The President's Mixed-Breed Heritage Posted by David Shorr

What do you get when you cross a Kansan and a Kenyan?

A Keynesian.      [sorry]

A Great Day for American Foreign Policy Posted by Michael Cohen

Today in Russia, President Barack Obama said something that, as a foreign policy wonk, truly made me smile:

America cannot and should not seek to impose any system of government on any other country, nor would we presume to choose which party or individual should run a country. And we haven't always done what we should have on that front.

Even as we meet here today, America supports now the restoration of the democratically-elected President of Honduras, even though he has strongly opposed American policies. We do so not because we agree with him. We do so because we respect the universal principle that people should choose their own leaders, whether they are leaders we agree with or not.

These words literally made me light-headed. The first part of what the President said is sort of boilerplate: we won't impose democracy or our system of government on another country, yada-yada, even when we do. But the second part is what we in the business call, walking the walk.

Few things did more to lessen US credibility on the issue of democracy promotion than the Bush Administration's propensity to push for democratic election - and then throw a hissy fit when our candidate did not win. The 2005 victory of Hamas in Palestine is perhaps the quintessential example.  For America to have any credibility as a voice for democratic reform we simply must adhere to the universal values that we regularly trumpet -- even when the results don't turn out in our favor.

Today in Moscow that is precisely what Barack Obama did.

MEMO: START is Urgent, Legitimacy Matters, and Afghanistan is Difficult Posted by Patrick Barry

Christian Brose makes two smart, if contestable, points: A) there is a disconnect between all that was accomplished or promised at the Moscow summit and the looming challenge of building a joint U.S.- Russia consensus on Iran; and B) the U.S. should not expect to pivot easily from its limited cooperation with Russia to pricklier issues like Iran's nuclear program.  But then Brose makes a series of not-so-smart points that leave me scratching my head.

First, its a little troubling to see Brose argue that negotiating an update (or bridge) to START is "not a pressing issue." Spearheaded by Reagan, and signed by George H.W. Bush, START is the most significant arms-reduction agreement in the last 20 years.  It is set to expire THIS YEAR.  For that to happen without a follow-on would deal a serious blow to the nonproliferation regime.  Suggesting the issue is not urgent is just naive.  I have to assume that Brose just didn't mean to say it.   

Also, no one seriously thinks that the Obama administration was ever hanging its Iran policy on the hope that a U.S. - Russia nuclear deal would persuade Iran's leaders to "give up their nuclear aspirations," an accusation Brose falls just short of making.  But it is true that part of harmonizing diplomatic pressure is lending legitimacy to your actions.  By recommitting to the international nonproliferation regime, the Administration signals to allies, enemies, and fence-sitters alike that it intends to take international agreements seriously.  Is this the magic bullet for building a coalition to solve the Iran problem? Or course not.  But the Obama administration is right to calculate that upholding the nonproliferation regime (as opposed to gutting it...Bush...cough, cough) is a surer way of pressuring Iran to denuclearize.

That leaves Afghanistan and Russia's agreement to open up its transit routes for military goods headed there, a move Brose likens to Moscow's petrol politics in eastern Europe and Ukraine.  While I suspect that Russia's concession on transit rights is partially rooted in a desire to set the terms on which goods and people move through its sphere of influence, I ultimately agree with Christian Bleuer - Russia's fear of seeing insurgents overrun Afghanistan is the dominant explanatory factor.  Besides, with so much murkiness and uncertainty surrounding the flow of goods through central asia, its tough to see how getting the Russians to expand the scope of allowable items passing through their territory is anything but shrewd policy. 

Is Italy's G8 Membership In Jeopardy? Posted by David Shorr

From The Guardian's diplomatic editor, Julian Borger, we have this report about mounting exasperation with the Berlusconi government's dreadful performance as conveners of the upcoming G8 summit in L'Aquila and the possibility that Italy could be kicked out of the club. That would be a major diplomatic move, and therefore should not be carried out in a fit of pique. On the other hand, if this idea gains steam, there are ways it could be a step in the right direction.

My main concern about these summit meetings is to hold them to the highest possible standard of substantive action. With all the hoopla and ceremony, we should always ask what the assembled leaders actually accomplished to justify the fuss. In other words, soaring communiques don't cut it. If the Italian government truly has botched its job as host and pays a steep diplomatic price, that would reinforce the idea that much is expected from nations and leaders who want to be considered major powers.

Those looking for an info and commentary source on the L'Aquila summit should go to this blog, brought to you by Canada's Centre for International Governance Innovation and Britain's Chatham House.

McNamara Dies Posted by Michael Cohen

Is there a more complicated figure in the history of American defense policy than Robert McNamara? Personally, I find everything about McNamara both endlessly fascinating and incredibly depressing. He was a man whose actions during the Vietnam War simply cannot be forgiven: by 1965 and perhaps earlier he knew the war was wrong. He knew it was a lost cause and yet he continued waging it as Secretary of Defense for years after he had come to that conclusion. After leaving the Pentagon his refusal to speak out against the War only increased his moral culpability. Later McNamara would publicly recognize the error of his ways both in print and in the fascinating Fog Of War.

These public mea culpas were noteworthy and unlike many architects of failed wars (I'm looking at you Don Rumsfeld, Doug Feith, Condi Rice and Colin Powell) McNamara at least had the guts to admit his mistakes and offer a lesson for future generations. Still that late life acknowledgment of wrongdoing does not absolve him of his sins.

As the New York Times put it quite succinctly in 1995:

Surely he must in every quiet and prosperous moment hear the ceaseless whispers of those poor boys in the infantry, dying in the tall grass, platoon by platoon, for no purpose. What he took from them cannot be repaid by prime-time apology and stale tears, three decades late.

Robert McNamara had blood on his hands and he knew it.

With all that, McNamara's obituary in the New York Times offered two quotes that really jumped out at me, because they offer object lessons for the wars America is waging today:

By 1962, the White House and the Pentagon devised a new strategy of counterinsurgency to combat what Mr. McNamara called the tactics of “terror, extortion, and assassination” by communist guerrillas. The call led to the creation of American special forces like the Green Berets and secret paramilitary operations throughout Asia and Latin America.“Counterinsurgency became an almost ridiculous battle cry,” said Robert Amory, who in 1962 stepped down after nine years as the C.I.A.’s deputy director of intelligence to become the White House budget officer for classified programs.

Sound familiar? It is worth remembering that today's debate over counter-insurgency is not new and that the focus on COIN as a means of fighting Communism in the early 1960s would eventually graduate to the conventional military struggle, which killed so many Americans - and many more Vietnamese -- over the next 15 years. It's not to say this will happen in Afghanistan, but it's something that we have a responsibility to be cognizant of today.

This is particularly true in light of something that McNamara said in Fog of War, which should gnaw at every policymaker who sends America's fighting men and women overseas:

“War is so complex it’s beyond the ability of the human mind to comprehend,” Mr. McNamara concluded. “Our judgment, our understanding, are not adequate. And we kill people unnecessarily.”

How Much Of Moises Naim's Minilateralism Could We Really Have? Posted by David Shorr

The question of how the nations of the world will mount collective responses to urgent problems -- or even whether they will -- is a critical issue, and Foreign Policy Editor Moises Naim gave his own proposal in the recently published issue. Like any good entrepreneurial public intellectual, he even branded it with a catchy name. For Naim, "minilateralism" would, for a given international challenge, bring together the top tier of countries with leverage over that problem. The result would be a profusion of 'G' groupings with rotating casts of members. Clearly intergovernmental cooperation in the 21st Century will be spread across many forums and arrangements, with varying degrees of permanence or legal formality. I have my doubts, though, about Naim's notion of numerous parallel tracks, particularly at a practical level.

Setting those aside, for the moment, Naim basically has the right big-picture diagnosis. The dearth of landmark international agreements in the last 10-15 years is stark indeed, given the seriousness of the problems we confront. It's also true that negotiating among the entire world community of 192 nations is, in most cases, neither necessary nor workable (any of us who lived through Kofi Annan's valiant 2004-05 UN reform push knows that from hard experience). Naim is right too in looking toward pivotal countries for policy leadership. Of all the responses to Naim from Foreign Policy bloggers, I like the two posts from David Rothkopf, who coined a neat term of his own: "coalitions of the influential."

Where the argument loses me is the proposed proliferation of G groupings. Like Naim, I view 'the Gs' -- and by extension their paradigm of informal yet regular series of consultations -- as a hopeful and under-tapped locus of international cooperation and action. As I argue in a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette op-ed today, the true comparative advantage of the Gs stems from the summit meetings around which they revolve. So where I diverge from Naim is the question of how many different Gs we can really have. In practical terms, I'm not sure what volume of diplomatic activity will be possible. And given the potential constraints, I want to husband our high-level attention and action in one place and apply it to problems from economic growth to non-proliferation as need and opportunity arises. If, on the other hand, we see heightened concern and political push from leaders and a new plenitude of diplomacy, then I'll be a staunch proponent of minilateralism. It's an issue on which I'd be happy to be wrong.

NSN Daily Update: 7/06/09 Posted by The Editors

To read today's complete Daily Update, click here

What We're Reading

Iranian tensions continue to harden, as a group of clerics denounce the elections as fraudulent, while opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi presents the most detailed evidence yet of electoral fraud and announcing the creation of a new political party. A hard-line newspaper calls for charges of treason to be put forth on Mousavi. Obama Administration officials continue to insist engagement will be the US’ policy towards Iran.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara dies.

Serious unrest between Muslim Uighers and Ethnic Han Chinese in Western China kills over 140 and injures hundreds more.

Both Iraqis and American troops and policymakers try to assume their new roles following the withdrawal of US troops from Iraqi cities.

Commentary of the Day

Andrew J. Bacevich discusses how Obama should review his strategy for the Long War before the costs becomes greater a liability.

Edward Schmacher-Matos helps untangle the crisis in Honduras by explaining the contradictions with a coup to save democracy.

The Hearts and Minds of Pakistan's Displaced Posted by David Shorr

An important alarm bell today from the Times' Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, who report on Islamic aid groups providing displaced Pakistanis with assistance -- and a heaping helping of anti-American, anti-government political indoctrination to go with. Any of us who are concerned about popular sentiment toward the US will be disturbed to learn that the IDPs resist any aid coming from us, especially after the Pakistani goodwill resulting from America's post-earthquake relief efforts there four years ago. But anti-American sentiment is the least of the problem here.

You can get the details on the current humanitarian need and response from Refugees International. I want to make sure we keep sight of the stakes here. Never mind the United States, the question uppermost for the displaced population is whether their own government cares about them and will cushion the blow after their lives have been turned upside down. Of course the US should do whatever it can to help. We just need to be mindful that if the displaced are left to scrape by in open-ended limbo, a huge hearts and minds battle will have been lost. The relevant grafs from the Times report:

Signs of the organizational strength and robust coffers of Islamist charities were easy to see around the camps, often in contrast to the lack of services offered by the government.

For example, Al Khidmat, Mr. Hassan’s group, arranged to bring in eye surgeons from Punjab to staff a free eye clinic for the displaced, offering cataract operations and eyeglasses.

“Government hospitals are nonexistent here, and we are able to treat not only the displaced but the whole community,” said one of the surgeons, Dr. Khalid Jamal.

Refugees and those displaced within their own countries classically tend, over time, to fade as a focus and a priority. Indeed, they pose challenges much easier to ignore than tackle. How do you help rebuild productive lives for two million people who suddently find themselves somewhere new? Regardless of the problem's difficulty, though, the people affected are bound to see it as a test of the responsiveness and true intentions of their government. Whether the IDPs settle in their new locations or manage to return home, the faith and allegiance of an entire Pakistani region are up for grabs.

Process versus Politics: Conservatives confused about Honduran Coup Posted by The Editors

This post is by NSN intern Luis Vertiz

The recent military coup in Honduras presents another thorny situation for President Obama to deal with. Conservatives at the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Examiner, however, have already pounced on him by demanding that he reverse his support for Honduran President Manuel Zelaya’s reinstatement to office following the military coup that exiled him to Costa Rica. Here is Mary Anastasia O’Grady from the Wall Street Journal:

But Honduras is not out of the Venezuelan woods yet. Yesterday the Central American country was being pressured to restore the authoritarian Mr. Zelaya by the likes of Fidel Castro, Daniel Ortega, Hillary Clinton and, of course, Hugo [Chavez] himself. The Organization of American States, having ignored Mr. Zelaya's abuses, also wants him back in power. It will be a miracle if Honduran patriots can hold their ground.

The problem with this statement is two-fold. One, O’Grady is clearly taking sides in this Honduran crisis – harking back to the Cold War legacy of American interference in the region. While the details of the coup are beginning to emerge, she has already chosen to shower the military’s coup with laudatory language. Clearly, despite Zelaya’s democratic election to office, O’Grady believes it’s more important that Chavez’s brand of Bolivarian socialism be rooted out rather than foster stronger democratic norms. Someone has to remind me again why supporting democratically-elected leaders, no matter their political persuasion, puts American values and interests at risk more than acquiescing to military coups. Latin America has a history of military coups and strongmen, yet the past two decades have shown an impressive dedication to democratic governance. With the region warming up to Obama, despite our history of American interference in Latin American countries, why turn our back on 20-plus years of democratic governance in Latin America now by allowing this intervention? Turning a blind-eye to the abrogation of the rule of law – the foundation of any democracy – will only serve to further weaken democracy and increases the prospects for increased military interference in democratic politics in the region.

The secondary problem with arguments like O’Grady’s is, while there is genuine concern that President Zelaya was blatantly pushing forth constitutional reforms for self-preservation, the loci of her concern was the personal politics of the President Zelaya, rather than the process by which he was removed from office. Process in a democracy matters. No one applauds the authoritarian leanings of Zelaya’s inspiration: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Yet Chavez isn’t the man in charge of Honduras’ politics. News reports suggest President Zelaya was alone in Honduras in pushing for constitutional reforms similar to what Chavez has done in Venezuela. The Honduran Congress, their Supreme Court, the country’s Attorney General and even members of Zelaya’s own party were all against the President’s plans for a referendum. Zelaya was increasingly isolated. It is a shame the military felt it necessary to physically remove him from power. The Washington Examiner’s conservative editorial board wrote: “These [coup] actions were also affirmed by the Honduran Supreme Court. In other words, as was said over and over here after Watergate, ‘the system worked.’” No, the system clearly didn’t work. Democratic governance was not set up to be periodically tamed by military coups.

O’Grady at the Wall Street Journal ironically writes: “The struggle against chavismo has never been about left-right politics. It is about defending the independence of institutions that keep presidents from becoming dictators.” How does O’Grady believe that the independence of Honduran democratic institutions are best served when the military takes power by force? Because the general in charge of the Honduran military felt he needed to compel the President to obey the ruling of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling preventing a referendum on constitutional reform, Honduras clearly has a civil-military relations problem as much as it has a governance problem. Instead of reflexively supporting the military’s coup, why can’t conservatives ask why Honduras’ domestic institutions seemed scared of Zelaya’s referendum, when he had no legal authority to hold one? Why not merely wait until after the illegal vote and then assess the options? Conservatives like O’Grady and the Washington Examiner Editorial Board don’t help Honduran democrats [with a small d] if they enthusiastically latch onto an opportunistic coups.

Should the Burqa be Banned? Posted by Shadi Hamid

The issue of the burqa (or the niqab) is one that I've struggled with because it forces us to choose between competing goods. It cuts to fundamental questions of the limits of tolerance and free speech. Mona Eltahawy is a courageous advocate for women's equality and I enjoy her columns a great deal, but I find her most recent piece for the New York Times somewhat perplexity. She advocates a burqa ban because the burqa violates women's rights. I agree with almost everything she says regarding the burqa, that it, in effect, "erases women from society." Agreed. As an American-Muslim, it both bothers and offends me to see women in major American cities with only their eyes showing. The niqab is an affront to the values I grew up with, but, then again, so are so many other things. I do not enjoy the right to not be offended.

Eltahawy also references Soad Saleh, an Islamic law professor who says that the burqa has "nothing to do with Islam" and is, rather, a cultural tradition. Again, I fully agree.

French President Nicholas Sarkozy said recently, "The burqa is not a religious sign, it is a sign of the subjugation, of the submission of women. I want to say solemnly that it will not be welcome on our territory.” Again, I agree with the first sentence but I'm not sure how the second sentence follows from the first. You cannot justify a ban on something simply by saying that it is a sign of the submission of women. There have to be legal and/or constitutional grounds for implementing such a ban, and, in this case, such grounds do not appear to exist. You could presumably institute or execute laws that prevent men from forcing their wives to do things against their will, but if the burqa is something some women choose to do voluntarily then such injunctions would not be germane.

What is interesting, and rather puzzling, about Eltahawy's article is that it does not attempt to make any real argument for banning the burqa, even though is presumably the intent of her piece. The idea that we can or should ban things we don't agree with is dangerous because it can easily be applied - as it often is - in reverse situations. For example, there have been attempts in Muslim-majority countries to silence minority opinions on the exact same grounds - that a form of expression must be banned because it is an affront to a certain set of norms and values that the majority holds dear.

On such grounds, anything that hints of criticism of Islam in Muslim-majority countries, even those that are supposedly secular, can be made punishable by law. Scholars and commentators have been charged with apostasy and, in some extreme cases, forced into exile for supposedly undermining the Islamic faith (see for instance the case of Nasr Hamed Abu Zayd). The reasoning here operates in parallel to Eltahawy's: Voluntary expressions of speech or faith must be restricted because they come into conflict with societal perceptions of what is "right." It sets a dangerous precedent, then, to go down this path, whether in the name of one set of ideals or another - even if we are convinced, as may very well be, that the one set of ideals is better than the other.

That said, I am more than willing to be convinced that there are indeed reasonable legal and constitutional grounds for banning the niqab, but I have trouble seeing how those might take precedence over the higher principle and constitutionally-guaranteed right to free speech and expression.