None of us really know what's happening in Iraq right now - or what's going to happen. We're truly in the midst of "interesting times."
Since everything I know about Iran I learned in a great seminar with Nasser Hadian at Columbia University (and that was 7 years ago), I'll do my best to pass along smart analysis of the situation.
At TNR, John Judis makes a great argument as to why the Obama Administration should say less not more about what's happening in Iran:
The Obama administration
has to be very careful about backing, or even placing great hopes on, someone
like Iran's
Moussavi and even on his impassioned followers. If we are seeing the beginning
of another revolution--or structural transformation--in Iran, it is worth remembering that
before the dust clears on this events, Kerensky can become Lenin and Bani Sadr
can become Khomeini. The U.S.
should use its influence--and get European countries to use theirs--but we
should be careful and not allow ourselves to get into crusading mode where we
think we can protect or defend one side against the other.
This take from Noah Milman is worth a read:
America should be playing it pretty cool right
now. There are states that could plausibly bring pressure to bear in
support of proper democratic procedures and against stealing elections
or shooting protestors, but they would have to be states with real
credibility both as democracies and as friends of Iran – i.e., places
like Germany or India, not us. But it’s not obvious to me why Germans
or Indians would want to interfere like that. We, unfortunately, can’t
do much more than watch.
Finally, Trita Parsi tells us all to get a grip . . . sort of:
What's often forgotten amid the genuinely awe-inspiring spectacle of
hundreds of thousands of long-suppressed people risking their lives on
the streets to demand change is the fact that the political contest
playing out in the election is, in fact, among rival factions of the
same regime. Ahmadinejad represents a conservative element, backed by
the Supreme Leader, that believes the established political class has
hijacked the revolution and enriched themselves and is fearful that the
faction's more pragmatic inclination toward engagement with the West
could lead to a normalization of relations that will "pollute" Iran's
culture and weaken the regime. Mousavi is not really a reformer so much
as a pragmatic, moderate conservative who has campaigned with the
backing of the reform movement because it recognizes that he has a
better chance of unseating Ahmadinejad than one of their own would
have.
Also keep an eye on Andrew Sullivan and Nico Pitney and Spencer Ackerman who are all on top of this in a big way.
UPDATE: Laura Secor has a fascinating post as well over at the New Yorker blog:
This is uncharted territory for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Until
now, the regime has survived through a combination of repression and
flexibility. The dispersal of power throughout a complex system, among
rival political factions, and with the limited but active participation
of the voting public, has allowed a basically unpopular regime to
control a large population with only limited and targeted violence.
There have always been loopholes and pressure points that allow the
opposition and the regime to be dance partners, even if one or both of
them is secretly brandishing a knife behind the other’s back. That has
been less true under Ahmadinejad than in the past. But the culture of
the organized opposition under the Islamic Republic has tended to
remain cautious and moderate. Many of the protesters of recent days are
not calling for an end to the Islamic Republic. They are calling for
their votes to be counted. More nights like last night, however, when
some seven protesters were allegedly shot, could swiftly change that.
So is there any way Khamenei can dial the situation back even to the
unhappy modus vivendi of June 11th? He could have the Guardian Council
concede that the official figures were wrong, and assert that the vote
was close enough, after all, to send the election to a second round
between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad. If this had been the initial
announcement from the Interior Ministry on June 12th, it would have
been entirely plausible. Ahmadinejad has a reliable base that could
comprise as much as thirty per cent of the country, as well as all the
advantages of incumbency, including access to state television; his
conservative challenger, Mohsen Rezai, had amassed little momentum;
and, at least until Mousavi’s late surge, there was a real contest
between Mousavi and Karroubi for the hearts of the uncommitted. A split
vote and a run-off would hardly have raised an eyebrow in the first
instance. But to call one now, after having already endorsed a
landslide victory for Ahmadinejad and called out riot police to enforce
it, would be an admission that a brute power grab had been attempted
and abandoned.