Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - The Cordesman/Biddle/West Version Posted by Michael Cohen

H/T to Steve Hynd for catching this tidbit from across the pond:

The United States should send up to 45,000 extra troops to Afghanistan, a senior adviser to the American commander in Kabul has told The Times.

Anthony Cordesman, an influential American academic who is a member of a team that has been advising General Stanley McChrystal, now in charge of Nato forces in Afghanistan, also said that to deal with the threat from the Taleban the size of the Afghan National Army might have to increase to 240,000.

This seems at pace with what we're hearing from Stephen Biddle, who was also a member of McChrystal's review team:

"We will need a large combat presence for many years to come, and we will probably need a large financial commitment longer than that," said Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the "strategic assessment" team advising McChrystal. The expansion of the Afghan security force that the general will recommend to secure the country "will inevitably cost much more than any imaginable Afghan government is going to be able to afford on its own," Biddle added.

And folks wonder why I call this feature the Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch. If McChrystal is listening to Biddle and Cordesman - and if the President is listening to McChrystal -- we are going to be in Afghanistan for not years, but potentially decades. This point, by the way, was reinforced by General Sir David Richards, who is about to become head of the British Army. He said recently that "Britain’s commitment to Afghanistan could last between 30 and 40 years, although he envisaged that troops would have to stay only for the medium term." I'm assuming medium term is 15-20 years. The fixation that otherwise intelligent military and foreign policy analysts have with Afghanistan is growing larger than my meager ability to comprehend. One would think from reading these quotes that the US and UK has never protected its interests in any manner other than that of military occupation.

And the cherry on top of all this comes from the always enjoyable Bing West:

"Afghan forces will need $4 billion a year for another decade, with a like sum for development," said Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense and combat Marine who has chronicled the Iraq and Afghan wars. Bing said the danger is that Congress is "so generous in support of our own forces today, it may not support the aid needed for progress in Afghanistan tomorrow."

Yes, this is definitely a serious danger facing the United States - that we won't be generous enough to support progress in Afghanistan.

Juan Cole Makes a Really Good Point Posted by Michael Cohen

Juan Cole picks up the far more important story coming out of Pakistan today:

Pakistan's Supreme Court has ruled that emergency rule enforced by former President Pervez Musharraf was unconstitutional and illegal.

The order clears the way for him to be tried for treason because under the constitution, anyone found guilty of abrogating it can be prosecuted. The court ruling also said that the appointment of judges after the emergency was illegal.

As Cole points out this is the first time the Pakistani Supreme Court stood up to the military and calls it the most important turning point in the country's history since its founding in 1947.

This reminds me of a post I wrote about 5 months ago about a story that received a similar level of coverage: the restoration of the country's Supreme Court Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry after fulsome protests by one of Pakistan's most respected non-Islamic civil society institutions: the independent lawyer's movement.

For all the hand wringing about Pakistan and the overhyped notion that the country will fall or allow a loose nuke to fall into the hands of terrorists we tend to overlook the occasional good news coming out of the country. This is precisely one of those stories and as Cole argues, it deserves to receive a lot more attention than it has.

Metrics, I Don't Need Your Stinking Metrics Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at the New York Times we have a good example of how the new American Way of War (COIN) mantra has infected public discourse on Afghanistan:

But as the Bush administration learned the hard way in Iraq, poorly designed measurements can become misleading indicators — and can create a false sense of progress. That is especially difficult in a war like the one in Afghanistan, in which eliminating corruption, promoting a working democracy and providing effective aid is as critical as scoring military success against insurgents and terrorists.

To the first point, the Bush administration created measurements for judging success in Iraq (18 in all) and then made lowering civilian casualties the most important one - even though it wasn't one of the original 18. So to be clear the individuals who created a false sense of progress were the ones who were pushing different benchmarks then those generally agreed upon. And it's still happening today: the surge in Iraq is constantly portrayed as a success even though its founding element - political reconciliation -- has not been achieved.

In a sense this is a big problem with using metrics to define progress in war time - they can either represent false indicators of success (see Vietnam War and body counts) or they can be changed to fit a particular political and military narrative (see Iraq War and surge success). Or they can cloud over the fact that the underlying mission is fundamentally flawed, not in the national interest or due to resource and political constraints not achievable.

The problem I generally have with these conversations about metrics is that you can't judge success if you don't know what the goal is - and frankly I don't know what the Obama Administration's goal is in Afghanistan. I've been told by the President that it is to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat" Al Qaeda. Great. I'm all for that. But how you achieve that goal matters a great deal. For example, counter-insurgency advocates would argue that the way to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for Al Qaeda is to prevent a Taliban take-over of the country. And the best way to achieve that goal is to conduct population centric counter-insurgency that strengthens the legitimacy of the Afghan government and convinces Taliban members to effectively switch sides.

Well I don't agree and I'm not alone.

In fact, look at what the NYT article says about metrics:

"eliminating corruption, promoting a working democracy and providing effective aid is as critical as scoring military success against insurgents and terrorists."

Well that's one view of success (although I'd hate to know how the US government scores these days on being a working democracy).  But there are others that think the latter (military success) is more important or that these goals are not achievable in the near term or aren't necessary for achieving success in Afghanistan.

In other words, if we're going to measure success in Afghanistan by the successful realization of counter-insurgency goals, then we've restricted a whole level of the conversation we need to be having. Or even worse, we're having a conversation that is based on measuring the success of an operation that it at is at its core may be fundamentally flawed.

Let's stop talking about metrics for success in Afghanistan. Let's start talking about goals and end games.  For example, is the goal to stabilize Afghanistan via nation building or is it to prevent a Taliban takeover? (These are two different things). How will we know what success in Afghanistan looks like: an effective Afghan government or a government in Kabul that is able to prevent a Taliban takeover of the country (of those could be one in the same, but the latter would likely be easier than the former).  If the goal of the US mission is, as the President suggested, to defeat, dismantle and disrupt Al Qaeda should the mission be focused more on the Pakistan part of the fight rather than the Afghan side? I know these two are connected, but in the most narrow definition of US interests . . . they're not. Al Qaeda is in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. And while I know they can always come back and receive safe haven under a Taliban government is that a realistic enough possibility that it requires a long-term US military intervention.  Finally, can we live with the Taliban playing an active political role in Afghanistan as long as they are not giving Al Qaeda shelter?

Quite simply, there are a lot of questions to be answered about the US mission in Afghanistan. Figuring out the metrics for success is, right now, not one of them.

Score One For the Drones Posted by Michael Cohen

It can often be a bit unseemly to revel in the death of another person, but in the case of Baitullah Mehsud I think we can make an exception. According to a number of reports, Mehsud, leader of the Pakistan Taliban was killed yesterday . . . in a CIA drone attack.

This was a man who killed hundreds of people, including (it is believed) presidential candidate Benazir Bhutto. As one official said, the world is a safer place without him. Now it's a bit early to assess the political impact of his death, but suffice to say, it hasn't been a good week for the Pakistani Taliban.

And if ever we needed an object lesson in why the drone war is necessary and an essential tool of US counter-terrorism policy this would be it.

UPDATE:

In the interests of full disclosure, Joshua Foust over at Registan is skeptical about the reports of Mehsud's death.

Yup Posted by Michael Cohen

There were parts of John Brennan's speech at CSIS that gave me pause, but these three paragraphs practically made we weep:

First, and perhaps most significantly, the fight against terrorists and violent extremists has been returned to its right and proper place: no longer defining—indeed, distorting—our entire national security and foreign policy, but rather serving as a vital part of those larger policies. President Obama has made it clear that the United States will not be defined simply by what we are against, but by what we are for—the opportunity, liberties, prosperity, and common aspirations we share with the world.

Rather than looking at allies and other nations through the narrow prism of terrorism—whether they are with us or against us—the administration is now engaging other countries and peoples across a broader range of areas. Rather than treating so many of our foreign affairs programs—foreign assistance, development, democracy promotion—as simply extensions of the fight against terrorists, we will do these things—promote economic growth, good governance, transparency and accountability—because they serve our common interests and common security; not just in regions gripped by violent extremism, but around the world.

 . . .  Indeed, it was telling that the President was actually criticized in certain quarters in this country for not using words like "terror," "terrorism" or "terrorist" in that speech. This goes to the heart of his new approach. Why should a great and powerful nation like the United States allow its relationship with more than a billion Muslims around the world be defined by the narrow hatred and nihilistic actions of an exceptionally small minority of Muslims? After all, this is precisely what Osama bin Laden intended with the Sept. 11 attacks: to use al Qaeda to foment a clash of civilizations in which the United States and Islam are seen as distinct identities that are in conflict. In his approach to the world and in his approach to safeguarding the American people, President Obama is determined not to validate al Qaeda’s twisted worldview.

Hear, hear brother! The war on terror is officially dead and buried.

Read the whole thing here

Our Public Debate About Afghanistan Posted by Michael Cohen

Andrew Bacevich asks an important question about Afghanistan:

What is it about Afghanistan, possessing next to nothing that the United States requires, that justifies such lavish attention? In Washington, this question goes not only unanswered but unasked. Among Democrats and Republicans alike, with few exceptions, Afghanistan’s importance is simply assumed—much the way fifty years ago otherwise intelligent people simply assumed that the United States had a vital interest in ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. As then, so today, the assumption does not stand up to even casual scrutiny.

Over at Abu Muqawama, Andrew Exum disagrees:

I'm sorry, I like Andrew Bacevich very much, but this is simply and demonstrably false. Plenty of us in Washington have in fact been having a very sober-minded discussion about U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the limits of our new counterinsurgency doctrine. To suggest otherwise reveals ignorance of the discourse here.

While sure some people have had this discussion; but to argue that it's been a key feature of the public discourse on Afghanistan is pretty hard to swallow. And for Andrew to use Stephen Biddle's tortured logic argument for staying in Afghanistan that offers a strawman choice between withdrawal and stay the course is not what I would call a robust debate.

For example, Biddle argues, "The United States has two primary national interests in this conflict: that Afghanistan never again become a haven for terrorism against the United States, and that chaos in Afghanistan not destabilize its neighbors, especially Pakistan. Neither interest can be dismissed, but both have limits as casus belli." To that end, Biddle endorses continuing on the path of a counter-insurgency mission and robust US military involvement.

On the flip side Bacevich argues that while the first part of Biddle's argument is sound, the notion of using the military to stabilize the country is not - because, as he argues, stabilizing Afghanistan is not that terribly important to keeping Americans safe:

"Averting a recurrence of that awful day (September 11th) does not require the semipermanent occupation and pacification of distant countries like Afghanistan. Rather, it requires that the United States erect and maintain robust defenses. Fixing Afghanistan is not only unnecessary, it’s also likely to prove impossible."

 . . . It would be much better to let local authorities do the heavy lifting. Provided appropriate incentives, the tribal chiefs who actually run Afghanistan are best positioned to prevent terrorist networks from establishing a large-scale presence. As a backup, intensive surveillance complemented with precision punitive strikes (assuming we can manage to kill the right people) will suffice to disrupt Al Qaeda’s plans.

Is that not a very different conception of the importance of Afghanistan and its relation to the national interest? And let me ask a question to DA readers, which argument do you hear more often in public debates, Biddle's or Bacevich's? And not only is the debate constricted around the strategy for Afghanistan it is too around the tactics. Exum argues that the debate has "moved on to strategic and operational concerns." Yeah, but only if you think that population centric counter-insurgency is the only way to further US objectives in Afghanistan.

And what's more I'll call your Stephen Biddle and raise you Peter Bergen's recent piece in the Washington Monthly. I like Peter and he is a colleague, but I think it's fair to say that his article focuses far more on the operational side of the Afghanistan war and tends to gloss over the larger strategic issues raised by Bacevich.

It's one thing to focus on cloistered debates among think tank denizens. It's quite another to call that a robust public debate. The level of public debate in Washington about US interests and objectives in Afghanistan has been frightfully constricted. The only discordant voices from political leaders is coming from the left of the Democratic Party, Russ Feingold and his ilk.  When Bacevich says "Among Democrats and Republicans alike, with few exceptions, Afghanistan’s importance is simply assumed" well I'm sorry, but if we're talking the political realm that certainly seems to be the case.

From a media perspective, the WP and NYT are filled with stories about operational elements of our mission in Afghanistan; a lot less on national interests. Indeed, not one reporter even bothered to ask President Obama in his recent press conference a single question about Afghanistan. And as the mission evolves from a counter-terrorism mission (disrupt, defeat and dismantle Al Qaeda) into a full-fledged counter-insurgency (protecting the populace and building Afghan government legitimacy) it's more important than ever that these questions are asked and answered.

I don't always agree with Andrew Bacevich, but he's right to be asking these core questions about US national interests in Afghanistan and he's right to offer military options other than population centric counter-insurgency. Not many other people in this town are.

National Security is Energy Security Posted by Adam Blickstein

Retired general and former National Security Adviser Don Kerrick writes in today's Orlando Sentinel:

As a retired general and former deputy national security adviser, I have firsthand experience combating enemies that threaten American security. But while most see these threats as coming from radical extremism or the standing armies of rogue regimes, our intelligence community, national security experts and many retired military officials agree there is another, more-subtle enemy that threatens our way of life and how we keep America secure: the ramifications of climate change.

Just last year, the National Intelligence Council called climate change one of the gravest long-term threats facing global stability, a looming peril that could undermine American and international security. This is why it's gravely important that President Obama and Congress have begun to take action.

North Korea's "Propaganda Coup" Posted by David Shorr

Returning to the category of flimsy conservative argments, we have the idea that President Clinton's mission to Pyongyang was a major PR victory for Kim Jong-il. Today's conservative, appearing on NPR's All Thing Considered, is Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation (a sometime participant in Stanley Fouundation programs whom I consider a friend). Peter contends that the visit of a former US president constitutes a morally hazardous ransom for the kidnapping and kangaroo trial of the two journalists.

For those keeping score at home, let me tell you how this looks to me. The Dear Leader got to play host to President Clinton for ONE DAY (make that one or two news cycles). Meanwhile, when it comes to any further discussions with the DPRK, the situation with Laura Ling and Euna Lee is now resolved and no longer on the agenda. I don't see how Kim really gains a PR or diplomatic advantage here. He didn't look so great turning the journalists' lives into a Kafka novel, and isn't going to look much better now that Topic A is all those missile launches and nuclear tests.

That Pesky SOFA Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at TNR's The Plank Michael Crowley has a post up about the future of Iraq and what President should do if tensions boil over there into ethnic and sectarian violence:

If Iraq does seem to be headed back towards chaos as U.S. troops withdraw, what will Obama do? It's hard to say for sure. During the campaign, he was tonally emphatic about ending America's commitment there. But he has always allowed for revisions based on the judgment of his commanders. It's awfully hard to imagine that surge architect David Petraeus would be willing to watch his gains there disappear in a maelstrom of car bombs and sectarian assassinations. If Petraeus says we need to maintain a substantial troop committment, will Obama defy him?

Over at the LA Times, Barbara Walter makes a similar argument:

The U.S. shouldn't fool itself into believing that it can get peace and stability in Iraq without committing significant military and nonmilitary resources to Iraq well beyond 2011.

What goes unmentioned in both pieces is the simple fact that whether the US stays in Iraq - and how Obama responds to increasing levels of violence - is out of our hands. In 2008, the United States signed a binding legal agreement with a sovereign Iraqi government that governed the status of forces in Iraq (the SOFA).  Under that agreement United States Forces must be out of Iraq, "no later than December 31, 2011." Any changes to the SOFA must be negotiated with the Iraqi government.

Now there have been rumblings of late from Prime Minister Maliki that US troops may stay beyond 2011, and of course the US government can advocate for staying longer, but all these discussions about whether the US should stay or go - and the choices that Obama supposedly has to make -- are irrelevant. It's not our call. If the Iraqis want us to stay - and we decide that it's in our interests - we can stay. If they want to us to stick to the withdrawal timeline that we agreed to, then we go. End of story. No matter how bad things get in Iraq. If we're going to talk about Iraq's "future" it's important to at least recognize that the Iraqis themselves get a vote. In fact, they get a veto.

One other point that Crowley makes is also worth addressing, "It's awfully hard to imagine that surge architect David Petraeus would be willing to watch his gains there disappear in a maelstrom of car bombs and sectarian assassinations. If Petraeus says we need to maintain a substantial troop commitment, will Obama defy him?"

Excuse me? You know it's been a while since I studied civil/military relations but President Barack Obama acts in defiance of no man or woman in uniform. They follow his orders - seeing as he is commander-in-chief and all.

I don't mean to pick on Crowley but this slip is indicative of an ongoing erosion in civil/military relations. In 2004, you had General Petraeus wading into domestic politics by writing an op-ed supportive of President Bush's policy in Iraq on the eve of the general election; you had Bush and Senator McCain basically saying that decision-making about troop levels would be made by Petraeus, as opposed to his civilian bosses. Right now in Afghanistan we're seeing a ramping up of a counter-insurgency mission that stands in sharp contrast to President Obama's statement on Af/Pak policy in March. And in perhaps the most underreported example, you had Jim Jones statement that no more troops would be going to Afghanistan undermined a mere ten days later by leaks from Gen. McChrystal that more troop requests were on the way. Granted these are somewhat disparate examples, but they point to the far more public role that military leaders are playing in national security debates - and often at the expense of civilian leadership.

So all this is to say that General Petraeus may oppose President Obama's Iraq policy - and one would hope that in private he would tell him so - but the notion that the President would "defy" his top general is sort of mind-boggling.

Reading Walt Whitman and the Conservative National Security Critique Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Over at bloggingheads, Eli Lake and I debate Iran policy, Israeli policy and Sudan policy (regrettably lots of violence in Sudan today, even more regrettably it's local group on local group in the south, taking advantage, if you can call it that, of the plethora of weapons left over from the two-decades' long civil war and the very limited reach of the state).

We find no shortage of things to disagree about, I think:  what's interesting is that many of the commenters seem to share the view of Eliot Cohen and one wing of the Republican party -- call them the "no difference" school. 

I'm always bewildered by the "there's no difference" critique, whether it comes from the left or right.  In my experience, the difference begins with how you see the world -- as a collection of other actors who also have legitimate rights and aspirations that have to be considered, even when they differ from our own, or as primarily objects to be acted upon.  Then there's the question of how you understand American power -- whether you believe it has either moral or practical limits and what you think those are.

Then it can be the case that two people, or two Administrations, can legitimately reach the same decision -- eg, that attacking North Korea is foolhardy, or that building a partnership with India is a good idea, to pick a couple of places that (almost) no one complains about policy continuity -- having started from quite different ideological and experiential premises.

The "no difference" critique from the right is particularly disingenuous, coming as it does from folks who resisted containing North Korea, drawing down in Iraq, engagement with Iran and other Obama initiatives for years of the Bush Administration when progressives proposed them.

Then, as NSN pointed out today, you get other conservatives saying that Obama policies are changing Bush policies that kept America safe.  Well, wait.  Either he's changing them or he's not.  Get your story straight, please. 

Anyway, it all sent me to Walt Whitman.  Reading all of Song of Myself beats heck out of reading competing foreign policy critiques, even mine.  Or "There Was a Child Went Forth Every Day" or "Who Learns My Lesson Complete?" from Leaves of Grass.  So in Whitman's spirit of inclusivity and love of his fellows, I send this verse to our critics:

Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)