Give That Man A Contract Posted by Michael Cohen

For several months now I've been arguing that what is needed in Afghanistan is policy of containment vis-a-vis the Taliban rather than a policy of elimination. Over at the FP/NAF Af/Pak channel Sean Kay makes the case far more effectively than I have.

The war in Afghanistan began justifiably in fall 2001 and troops are serving a noble cause. It was, also, a winnable war had America not invaded Iraq or had the Bush administration adopted the current strategy three years ago when the Taliban regrouped. While the Taliban have local territorial goals, al Qaeda is a global challenge. Its origins lie in Afghanistan and while global jihadists there must be defeated, there is no logic that says denying al Qaeda a base in Afghanistan eliminates their ability to operate elsewhere.

The status quo in Afghanistan is not sustainable. Metrics for success are unclear and absent prompt positive results, public support will likely erode further. The war in Afghanistan is taking an unsustainable toll in American life and resources.

If the United States and its allies are not providing the resources necessary for victory, the mission must be realigned. Plan B for Afghanistan is likely coming -- the question is how long it will take to get there, and at what cost.

I won't bother to summarize his Plan B - just demand that folks read it.

Tha Wacky, Wacky Pete Wehner Posted by Michael Cohen

Via Yglesias, Pete Wehner has opened up some whoop-ass on George Will. I won't bother to critique his rather hyperbolic post, but two things did jump out to me. Responding to Will's column arguing that it's time to end the US military intervention in Afghanistan, Wehner makes this snide and obnoxious comment:

It is a column that could have been written in Japanese aboard the USS Missouri.

I am generally hesitant to call something someone has written stupid because I tend to think it's a juvenile way to debate . . . but this is incredibly stupid. And offensive. And it's also historically illiterate.

But here's the part that I find really odd. At the end of the piece Pete Wehner says this:

We need individuals who believe a nation must be willing to fight for what is right even when it is hard. We need people who are going to resist the temptation to eagerly support war at the outset and then prematurely give up on it.

Well Pete, you know who took exactly that approach - and fought a war as eagerly at the end as they did at the outset even when it was quite obvious the war was lost. F***king imperial Japan!!

Is that the model America should be imitating? By Wehner's logic, the Japanese should have kept fighting even after we dropped two atom bombs on them - because that whole surrendering on the USS Missouri was unmanly and defeatist. They apparently, "prematurely gave up." By Wehners twisted logic we can never stop fighting the war in Afghanistan or we can never shift course no matter how bad things get - until we've won that is. But Wehner can't be bothered with defining victory.  (Of course, he's not alone.) This is mindless foreign policy flagwaving.

The even more amusing part is a point raised by Matt. Wehner says this:

Now, like then, America needs spirited realists, not defeatists.

If Pete Wehner had any comprehension of what a realist is he would understand that George Will has actually expressed a realist principle in ending his support for the war.  No Pete, the word you meant to use here was "blowhards."

I dare you to read this toxic post and find one example of where Pete Wehner explains why George Will is wrong, or what victory looks like, or what the US interest in in fighting a war in Afghanistan. He doesn't, because he's too busy calling George Will a defeatist. This isn't political debate, it's name calling - and it belongs on an elementary school playground, not in a serious policy debate.

We Have A Winner: The Worst Rationale For Staying in Afghanistan Posted by Michael Cohen

It would be foolish on my part to expect a cogent and rational explanation from Danielle Pletka as to why the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting, but this entry defies even her low standards:

Poor Afghanistan, so lacking in succor for the self-righteous. No Jews oppressing Muslims, no apartheid, no Islamists starving Africans. Angelina Jolie doesn't seem to care. It isn't even Iraq. It's no longer the good war, the one worth winning, as it was during the elections. And when Cindy Sheehan and George Will agree it's time to get out, can a hasty retreat be far behind?

Worse still, for those who believe victory is worth achieving in Afghanistan, it's not easy to pinpoint what victory looks like. It never has been. Nonetheless, Afghanistan has both strategic and moral value to the United States. And it is wise to remember that the price of failure is horribly high. We have failed before in Afghanistan and betrayed the trust of Afghans who believed America cared about them. After two decades and the rise of an al Qaeda homeland, we paid the price.

Now we have a chance to cement a better system into place in Afghanistan. It won't be easy, and the price will continue to escalate. But it is a lie to suggest it will be possible through remote counterterrorism operations; as in Iraq, security on the ground and faith in the future are the best antidotes to insurgents. Real victory is attainable; a real Afghan national army is being slowly empowered; and though the elections were a disappointment to many, they remain a model of suffrage compared to the past. We are progressing slowly, but we are progressing. And capitulating to the Taliban is unthinkable.

Oy! I'll try to make this quick, but a few thoughts:

• Maintaining the trust of the Afghan people is more important than say maintaining the trust of the American people.
• Like Tony Cordesman, Danielle Pletka can't actually say what victory looks like in Afghanistan, but she has the goods on what defeat looks like.
• Real victory is attainable but it's not easy to pinpoint what victory looks like (her words not mine).
• Apparently it's a lie to suggest that remote CT operations would work in Afghanistan - but it's truth to suggest that counter-insurgency tactics will succeed.  
• All the Afghan people need is "faith in the future" - that will really show the Taliban.
• A real Afghan national army is being empowered - except of course in Helmand province where its US Marines and not Afghan soldiers fighting the Taliban.
• The price of failure is incredibly high, but the price of success doesn't merit consideration.

I could go on, but what's the point. I tend to believe that Danielle Pletka has a string attached to her back and when Washington Post editors pull it she spits out platitudes like "Capitulating to the Taliban is unthinkable." "We are progressing slowly, but we are progressing." "Cindy Sherman." "Angelina Jolie" "Cindy Sherman." "The price of failure is horribly high."

By the way, you got to love the Washington Post. They have a debate on whether the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting and they get 5 people who think it is and 1 who doesn't.

Way to keep it even-handed guys.

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - The Condensed Version Posted by Michael Cohen

I'm trying to think of the most polite way for me to say that General McCrystal and the military leadership have really screwed over President Obama and dangerously narrowed his choices on what to do about Afghanistan.

Luckily, this McClatchy article tells the story pretty well. First check out the headline:

Pentagon worried about Obama's commitment to Afghanistan

Uh oh. And then look at these off-the-record quotes:

"I think they (the Obama administration) thought this would be more popular and easier," a senior Pentagon official said. "We are not getting a Bush-like commitment to this war."

Monday's assessment initially was to include troop recommendations, but political concerns prompted White House and Pentagon officials to agree that those recommendations would come later, advisers to McChrystal said.

This is pretty unbelievable stuff. But it gets worse:

Obama now feels that McChrystal and his superior, Army Gen. David Petraeus, the head of the Central Command, are pressuring him to commit still more troops to Afghanistan, a senior military official said. The official said that retired Marine Gen. James Jones, Obama's national security adviser, told McChrystal last month not to ask for more troops, but that McChrystal went ahead anyway and indicated in interviews that he may need more.

I don't even know what to make of this story. Maybe it's pro-Obama folks trying to push the notion that the military is narrowing the President's choices. But whatever the case it highlights a concern that I've had for quite a while, but I've seen few people make: the military not the White House is driving U.S Afghan policy - and they're driving it right off a cliff. 

Back in March when President Obama announced his new policy for Afghanistan-Pakistan he made very clear that the mission was to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda." He never used the words counter-insurgency and he never mentioned making protecting the population the focal point of US efforts in Afghanistan.

But by June, General McCrystal was already sounding a very different tune:

“A resilient Taliban insurgency, increasing levels of violence, lack of governance capacity … lack of development in key areas” threatens the “future of Afghanistan and regional stability.” Providing the Afghan people “with an opportunity to shape their future” requires a “firm commitment” from the United States. “The challenge is considerable,” and “there is no simple answer.” McChrystal advocates a “holistic counterinsurgency campaign.” Casualties “will increase” but “with the appropriate resources, time, sacrifice and patience, we will prevail.”

In March, Obama said that the US would not be focused on dictating Afghanistan's future. In June McCrystal says the exact opposite and goes far beyond simply describing an operational approach - this is a shift away from counter terrorism to counter-insurgency and nation building. This provided, I think, the first inclination that the mission in Afghanistan was evolving and that it was being defined not by the President, or the Secretary of State, but by the Pentagon and in particular, by General McCrystal. A mission initially focused on al Qaeda was now being broadened to target the Taliban. Still there was reason to believe this was strategic approach shared by the White House.

Yet a mere month later, National Security Advisor Jim Jones threw some very cold water on the notion that the US was getting into a deep counter-insurgency mission or more important that more troops would be on their way. Remember the WTF moment:

Suppose you're the president, Jones told them, and the requests come into the White House for yet more force. How do you think Obama might look at this? Jones asked, casting his eyes around the colonels. How do you think he might feel? Jones let the question hang in the air-conditioned, fluorescent-lighted room. Nicholson and the colonels said nothing.

Well, Jones went on, after all those additional troops, 17,000 plus 4,000 more, if there were new requests for force now, the president would quite likely have "a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment." Everyone in the room caught the phonetic reference to WTF -- which in the military and elsewhere means "What the [expletive]?" Nicholson and his colonels -- all or nearly all veterans of Iraq -- seemed to blanch at the unambiguous message that this might be all the troops they were going to get.

Yet, a mere 10 days later; a mere 10 days after Jim Jones makes clear no more troops should be requested comes this story from the Washington Post:

"There are not enough Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police for our forces to partner with in operations . . . and that gap will exist into the coming years even with the planned growth already budgeted for," said a U.S. military official in Kabul who is familiar with McChrystal's ongoing review.

Without significant increases, said another U.S. official involved in training Afghan forces, "we will lose the war." Gates would have to agree to any request from McChrystal for additional funding or troops, and recommend it to Obama.

And before you know it, Jones is backtracking from the WTF moment:

Jones said McChrystal is "perfectly within his mandate as a new commander to make the recommendation on the military posture as he sees it. We have to wait until he does that. There was never any intention on my visit [to Afghanistan] to say, 'Don't ever come in with a request or to put a cap on troops.' 

This should have been the wake-up call that something was amiss in U.S-Afghan policy - and more important that the White House and the military were not on the same page. As I wrote at the time:

I believe this is known as the ratf**k. Does anyone else think that if McCrystal and Petraues come to the President in the Summer of 2010 (a few months before a mid-term election) and say we need more troops at the same time you have military officials leaking to the WP that we'll lose war if we don't get more troops . . . that more troops won't be on their way to Afghanistan?

Guess what. I was off by about a year. Now you have McCrystal leaking his "secret" review to the press and senior officials in the military expressing off-the-record concern that our Democratic President, in the midst of a bruising battle over health care reform, who by the way never served in the military is not "committed" to the mission in Afghanistan.

Does anyone believe that President Obama will politically be able to say no to an almost inevitable military request for more troops?  And unless the President has the guts to stand up to McCrystal and the military we're going to be in Afghanistan for a very long time.

You got to give McCrystal and the military credit - they played this beautifully.

In the end, does anyone believe that once we begin to wade deeper into this conflict that it won't become even more difficult to get out?  Can anyone see a realistic light at the end of this tunnel? Because I sure as hell don't.

We are fighting on behalf of a corrupt, illegitimate "president" in Kabul who probably just stole a presidential election, we have little support from the Afghan military and police for a counter-insurgency mission, no interest from the Pakistani government to go after Afghan Taliban safe havens in their country, a slowly eroding NATO alliance, a resurgent Taliban insurgency and hawks in the Washington Post telling the President unless he sends more troops to Afghanistan he is facing "certain defeat" and the prospects of becoming a "failed war time president."

To quote David Petraeus, "tell me how this ends."

Why Texas Shouldn't Mess with Secession Posted by Patrick Barry

With secession nonsense flaring up again in Texas again, I think it's a good time to recollect that the Lone Star state would face some pretty catastrophic consequences were it to actually break off from the Union.  Annie Lowery had what I think is the most definitive contribution on the subject. Here's an excerpt (though you should really read the whole thing for a sense of what Texans could expect after seceding):

In short: the state of Texas would rapidly become direly impoverished, would need to be heavily armed, and would be wracked with existential domestic and foreign policy threats. It would probably make our failed states list in short order. Probably better to pay the damn taxes.

A friend of mine also observed to me this weekend, that given the size of Texas's Aerospace and Defense industries, the secession-induced economic collapse would probably be hastened by the canceling of billions of dollars in government contracts.  Unfortunately, anti-secessionist arguments run into the problem of depending too much on reality, when pro-secessionists live in a fantasy theme-park, where Rick Perry reigns supreme.

COIN in Space? Posted by Patrick Barry

While the rest of the DC blogosphere is alight with news of the Disney-Marvel merger, my inner-geek was struck by Andrew Exum's Marine Corps officer cousin's views on strategy and insurgency as they relate to the Star Wars Universe.  His take? The Rebel Alliance would have been better to adopt an insurgent mindset rather than trying to go toe-to-toe with a Galactic Empire that maintained a huge conventional advantage:

Why didn't the Rebel Alliance pursue a strategy of insurgency in their rebellion against the Galactic Empire?  I would argue that they pursued a strategy of conventional war against the Empire and forwent every aspect of insurgent strategy and tactics.  They finally came around a bit in the end by co-opting the Ewoks onto their side.  Why hadn't they pursued that strategy on a larger scale?
 
Instead, they simply staged two conventional assualts on the Empire's center of gravity: the Death Star.  Although both attempts were successful, I think they got lucky.  I think they would have been better served had read their Mao and followed his maxims.

One big question I have is whether, given the intergalactic nature of the war between the Empire and the Rebel Alliance, a classic insurgency is even possible? If one of the insurgent's biggest advantages is his knowledge of the local environment, and the tacit support of the inhabitants of that environment, then isn't that advantage pretty much negated in the vacuum of space?  I imagine that the space-based nature of war in the Star Wars universe constrained the Alliance's strategic options, perhaps significantly. I suspect that the rebels were pursuing the best set of tactics available to them - waging asymmetric war against the Empire's vulnerable conventional military assets.

To the broader argument that the Alliance was spending far too much time on military engagements at the expense of the more important political battles, I would reply that that's just not really born out by the evidence.  Consider the pretty dramatic increase in the Alliance's diversity from 'A New Hope' to 'Jedi?' Presumably Admiral Ackbar's people would not have joined up with the Rebels during the intervening years had there not been some kind of serious, if un-depicted, political effort directed against the Empire.

Of course, all of this leaves out the question of how the alliance could have possibly waged an insurgency against a near limitless supply of Imperial clone-troopers.  Someone better versed in the ways of the force will have to answer that question. 

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - The Cordesman Version Posted by Michael Cohen

Today, over at the Washington Post, Anthony Cordesman helpfully tells us not how we can win in Afghanistan - but how we can avoid losing. Cordesman argues that the US should send as many as 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan and commit billions of dollars for what he describes as "a reasonable chance of victory." The alternative "certain defeat."

The almost funny thing about this argument is that never seems to occur to Cordesman - or for that matter any national security expert who advocates more military intervention -- that the level of commitment being advocated, on behalf of a amorphous notion of victory, may not be worth the cost. Indeed, the most important metric appears to be the "costs" of defeat as opposed, to say, the benefits of "victory."

Not surprisingly, Cordesman isn't even able to offer an idea of what a "reasonable chance of victory" will look like or what the US strategic interest is in spending blood and treasure for 5, 10 or who knows how many years in Afghanistan. But Cordesman knows what "certain defeat" looks like - so we must stay.

But enough about strategy - let's talk tactics, because apparently that's what really matters in Afghanistan. Cordesman argues that the Bush Administration failed in Afghanistan because:

• They gave priority to Iraq
• It undermanned and underresourced the war in Afghanistan
• It didn't "react" to the growing corruption in the Karzai government
• It didn't put enough pressure on Pakistan to crack down on al Qaeda and the Taliban
• Never developed an integrated civil-military plan
• Focused too much on failed development efforts

So what is Cordesman's solution? Here is a shocker - send more troops. And what will these soldiers do:

A significant number of such U.S. reinforcements will have to assist in providing a mix of capabilities in security, governance, rule of law and aid. U.S. forces need to "hold" and keep the Afghan population secure, and "build" enough secure local governance and economic activity to give Afghans reason to trust their government and allied forces. They must build the provincial, district and local government capabilities that the Kabul government cannot and will not build for them.

And again, I want a pony for every man, woman and child in Afghanistan. Just so there is no confusion, Anthony Cordesman is suggesting that US troops should "build" provincial, district and even local government capabilities FOR the Afghan government. How is a sustainable solution to the problems of Afghanistan to have the US military take on the basic responsibilities of the Afghan state? Does Cordesman not see the irony in suggesting that Afghans need reason to trust their government and then advocating on behalf of a policy that has the US military take on the job of building that government's capacity?

And here's an even better question, why does Anthony Cordesman believe that this goal is achievable? Why would the US military be able to do what an Afghan government cannot and what evidence from the past 7 1/2 years would lead anyone to believe that such a goal is not only realistic but actually sustainable? Well actually Cordesman sort of answers that question, by suggesting that the appointments of Karl Eikenberry and Stanley McChrystal are "are our last hope of victory." Sigh.

Actually Cordesman goes further, doubling down on the Dave Dilegge approach:

They can win only if they are allowed to manage both the civil and military sides of the conflict without constant micromanagement from Washington or traveling envoys. They must be given both the time to act and the resources and authority they feel they need. No other path offers a chance of a secure and stable Afghanistan free of terrorist and jihadist control and sanctuaries.

Double sigh. Yes, the last thing we need is for our civilian elected leaders to weigh in here.

To his credit, Cordesman does identify two of the biggest problems with the US mission in Afghanistan - the lack of Pakistani support for targeting Afghan Taliban sanctuaries in their country and the high levels of corruption in the Karzai regime (a point bolstered by widespread allegations of fraud and ballot stuffing in the recent presidential election). Yet, he doesn't even offer solutions for these two problems. I realize this is 700-word op-ed, but if you are going to identify these issues as problems then don't you think that you should at least address them in the solutions section of the op-ed?

Yet, this doesn't stop Cordesman from complaining about "strong elements in the White House, State Department and other agencies" who are "ignoring realities" about the situation in Afghanistan. Mr. Cordesman meet the kettle. Kettle meet Mr. Cordesman.

Still there's more. Cordesman argues that unless President Obama follows his course of action he will "be as much a failed wartime president as George W. Bush." Seriously, give me a break. This is absurd hyperbole. Cordesman can't explain what victory looks like, doesn't make the case for a US strategic interest in fighting a long, drawn-out conflict in Afghanistan, doesn't offer solutions to the problems of Afghan government corruption, doesn't explain how the continued existence of Afghan Taliban safe havens in Pakistan will be dealt with, pins all hopes on the leadership of Eikenberry and McChystal and offers a pie in the sky vision of the US military's capabilities in Afghanistan.

But unless Cordesman's advice is followed, Obama will be a failed President. I'll tell you what, if President Obama wants to know "How To Lose in Afghanistan" - he should listen to Tony Cordesman.

Cheney on Fox News Sunday Posted by James Lamond

Former Vice-President Cheney was on FOX News Sunday this morning discussing Eric Holder’s decision to appoint Assistant US Attorney John Durham to see if any laws had been broken in the interrogation of detainees held at Guantanmo Bay and elsewhere.  As always, Cheney provides some great converstaion starters when discussing torture.  A few comments on his appearance:

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - The Credibility Version Posted by Michael Cohen

A couple of weeks ago I highlighted this Cheney-esque quote from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on why the US needed to stay in Afghanistan:

I think the president believes that this is not only the right strategy but facing what he faced, to withdraw our presence or keep it on the low-level limited effectiveness that had been demonstrated would have sent a message to al-Qaeda and their allies that the United States and our allies were willing to leave the field to them. 

As I said at the time, "How is this any different from the argument made during the Bush Administration that we couldn't leave Iraq because it would be trumpeted as a moral victory for Al Qaeda . .  This may be the single most disappointing thing I've heard from a member of the Obama Administration to date."

Well apparently Hillary is not alone in buying into the credibility argument. Here via Mike Crowley is Bruce Riedel on why we are REALLY fighting in Afghanistan:

The triumph of jihadism or the jihadism of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in driving NATO out of Afghanistan would resonate throughout the Islamic World.This would be a victory on par with the destruction of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. And, those moderates in the Islamic World who would say, no, we have to be moderate, we have to engage, would find themselves facing a real example. No, we just need to kill them, and we will drive them out. So I think the stakes are enormous.

Bruce Riedel has forgotten more about Afghanistan/Pakistan than I know but really . . is this the argument we are now using for staying the course? By this logic, we can never leave Afghanistan until we've wiped out the Taliban and Al Qaeda - not managed or contained, mind you, but eliminated. By this logic, we have no control over when and how we leave Afghanistan because we are pretty much playing by AQ and the Taliban's rules. Even if based on a strategic weighing of America's national interests we decide to leave or pare down our military presence in Afghanistan, according to Riedel, we lose . . .because al Qaeda will spin it as a victory. Talk about giving the enemy a vote; this basically gives them a veto.

Seriously though, hasn't this credibility argument been repeatedly discredited? In Vietnam, in Iraq for example. I know that some like to argue that Bin Laden was emboldened by the US departure from Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1993 because we got our nose bloodied - so by the credibility argument we should have stayed and slogged it out in both wars so as to avoid giving al Qaeda a victory.

And as for the notion that a NATO departure will hurt moderates and empower jihadists in the Muslim world, call me crazy but wouldn't a long-term US military presence in Afghanistan have a similar effect? I can't imagine that any of this is going to help US outreach to the Muslim world.

As I said earlier, it's a bit difficult for me to be so critical of Riedel, but this is not the first time in recent memory that he has sounded overly alarmist about the jihadist threat. Back in June, he wrote a piece for the National Interest that made this rather astounding claim:

The growing strength of the Taliban in Pakistan has raised the serious possibility of a jihadist takeover of the country. Even with the army’s reluctant efforts in areas like the Swat Valley and sporadic popular revulsion with Taliban violence, at heart the country is unstable. A jihadist victory is neither imminent nor inevitable, but it is now a real possibility in the foreseeable future. This essay presumes (though does not predict) an Islamic-militant victory in Pakistan, examining how the country’s creation of and collusion with extremist groups has left Islamabad vulnerable to an Islamist coup.

Riedel then proceeds to lay out an absolute horror story of what would happen from this neither imminent nor inevitable occurrence, which leads to this conclusion:

In the end, we would be left with an extremist-controlled Pakistan, infested with violence, an almost completely dysfunctional economy, harsh laws and even-harsher methods for imposing them, and above all a nuclear-armed nation controlled by terrorist sympathizers.

The essay goes on to lay out a possible war with India, conflict with Israel, a terrorist safe haven for jihadists and even a possible US-Pakistani nuclear war. (No, I'm not making this up).  As Robin Walker correctly noted at the time, little of what Riedel "presumes" is even "remotely likely."

Of course, as we know the Pakistani military was anything but reluctant when they finally engaged in the Swat Valley and the level of US-Pakistani intelligence sharing and targeting of Taliban leaders has improved. But all that, notwithstanding, Bruce Riedel is making some pretty outlandish presumptions and talking up doomsday scenarios that seem rather fantastical.

Crowley suggests that Riedel's views, particularly about the dangers of an al Qaeda and Taliban "victory" in Afghanistan, "carry more weight at the White House than people realize."

Honestly, I sure hope not.

Analyzing the Case for Afghanistan Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at registan.net, Josh Foust has taken on the admirable and difficult job of making the case for staying the course in Afghanistan. He argues there are two strategic goals for the US mission:

1. A basic minimal stability in Afghanistan, such that neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda is likely to develop a staging ground for international attacks, whether against neighboring countries or the United States and Europe;
2. The permanent delegitimization of Pakistan’s insurgents, such that they can no longer push Pakistan and India toward nuclear conflict;

Number one is a compelling rationale for a US mission in Afghanistan - whether completing that mission needs to be done via robust counter-insurgency is something else altogether. In my view, it doesn't and I will try to tackle that point in a future post.

But to the second point, I'm not sure I completely understand Josh's argument. He explains it more here:

Lest anyone think it is appropriate to write off the India-Pakistan conflict as somebody else’s problem, it is never somebody else’s problem when nuclear weapons are involved . . India and Pakistan have come a hair’s breadth from nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir. And like it or not, it is a compelling and vital American interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia—which makes “fixing” Afghanistan in some way also a vital American interest.

Now I certainly share the view that preventing nuclear conflict in South Asia is a vital American interest, less clear to me is why we need to fix Afghanistan to achieve that goal. Is the fear that if we leave, Afghanistan will become a proxy war for India and Pakistan that could turn into a full-fledged nuclear conflict? I suppose I have to ask where is the evidence for that. I know India is playing a more open role in Afghanistan, but does really rise to the level of proxy war?  I do wonder how much of the "Indian influence" is being hyped by the Pakistani government. I'm just not seeing the direct and vital connection that Josh is making.

Josh goes on:

When it comes to Pakistan, the big danger is not in a Taliban takeover, or even in the Taliban seizure of nuclear weapons—I have never believed that the ISI could be that monumentally stupid (though they are incredibly stupid for letting things get this far out of hand). The big danger, as it has been since 1999, is that insurgents, bored or underutilized in Afghanistan, will spark another confrontation between India and Pakistan, and that that confrontation will spillover into nuclear conflict. That is worth blood and treasure to prevent.

Again, it's important to prevent such a conflict from emerging, but why is it worth US blood and treasure? I'm actually quite serious here - I don't want to get all Chris Preble on Josh, but I really don't see why American troops have to be put in harm's way because a blow-up in Afghanistan might turn into a full-fledged India-Pakistan war. Why would the United States willingly hold itself and its soldiers hostage to an unresolved regional conflict? And are there really no other options - for example, diplomatic - for preventing such a war than "fixing" Afghanistan?

But there is something else about this argument that troubles me. Josh alleges that the big danger is if insurgents bored from the Afghanistan fight will try to spark a confrontation between India and Pakistan. I'm not clear as to why Afghan Taliban would in the wake of a US withdrawal want to get involved with the fight for Kashmir (did that happen from 1996-2001?) but the bigger question is that didn't jihadist terror groups already try to spark that conflict last November in the Mumbai attacks that killed 173 people?  Not to minimize those horrific attacks, but even though the jihadists behind the Mumbai attacks were based in Pakistan - and probably backed by the ISI - it didn't spark a military escalation between the two countries. What would be different if we left Afghanistan?

But I will say one thing, if THIS is the rationale for staying I can understand "why even the war supporters cannot articulate them." I seriously doubt most Americans believe that we should be fighting a war in Afghanistan so that India and Pakistan don't fight one in the future.

I ask these questions not to tweak Josh, but I'm actually curious to hear his answers. So I look forward to the debate.