Planning the Post-war Posted by Suzanne Nossel

A CFR Task Force has come up with a good report on post-conflict stabilization with ideas on how to fund and organize U.S. efforts to preserve peace and get countries back on their feet after violent conflict.  We've been talking about that here for months.   The report counts 6 such missions in the last 12 years, beginning with Somalia and points out that post-conflict work has become an integral part of U.S. defense.

The unfortunate part is that the Administration has underfunded even its very limited bureaucratic response to post-conflict needs.   Signs suggest that we may face more missions for which we are ill-prepared before we invest the money and attention required to bring post-conflict operations up to the standard we uphold for military operations.

Changing Tack on Iraq Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Just weeks after President Bush's primetime speech vowing to stay the course and redouble U.S. efforts in Iraq, it appears today that the Administration is changing tacks.

Rumsfeld issued something that sounded suspiciously like an ultimatum, demanding that the Iraqi leadership crack down on the insurgency, agree swiftly on a new constitution and put more pressure on Iran and Syria to seal the borders.   From the sound of things, the Administration may be putting out terms they know the local government cannot meet laying a potential foundation for later announcing that America can't or won't stay in light of the Iraqis' failure to hold up their end of the bargain.

General Casey, who is in charge of the U.S. troops in-country spoke today of "substantial reductions" in the U.S. presence next Spring, provided progress is made on training Iraqi troops.

On cue, Iraqi Foreign Minister Jafari stressed Iraqis' desire for a speedy timetable to send the Americans on their way.

Make no mistake, these comments do not reflect any improvement on the ground in Iraq. 

On the insurgency, General Casey said this:  "I wouldn't say that it's necessarily a stalemate . . . Insurgencies need to progress to survive, and this insurgency is not progressing. There's been a change in tactics, to more violent, more visible attacks against civilians. That's a no-win strategy for the insurgents."

Now, why are violent, visible attacks against civilians a no-win strategy for the insurgents?  They terrorize people, presumably undermine their confidence in the Iraqi government and security forces (and the U.S. military) to protect them, they can disrupt the political negotiation process (as occurred last week when the Sunnis pulled out of the constitutional talks due to security concerns).  These attacks project publicly that the insurgents are alive and well and capable of mayhem.  They are probably helpful in drawing in recruits and support from anti-U.S. elements abroad.

Perhaps what Casey means is that such attacks turn the Iraqi people against the insurgents.  Clearly the Administration wishes this were the case.  After a bomb that killed 25 Iraqi civilians earlier this week, the Pentagon issued a statement quoting an unnamed Iraqi who said: 

"They are enemies of humanity without religion or any sort of ethics. They have attacked my community today, and I will now take the fight to the terrorists."

The trouble is, according to the New York Times, that the Pentagon used the exact same quote after a separate explosion two weeks earlier.   The Times reports that Lt. Col. Steve Boylan, a military spokesman, said he had "no idea" how the duplication occurred.  "I have sent a message out to discuss this with the leadership," he said.  The gaffe is now being chalked up to "administrative error."

That the Administration is beginning to despair over Iraq is no surprise.  A look at headlines  during the past 24 hours tells the painful story:  Diplomats are being gunned down, pounding deadly violence is targeting both Iraqis and U.S. troops, the U.S. death toll is mounting, Iraqi morgues are overflowing, the military is struggling to deal humanely with swelling numbers of detainees, British intelligence analysts are calling Iraq the dominant issue driving the violent extremists behind the July 7 bombings, the political fissures dividing the country may be deepening.

While the completion of a draft constitution on time in August will be a hopeful development if it happens, the document's content may raise serious concerns about women's rights and religious freedom.

Bottom line?  I wrote about 5 weeks ago that I thought the consequences of U.S. retreat from Iraq were grievous, and that there were still ways to turn the situation around.  I still believe the former is true.  Leaving Iraq in danger of becoming a failed state will have dire results for the region and for U.S. security.  But there's no sign of improvement on the ground and the amount of sound advice that has been dismissed and ignored would fill volumes.   Whatever glimmer of hope there was to build up the Iraqi security forces in time to combat the insurgency and allow a noble exit for the U.S. is fading fast.

If the Administration has indeed grown cynical about prospects for putting Iraq on a stable footing so that its no longer in danger of becoming a failed state, then it is time to rethink the wisdom of putting American lives at risk for that goal.

Attention to Africa: Be Careful What You Wish For Posted by Heather Hurlburt

This piece in Tuesday's Washington Post is a lovely bit of writing, even if it does draw too heavily on the "white man's burden" school of Africa reporting.  The substance of its coverage, focused on a unit of National Guard reserve Green Berets training Chadian soldiers, under the headline "US Pushes Anti-Terrorism in Africa," was, however, lacking in content and context.  Using the magic of the web, allow me to fill in some gaps.

1.  So, the US has just discovered a terrible terrorism threat in Africa?

For years now, Africa advocacy groups have been toying around with the theme that Africa presents ripe opportunities for terrorists, in hopes that the US would pay more attention.  Well, folks, my mother used to tell me about Saint Theresa, who cursed you by giving you what you thought you wanted -- and here we are.

According to the International Crisis Group, the highest threat of Islamist activity is actually in Mali, "star pupil of 1990s neo-liberal democratisation."  ICG (see links below) also says that the Salafist Brotherhood for Preaching and Combat was dramatically weakened by the raid described in the article.

In any case, what seems clear is that recognition of terrorism in Africa is not, in fact, leading to increased resources for government, health, education and other areas that will, in the long run, give people choices beyond joining terrorist groups and hunting gazelles and/or non-Muslims.   It's leading to more DoD programming with little regard for broader political consequences.  Oh well.

2.  And the military response is the best one?  Thank goodness the Pentagon is on the case.

Back in March, the International Crisis Group published a report on US anti-terrorism activities in Africa which had some rather pungent things to say about where there is a problem:

With the U.S. heavily committed in other parts of the world, however, Washington is unlikely to devote substantial non-military resources to the Sahel soon, even though Africa is slowly gaining recognition -- not least due to West Africa's oil -- as an area of strategic interest to the West. The resultant equation is laden with risks, including turning the small number of arrested clerics and militants into martyrs, thus giving ammunition to local anti-American or anti-Western figures who claim the PSI (and the proposed, expanded Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) still under consideration in the U.S. government) is part of a larger plan to render Muslim populations servile; and cutting off smuggling networks that have become the economic lifeblood of Saharan peoples whose livestock was devastated by the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, without offering economic alternatives. To avoid creating the kinds of problems the PSI is meant to solve, it needs to be folded into a more balanced approach to the region, one also in which Europeans and Americans work more closely together.

3.  Of course, this will also promote democratic accountability, since that is so important to the Bush Administration.

One of the things I love about working with the military is that by and large you get very straightforward answers to questions.  Our Post reporter is clearly troubled by the implications of training a military whose job is to protect an embattled and autocratic government frm its irate fellow-citizens.  She notices that members of Chad's president's small ethnic group control everything and are "feared" by others.  She poses the question to a soldier and gets the following answer, much more straightforward than any comment you will get on the subject back home:

"It just makes sense. They're the president's guard, and so in this region, with all the coups and stuff, you'd want them the best trained," said Capt. Jason, the team leader.  U.S. officials said the battalion is based in N'Djamena to safeguard the government and prevent its vehicles from falling into the hands of regional commanders.

Res ipsa loquitor.  (**Thanks, Dan, for correcting my Latin spelling.)  But there's really no further comment on the old democracy vs. stability argument needed.

4.  And nothing like this has ever been tried before?

Here's where readers can test out their wonk skills.  What do ACRI and ACOTA stand for?  Which was an initiative of the Clinton Administration, and which of Bush 43?  What was the difference between them?

The Africa Crisis Response Initiative was a State Department-managed, DOD-supported program to train selected African militaries for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, and promote Africans' ability to work together (basically, to build a peacekeeping capacity for circumstances in which the US and other Western nations would not send forces themselves).  This was a Clinton-era initiative in the wake of Rwanda.

In FY2004, the Bush Administration replaced this with Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance, focused "on training trainers and providing programs tailored to individual country needs."

Obviously, peacekeeping and terrorist-hunting are not the same things.  But we do have a dismaying track record of Administrations trying out and then abandoning ideas for Africa, as if no one had ever thought of them before.  And then we wonder why our programs encounter difficulty in producing long-term change.

So we know that the trouble with the war on terror is that our allies can't just be Britain, Poland, and those plucky democrats in Georgia and Ukraine.   Now that Secretary Rumsfeld has shored u p our bases in Uzbekistan, and gotten the Kyrgyz to say that they didn't really mean what they said when the Russians and Chinese were in the room, can't we be a little more honest about where we can't avoid dealing with thugs, and a little more discriminating about which thugs we hug?

One is just left with the impression here that this Administration's policy is more like that wonderful board game Risk -- "terrorists here?  let's put some chips there" -- than an actual calculation of the sum total of US interests and how to maximize them.

The International Crisis Group report I linked to above has some good policy suggestions, among them doing more cooperative work with the Europeans in Africa.  At least that would give our soldiers some up-to-date maps of Chad.

(It's good to be back.  I'll have my midwest trip report soon...)

A Breakthrough with North Korea? Posted by Derek Chollet

For a long time, critics of the Bush Administration’s policy toward North Korea have argued that the U.S. should be prepared to sit down face-to-face with the North Koreans to bring an end to their nuclear ambitions—some even quoted the old JFK line about the Soviets, that we should never to negotiate out of fear, but never fear to negotiate.

Well, we wanted a more direct approach, and that’s what we finally got.  It took awhile—it has been 13 months since the U.S. formally met with the North Koreans in the “6-party” format (where the two sides are joined by China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan)—but yesterday in Beijing, Chris Hill, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, met alone with his North Korean counterpart.  Chris Hill is one of America's best and most experienced diplomats, full stop.  He is smart, tenacious, and no stranger to tough negotiations with difficult characters. He cut his teeth a decade ago in the talks that ended the war in Bosnia--when working under Richard Holbrooke, he crossed swords with the likes of Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, among other thugs (including, at one point, Bosnian Serb war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic).  He was Ambassador to Macedonia during the 1999 Kosovo war, where he served as the Clinton Administration's point person in dealing with the Kosovar Albanians.

This experience has earned him trust among the Bush Administration hardliners to deal with the North Koreans.  He's not an "Asia hand"--proudly so--having only served there briefly (he was most recently ambassador to South Korea), and has ruffled some feathers in that relatively insular Foreign Service world by bringing in some fellow non-Asia hands to fill senior positions in his State Department bureau.  He is one of Rice's most trusted aides and well-liked by President Bush -- who got to know him when he served as ambassador to one of Bush's favorite countries, Poland.

Hill has told the press that he is in Beijing to get results--and that he might stay there for weeks if he needs to.  "We do not have the option of walking away from this problem," he said when the talks opened this morning.  This is a far cry from the stilted and overly-managed efforts of his predecessor, Jim Kelly, who was very much part of the Powell and Armitage crowd but did not seem to be trusted by anyone else. 

So in terms of skills and stature, we’ve got the right person there.  But the key question is: what does he have in his diplomatic bag of tricks?  The Administration got caught flat-footed a few weeks ago when the North Koreans announced that they would return to the 6-party talks, and they publicly state that there is no new American position.  They claim to have had success in pressuring the Chinese to take a more forceful role, although many Asia experts dispute that.  The prospects for success seemed to get new life a few weeks ago when South Korea announced that it would supply energy to North Korea—at cost of billions of dollars--if it gives up its nuclear programs.

It is anyone’s guess whether there is a deal to be had—whether North Korea actually will agree to anything that blocks its desire to be a nuclear power.  But for too long, the U.S. policy has been to leave things up to the allies (note the irony—while many complain that the Bush team ignores allies, this is a case when we’ve deferred to them too much).  Now that we have a negotiator on the ground who has a track record of success in dealing with tough talks (and my guess is that his interlocutors know this) and, importantly, the trust and confidence of officials in Washington, what has started this week is the best chance we’ve had for some kind of breakthrough since this crisis erupted nearly three years ago.  Stay tuned. 

10 Open Questions On the Gaza Pullout Posted by Suzanne Nossel

If we're lucky, this summer will be remembered not as the moment the U.S. Supreme Court took a swerve to the right or for the quickening of Iraq's spiral out of control.  It could be known instead as the watershed moment in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the time when Israel proved it was serious about dismantling settlements and allowing a 2-state solution to take hold, and the Palestinians showed they were capable of  controlling, governing and developing truly independent territory.

But the devil is in the details and, 24 days before the actual pullout (which may be expedited to forestall further protests) , lots of unanswered questions remain, questions that may determine whether Israeli withdrawal from Gaza turns out to be a major step forward or a backward stumble for the peace process.  Here are some of the most important unanswered questions:

1.  Will the actual withdrawal date proceed smoothly? - No one expected the Gaza pullout to be clean.   Die-hard protests by furious settlers, violent outbreaks and mutual frustration were inevitable.  With the killing of two innocent motorists and an attempted suicide bomb, the situation is becoming explosive.  Rumor is that Israel will expedite the pullout to avoid further escalation (as was done with the end of the US occupation in Iraq - - it seemed to help, but only very, very briefly).  If violence boils over and Israel cracks down (in an operation already planned and labeled "Iron Fist"), the pullout has the potential to become a fiasco before it is even completed.   Sinai in 1982 offers the benchmark for a painful, but largely peaceful, withdrawal.

2. Will the Palestinians be able to maintain security in Gaza post-withdrawal? This is the linchpin.  If Gaza is relatively stable and turns out to be a decent neighbor to Israel, the political weight in the Jewish state will shift inexorably toward favoring a final settlement and substantial disengagement from the West Bank.  If not, not.  Mohammed Dahlan, this is your hour.  If you can keep Gaza quiet (without trampling rights in a way that undercuts the Palestinian State's long-term stability), you will deserve a Nobel.

3.  Will Egypt do its part to keep arms from flowing into Gaza - Just last night Israel struck a preliminary agreement, long in the making, with the Egyptian government over the control of the Philadelphi Corridor between Egypt and Gaza.  Some 750 Egyptian border policemen will patrol the area, necessitating an amendment to the Camp David agreement.  Egypt will also be responsible for intelligence-gathering in Sinai.  After this weekend's carnage at Sharm el Sheikh, one hopes Egypt views tight border control, good intelligence, and a stringent arms crackdown as matters of straightforward self-interest.

4.  Will Hamas take over Gaza?  Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority has only a tenuous hold over Gaza.  Just days ago PA Civil Affairs Minister Mohammed Dahlan accused the group of plotting a coup.  Hamas, through its social-service minded style of politics, has been making strides at the polls in Gaza.  If Hamas, with its active military wing, takes over, the U.S. will be confronted with whether to continue to boycott a terrorist organization.   In terms of the Israeli-Palestinian relationships, all bets are off in this scenario.

5.  Will the Palestinians be able to keep Gaza economically viable? - This World Bank report details why disengagement in itself may mean precious little to the moribund Palestinian economy.  While Israeli farmers were prosperous in Gaza, for Palestinians to simply pick up where they have left off will pose challenges.  For one thing, the renowned Gush Katif greenhouses, employer to 600 Israelis and 1200 Palestinians, are being dismantled and relocated near Ashkelon.  To be healthy, a Gaza economy will depend on careful husbanding of the territory's agricultural resources, open access to markets, and generous foreign aid, none of which is guaranteed.

6.  How will goods flow from Gaza into Israel? - To thrive, Palestinian farmers in Gaza there will need ways of swiftly transiting produce into Israel for sale and shipment overseas.  If every car and truck were to be stopped and searched for weapons, the citrus and vegetables would rot in the heat.  But the parties have yet to hammer out a formula for this common customs envelope to encase the two territories.  Maybe the answer lies in an airport-style "Fastlane" - regularly pre-checking and validating certain producers and drivers who become eligible for swifter passage at the border.  One of the big debates is whether Israel will trust a reputable 3d party to do this sensitive job.

7.  Will true freedom of movement for people be possible - A ready flow of labor from Gaza into Israel will be essential for the territory to avoid isolation and economic ruin.  Thousands of Gaza residents commute daily into Israel for jobs.   With Israel in control of Gaza, border closures were routine.  Unless the security situation improves dramatically, this is likely to continue.

8.  How will people and goods transit between Gaza and the West Bank? - One of the most awkward elements of any conceivable peace settlement is the fact that Gaza and the West Bank are not contiguous, and the only route between the two cuts through 40km of Israel.  For the Palestinians to build a viable polity and economy, passage needs to be made simple.  The World Bank has proposed a kind of desert chunnel - - an sunken road linking the two.   Rail link is another option. 

9.  How quickly can Gaza's airport and seaport be reopened? - No matter how optimistic one is about the post-withdrawal period, there's no getting around the fact that security considerations were a key driver behind Israel's desire to withdraw from the combustible Strip.  So leaving the Palestinian economy fully dependent on open borders is a recipe for ruin.  Israel has approved the reopening of sea and airports.  While the airport should be up and running more quickly, the seaport is projected to take years to get started.

10.  What happens next?  Assuming the pullout is less than disastrous, what's next?  Do Sharon and Abbas continue to lead their respective peoples forward, implementing the road map to a two-state solution (or something close to it)?  Is Sharon really - as some accuse - using Gaza simply as a way to tighten Israel's hold on the the West Bank?  Are the Palestinian terrorist factions kept sufficiently in check to enable progress?

Integrated Power and Truman Democrats Posted by Michael Signer

There's a new national security plan out from the Center for American Progress by Larry Korb and Bob Boorstin called Integrated Power.  Every progressive should study this road map not just through post-9/11 foreign policy but also through the political problems that have bedeviled a party since Vietnam -- how to recapture the energy, spirit, drive, and courage, internationally-speaking, of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy.

The book is especially important in light of a debate we were having over here at Democracy Arsenal about just how we can go about rebuilding progressive strength on security.

A little background first.  A few weeks ago, I put up a post here synthesizing some values of "Truman Democrats" -- the new group of Democrats (of which I am a Principal) who have formed to try to reinvent the engaged, robust internationalism of Democrats past.  The piece said that six values should frame the underlying theory of an American left re-engaged on the international front:  American exceptionalism, acceptance of the use of force, hegemony, community, liberal-mindedness, and democracy.

There was a fair amount of reaction to the piece.  Anne-Marie Slaughter wrote it up at TPM Cafe, saying it "provocatively summarized" the "best nextgen foreign policy thinking I know."

Women's rights in Iraq - Where is the Support? Posted by Anita Sharma

The editorial “Off Course in Iraq," published in the New York Times on July 20 was particularly disheartening. After being disillusioned about the invasion of Iraq and U.S. failures at efforts to reconstruct and bring peace to the country, I thought that at least my efforts working with Iraqi women in the new political system may prove to be a one bright spot in the otherwise dark and dangerous days of the post-Saddam era.

It seems now that even the hollow justification for the intervention in Iraq—to free people from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, and in particular the women of Iraq—is just an excuse reminiscent of invading because of the Saddam’s nuclear arsenal. In question is the insertion of sharia law into the new constitution. Although there are supposed to be separate provisions depending on your religion, women would be stripped of their right to choose their own husbands, inherit property on the same basis as men and seek court protection if their husbands tire of them and decide to declare them divorced.

The Iraqi women that I’ve worked with during the past two years say that one of their biggest fears may now become a reality. Since Saddam fell a courageous group of women have braved assassination attempts, kidnappings, and other hardships to work to ensure women’s participation and representation in Iraq.

And they were successful—the interim constitution set aside 25 percent of its seats for them and women were named to key ministry positions and took up posts throughout government agencies. Indeed in his February 1, 2004 op-ed in the Washington Post, then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced the U.S.commitment to Iraqi women with a special allocation of $27 million for women's programs.

He goes further in his op-ed by saying, "In the end, it will be up to Iraqis to fashion a democracy that suits their circumstances. One of the critical tests of an Iraqi democracy will be whether it empowers women to enjoy the benefits of freedom and prosperity without sacrificing their religious faith. This is an issue that concerns everyone, not only women. A government that does not respect the rights of half its citizens cannot be trusted to safeguard the rights of any.”

Is this just lip-service? Or will be shake our heads and say it is a pity—Iraq has been “liberated,” but its women enslaved.

Framing: Cure-all or Hype? Posted by Lorelei Kelly

Framing--the art of effectively using language as political rhetoric--has garnered new interest with last Sunday's NYT magazine cover story by Matt Bai.  While the article pointed out the Republicans' successes and the Democratic steep learning curve--this desire to understand a cognitive linguistic perspective has been helpful for liberals.

Much of what Lakoff writes is ponderous, and politics is often uncontrollable,  DNA coded telegenic appearance or the economy, for example.  But framing shouldn't be seen as a simple recipe .  Rather, framing is a technique...done well it provides the alchemy between ideas and politics.  In academia this is similar to the tension between theory and practice--each one informs the other and the key to successful influence is how the relationship between them is organized.

Liberals like lots of data, but don't spend as much energy on conveying ideas.  Our problem is not one of analysis (facts) but of synthesis (marketing).  Conservatives have built a rhetorical empire with marketing. As many have noted elsewhere, the truth behind the ideas is often not important.  So now our government is being run by a bunch of right-wing Toastmasters--thirty years in the making--while we've been yukking it up at wine bars and over sprocket spewing PHD dissertations.   The liberal challenge is not unfixable, but it will take a plan and some time. The framing discussion has jump started this process.  This is good.

Examples from the trenches:

One of the reasons Lakoff's instruction has been so helpful for Democrats is that it gave their problem a name.  Being able to talk about what is happening is empowering.  In psychology, this technique is called  "naming the behavior" and in itself provides a helpful way to move a discussion forward into a new frame.  When I was a court mediator one of the lines I oftened used with litigants was "may I share an impression with you?" I would then--given their permission-- point out how we were jointly botching the prospects for a fair dialogue and possible common agreements. It was remarkably successful in jolting the conversation back to a more balanced terrain.  It seems like this type of verbal intervention could be very helpful for liberals--whose comfort zone includes unashamed appeals to the common good and the public interest.

Back to Lakoff. After election 04, the Dems had him out more than once for intensive sessions on framing techniques.  I remember a conversation I had with a Democratic staffer last February--after one of these sessions.  She told me that her boss--brimming with inspiration--had assigned Lakoff's book "Don't Think of an Elephant" to all the office staff.  A great intention, but very few Hill staff have the time and energy to read something that doesn't directly relate to constituents or immediate duties.  So the conversation stopped right there. 

Contrast this with the zillion follow-up opportunities for conservative staff --outsourced to their institutional ecosystem: yoda-like mentoring, communications training, practical internships, philosophical education and, finally JOBS! Now, why can't the DNC create follow-up tracks, organized regionally for relevant themes and content--for all liberal Hill staff? Cognitive Linguists could be on hand but the real value would be shoring up relationships and building communications skills.

Liberal Hill staff are a highly underutilized resource. They aren't systematically kept in a system that builds ideas and frameworks for understanding them. To my mind, Hill staff make great translators between theory and practice...as they have spent time massaging the relationship between ideas and politics. ( My favorite staff and Members are those idealists who have been knee-capped by the process.  They mend their worldview and become pragmatic dreamers. The best kind of leaders.)

Consider this hypothetical: If the minority leader had been a conservative and lost his election last November, a gaggle of fellow believers, funders, elected officials and movement operatives would have chartered a new "non partisan" think tank down on MacPherson Square and exported the staff there.  In contrast,  we lose our people to the four winds.

National Security is an issue area ripe for reframing. One present challenge for liberals is to stop the Bush administration's absconding with the Grand Strategy of  Democracy.

As Jonathan Chait notes in his excellent article "The Case Against New Ideas":

The idea of spreading democracy may be a powerful one, but we shouldn't forget that it's an adhoc rationale for the Iraq war--hastily put forward after Bush's primary justification, weapons of mass destruction, fell apart.  If Bush believed in democracy-promotion as a central goal of the war, he didn't trust the public enough to make that argument.

Well, now the public no longer trusts the president.  This is a good opening for liberals to step in and take back this issue. What to do in Iraq presents a case study for reframing democracy as a Grand Strategy.

Americans recognize that the use of military force is not the only or the best way to help create a stable, democratic, and prosperous Iraq.  But by the same token, they are not convinced that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq will solve the problems there.  Advocacy that focuses on bringing the troops home may fail to engage or galvanize this “persuadable middle” of the public precisely because these Americans intuitively understand that the military dimensions of the challenge in Iraq are only part of the picture.  Like most Americans, they want to do what’s right in Iraq, and they mistrust policy proposals that seem to treat troop withdrawal as an end in itself, without paying sufficient attention to the larger context.

Liberals threaten to divide into two camps: "out now" and "stay the course".  This is a false division.

The United States needs a comprehensive, creative strategy and the support of other nations if progress is to be made on key political, economic, and security aspects of rebuilding Iraq.   In contrast to today’s failed policies, the new strategy must be farsighted and collaborative; it must unfold on multiple, interconnected tracks that account for the complexity of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction; it must rely on a full range of tools, not just military force; and it must enable American troops ultimately to withdraw without fear of destabilizing the new Iraqi state.  How can advocates communicate most effectively with the American public and policymakers about such an approach to U.S. engagement in Iraq?  What ideas and stories, messages and messengers might advocates employ to engage the “persuadable middle” of the American public in a new national dialogue about Iraq – a dialogue that includes but is not limited to strategies for phasing out our military presence there?  What ideas and messages might enlarge the space for debate about this highly charged set of issues, so more people are invited into the discussion and a broader public consensus can be created around responsible and effective American policies?

How to Build Back Better: Working on Tsunami Recovery Efforts in Indonesia Posted by Anita Sharma

Thanks Heather, for that warm introduction, and hello to everyone at Democracy Arsenal! I’ll do my best to fill Heather’s shoes while she and her family journey on America’s highway en route to a reunion and a fun-filled summer vacation! Ahh summer vacation, I can’t much recall what that feels like right now because I left the nation’s capitol on a frigid, but sunny, February afternoon and have been in the warm tropics of Indonesia since then. And you’ll have to forgive me if it takes a little while to get back to U.S. foreign policy as I’ve been working fully on a tsunami relief project with the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

As Heather said, I’ve been in DC for some time, and like many of our bloggers, contributed to the Kerry-Edwards campaign. I also worked in Iraq and Jordan with IOM as “major hostilities” finished,” and Saddam fell, beginning in March 2003 until the United Nations headquarters was blown up in August 2003. I stayed in Jordan until the beginning of 2004 when I resumed my job at the Woodrow Wilson Center and became fully involved with the campaign. We all know how the elections turned out, and that, combined with being in Australia the day after the tsunami and experiencing the outpouring of relief support, prompted a major job and location change.

For five months I’ve been in Indonesia, trying to help repair the devastation of coastal Aceh caused by the tsunami. When I first arrived the magnitude of the problem seemed overwhelming. Although trite, the best analogy I gave people back home was to think of a nuclear bomb and how entire areas were completely leveled. The massive 9.3 earthquake caused a tsunami originating in the Indian Ocean just off the western coast of northern Sumatra, Indonesia. The subsequent tsunami devastated the shores of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, South India, Thailand and other countries with waves up to 30 m (100 feet). Anywhere from 200,000 to 310,000 people died as a result of the tsunami, with more than 130,000 people killed in Aceh alone. Although I arrived after most of the bodies that hadn’t been swept out to sea had been collected, the destruction and the needs of the more than 500,000 people displaced were palpable. To put that number in context, half a million people is a population roughly equivalent to the cities of Baltimore, Islamabad, Oslo, or Beirut.

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, IOM provided life-saving relief items and health care. Our reconstruction activities are now in earnest as we, like so many other aid organizations, are working to in the words of UN Tsunami Special Envoy President Bill Clinton, to “build back better.” As we attempt to rebuild communities by providing shelter, meet health needs and promote livelihood activities, the question is not whether we can do this, but how. Interestingly in this disaster response, the challenge is not financial. Recently released figures from the UN put total worldwide pledges at about 6.7 billion dollars. (Of this, about 1.9 billion dollars in pledges have been converted into commitments.) Private donations, mostly through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Red Cross, U.N. relief agencies and all other channels, amounted to an additional 4 billion dollars. Taken together, the estimated total is over 10.7 billion dollars! Though it seems like a lot, and it is, how these agencies work together, and with the Indonesia government, is critical.

One thing I spend a lot of time thinking and working on is how to get people out of tents, make-shift homes, or host families and into homes of their own. The disaster damaged or destroyed approximately 116,880 homes. While reconstruction work has now started, sufficient numbers of homes will not be rebuilt or repaired in the next few months. The concern right now is how can the international aid agencies, with so much money in their coffers turn, to their donors (in many cases individuals like you and me who saw the aftermath on TV and opened their pocketbooks) and admit that one year after the disaster people may still be living in awful conditions? Sometimes I wonder who the aid agencies are most concerned about—the Acehnese living in squalor or the journalists who will report back on the dearth of rebuilding, and the resulting wave of criticism of “why haven’t you done more?” I’ll get back to why and the difficulties associated with our work in the next posting.

Another recent development, and why it’s fascinating to be here at the moment, is the potential for peace in Aceh. If the agreement, to be signed on August 15, goes through, it may end one of the world’s longest-running conflicts where more than 12,000 people died since 1976. According to negotiators, the agreement calls for Indonesian troops to largely withdraw from the province and for the rebels to demobilize by the end of the year. Brokered by Martti Ahtisaari, the former Finnish president who chaired the talks, the memorandum of understanding covers issues such as human rights, amnesty and security arrangements. While international aid has been permitted to the tsunami hit areas of Aceh, access to the hinterland and economic development in the province has been hampered by restricted access and continual fighting between the GAM and Indonesian military.

The peace deal, if successful, is likely to smooth the way for reconstruction efforts throughout the province. Interestingly I could potentially be working to assist not only the tsunami survivors, but also those who have lived through three decades of war. Of course, there are skeptics. Several times the warring sides came close to peace but this time there is additional grounds for optimism. The cloud of the tsunami may have a silver lining in that after years of martial law, and then emergency rule, Aceh was forced to open its doors to outside help and the international attention to the province has shone a spotlight on the brutal, but much ignored, conflict.

Since we began work in Aceh, everyone has said that for recovery and reconstruction to be effective, fighting in the region must end. It will be quite amazing if this actually does come to pass.

I realize that my post has run on a bit long without me being provocative or particularly insightful. I wanted to first give you my thoughts on the scope of the problem and what it’s like being at the center (though I am myself but one of the multitude of aid workers) of such a complex and crucial set of issues. I do hope to use the air-time graciously given to me by Heather to get deeper into the challenges of reconstruction: like building fast versus sustainability; how coordinating aid agencies is like herding cats (in this case many fat cats with big pockets); the changing political landscape of Indonesia, its own battles with terrorism; the evolving U.S.-Indonesia relationship and the perception of America by young Indonesians. Again, apologies for the long posting and I welcome your thoughts!

Iraqi Women Re-veiled/More on Hersh Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Latest word is that Iraq's draft constitution will roll back the rights and freedoms of women in the name of Shaaria (Koranic law).   The draft provides that family law matters like marriage, divorce and inheritance would be governed by religious law based on the sect to which the woman's family belongs. 

This would require Shiite women to get their families' permission to marry and give men, but not women, liberal rights to divorce.   This would replace a body of law that has for the past few decades been among the region's most progressive in its treatment of women, according them freedom to marry who they please and requiring judicial oversight of divorces.   

Iraqi women are understandably up in arms, taking to the streets to protest.  There's still a chance that public and international outcry may lead to revisions in the draft before its adopted.

Apropos of all the discussion about the Bush Administration's meddling in the Iraqi electoral process, its worth remembering that letting countries alone to set up their own democracies can open the door for infringement on principles we hold dear, even to the point of undermining what we see as precepts fundamental to democracy. 

That brings me to some interesting line-drawing questions that the Hersh article raises.   I doubt there would be much objection to the U.S. supporting, for example, the women's groups that are protesting these new provisions.   But if those groups backed someone for elected office, that equation might change.   

The perception of American interference in a fledgling democracy is obviously unacceptable.   But what does that mean for the reality of what we do and don't support?

Among the critics of the Administration that Hersh cites is the National Democratic Institute, a body that devotes a major portion of its program to helping develop political parties overseas.  NDI's criteria for who to support include things like "policy positions,"  "democratic commitment," and "level of internal democracy."   These may not be overtly political, but they sure are close.  I suspect that a strong case might have been made that according to NDI's written standards, Allawi might have merited the organization's support.   Other groups Hersh talks about like NED and IRI do similar kinds of work.

One could argue that that the difference is that NDI, NED and IRI are all private groups, so that there activities aren't the work of the U.S. government intervening in a foreign sovereign democracy.  But all 3 groups are primarily supported by the USG, and are known to be so by the groups they work with overseas.

If we are going to work on articulating a new vision for the role the U.S. ought to play in seeding democracy around the world, these lines are ones we will need to figure out where to draw.