Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch Posted by Michael Cohen

President Obama, March 27th, 2009:

We are not in Afghanistan to control that country or to dictate its future.  We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the United States, our friends and our allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of violent extremists. So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal:  to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.  That's the goal that must be achieved.

 . . . I've already ordered the deployment of 17,000 troops that had been requested by General McKiernan for many months.  These soldiers and Marines will take the fight to the Taliban in the south and the east, and give us a greater capacity to partner with Afghan security forces and to go after insurgents along the border.

General Stanley McCrystal yesterday in Afghanistan:

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who took over Monday as the top commander in Afghanistan, said he will launch a broad assessment of how U.S. and NATO troops are arrayed in the country to ensure his forces are focused on safeguarding key population centers and not hunting down Taliban fighters.

In judging the effect his strategy was having on security, McChrystal said he will avoid such measurements as the number of insurgent attacks, enemies killed or raids initiated by U.S. forces. Instead he pledges to focus on indicators that shed light on local governance and economic development.

"One indicator might be how well commerce is moving," McChrystal said. "If an individual can move his product to market right away from his village or town, that is telling. If he's got to go through six checkpoints and pay a bribe at each one, that is a sign that you've got abuse of governance or an insurgency, depending on who's doing it."

"The Afghan people are at the center of our mission," he said. "In reality, they are the mission. We must protect them from violence -- whatever its nature. We must respect their religion and traditions."

Keep Your Powder Dry Posted by Michael Cohen

When it comes to Iran, no one really know what is happening and how it will play out -  point reinforced by this amazing thread from Andrew Sullivan that contains dozens and dozens of Twitter posts from Iran. In talking to some Iranian friends yesterday it seems clear that the confusion we are feeling here is being felt by those on the ground.

For those looking for the most up to date information I highly recommend checking out Nico Pitney's site on HuffPo as well Andrew Sullivan and Laura Rozen over at the Cable and the NiacInsight blog. These pictures from the Boston Globe website are deeply moving, particularly number 28 and 29.

As the drama unfolds in Iran, the question being asked here in the States is how should the US respond. This morning President Obama offered some well-considered words:

"I want to start off by being very clear that it is up to Iranians to make decisions about who Iran’s leaders will be; that we respect Iranian sovereignty and want to avoid the United States being the issue inside of Iran . .  what I would say to those people who put so much hope and energy and optimism into the political process, I would say to them that the world is watching and inspired by their participation, regardless of what the ultimate outcome of the election was. And they should know that the world is watching. And particularly to the youth of Iran we in the United States do not want to make any decisions for the Iranians, but we do believe that the Iranian people and their voices should be heard and respected." 

This is very smart: Stand up for democratic processes, decry the violence taking place, remind the mullahs that the world is watching, but above all avoid taking sides in the dispute or openly attacking the regime in Tehran. The President's statement is reflective of a man who understands the limitations of American power and rhetoric.

But the same, unfortunately cannot be said for Obama's 2008 campaign rival, John McCain:

We lead; we condemn the sham, corrupt election. We do what we have done throughout the Cold War and afterwards, we speak up for the people of Tehran and Iran and all the cities all over that country who have been deprived of one of their fundamental rights. We speak out forcefully, and we make sure that the world knows that America leads - and including increased funding for part of the Farda, Iranian free radio.

And then this from George Packer over at the New Yorker blog:

For the Obama Administration to continue parsing equivocal phrases serves no purpose other than to make it look feckless. A stronger American stand—taken, as much as possible, in concert with European countries and through multilateral organizations—would do more to improve America’s negotiating position than weaken it . . . The tens of millions of Iranians who voted for change and are the long-term future of that country will always remember what America said and did when they put their lives on the line for their values.

Let's be very clear: what is happening in Tehran is not about us. It's about the people on the streets risking their lives so that their voices will be heard. If we want to help those people the best thing we can do is speak softly and wait for the drama to play itself out. If we are appearing to take sides and if we are seen as openly supporting the opposition movement we won't be doing them any good at all. As Spencer Ackerman perceptively notes, "American rhetorical support will immediately become a cudgel in the hands of Ahmadinejad."

To turn John McCain's silly argument around, leadership is not simply about beating ones chest and taking strong moral stands, it's about listening to those on the ground in Iran and having a nuanced understanding about the impact of American statements in a country where there is no great love loss for the United States, particularly among supporters of Ahmadinejad. The course being recommended by Packer and McCain would have the ironic of hurting the cause of the people they are seeking to support.

5 Conservative Fallacies on Post-Election Iran Posted by Patrick Barry

Amidst widespread speculation about whether the Obama administration is treating the situation in Iran correctly, it's important to point out that conservative commentary has not only been scattered and incoherent, but totally wrong on the substance.  From what I can tell, there are 5 strains of conservative arguments on Iran - none of them coming close to being credible:

1) Obama administration wrong about robust debate within Iran.  Using his appearance on ABC's 'This Week' as a soapbox, Mitt Romney blasted the Obama administration, remarking that "the comments by the President last week that there was a robust debate going on in Iran was obviously entirely wrong-headed."  Romney's argument doesn't square with the run-up to the elections, which showed a deep desire on the part of the Iranians for engagement and dialogue with the west.  Candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi himself called for Iran to embrace the Obama administration's offer of dialogue, saying that the "taboo in this country about talking to America had been lifted."  The fact that Iranians have protested the results so vigorously after elections widely seen as illegitimate is a testament to the strong desire for better relations with the West.

The Fallout from the Other Election Posted by Adam Blickstein

While Iran continues to erupt, positive outcomes continue to manifest from the other recent major election in the region: Lebanon. The news coming out of Beirut, though, couldn't be in starker contrast to the tragic situation in Tehran:

Prime Minister Fouad Siniora said on Sunday that Hizbullah's right to veto legislation would not be reinstated by the new Lebanese government. The Shiite movement Hizbullah and its Christian allies last year obtained the right to veto thanks to a deal that allocated them 11 of 30 cabinet seats.

The deal was eked out to defuse a power struggle with the rival coalition of Saad Hariri, whose coalition defeated the Shiite group and its allies in a general election on June 7.

This is a pretty big deal. To the extent that Hezbollah will be marginalized politically in Lebanon at a time where turmoil in Iran could further weaken Hezbollah's stature with the possibility of reduced support from Tehran as they try to sort out their political situation strikes me as a potentially game-changing moment for the expansion of reform and democracy in Lebanon. But then again, it could also inspire Hezbollah to renew nefarious actions in Beirut and elsewhere, attempting to inflame the delicate political situation to a degree. Nonetheless, this news is encouraging. 

NSN Daily Update: 6/15/09 Posted by The Editors

For today's complete daily update, click here.

What We’re Reading

Tensions in Iran continue to simmer as rallies are staged for those supporting and opposing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s electoral victory, despite warnings against opposition rallies and the detention of hundreds of opposition leaders. Ahmadinejad appears to maintain significant support, despite Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s announcement of an investigation into the electoral irregularities. Most nations stay silent on the issue of acknowledging the results of the election, while Vice President Joseph Biden makes clear that US national interests have not changed and engagement will continue in the future.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu endorses the creation of a Palestinian State, but poses caveats considered non-starters by Palestinian negotiators.

Pakistani security forces acknowledge their intent on pursuing Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Meshud.

A meeting of G8 nation ministers will discuss stimulus measures amongst the member states.

Commentary of the Day

The NY Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post all discuss the frustrated hopes of the Iranian opposition as the fallout from Iran’s presidential elections continues. Ken Ballen and Patrick Doherty discuss the reason why Ahmadinejad may have won anyway without fraud, while Roger Cohen says Iranians will first reflect over the results before they take any action.

Wolfgang Münchau at the Financial Times has an overview of the upcoming meeting of G8 nations ministers, explaining why politics may trump sound economic policies.

Groundhog's Weekend for Conservatives and National Security Posted by Adam Blickstein

It seems like every weekend, conservatives come out of their hole and see the shadow of their own failed policies and legacy casting an ever growing darkness over their waning credibility. First Jon Kyl on Guantanamo:

HOST: But it has been an issue in Europe, among leaders, our allies. They’ve pointed to that as something…

KYL: Big deal. You know, the fact that some European leader — first of all, they didn’t like the fact that we invaded Iraq and replaced Saddam Hussein either. But we decided it was our best interest to do that. So we did. And I don’t think we have to, just because somebody over in Frances says, “oh we think its a bad thing that you have that prison in Guantanamo.” You know, my answer is ok, fine, what would you do with them? France is willing to take one prisoner.

Well, Jon, this is actually why its important. You don't want Gitmo detainees coming to America (even those who have been cleared of any wrongdoing), but you continue to disparage the very leaders and nations who are willing to clean up the mess you helped create and continue to defend. Good thing the Europeans are smarter than Kyl:

The European Union agreed on Monday to help the administration of President Barack Obama "turn the page" on Guantanamo, saying individual EU nations will take detainees from the American prison in Cuba.

The EU and the U.S. issued a joint statement saying some EU nations are ready "to assist with the reception of certain former Guantanamo detainees, on a case-by-case basis."

And Mitt Romney on This Week seems view the Iranian people's manifestations of freedom in the face of oppression as somehow symptomatic of Presidet Obama's "apology tour."

ROMNEY: The comments by the president last week, that there was a robust debate going on in Iran, was obviously entirely wrong-headed. What has occurred is the election is a fraud, the results are inaccurate, and you’re seeing a brutal repression of the people as they protest. … It’s very clear that the president’s policies of going around the world and apologizing for America aren’t working. Look, just sweet talk and criticizing America is not going to enhance freedom in the world.

Of course Mitt embraced diplomacy (what Mitt calls sweet talking I guess) when it came to another despotic entity in the region and actually embraced Hezbollah in Lebanon at a time where the nation was struggling with the aftermath of failed aspirations towards expanding freedom:

Romney: Did you notice in Lebanon, what Hezbollah did? Lebanon became a democracy some time ago and while their government was getting underway, Hezbollah went into southern Lebanon and provided health clinics to some of the people there, and schools. And they built their support there by having done so. That kind of diplomacy is something that would help America become stronger around the world and help people understand that our interest is an interest towards modernity and goodness and freedom for all people in the world. And so, I want to see America carry out that kind of health diplomacy.

The bottom line is freedom is only to be praised if it fits the conservative's political agenda and worldview. And that sadly is dangerous for both America's interests around the world and the well-being and future of people living under oppressive regimes.

NSN Daily Update: 6/12/09 Posted by The National Security Network

See today's complete daily update here.

What We’re Reading

The CIA believes Osama bin Laden is still in Pakistan, and is hoping capture him as the Pakistani military cracks down on the northwestern tribal area.

U.S. general David Petraeus said that the past week showed the "highest level of security incidents" in recent Afghan history with attacks rising to record levels not seen since 2001.

The UN Security Council is expected to adopt tougher sanctions targeting North Korea's ballistic missile programs. Meanwhile, South Korea is preparing for a possible third nuclear test by the North, despite looming U.N. sanctions.

Binyamin Netanyahu is reportedly ready to endorse a “two-state solution” in a speech this weekend, but he may stall on American demands to freeze Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

Commentary of the Day

Joe Klein argues that the US should start talking to Hamas.

According to Fared Zakaria the single most important place where Obama can have a transformative impact within the Muslim world is Iraq.

The foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Saud al-Faisal, discusses President Obama’s Cairo speech and its implications.

War, What Is It Good For? Posted by Michael Cohen

A couple of days ago I nicknamed Judah Grunstein the "always astute Judah Grunstein" and for those who don't make his blog at World Politics Review part of their daily rotation they are missing out.  It's great stuff and, in fact, the whole site is a plethora of really thought-provoking content, particularly when they publish DA writers! (His post today on the theory and practice of COIN is spot-on.

But today I have to take issue with one of his postings, because reflects one of the more dangerous memes about counterinsurgency. Writing about COIN, Judah says:

Unlike Michael Cohen, I think that the COIN doctrine represents an enormous advance in the U.S. approach to warfare, both strategically and politically.

Strategically, it represents the realization that the thinking that dominated during the Cold War era is no longer applicable or relevant to the vast majority of operational environments that the U.S. military will be called on to face today. And although there might be "big war" scenarios where it will once again prove necessary, it certainly isn't applicable or relevant to the two wars we're engaged in now. So far, that strategic advance has gotten the lion's share of the attention in this debate.

Politically, though, COIN marks an end -- not necessarily a definitive end, but an end nonetheless -- to the era of total war, at least as the dominant prism in U.S. military thinking. And that, to me, is by far the more significant of the two advances. This is a warfighting doctrine that by its very DNA rules out the idea of dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, or fire-bombing Dresden.

While I appreciate Judah's shout-out, credit must being given to the appropriate folks, like Gian Gentile, Charles Dunlap, Michael Mazarr, Stathis Kalyvas, Ed Luttwak, Andrew Bacevich, Michael Vlahos, Carl Connetta, Steve Biddle, Steve Metz, Chris Preble and many others who have been making far more authoritative arguments than me on the problems of COIN doctrine and the ongoing militarization of our foreign policy.

But improper credit, notwithstanding, I'm not sure I agree about what the advance of COIN doctrine represents. First of all, it is not clear to me that the doctrine of Total War has disappeared. Indeed, if the US were to find itself mired in a major existential conventional conflict than I'm quite sure we would engage in Total War (a point that Judah seems to concede). And if you look at the most recent defense budget, the lion's share of money goes not to irregular warfare or COIN but to old fashioned conventional weaponry. COIN doctrine may be on the rise, but our armed forces are still geared toward fighting major conventional conflicts. (It also bears noting that trends in war-fighting tend to change pretty quickly. Remember when Kosovo was the future of war.)

But really I would argue that the concept of total war has diminished not because of COIN, but because there is no global rival on the world stage for which such a military doctrine would be relevant (which by the way makes my earlier point about defense spending priorities really hard to fathom). If one really wanted to be snarky they could argue that the perpetuation of COIN doctrine is an attempt to ensure the military's relevance in an era when large-scale conventional conflicts are almost certainly a thing of the past.

Judah also argues that COIN represents "an enormous advance towards a progressive, almost humanist approach to warfare (although it feels perverse to frame it that way), and under no circumstances should it be underestimated."

Here I even more strenuously disagree. First, as any COIN advocate will tell you, counter-insurgency might be 20% military and 80% political, but it still involves a lot of people being killed. For example, in FM 3-24 the ArmyMarine counter-insurgency field manual, the authors cheer the CORDS, counter-insurgency program in Vietnam. But a key part of CORDS was the Phoenix program, which basically assassinated more than 25,000 member of the VietCong. Similar neutralization efforts were utilized in Iraq and of course the success of COIN efforts there were due in no small measure to the ethnic cleansing and enclaving that followed the bloody sectarian violence of 2005 and 2006. I could go back further to the Phillipine-US War, which not only featured terrible human rights atrocities by the United State but killed, by some estimates, as many as 500,000, even 1 million Fillipinos. COIN is still war and is capable of killing lots of innocent people.

But having said, I certainly recognize that current COIN doctrine places a premium on minimizing civilian deaths making it infinitely more attractive than conventional "total" warfare. This is, perhaps, why it is so dangerous.

The thing about total war is that it's very nasty and brutish and difficult to rally public support for. It's why in the 1980s and 1990s, Caspar Weinberger and Colin Powell introduced an entire doctrine that would make it less likely we would engage in such a conflict. It's why, for the most part, we avoided protracted and nasty wars for much of the post-Vietnam era, because we didn't want to make the political and military commitment that total war demands.  A doctrine of total war or wars of annihilation are a recipe for less not more global conflict.

COIN doctrine, however, with its seductive humanist approach to war risks changing that equation.
For example, if the option in Afghanistan was not COIN but "total war" I imagine we would think twice about doing it. Because COIN seems on the surface to be more progressive - smart, not dumb war -- it seems less objectionable. Quite simply, it's fetishization and enshrinement is a slippery slope for more not less US military intervention (a point that I think Judah would agree on).

Now of course COIN advocates will say that we need to be prepared to fight counter-insurgencies because these are the wars of the future; but this is a self-perpetuating argument. Perhaps instead of devoting so much energy to preparing our military to fight counter-insurgency, COIN advocates should be patiently explaining all the many reason why we should avoid them at all costs. But they're not. They are orienting army doctrine and key resources toward COIN. They are making it the key approach of our fight in Afghanistan. It's only a matter of time before they convince policymakers (and it may have already happened) that we're so good at COIN we should be doing more not less. If more people agreed that counterinsurgency is "hard" and it's "best to avoid it" why do I feel like Sisyphus pushing that anti-COIN rock up a hill.

William Tecumseh Sherman is always remembered for saying that "War is Hell," but perhaps the better expression of his to remember is "War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it."

Thoughts on Triage Posted by Michael Cohen

In what will be of little surprise to regular DA readers, I have some thoughts on the new CNAS report, Triage, which offers potential metrics for measuring the success of US military operations in Afghanistan and operational recommendations for achieving them.

Before I offer a more critical assessment, it's important to give credit where credit is due. For many of us in the think tank community one of our primary jobs is to influence policymakers or at the very least provide them with a policy road map. The fact that the Obama Administration failed to offer a set of benchmarks for success in Afghanistan when they announced their policy review was, in my view, a notable oversight. By making the achievement of our national objectives so unclear and open-ended they dangerously opened the door for possible mission creep. But they also opened the door for those in the policy community to offer their own counsel on this issue. While I don't share many of the conclusions that the CNAS report comes to, I applaud them for engaging so robustly in this debate. It's precisely what a think tank should be doing.

And now I'll do my job.

While I still am taking some time to digest the operational recommendations, my biggest concern with the report is that it its recommendations are built on a foundation of shaky assumptions and strategic blind spots about the nature of the threats facing the United States and our national interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

For example, the report argues:

Failure in Afghanistan would mean not only a possible return of pre-9/11 safe havens, but also
a sharp blow to the prestige of the United States and its allies.

If failure in Afghanistan is defined as the return of the Taliban to power and the recreation of safe havens for Al Qaeda both possibilities seem far-fetched.  In fact, the lack of Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan today - and the lack of a realistic possibility that it will happen any time soon -- would suggest that we've achieved some measure of success there. As for debates about US prestige; I really thought after Vietnam, American global credibility would no longer serve as a rationale for maintaining troops in an overseas locale.

Then there is this:

The conflict’s center of gravity, meanwhile, has now shifted to Pakistan, where the government’s
very survival is at stake. . . An al Qaeda victory in Pakistan would galvanize global support
for the radical Islamist movement, provide a safe haven for al Qaeda, and substantially increase the threat of nuclear terrorism.

This is hyperbole. I don't think anyone really believes that the Pakistani government is in danger of falling to the Taliban or Al Qaeda. As Ben Arnoldy's excellent piece in the Christian Science Monitor makes clear, "For reasons of geography, ethnicity, military inferiority, and ancient rivalries, they (the Taliban) represent neither the immediate threat that is often portrayed nor the inevitable victors that the West fears." And if Al Qaeda is such a serious threat then it's hard to square that with the report's call for a moratorium on drone attacks against Al Qaeda leadership.

And then there is this:

The Taliban is pursuing a strategy of exhaustion designed to bleed away public support in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe for continued Western engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the United States and its allies are unable to halt the downward trajectory of the war in Afghanistan over the next year, then public support for the war effort in the United States will surely ebb.

First of all I'm not clear as to why the latter is a bad thing, but I wonder if the authors are misreading the intentions and make-up of the Taliban. For example, in Accidental Guerrila, David Kilcullen (a co-author of the CNAS report) makes a clear distinction between full-time fighters (Tier 1) and local guerrilas (Tier II) who "fight almost entirely in their home valley."  Triage fails to make that distinction, lumping all Taliban together,

As Jari Lindholm puts it, "While a group called ‘the Taliban’ does indeed exist, CNAS has chosen to use the term to denote all non-AQ opposition to the Afghan government and the U.S.-led coalition. This misidentifies a wide range of forces currently destabilising Afghanistan." 

We really need greater clarity on who is America's enemy in Afghanistan - and what our intentions are vis-a-vis them. For example, do we intend to eradicate the Taliban movement from Afghanistan or is our goal simply to prevent the movement from taking over the country or even creating safe havens in Taliban-controlled territory? These are two very different goals. For the former a full-fledged counter-insurgency operation might be warranted, but not the latter.

I really can't make this point strongly enough: we have to be realistic about the Taliban's capabilities and how far we are willing to go in order to degrade them. The question we must be asking is whether we are wiling to accept some Taliban presence in Afghanistan as long as we feel comfortable that the chances of them taking over the country - or setting up safe havens -- are slim. If that is the case then I am even more befuddled as to why General McCrystal is so down on the idea of reaching out to moderate elements of the Taliban (an idea by the way featured in the March inter-agency white paper on Afghanistan). But it seems instead that total defeat of the Taliban as a political movement - via military operations and legitimizing the Kabul government -- is our objective in Afghanistan. This seems both unrealistic and not in the national interest.

And as Judah Grunstein suggests, wouldn't a policy of containment rather than elimination be a more effective approach for dealing with the Taliban? And if I may ask the question that David Petraeus posed on the eve of the war in Iraq, "how does this end?" When will we know that we have achieved victory in Afghanistan? Triage offers no sense of what victory will look like or how we can hope to achieve it.

I understand that from a COIN perspective if the Afghanistan government is seen as legitimate the population will turn against the Taliban and support for the insurgency will dry up. Even accepting that point (and I'm not sure I do); it seems like achieving Afghan government legitimacy might take a few years to accomplish.  Is it a goal really worth seeking? And is it realistic?

While I'm still wading through this report, one other point jumped out at me:

Because population-centric counterinsurgency operations demand a high concentration of troops, there will still be a sizable gap between the coalition’s stated objectives and its available resources, even with these significant new commitments of forces. The United States and its allies may have enough military power to clear Taliban fighters from large areas of Afghanistan, but they do not have enough troops to hold and then build across equivalently large areas.This constraint will require commanders to triage ruthlessly, allocating their forces to areas where the smallest number of coalition troops can protect the greatest number of Afghans.

Now wait a minute, if there is a "sizable" gap between objectives and resources isn't that a pretty serious problem and doesn't it suggest that either the effort is doomed or we are on the cusp of a much longer and robust engagement? I'd love to get a respectful answer from the authors of the report on this question, but how do they believe that gap will be filled? Will it involve more troops and a longer US commitment to ensure that initial gains are solidified?  Do they truly believe that the United States is prepared for and interested in such a long-standing commitment?

The authors of the report are admirably honest about the fact that their vision of success in Afghanistan will take several years to achieve. If the Obama Administration intends to echo their conclusions then they need to say so as explicitly as possible. The American people have a right to know what a population-centric counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan will entail. My guess is that, like Iraq, if they know what such an effort truly entails, they won't be too interested.

My worry, as it has always been, that the argument for a population centric counter insurgency approach in Afghanistan is a recipe for justifying a longer and more engaged mission there. Nothing I've read in this report dissuades me from this view. And having attended the CNAS conference today in Washington I am convinced more than ever that if the COIN advocates have their way we will be in Afghanistan for a very, very long time.

von Brunn: International Supremicist Posted by Adam Blickstein

Turns out that the Holocaust museum gunman's extremist screed traversed the Atlantic as he was an avowed supporter of the BNP:

The white supremacist gunman who shot dead a guard at the Holocaust museum in Washington D.C. had attended meetings of the American Friends of the British National Party, it emerged today.

Tim Blodgett, a former White House aide who worked as an informant within white supremacist groups, said today that Mr von Brunn and his friend John de Nugent had attended meetings in Arlington County, Virginia, of the American Friends of the BNP. The organisation was set up to raise funds for the BNP but has since been disbanded.

Mr de Nugent wrote on his blog: “I have twice met Nick Griffin, the dynamic chairman of the British National Party.”

I assume von Brunn would be upset with the BNP's efforts to shed "its antisemitic past." Of course they are only doing so in order to exploit perceived enmity between Jewish and Islamic communities in Britain, as evidenced from the BNP's only elected Jewish member:

In one leaflet, handed out in north London last weekend, the party's only Jewish councillor, Pat Richardson, is quoted along with a picture of young Muslims holding a placard reading: "Butcher those who mock Islam."

"I'm in the BNP because no one else speaks out against the Islamification of our country," said Richardson. "Being Jewish only adds to my concern about this aggressive creed that also threatens our secular values and Christian tradition."

Different country. Same extreme and disgusting hate.