Blogging the McChrystal Review - Pretty Please Mr. Karzai Posted by Michael Cohen

This graf in the report really jumped out at me:

The absence of personal and economic security, along with the erosion of public confidence in the government, and a perceived lack of respect for Afghan culture pose as great a challenge to ISAF's success as the insurgent threat. Protecting the population is more than preventing insurgent violence and intimidation. It also means that ISAF can no longer or tacitly accept abuse of power, corruption, or marginalization. (p. 2-10)

And how precisely is ISAF going to do this? Hamid Karzai just brazenly stole the Afghan presidential election, right under the nose of the US and NATO - one in three ballots are in question. Color me crazy, but he doesn't seem overly concerned about NATO's upbraiding when it comes to abuse of power or corruption.

Precisely what leverage do we have over Karzai and the Kabul government to act responsibly when as far as McChrystal seems concerned, we have to stay in Afghanistan for the long haul?

Blogging the McChrystal Review - Who are the People? Posted by Michael Cohen

The McChrystal report makes a big point about the "people" being the "center of gravity" and the key "objective" in the counter-insurgency fight, but is rather breezy in how it describes them (p. 2-4).

For example, the report says that "communities make deliberate choices to resist, support or allow insurgent influence" which is almost certainly true. But then the report makes no effort to describe which people, which communities, which ethnic groups choose to support or resist insurgent influence. I'm still going through the report, but I don't see anywhere where it makes a distinction between these groups or identifies the regions where the challenge is the greatest. For a report that makes a big point about "people" being the objective that seems a pretty big oversight. Clearly the motivations of the "people" in  Kandahar is different from those in Kabul or Kunduz - and also quite clearly, they can't be solved by good governance alone. The report seems to presuppose that governance is the key to bringing the people to the side of the government as if ethnicity or tribal affiliation plays little role.

These sort of wide generalizations about the people are endemic. Take for example this section:

First, some GIRoA officials have given preferential treatment to certain individuals, tribes, and groups or worse abused their power at the expense of the people.

Second, the Afghan government has been unable to provide sufficient security, justice, and basic services to the people. (p. 2-8)

Well the first point here would suggest that not all the "people" share the same frustration toward their government, but it also speaks the the complexity of Afghan politics - a point alluded to in the report, but not fleshed out. It also suggests that perhaps the more effective strategy in Afghanistan would not be to focus on areas where the Taliban are both strong, and also have local sympathy, but instead on areas where the opportunity for political and security gains might be more fertile. It was a point that Sean Kay made a few weeks ago in Foreign Policy:

Shift from COIN to containment: Rather than a heavier presence, the United States should limit its military operations in southern Afghanistan and consolidate existing gains. Where possible, U.S. officials can negotiate with Taliban in the south if they will turn against global jihadists. Many Afghans supporting the Taliban can be bought out -- requiring financial incentives to persuade and empower populations to reject extremism. While several years ago major troop increases could have worked in southern Afghanistan, more troops now may be dangerously counterproductive. Increased presence in the south risks pushing Taliban over the mountains and into nuclear armed Pakistan. Meanwhile, previously secure areas of northern Afghanistan are falling under Taliban and al Qaeda influence -- encircling Kabul and threatening NATO supply lines.

A little prioritization from McChrystal would be nice, doncha think?

And Now For A Little Late Afternoon Levity . . . Posted by Michael Cohen

This nugget from Taylor Branch's new book the Clinton Tapes is a gem:

Boris Yeltsin's late-night drinking during a visit to Washington in 1995 nearly created an international incident. The Russian president was staying at Blair House, the government guest quarters. Late at night, Clinton told Branch, Secret Service agents found Yeltsin clad only in his underwear, standing alone on Pennsylvania Avenue and trying to hail a cab. He wanted a pizza, he told them, his words slurring.

The next night, Yeltsin eluded security forces again when he climbed down back stairs to the Blair House basement. A building guard took Yeltsin for a drunken intruder until Russian and U.S. agents arrived on the scene and rescued him.

Reminds me of my probably favorite video from the Clinton years when a tanked Boris Yeltsin berates the press. There are days when I really miss Boris Yeltsin!

Blogging the McChrystal Review - Changing the Culture Pt 2 Posted by Michael Cohen

Judah Grunstein saves me having to re-type everything in this report by highlighting this damning quote:

ISAF Shortcomings. Afghan social, political, economic and cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in local communities, nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, power-brokers, and criminality all combine to affect the Afghan population. (p. 2-10)

Yikes! Hard to reconcile that, with this:

To succeed, ISAF requires a new approach - with a significant magnitude of change - in addition to a proper level of resourcing. ISAF must restore confidence in the near-term through renewed commitment, intellectual energy, and visible progress. (p. 2-1)

How is that near-term restoration process going to occur if "ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics" . . . well you get the idea. This would all sound like an excellent idea if we weren't 8 years into the war in Afghanistan and domestic support for the war didn't stand at less than 40%. McChrystal is laying out a policy prescription that flies directly in the face of public opinion and political realities in every NATO country, including the United States.

One of my biggest complaints with much of COIN doctrine (FM 3-24 is perhaps the best example) is it often seems very much divorced from reality; traveling in an alternate world where domestic political considerations or even easily achievable military goals do not reside. As I've been arguing for a while, trying to do COIN in Afghanistan is the military equivalent of sticking a square peg in a round hole. This report really is at pace with that phenomenon.

Blogging the McChrystal Review - Changing the Culture Posted by Michael Cohen

Pg 2-1:

ISAF must now adopt a fundamentally new approach. The entire culture - how ISAF understand the environment and defines the fight, how it interacts with the Afghan people and government, and how it operates both on the ground and within the coalition - must change profoundly.

This sort of begs an obvious question; McChrystal is arguing for a wholesale change in military culture not just among US troops, but among all the members of the ISAF coalition. Why does he think this is realistic or even achievable? This seems particularly relevant when one considers that domestic support in NATO countries for the current mission is declining precipitously. It's one thing to counsel this for the US Army, but McChrystal is pushing for a multi-national change in culture and military tactics.

Wouldn't it make more sense, not to change the military culture so dramatically, but to work with what you have? I suppose on some level I applaud McChrystal's ambition, but I'm just not sure why he thinks ISAF can achieve the goal he has laid out.

Blogging the McChrystal Review - Mission Creep? Posted by Michael Cohen

Pg 1-1

"Stability in Afghanistan is an imperative; if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban - or has insufficient capacity to counter transnational terrorists - Afghanistan could again become a base for terrorism, with obvious implications for regional security."

I understand the importance of stabilizing Afghanistan so that it won't fall to the Taliban, but according to McChrystal that is not enough - the Afghan government must also maintain the capacity to counter transnational terrorists. That is a much higher bar for achieving stability than simply keeping the Taliban at bay.

Blogging the McChrystal Review Posted by Michael Cohen

There's a lot to discuss about the McChrystal review and I'll try to keep a running tally of posts going throughout the day as I slog though it. This graf from the Woodward leak article really jumped out at me though:

He (McChrystal) repeatedly warns that without more forces and the rapid implementation of a genuine counterinsurgency strategy, defeat is likely. McChrystal describes an Afghan government riddled with corruption and an international force undermined by tactics that alienate civilians.

Here are some of the follow-up quotes from the report:

The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government.

Afghan social, political, economic, and cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in local communities, nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, power-brokers, and criminality all combine to affect the Afghan population.

Um, if the Afghan government is riddled with corruption and ISAF doesn't understand how to prosecute a counter-insurgency strategy . . . why exactly are we prosecuting a counter-insurgency strategy. I mean how exactly are we supposed to stand up an Afghan government if that same government is seen as corrupt and illegitimate? And why does McChrystal believe that the problems with ISAF and embracing COIN doctrine will be turned around in 12 months?

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - The Who's In Charge Version Posted by Michael Cohen

I've been meaning for a few days to write something about Michael Crowley's piece in the New Republic about troop increases in Afghanistan and how it unintentionally demonstrates precisely how screwed up  civil-military relations are in this country. RIght on cue, the massive leak of Gen. McChrystal's strategic review does a nice job of making the case for me.

Crowley's argument is predicated on the notion that the current Administration is subverting the will of the military by placing political constraints on the number of troops they can request - i.e trying to fight the war on the cheap. But in fact the exact opposite is occurring - it's members of the military who are trying to subvert the will of the country's elected leaders.

First, we all have to recognize that every general - from time immemorial - has wanted more troops. And considering that Gen. McChrystal is trying to fight a troop-intensive counter-insurgency operation his desire for additional soldiers is obvious. But the job of the civilian leadership is to determine strategy and to balance military requests with political realities.

That was almost certainly the context behind Jones WTF moment back in July with Marine officers in Afghanistan. And yet ever since then the military was been none too quietly lobbying for the US to send more troops to Afghanistan. As I've argued repeatedly in the AMCW, the President announced a policy of defeating, disrupting and dismantling al Qaeda that evolved into a much more expansive policy of nation-building and counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. And it wasn't the civilian leadership pushing that particular version of mission creep.

Via a policy of selective leaking to prominent media outlets, the military has further constrained the President's options, by making this entire debate one about more troops vs. less troops, rather than the current counter-insurgency strategy vs. a different one.

The notion, expressed in Crowley's piece, that "there is pressure being brought on generals" by the White House has it precisely backwards. Looking at the situation over the past five months, it is the military that is putting pressure on the WH for more troops!

That brings us to today: the selective leak today to Bob Woodward of McChrystal's strategic review, which ominously warns, "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible."

How is this not a crystal clear example of the military playing politics or at the very least using a pliant media to push its agenda and force the President's hand on troop increases? I'll have more to say about McChrystal's review later, but this should be lesson number one in precisely how screwed up civil-military relations are in this country. 

Look for example at the lead story over the New York Times:

General Calls for More U.S. Troops to Avoid Afghan Failure

Appalling I tell you. Absolutely appalling. So much for the President's own internal review of Afghan policy. Now if he wants to change course in Afghanistan he is going to have to disagree with his own top general, who has very flagrantly and very publicly shown his hand.

Finally, what exactly is wrong with the President taking into account political and public opinion considerations when making military decisions? The success of any military intervention relies at least in some measure on the support of the electorate. Conservatives love to argue that when it comes to matters of national security, Presidents should ignore polls and do what they think is right. But this is a simplistic argument, because public support for a US military intervention is essential to its success. The pro-surge folks will argue that Bush's disregarding of polls in 2007 "saved" Iraq. It's a debatable point, but in the process Bush's refusal to consider public opinion a) destroyed the Republican Party politically and b) limited President Obama's strategic options in Afghanistan.  Generals have the luxury of ignoring public opinion or, at the very least, disregarding it; president don't. And that's part of the reason why we should be glad that we live in a democracy with a well-established principle of civilian control of the military.

It's the job of politicians to balance politics and strategy. It's the job of the military to give advice, but then follow orders and fight wars. But these days it feels like the nation's generals are not only making strategic decisions, but trying to force the hand of our elected leaders.

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - The We Can't Leave EVER Version Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at the Plank, Michael Crowley nods approvingly at this quote from General Sir David Richards, head of the British Army:

Richards warned last night that Nato had yet to find the right formula for success in Afghanistan. General Richards also warned that defeat for the international coalition would have an “intoxicating impact” on extremists around the world. Failure for an alliance as powerful as the Nato presence in Afghanistan would convince terrorists that “anything might be possible."

What a shocker to see an advocate of the current mission in Afghanistan unable to come up with the "right formula" for success in Afghanistan, but utterly convinced that failure would be a complete disaster.  I think we should make a deal with the "Failure Crew" and demand that every time they say we can't afford to fail, they be required to point out how exactly success can be achieved.

Just to give you a sense of how odd Richards argument actually is, consider these words:

Let me remind you that most of you only 18 months ago had written Iraq off — a disaster about to implode. Yet today, most are cautiously optimistic. We knew the ingredients for success but it took us time to discover the correct formula. The ingredients for success in Afghanistan are similar . . .

One would hope that Richards understands that the reasons for the turnaround in Iraq were far different than anything that is possible in Afghanistan; that the decline in civilian casualties in Iraq was preceded and abetted by horrific ethnic cleansing and enclaving in Baghdad; that the key insurgent force in Iraq was AQI and it was turned on by rival Sunnis; that the Mahdi Army's cease fire (the strongest non-government militia in the country) played a huge role in the decline in violence, etc. The point is that just because something "worked" in Iraq does not mean it will succeed in Afghanistan or that even "success" in Afghanistan can be measured in the same terms as it was in Iraq.

But the real problem with this argument is that only views NATO actions in Afghanistan through the prism of how it will empower what Richards calls "extremists worldwide" and seems oblivious as to whether the continued presence of US troops in a Muslim country will have a similarly "intoxicating" effect.  If there is one lesson that should be derived from the US occupation in Iraq it is that the prolonged presence of US troops in Iraq actually contributed to al Qaeda's propaganda and recruiting efforts. It's not to say that a US withdrawal from Afghanistan wouldn't empower some extremists, but if you're going to make this argument there should at least be a recognition that a continued military presence could potentially have the opposite effect. (For the record, I recognize the propaganda impact of a US departure from Afghanistan - I just think that's a price this country can afford and I'm not at all convinced that "staying the course" in order to prevent that propaganda victory will make America any safer.)

Worst of all Richards pessimistic interpretation of withdrawal tends to overstate or misunderstand the grievances of Islamic extremists. The vast majority of these groups, including the Taliban, have local, perhaps regional grievances. Few, outside of al Qaeda, are focused on the US and have global aspirations. Listening to Richards, one might not know that al Qaeda has become a hollowed out, desiccated organization that is having a far more difficult time recruiting new members and from Somalia and Pakistan to Indonesia finds itself more and more under direct military attack.

Finally, perhaps the worst problem with Richards argument is that it plays directly into al Qaeda's own propaganda; it makes their "response" or "interpretation" of US and NATO actions more important than the actions themselves. By Richards logic, the US can't do anything that might play into al Qaeda's narrative and so we are basically hostage to their spin machine. If NATO decides it is no longer in the alliance's vital interests to remain in Afghanistan or that the current mission is not realistic or achievable, this is practically irrelevant because al Qaeda will interpret this as a victory and become even more empowered - even though they have very little power and influence at this given moment. 

You're basically giving al Qaeda a veto over any actions taken by the US and NATO. This is like flawed domino theory behavior updated for the 21st century. It's no way to run the foreign policy of a mature superpower.

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch - The Mission Creep Version Posted by Michael Cohen

President Barak Obama today on the Sunday news shows talking about Afghanistan:

“When we came in, basically, there had been had been drift in our Afghan strategy. Everybody acknowledges that,” Obama said. “We lost that focus for a while and you started seeing a classic case of mission creep, where we’re just there and we start taking on a whole bunch of different missions.”

Obama also told CNN that narrowing the focus of U.S. operations in Afghanistan will also improve the chances of tracking down and killing Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden.

“If we have a overarching strategy that reminds us every day that that’s our focus… we have a better chance of capturing and killing him and certainly keeping Al Qaida on the run than if we start drifting into a whole bunch of other missions that really aren't related to what is our essential strategic problem and rationale for being there,” the president said.

Well that is something. Am I crazy to think that the chances of the US sending more troops to Afghanistan is looking like a 50/50 possibility?