned Congress that he has been stymied in his effort to find ways to gauge progress."Right now, our assessments of progress are anecdotal, and they vary daily, weekly," Craddock told the Senate Armed Services Committee. [AP, 3/24/09]

 "I could not agree more that we must have objective metrics," he told Senator Ben Nelson, a Democrat who has called for the Obama administration to draw up a series of benchmarks to measure progress in Afghanistan.

 "We have to find a metric that tells us whether or not more or less of the country is secure," Craddock said.

"Right now, it's based upon incidents," he said. "Gunfire in a bazaar counts the same as a suicide bomber killing 13 people. That's not correct." [Reuters, 3/24/09]

There obviously needs to be debate within the Administration and within the American public about how to measure success in Afghanistan. Opinion range from cataloging the number of attacks on NATO forces, number of NATO soldiers killed, number of schools built, number of vaccinations administered, etc.  However, the debate about metrics misses one critical issue: there is very poor demographic data about the Afghan population.

Current counterinsurgency doctrine has switched the loci of military operations from killing the enemy to securing the civilian population. But no organization, either governmental or non-governmental, has much, if any, good data on the Afghan population. Nearly three decades of conflict has prevent the collection of health records, enrollment of children in schools, the exactly number of refugees or internally displaced people. Even the last reliable census for the population was conducted [partially] in 1979. Such data is critical for creating development policies because it gives both governments and non-governmental organizations a “floor” by which they can measure success in providing social services and security to the population. Recording NATO causalities or even schools built are not necessarily helpful indicators of policy success if the US and others are unable to have concretely set a baseline of living conditions for the average Afghanistan and thereby deduce how US and NATO operations are measurably affecting the living standards of the average Afghan. Organizations like the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit have attempted to collect demographic and other data, but security conditions have understandably restricted their research.

Saying We Have Options in Afghanistan Doesn't Make It So Posted by Patrick Barry

Ilan’s post on three strategic concepts for U.S. policy toward Afghanistan made for a stimulating read, but when it comes to the military component, I wonder whether his construct draws distinctions where there are none.  After all, three of the most prominent illustrations of the strategic concepts falling along Ilan’s policy spectrum all accept or endorse a short-term expansion of our military footprint under roughly similar time-frames.

First we have the ‘all-in’ approach.  I’d start by asking whether the basic premise of this plan isn't flawed at its core, since our troop commitments to Iraq, the strain on our military, the economic crisis, and competing strategic priorities make a limitless engagement of the kind described by Senators McCain and Lieberman completely unrealistic. An all-in style approach is probably the closest you can credibly get.

The strategy that comes closest to the all-in approach, while still being legitimate, is CAP's 10-year plan for Afghanistan.   In their latest report, CAP endorses a plus-up of 15,000 troops for Afghanistan (on top of the 17,000 already committed by the Obama administration, raising the total to 85,000) for a period of at least 18 months.  The report also lays out a set of medium term recommendation that suggest a large military footprint for a period of 3 - 5 years, but on this point, CAP's report is somewhat flexible. 

From there we jump to the minimalist strategy.  Les Gelb's minimalist plan (I'm leaving GAR out for reasons I'll touch on later) doesn't directly deal with troop numbers, but it does tacitly accept the Obama administration's already-stated intention to raise troop levels to 55,000.  Troops would engage in counter-insurgency operations with a plan to withdraw "after about three years." The minimalist timetable would therefore run concurrent to the first half of maximalist timetable, albeit with fewer troops and a hard commitment to withdraw. 

Finally we have Ilan's middle path, which contains a definite commitment to intensify military operations for the next 12 to 18 months.  During this period, there would be ongoing strategic revaluations, so that at the end of the timeframe, the Obama administration could determine whether the military operations had yielded positive outcomes, and whether future military involvement of any scale would improve the situation further.  This approach is similar to the beginning stages of the CAP strategy, but it leaves open a greater possibility for a shift in course militarily.

We essentially have three strategic concepts which supposedly offer a spectrum of options, yet on the issue of military presence, the three most prominent articulations of these concepts support or accept an increased military commitment for a period of roughly 18 months - 3 years.  Of course, there are qualifications - CAP's timetable for increased military involvement seems to be 3 years at minimum, the strategy voiced by groups such as Get Afghanistan Right, which could arguably be called minimalist, doesn't support a troop increase, etc.  But there does appear to be basic agreement across the spectrum set-up by Ilan that the U.S. should commit more troops to Afghanistan in the short-term. 

I suppose it’s possible that what I'm seeing is emlematic of a broad consensus among the different strategic perspectives on the contours of a military strategy for Afghanistan.  But I tend to think that there's actually a lot less space between the various plans outlined by Ilan than he recognizes. This is not an argument against adopting any of the strategies, but we shouldn't fool ourselves into thinking they represent the full menu of options available to the U.S.

NSN Daily Update 3/26/09 Posted by The National Security Network

See today's complete Daily Update here.

What We’re Reading

Iran accepted the United States’ invitation to a conference on Afghanistan.

U.S. officials say that Taliban attacks in Afghanistan get help from Pakistani intelligence.  The U.S. is taking an increasingly large role in Afghanistan, undercutting NATO.

The Pentagon released a report finding an increase in China’s military strength.  China sharply criticized the report, saying it was a “gross distortion” and “interference.”

In Mexico, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that failed U.S. counternarcotics policies contributed to Mexico’s drug wars.

Commentary of the Day

Timothy Garton Ash says that at the G-20 next week, there will be Europeans present, but no one speaking for a united Europe.  The Financial Times thinks that the Czech Republic’s poor EU presidency argues a semi-permanent EU president as was outlined in the failed Lisbon treaty.

The Wall Street Journal analyzes the U.S. and China’s interactions over the dollar.

The LA Times applauds the Obama administration’s first step in combating drug violence in Mexico.

We Know Not What We Do in Pakistan Posted by Patrick Barry

Reading today about Pakistan's military intelligence agency's (ISI) persistent connections to the insurgency in Afghanistan doesn't leave me with much hope that this problem is going away anytime soon:

American officials have complained for more than a year about the ISI’s support to groups like the Taliban. But the new details reveal that the spy agency is aiding a broader array of militant networks with more diverse types of support than was previously known — even months after Pakistani officials said that the days of the ISI’s playing a “double game” had ended.

Bush administration complaints do not appear to have changed the outlook of ISI factions or curbed their associations with insurgents in Afghanistan. And while there may still be steps we can take to support Pakistan's efforts to rein in these rogue elements (Mullen's efforts to re-establish mil-to-mil relations are a good start), the most encouraging tidbit from a very discouraging article may be that western officials are beginning to realize that they may just have to live with this reality:

In a sign of just how resigned Western officials are to the ties, the British government has sent several dispatches to Islamabad in recent months asking that the ISI use its strategy meetings with the Taliban to persuade its commanders to scale back violence in Afghanistan before the August presidential election there, according to one official.

Afghanistan is not “harder” than Iraq Posted by Max Bergmann

I have to take issue with the now clichéd line that Afghanistan is harder than Iraq. It is hard – very hard – but saying it is “harder” is Monday morning quarterbacking with rose-colored glasses. As Iraq descended into chaos in 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, there was nothing “easy” about it. We forget that we spent years groping in the dark in Iraq with no real clue – on either side – about what to do.

The progressive argument for withdrawal did not really pick up steam until the fall of 2005. Prior to that progressives argued for more troops, a focus on nation-building, and protecting the population, (yes the very approaches that Petraeus implemented) but with little confidence it would work. Conservatives were wedded to a highly kinetic “kill bad guys” approach until they adopted what progressives had advocated in 04-05. The point being there was simply no straightforward approach to turn things around. The only thing that was clear was that the Administration’s approach wasn’t working.

By 06 and 07 the strategy began to shift and those running the war became more competent and pragmatic about U.S. goals and means. But the other factors that contributed to the decline in violence and greater stability were by no means a given or even foreseen. For instance, negotiations with former Sunni insurgents would not have been politically possible in the first few years of the war and there wasn’t a real sense when they began that they would be successful. I never heard anyone say with confidence in 05-06 that the key was negotiating with insurgents. Once they began to show promise they were pursued vigorously. There were also inherent reductions in violence resulting from comprehensive ethnic cleansing, which were followed on by the efforts of U.S. forces to maintain the segregation of these neighborhoods. This contributed greatly to the let up in violence, but no one would have said that the ethnic cleansing or segregation of urban neighborhoods was easy. Finally, the gradual development of the Iraqi security forces and Iraqi capacity, which was by no means a given, enabled the U.S. to increasingly work with Iraqis and begin to transfer authority. U.S. strategy and policy played a key role in exploiting opportunities, but there was never any clear indication at the time that any of these efforts – negotiations, walling neighborhoods, and investing in Iraqi security forces, along with a counter-insurgency approach – would pay off.

Additionally, we spent a lot of money and threw the whole weight of the U.S. military behind these efforts – much more than we are imagining we will put into Afghanistan. And after all this and after being the sole focus of U.S. foreign policy and national security for five years, Iraq could easily still be pulled apart by ethno-sectarian violence.

Now – Afghanistan is hard, very hard. Its terrain is extremely challenging, its poor, the insurgency is rural-based, there is no history of a strong state, there are deep ethnic cleavages, it is bordered by an ungoverned region that serves as a safe haven and launching pad for attacks, and the insurgency is fueled by an uncontrollable drug trade. Oh it’s bad, real bad. But Iraq had much of this as well, such as uncontrolled border with Syria that allowed insurgents to stream across, not to mention a meddling Iran. And Afghanistan has some advantages, baseline expectations are lower, we are still more popular, we have allies, and there is an Army that is respected.

The point though is that this debate over what is harder is really not all that helpful. Each pose exceptionally challenging and unique circumstances and shouldn't really be compared in such a direct way. It also raises the uncomfortable question: If we are truly committed to Afghanistan and believe that it is harder than Iraq, shouldn’t we be committing more resources and manpower to Afghanistan than we did in Iraq?

NSN Daily Update 3/25/09 Posted by The National Security Network

See today's complete daily update here.

What We’re Reading

As Secretary of State Clinton begins her trip to Mexico, the Department of Homeland Security announced a new border security plan and steps to combat the drug cartels, including stopping weapons and cash from entering Mexico from the U.S.

The IMF reforms several policies to cope with the economic crisis.  The IMF approved an economic rescue package for Romania.

The GAO found that the Iraq withdrawal is likely to increase Iraq-related costs during the withdrawal and for several years after.

The U.S. military focuses on halting military suicides, which have killed almost as many troops this year as fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan combined.

Commentary of the Day

The New York Times wants President Obama to reform U.S. nuclear arms policy, which is “still mired in cold war thinking.”

The LA Times collects opinions from experts on what should be discussed during Secretary Clinton’s visit to Mexico.

The Wall Street Journal looks at how gasoline sanctions could give Iran “pain it can believe in” and raise the cost of its nuclear program.

The Case for the Middle Path in Afghanistan Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

As the President moves to make a decision in Afghanistan three schools of thought have emerged on what he should do.  The President could choose to go all in.  He could choose a minimalist strategy.  Or he could opt for something in the middle.  The President has no good options, but the best option is to pursue a middle of the road approach for at least the next 12-18 months.  If it proves to be ineffective, the President should then move to a minimalist strategy.

The "all in" approach, best exemplified by John McCain and Joe Lieberman’s op-ed in the Washington Post, argues for “victory” through a full scale commitment of undetermined length at an undetermined cost.  It is supported by hawks like McCain and Lieberman who generally believe that America must “win” any war no matter the cost.  A more clear-eyed view, but still part of the all in school, is that of many in the counterinsurgency community who believe that the way forward in Afghanistan requires a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign that would likely take years.  As John Nagl recently explained, “We have more fighting in front of us than behind us.”  The "all in" crowd also includes many in the development community, who are less focused on the military options, but have invested years working to improve the lives of the people of Afghanistan and do not want to see a reduced commitment. 

The minimalist approach is supported by a combination of realists and progressives.  It calls for doing what we can to help the people of Afghanistan, while limiting our military commitment and recognizing that America’s ability to influence events in far off unstable states such as Afghanistan is incredibly limited.  Les Gelb’s writings on this issue present an excellent example of the realist approach and are focused primarily on a short and limited surge to help the Afghans followed by a containment strategy that brings in Afghanistan’s neighbors and reduces the threat of terrorism to the United States and its allies.  Alex Thurston and the coalition behind Get Afghanistan Right offer a different take on minimalism – one that is more skeptical of any use of military force but is willing to do more on the non-military side. 

The third option is the middle ground and it is the option that seems most likely to be pursued by the Obama administration.  It calls for minimalist goals based on limiting the possibility of an Al Qaeda safe haven and the chance that instability in Afghanistan could destabilize Pakistan.  But it argues that to achieve this goal the U.S. needs to invest in enough security and Afghan governing capacity to avoid a total collapse.  The result is a plan that calls for a dramatic increase in military and non-military resources.  It is at a much higher level than what the minimalists may prefer but may not be nearly enough for the “all in” crowd.

Most of the proponents of these three approaches have much in common.  They agree on the need for broader engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbors to develop and coordinate an international response that helps stabilize the country.  They recognize the importance of Pakistan and the need to: lend support to democratic institutions that will strengthen and stabilize the government; provide more development and economic aid; limit Indian-Pakistani tensions so that the Pakistani military makes a greater commitment to dealing with the insurgency on its side of the border; and help the Pakistani military become more adept at counterinsurgency.  The three approaches also concur on the fact that there is no strictly military solution for the conflict and that only a comprehensive solution that increases civilian capacities, governance, the ability of the Afghan security forces and police, and economic opportunities for Afghans.  In fact, most of the strategies also seem to support or at the very least not object to some form of engagement with the Taliban and an attempt to split off the more moderate elements from the extremists. 

Where the different approaches disagree is on the use of military force and the level of commitment that will be required by the United States.

Each of the options also has major downsides.  The “all in” approach does not carefully take into account U.S. strategic interests or weigh costs and benefits.  It starts from the view that Al Qaeda represents a threat to the United States and moves quickly to a need for a massive commitment without carefully explaining why it is in America’s interests to pour billions of dollars and thousands of troops into Afghanistan to create a democratic Afghan state. 

The minimalist approach assumes that there is simply not that much that we can do in Afghanistan, but seems cavalier about our ability to prevent an Al Qaeda safe haven or the melt down of the Pakistani state as we withdraw and leave in place an even worse security vacuum than the one that exists today.  It also ignores any moral questions that might be tied to abandoning our Afghan allies to extremist elements.

The middle approach has its own dangers.  Just as did in Iraq from 2003-2006 or in Vietnam from 1965-1968, the United States may find itself doing enough not to lose, but not enough to win.  The result would be a slowly deteriorating situation that would lose all domestic support in the United States and eventually collapse with much greater costs to us and to the Afghan people. 

Yet despite that very real danger, at this point the middle approach is the best option to try for at least the next 12-18 months.  A massive and unlimited commitment is completely unrealistic both politically and financially in the midst of a global economic crisis. And our interests in Afghanistan do not rise to the level of meriting this type of approach.  However, it’s too early to go with a minimalist approach considering that right now is the first time in seven years that the United States is finally putting all of the elements of national power behind a serious approach to Afghanistan.

By the middle of 2002 the Bush administration was completely absorbed with Iraq and that focus remained until the end of the administration.  As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen explained in 2007 “In Afghanistan we do what we can.  In Iraq we do what we must.”  This applied not just to the military but to our national security bureaucracy and the top level of political leadership that only now for the first time since 2002 are focusing on Afghanistan as an absolute top priority and putting the resources and thinking into a comprehensive strategy.  From this perspective it seems premature to at least not try a comprehensive diplomatic, regional, military, and development approach to the conflict.  It may work.  It may not work.  But I am not willing to not try at all.  Especially since our interests in Afghanistan are significant, even if they do not rise to the level of an existential threat that some would have us believe .

If a middle ground strategy shows little to no progress within the next 12-18 months than it would be wise for Obama and his advisors to reconsider and move to a strategy along the lines of the minimalist path advocated by Gelb.  This will be extraordinarily difficult as once you commit to a strategy changing course involves admitting failure and reevaluating – something American administrations have been historically bad at.  But despite this potential danger, it’s simply too early right now to move into containment mode and dramatic escalation is not a viable option.  The middle path is not a good option.  But it is the best of a number of bad ones.

South Africa's Sad Descent and the Implications for Democracy Promotion Posted by Michael Cohen

There is a very sad story out of South Africa today about the troubled state of that nation's commitment to democracy. Apparently, the government has rejected a visa for the Dalai Lama to attend a peace conference of Nobel Laureates. According to a a government spokesman, "Dalai Lama's presence was not in South Africa's best interest at the moment." And when he refers to best interest, this is no doubt a reference to South Africa's burgeoning political and economic relationship with China, which invests about $6 billion a year in the country.

Now, of course from a symbolic standpoint this is pretty bad. Considering how hard many countries fought to see the yoke of apartheid lifted from black South Africans - and considering the plight of Tibet -- this is pretty objectionable behavior.

But I suppose in the country's partial defense, nations act in their economic self-interest all the time. But what is really worrisome here is that this fits a disturbing pattern. On the Security Council, South Africa has hardly been a passionate voice for democracy, siding with authoritarian leaders in Burma and others.

Its response to the crisis in Zimbabwe has been horrible, not only in its failure to put pressure on the Mugabe regime, but in its acceptance of naked and obvious un-democratic behavior.  If anything, South Africa has not only been asleep at the wheel in resolving the political stalemate there, they've helped drive the car into the ditch. They are perhaps the most important country in sub-Saharan Africa and their commitment to democracy is less than stellar.

Now in a vacuum this might just seem like bad behavior from a wayward country, but there are larger implications here for US policymakers. First, the inclination among Chinese leaders to spread an anti-democratic political model cannot be underestimated. There is emerging an alternative political and economic model to liberal democracy - its semi-authoritarian in nature and its being backed by China's vast economic leverage. If the United States is to be serious about spreading democracy we need to recognize this threat and be prepared to combat it, both rhetorically and financially.

Second, there will always be feckless politicians who will place economic assistance over democratic promulgation. What that means for US leaders is they need to stop looking to leaders - both ones we like and ones we don't like - as the harbinger of democratic outcomes. If we want to seed democracy around the world and support democratic movement then we need to be looking more to private groups, NGOs etc as the focal point of our efforts and focus on institution building rather than individuals.

How to Secure Paranoia Posted by Adam Blickstein

 
I'm all for increased vigilance in reporting suspicious activity, but random dumpster diving does not seem to be a sustainable or sanitary strategy for combating possible terrorism:

Don't rely on others. If you supect [sic] it report it.

Londoners are being asked to trust their instincts and report suspicious behaviour to help combat terrorist activity.

Just one piece of information could be vital in helping disrupt terrorist planning and, in turn, save lives.

This national publicity campaign across England and Wales raises awareness of the Anti-Terrorist Hotline and gives the public examples of suspicious activity and behaviour. The public are encouraged to trust their instincts and report anything confidentially to the Anti-Terrorist Hotline, where specialist officers will take their call.

While public relations is certainly an integral component to raising awareness (especially in Britain with its strong history of homegrown terror), it seems to me that there is a fine line between raising true public awareness of possible threats and fomenting paranoia that every person snapping photos is a potential suspect and every rubbish bin is repository for explosive material. And making every Tom, Dick and Harry a vestigial law enforcement official can have a detrimental societal effect. Police Academy 4: Citizens on Patrol is fairly instructive on this point.