Death of a Salesman, 2005 Posted by Michael Signer

Amid more news that the Iraq Constitution is faltering and splintering, that American support for the engagement has dropped to an all-time low, and that President Bush has been forced to take a vacation from his vacation and try personally to salvage the process, I want to propose an argument (with the proviso that it's perhaps a little Theory of Everything-ish, and maybe, just maybe, has a teeny-tiny bit of partisan schadenfreude in it):

Most of the problems about America's situation in Iraq can be traced back not to faults in intelligence, to the Bush's failure at international diplomacy, or to internal disputes in Iraq.  They're instead rooted in an earlier, domestic catastrophe:  the Bush Administration's failure to convince the American people of the moral rightness of invading Iraq.

It's August, so it's worth remembering this is the month that Andy Card said was, "from a marketing point of view," a bad time to introduce new products.

If they know so much, why was the Bush Administration so bad at selling us this product?

Americans are willing to suffer great numbers of casualties when they believe there's a cause that, morally, rises to the level of mass sacrifice.  Osama bin Laden famously said America in Somalia was "paper tiger" that "after a few blows ran in defeat."  This belief underlies the ferocity of Al Qaeda's attacks. 

The American people want to be convinced by their leaders that they should summon collective moral passion for a military engagement.  We tend to approach casualties in a binary fashion -- either they are good (and worth dying for) or not (and worth protesting against -- by the way, Cindy Sheehan is back).   

Being Alternative Means being Realistic: Means and Ends in Iraq Posted by Michael Kraig

Responding in part to Heather’s great piece “Open Floodgates Pt. 1: Plans for Iraq,”

First, we have to be honest with ourselves – events on the ground are too fluid and chaotic to have a stable, democratic, and highly centralized Iraqi state entity as a short- or medium-term goal.  Odds are that it will fragment, because we destroyed the Iraqi state by de-Ba’athification, and in the void have jumped all the sectarian and ethnic groups, who have their own militias – which the US military has given up on de-arming and de-mobilizing. 

The Kurds have no real interest in a real Federal Iraq; if you listen to their leaders’ statements, they basically want a confederal Iraq not too different from what our 13 American colonies started out as – a loosely knit collection of 13 autonomous states, with one central Capitol that had little power but which represented the confederation abroad.  In addition to the Kurds, it increasingly appears that top Shi’ite leaders have the same overall goal in mind.

Would such a loose confederation really constitute a functioning state?  Odds are that all things would exist simultaneously (a confederation Capitol alongside the reality of regional autonomous rule), as they do right now.  To whit:

1)      A largely autonomous Kurdish region, secured by militias, with representatives in Baghdad whose central mission is to preserve Kurdish autonomy and use central state resources and international political legitimacy to fend off any predations by Iran and Turkey next door.  In short: use the central diplomats of the state, and use the budget of the state, but use them toward the goal of an autonomous Kurdish region.

2)      A largely autonomous Shi’ite region, secured by militias, with representatives in Baghdad….etc. etc…..using central state resources to fend off predations by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other neighbors of southern Iraq.

3)      A largely autonomous Sunni region, secured by militias….you get the idea.

This would reflect the military, social, political, and economic realities on the ground already.  Yes, a new Iraqi economy could theoretically emerge that is not based on sectarian divisions; yes, a strong central military could take on the militias.  But the Sunni guerrillas (the fighters who are truly indigenous, not from far-flung South Asia or Southeast Asia) are simply not going to let either of these things to take shape because of the very understandable fear that de-Ba’athification means de-Sunni-fication in practice, and “central Iraqi economy and state” means a state run by a coalition of Kurds and Shi’ites, who agree to a bargain to keep the Sunnis down and out, as well as out of their own business in their respective sub-regions of Iraq. 

In sum: militarily, economically, and socially, Iraq is now being run on a day-to-day basis by different politico-religious groupings based on well-defined neighborhoods in urban areas and longstanding tribes in outlying areas.  It is starting to border on fantasy to assume this will change. The best hope to avoid this de-centralized, district-based rule was to avoid wholesale de-Ba’athification.  The damage was done in 2003 and now we have to live with the consequences.

If unity happens on a more substantial basis, it will likely happen as a slow evolutionary process of complex micro-level interactions between different tribes, sects, and groups, as was true of state building in many other parts of the world.  It isn’t pretty, but it is how today’s stronger states have historically evolved. 

This leads to the basic question: how to make such an arrangement stable, peaceful, and secure, in a way that doesn’t undermine regional security and the global economy?  On this, I agree with most of Juan Cole’s suggestions.

First, a confederal Iraq (with a bunch of Sunni tribes in outlying border areas doing pretty much what they want) can only be stabilized and regularized if every single neighbor is brought into the process. 

This means finally admitting that Iran is not the primary supporter of Iraqi internal terrorism or insurgency, and in fact, that Iran has played its cards cautiously and pragmatically since March 2003, as pointed out by the International Crisis Group in various reports.  Iran has been schizophrenic, like the U.S. (and like all other neighbors of Iraq) in supporting various factions here and there so as to avoid all worst-case outcomes while at the same time giving relatively higher support to like-minded groups. 

So, Iran has aided virulently pro-Tehran leaders and groups, but not nearly to the extent monetarily or militarily as some analysts would have you believe.  Further, Iran has aided secular groups and even the current central government, in large part because in the end, Najaf is not Qom and Baghdad is not Tehran, and Ayatollah Sistani does not care at all for the Iranian melding of the Koran with authoritarian religious rule (believing that Shariah law must have a central moral role in law-making is not the same as iron-fisted rule by theocrats). 

So, Iran actually is spreading its various forms of aid in ways that avoids an overly strong, overly sectarian, overly-ideologized central grouping that could grow to challenge Iran on religious as well as political grounds. 

Sound familiar?  It should.  It is basically the strategy of all Iraq’s neighbors: keep Iraq together, but keep it weak.  If you believe that America’s six Arab “friends” in the Gulf are acting any differently from Tehran in this regard, then there is a bridge I could sell you in NY.   

Put another way: the balance of power and Realpolitik are not just concepts for international relations; they are the central concepts being applied to internal Iraqi affairs by Iraq’s neighbors.  Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Kuwait, and other Gulf Arab Monarchies are playing balance-of-power politics in Iraq, just as Syria and Israel and others once did in Lebanon with various factions. 

Within this paradigm, Saudi Arabia will of course give more relative support to those Sunni groups that accept the Saudi version of Wahhabi Islam, just as Iran will support similar groups in its favor.  And the Turks will aid the Turkomans to the extent possible to provide challenges to Kurdish militia leaders.

But, neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran, nor any other neighbor, is interested in a strong Iraqi state dominated by any such groups.  Hence the sly practice of aiding other forces as well.  If this sounds familiar, again, it should, because it’s what major corporations do in aiding politicians during election campaigns: relatively higher support goes to Republicans, but the Dems get a fistful of dollars as well.  It’s called playing the odds and spreading your bets, and Iran and Syria are no more “rogue-ish” in doing this within Iraq than any of the other neighbors. 

This reality of neighborly love for confederal fragmentation can work to the benefit of stability or against it.  It is the US job to use its muscle and pull to make sure that the neighbors’ strategy is coordinated (or at least constrained) in a way that supports a stable confederal arrangement rather than leading to all-out civil war, as happened in Lebanon. 

As Juan Cole points out, a much worse civil war could still break out, and if millions die because of it, the blood would be on our hands.  And, of course, such a war would severely disrupt oil supplies in the Gulf, leading to all sorts of nasty international outcomes. 

So what does this mean in practical terms?  First, it means customs, customs, customs, and border patrols, border patrols, border patrols.  It means defining a new military mission for the US that puts all of its gee-whiz high-tech gadgets to use with not only friends and allies, but also enemies such as Iran, in the region, to avoid a very real scenario of highly-trained Islamic insurgents leaving Iraq and destabilizing all neighboring states. 

At a recent Stanley Foundation off-the-record dialogue in Dubai, involving experts and officials from all 6 Arab monarchies, one of the main central security concerns expressed was this scenario: newly trained insurgents-cum-terrorists leaving Iraq when it finally stabilizes and destabilizing everything they can around it. 

I would venture to say that the same fear holds true for Syria (which has secular Ba’athist rule, not radical Wahhabi Islamic rule) and Iran, whose Shi’ite religious basis is antithetical to the radical Islamic insurgents being trained in terrorist methods in Iraq.  In fact, the most radical Sunni sects (which have followers in Iraq originating from far-flung areas such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asia) believe that if you kill a Shi’ite child, you go to heaven. 

In sum: The first recommendation is that the US does everything in its power to aid all of Iraq’s neighbors in setting up a customs and border security “firewall” around Iraq. 

Second, see Juan Cole’s full column, which makes acid points about America’s dysfunctional and infeasible policies toward Syria and Iran, as well as good military and logistical points about how to get US troops out. 

What Juan doesn’t do is admit that the current reality is the future reality; he still holds out hope for a strong and meaningful centralized Iraqi state.  At this point in the game, though, the option of a stable confederal state – with an internationally recognized government that handles diplomacy but which has few real powers internally beyond coordinating common security policies between militias where common interests exist – should be studied further as a potentially more realistic and feasible goal of US policy. 

But this is not as pragmatic as it sounds: it means dumping decades of rogue-state strategies based on coercive diplomacy toward Iran and Syria, and actually engaging them, Richard Nixon-goes-to-China style.  This would constitute a radical policy shift for both Dems and Republicans, but it is one that is necessary and long overdue (see for instance the Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, “Realistic Solutions for Solving the Iranian Nuclear Crisis.”) 

Michael Kraig

The Stanley Foundation

Open Floodgates, Pt 1: Plans for Iraq Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Last week, I promised Ezra Klein that I would do a follow-up to his fabulous post, scolding progressives for getting bogged down in yet more intra-mural hair-pulling instead of discussing the substance of what to do about Iraq.

While I’ve been absorbed in sideshows like Pat Robertson and Hugo Chavez, and watching BloggerBabe take his first steps, the web is bursting out all over with plans for Iraq, from Andrew Bacevich to Juan Cole, Kevin Drum and our own Suzanne Nossel.  Ivo Daalder, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Bruce Jentleson and Juliette Kayyem have a “get it done or get it right” thread going over at America Abroad.  The incomparable Fafnir proposes throwing a big tarp over Iraq, sadly not the dumbest line of reasoning I've heard.

Meanwhile, President Bush goes to the public repeatedly and tells us... well, if it's August 11 we're in Iraq until "the mission of defeating the terrorists in Iraq is complete." well, at least that's clear.

But if it's August 22, we're in Iraq until Iraqi forces can "take more and more of the fight to the enemy."   What exactly does that mean?  Now I can't even tell who is winning the war for the President's ear/mouth.

I haven't got a favorite plan yet, so I'm going to propose four criteria that any useful plan will have to meet:

#1.  Tell us the goal.  Are we defeating terrorism, standing up an army with a ghost of a chance, waiting for one more round of elections, putting in place the structures of democracy, or just waiting for troopships to arrive.  wherever you come out on a timetable for withdrawal, I want a reason for withdrawal.  Ideally it should be one that lets our troops and their supporters at home hold their heads up.  I don't pretend that is an easy task.

#2.  Tell the Iraqis -- and Americans -- the long-term costs.  For credibility in Iraq and internationally, we need to be clear:  what are we committing to do after we leave?  Close air support, as Juan Cole suggests?  Border security, to protect our friends in Jordan and Turkey?  Financial support for reconstruction, the oil industry?  None of the above?  What are the implications of all this for our own armed forces?  Will a pullout under some of these plans actually take as long as a deployment until 2008/9?  Alternately, will troops be pulled out of Iraq only to rest up for Iran? 

#3.  Tell the region our expectations -- and Americans our expectations about the region.  If history repeats itself, we're likely to make a number of more or less vague promises/threats about continued military engagement as we draw down.  Various commentators have proposed increased regional engagement as a lever for our exit.  But how are we going to work with Iran and Syria, pray tell?  What efforts of their to create some kind of stability in the region are we going to tolerate, and what not?  What level of instability, chaos and conflict are we going to tolerate?

#4.  Come to terms with the limits of internationalization.  Noah Feldman has written, and I think he is right, that we should neither expect too much from internationalization nor imagine that is absolves us of moral responsibility for the conflict we started.  The UN is neither willing nor able to come in and save us -- and the Iraqis -- from ourselves.  Positing internationalization as a central piece of the solution is probably not honest, at least not in the near term and not on the security side.

An interesting counterpoint is Michael Walzer’s assertion that Europeans in particular owe Iraq something for their failure to take the containment regime more seriously and thus build up an effective multilateral wall that the Bush Admin would have found it harder to breach.  He is probably right, but that doesn't get us an extra combat division.

#5.  Tell the world what we've learned.  This is an extra-credit question.  I've been reading Paul Berman's Terror and Liberalism, and I don't buy all of it, but as an effort to make the past four years mean something large and noble it beats what the White House puts out.

Who Would Jesus Assassinate? Posted by Heather Hurlburt

if my French doesn't fail me, Le Monde is reporting that Pat Robertson went on his Christian Broadcasting Network Monday night and said, "If Chavez thinks we are trying to kill him, we ought to go and do it."

He further explained that assassinating Chavez "would be much cheaper than launching a war." 

It has fallen to poor Sean McCormack at the State Department and GOP Senator Norm Coleman to repudiate this.  For once I think Coleman's comment was perfect:  "incredibly stupid."

But since there isn't much strategic coming out of this Administration about Latin America -- trade agreements and dire warnings about leftists -- this will have lots of impact overseas, even if it is barely noticed here.  And I'd like to see one of Mr McCormack's bosses step up and repudiate Robertson, loudly. 

In my years of church-going, I have never encountered Jesus' Sermon on Cost-Efficient Elimination of One's Enemies.  But perhaps this is just one more thing that the liberal Protestant hierarchy has been keeping from me.

(Meanwhile, Tim Padgett at Time points out that Robertson could hardly do more to bolster Chavez' popularity.  Maybe Robertson is hoping Chavez will respond in kind?  "Do unto others..." now that I do remember.)

Georgian democracy... and Democrats Posted by Derek Chollet

Watching the democratic process sputter along in Iraq serves as a reminder that we cannot forget the progress of nascent democracies elsewhere – from Lebanon, to Ukraine, to the country that arguably sparked the latest democratic wave, Georgia.  Wedged between the Caucasus and the Black Sea, Georgia is a small country that, in terms of importance, punches way above its weight in a critical neighborhood, the Black Sea region (for more on the strategic significance of the region, see here).  Its Rose Revolution was an inspiration to many democratic reformers around the world and, amazingly, it is helping the U.S. today militarily with troops in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Iraq.  President Bush did the right thing last May when he visited Georgia – a trip that the Georgians remain very proud of (billboards of Bush still are draped in downtown Tbilisi).

Yet Georgia also has big problems—two breakaway regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), a tense relationship with Russia, a border with Chechnya, a weak economy, and a young government (literally—most of its senior leaders are in their 30s; President Mikheil Saakashvili is 37) that has little governing experience and has had to start from scratch.

Earlier this summer I had a chance to see all of this first-hand during a visit to Georgia as part of a delegation put together by the German Marshall Fund and supported by the Bradley Foundation, where we spent a week traveling to many of Georgia’s trouble-spots (Abkhazia, the Chechen border) and saw nearly all of its senior leaders.  Recently one of my fellow travelers, Phil Gordon, and I wrote up for the online magazine YaleGlobal our impressions from the trip and what we believe Georgia’s road ahead means for the U.S. and Europe (for the impressions of another delegation member, Carl Bildt, see here).

But one impression that was left out of this article has special relevance for those of us here at DA.  When the Georgians look for support in the U.S., they look primarily to Republicans.  Now part of this is understandable – after all, right now the Republicans control all three branches of government.  But what was striking (and disturbing) is that, according to a wide spectrum of Georgian political leaders, almost all of their country’s champions here in Washington come from the right. 

For example, I was told that when Georgian leaders visit Washington and try to set up meetings with members of Congress, they usually have a line of Republicans waiting to see them (McCain, Hagel, Lugar, Allen, Voinovich, Brownback), but have a very hard time getting through the door to see anyone from the other side of the aisle.  I know that many left-leaning policy wonks and  NGOs (Open Society, NDI, etc) are deeply involved in promoting democratic reforms worldwide, but progressive political leaders seem to be increasingly checked out.   Is the Democratic Party in danger of ceasing to be the champion of democrats?      

Foiled by Idealism? - The US Foreign Policy Pendulum Posted by Michael Kraig

Foreign Affairs Managing Editor Gideon Rose recently wrote a very provocative column in the NYT on August 18, appropriately titled, "Get Real."  It is a Realpolitik bashing of America's proclivity for swinging wildly between unrealistic ideals in international relations and prudent balance-of-power pragmatism. He's definitely on to something, but I question his description of current policy realities.

Rose's argument is compelling: the United States has swung back and forth for decades between getting into international messes because of ideals/culture/nationalism, after which pragmatic policies reign and the US extricates itself, only to repeat the idealist debacle again under another Administration.  This pattern, according to Rose, does not respect partisan lines; Dems or Republicans are both prone to the errors of idealism, and both sides have had their chance to extricate America from its unrealistic messes.

There is one problem, however: we are not swinging back to pragmatism this time around - at least, not yet. 

First, Rose forgets what all of DC and much of America have "learned" from their supposed past Realpolitik misdeeds during the Cold War: namely, it was not idealism that led to 9-11, according to this argument, but rather Realism itself that is the cold-blooded culprit.   In the new DC Consensus, our active aiding and abetting of all sorts of authoritarian nasties during the Cold War is what got us into the current mess and made us a hypocrtical sham the world over.  According to both Dems and Republicans, it is time to make things right.

Thus, despite the debacle in Iraq, there is still a largely unquestioned assumption - growing increasingly popular to the point of becoming received wisdom - that the US can only be secure through spreading and supporting true democracy and economic liberalization the world over.  In this new Consensus, the path to Realism is Idealism.   To lessen one's ideals in the name of pragmatism is to invite disaster. 

For this reason, authors such as Reinhold Neibuhr and Hans Morgenthau, and the halcyon Wise Men of post-WW II international system building  (Marshall, Acheson, Kennan, etc.), are no longer being held up as revered historical gurus.  After Vietnam, these Realists felt vindicated in their earlier assessment that our failure was due to an overzealous application of an unrealistic "domino theory" of communism based on the obsessive need to spread systems like ours throughout the Developing World.   There is no similar vindication occurring now; rather, criticism tends to be on the Bush Adm.'s bad methods and faulty original rationales (WMD arguments), rather than criticism of the core assumption of "transforming the Middle East."

More to the point, there is no indication that Condi Rice's State Department is prepared to implement a truly "balance of power" policy of Realpolitik pragmatism and/or a progressive policy of reciprocal engagement and cooperation with the enemy (i.e., detente or rapprochement).   Rose makes much of the new and improved operation at State, but here's what's missing in our actual security policies:

--support for a new security consensus, or common security vision, between the Developed and Developing World at the upcoming negotiations in NY for UN Reform (see Thursday's Washington Post story to see what I mean);

--support for new confidence-building measures (CBMs) toward "rogues" such as Syria, Iran, and North Korea, all of which essentially say, "We recognize you as a sovereign state with legitimate security concerns, interests, and anxieties, and we will talk with you about security guarantees that will meet the interests of both of us without undermining the other." 

--(in other words: a balance of interests, which is what the Realist's balance-of-power is meant to create);

--statements to the effect that our goal toward these 3 states is not regime change, preemptive, preventive, or otherwise, but rather is one of reaching detente or a "grand bargain" that meets the interests of both sides without endangering either side's security;

--allowance of our friends and allies in these respective regions to engage the rogues, invest in them, and trade with them, without punishment from us (for instance, allowing India to negotiate with Iran on a new oil pipeline for South Asia);

--engaging Iran to better manage the threat of a disintegrating Iraq, which would make both Iran and the US massively insecure;

--in sum: the idea of Nixon going to China, with a view of transforming things gradually through achieving a balance of interests and values, rather than radical transformation through winning a competition and delivering outright defeat via coercive methods (i.e., one side's values/interests overturning the other);

--all of this based on the assumption that North Korea, Iran, and Syria are not expansionist powers chomping on the bit to kick out the Americans and win aggressive wars against their neighbors, but rather are insecure regional powers who feel under constant threat of extinction - an assumption that is neither idealistic or realistic, but is simply the truth (see for instance Leon Sigal's argument in Arms Control Today concerning North Korea's motivations and intent, based on actual behavior).

Whatever the current realities, is Rose right in his prescriptions?  Yes.  I do hope that Rose's pragmatic turn will happen soon, as laid out above, because as recently argued by Realpolitik Middle East analyst F. Gregory Gause in Foreign Affairs,

"Is it true that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? In other words, is the security rationale for promoting democracy in the Arab world based on a sound premise? Unfortunately, the answer appears to be no....Terrorism appears to stem from factors much more specific than regime type. Nor is it likely that democratization would end the current campaign against the United States. Al Qaeda and like-minded groups are not fighting for democracy in the Muslim world; they are fighting to impose their vision of an Islamic state. Nor is there any evidence that democracy in the Arab world would "drain the swamp," eliminating soft support for terrorist organizations among the Arab public..."

Michael Kraig, Director of Policy Analysis and Dialogue, The Stanley Foundation

Iraq Withdrawal: Whether to Set a Deadline Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Kevin asks a question now on many minds:  would we be better off setting a firm deadline for withdrawal from Iraq:

In other words, by the end of 2007 we're going to leave one way or the other. That being the case, why not announce it publicly? It would partially demotivate the insurgency by giving them a firm promise that we don't plan to occupy Iraq forever, it would help gain international support for the rebuilding effort, it would force the Iraqi government to take the training of its security forces seriously, and it would be popular with both the Iraqi and American public. What's more, it would allow the Pentagon to plan its withdrawal methodically, instead of either being caught in disastrous internal meltdown or finding itself in the middle of a savage civil war . . .

For my part, I'm partial to a plan that gradually draws down our forces based primarily (but not exclusively) on firm goals for training Iraq troops — which should be our overwhelmingly most important task, instead of the muddled excuse-making machine it apparently is today. Such a plan would most likely be based on substantive goals along the way (training, elections, etc.), but would have a hard end date of, say, December 2007.

Here are the issues I see with that logic. 

Demotivating the insurgency.  There are at least 2 scenarios in terms of what's behind the insurgency, and I have been unable to uncover definitively which is correct.  One maintains that the U.S.'s presence in Iraq is the prime motivator behind the insurgency - if we leave, it goes away.  The other suggests that while the U.S. presence is part of the picture, the insurgency is mainly a domestic political power struggle. 

Whichever it is, I don't see the insurgent fervor being dampened by an announcement of plans for a December 2007 withdrawal.  If indeed the insurgents are compelled mostly by a drive to push us out, a statement that we definitively plan to leave some 27 months hence stands a good chance of only emboldening efforts to get us out sooner by raising the human cost of staying.  Our terrorist enemies would love the feather in their cap of sending us running ahead of an orderly deadline.  If there motives are mainly political, knowing that we aren't going to stand in their way for long may encourage them to "wait us out." 

Moreover, though the Administration fervently wishes otherwise, there's an inherent contradiction between the firm end date Kevin advocates and the idea that withdrawal should be contingent on a certain level of progress in the readiness of Iraqi troops.   Particularly since we know that every aspect of rebuilding the Iraqi security forces has taken more time gone less well than hoped, how can we possibly be confident that progress will be so marked that we're free to leave by the end of 2007?  We can't, which means that by setting a firm end-date, we're saying that whether the Iraqi forces are ready or not, we're outta there.

Here is what Richard Holbrooke said based on his experience of a series of broken deadlines for US troop withdrawal from Bosnia in the 1990s:

Artificial deadlines encourage belligerents to outwait the outside intervention, delay and wait until the international community goes away, at which point they can resume doing what they had been doing before. Artificial deadlines give hope to warlords, criminals, and corrupt officials that they can outlast the international community.

His remaining remarks on the topic deal mostly with exit strategies for UN peacekeeping operations, but many of his points are equally relevant here.

If the same proves true in Iraq, the period between now and the end of phased withdrawal could prove even more deadly and miserable than the last 2 and a half years.

A fixed deadline may also raise questions along the lines of young John Kerry's famous rumination on how you ask someone to be the last to die for a mistake:  if our main focus becomes an orderly withdrawal from a failing mission, what exactly do we say to young men and women heading over to put their lives at risk? 

One answer might be that they've got the crucial job of tying up loose ends in terms of Iraq's own security capabilities.   That brings me to another of Kevin's points: that a withdrawal date would help the Iraqi authorities take "seriously" the need to train their own security forces.  My question is whether the problem right now is really the Iraqi govt's failure to take this seriously?  Surely they are not happy with a country up in flames.  My sense is that errors of focus, inadequate training, frequent attacks on recruits, lack of weaponry, etc. are hampering this effort, rather than lack of will on the part of Iraqi officials.

In terms of international support for the rebuilding effort, I likewise don't see how a timeline for US withdrawal helps.  If, as many fear, Iraq spirals downward, potential donors will fear that any additional monies committed will only go to waste.

Kevin is right that an announcement of a phased draw-down would be popular, and sounds lot better than a hasty retreat.  Juan Cole has gone a step further by suggesting that withdrawal be coupled with a commitment to continue offering close air support and other backing aimed to help Iraq stave off civil war. 

All this is not to say that we should not plan for withdrawal.  And this Administration has proffered nothing that comes close to a strategy for achieving our goals under current circumstances.   Absent such a strategy, withdrawal is preferable to continued loss of life.   If, as Juan Cole suggests, there's a way for us to get out while minimizing the risk of Iraq's becoming a failed state, so much the better.    But we won't come close to eliminating that risk entirely and, given the grave consequences of Iraq's implosion, phased withdrawal is a high risk option.

So planned withdrawal should not be off the table.   But we also shouldn't kid ourselves that leaving Iraq to its own devices is the same as solving its problems.

The List Goes On: If Iraq Fails Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Two consequences implicit in Suzanne's list of consequences if Iraq fails that I want to make explicit.   Both are the exact opposite of this Administration's stated goals; military force is a blunt instrument, folks.

The Kurds and Turkey.  "Instability in the Middle East" doesn't begin to cover the ripples if the Kurds walk out of Iraq.  The Turks have been very clear about their intention to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish state by any means necessary.  If Turkey finds itself again ensnared in fighting, occupation and atrocities on its southeastern border, that has ugly knock-on effects on its relations with Europe, its prospects for integration and economic modernization, and its internal balance of democratic, military and Islamic forces more generally.  Not to mention the ugly knock-on effects for human beings.

The US democracy establishment  By this I mean everybody from governmental or quasi-governmental democracy-promoters such as USAID, the National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute, but also wholly private outfits that may or may not have supported or participated in Iraq (George Soros' Open Society Institute comes to mind).  Suzanne cites this as a negative consequence for the Middle East.  But one can imagine a scenario under which the ferment in that region does produce some movement toward openness, though not necessarily producing governments the US likes -- but at the same time cripples or even destroys the ability of any US citizens to be effective promoters of democracy anywhere.   Just try showing up in Togo or Uzbekistan and saying, "I'm from America, I'm here to help you build democracy, and you can count on me.  No, really."

So if one takes seriously the neo-con goals of strengthening "moderate Islamic governments" and promoting America's democracy as a model and source of assistance for others seeking freedom, it sure seems like one would have to re-assess the theoretical underpinnings of this war. 

And for the record, if our posters who responded to Suzanne's list by insisting that, roughly, "the good guys are winning," turn out to be right, and we have seen the worst in Iraq, I will delightedly take to the keyboard to apologize.

Top 10 List: Consequences of Iraq Becoming A Failed State Posted by Suzanne Nossel

There is genuine uncertainty over whether, at this point, there’s anything the U.S can do to turn things around in Iraq. Kevin Drum suggests that the only reason to hesitate in calling for a pull out is the fear of looking weak.   As we debate what’s next, though, its worth considering what the consequences of a failed Iraq will be. 

I define failure as a situation in which the result of the U.S.’s invasion and subsequent occupation are not the stability (never mind the democracy) that we all hoped for, but instead continued chaos, factionalism, violence, and uncontrollable outside influence by the likes of Iran and Syria. It’s a scenario in which Iraq’s domestic security forces never gain the upper hand against insurgents, the economy does not recover, the fractious politics never coalesces into a functioning government, and the violence goes on unabated. In short, current conditions persist.

Noone, neither hawk nor peacenik, wants this to happen. But as we contemplate options that we long dismissed, its worth remembering why we’ve said for so long that the prospect of Iraq as a failed state was unacceptable. Even if we come to the conclusion that – though it may leave the country in ruins - U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is the best of an array of terrible options, if Iraq becomes a failed state that choice will not be without devastating consequences.

This post is intended not to suggest a particular course of action, but rather to point out that the result of recent years’ policies in Iraq is a painfully short list of options, all bad. Those guiding the war effort bear responsibility for backing us into this corner. At every stage, proposals have been made (to internationalize, involve the UN, improve planning, increase the number of troops when it still could have made a difference etc.) that could have helped us avoid this conundrum.

Some of the casualties if Iraq becomes a failed state:

1.   The fate of the Iraqi people – The Iraqi people will be left with a state that’s vulnerable to rampant violence, possible civil war and economic ruin. Those that believe that virtually anything is better than life under Saddam may face a Baathist resurgence.

2.   Stability in the Middle East – Chaos in Iraq will bleed over to the wider region.  Iraq’s neighbors can be expected to react opportunistically to the void, meddling in Iraqi affairs to serve their own interests, and very likely entering into violent conflict with one another.

3. Attitudes toward the U.S. in the Middle East – The U.S.’s image in the Middle East has gone from bad to worse in much of the Middle East as a result of the Iraq war. If the result of our efforts leaves the Iraqi people worse off, all the resentment over the perceived unilateralism of the Iraq invasion and the distortions of fact over WMD will harden into even deeper bitterness.

4. The fight against terrorism – Everyone from President Bush to al Qaeda #2 Ayman al Zawahri has declared the Iraqi insurgency the primary front of the fight against terrorism. If Iraq winds up a failed state, it will represent a territory terrorists have conquered and can claim. In addition to offering terrorists safe harbor to operate, the resources of the Iraqi state – oil, military, communications infrastructure, and funds – may fuel terrorist purposes.

5. Fight Against WMD, especially in Iran - Iranian influence is already on the rise in a chaotic Iraq; if Iraq fails, the role of the mullahs will only grow.  As illustrated by Ahmadinejad's election, the Iraq war has already undercut the support we used to enjoy among moderate Iranians sick of their repressive regime.  If Iraq becomes a failed state and U.S. influence in the Middle East correspondingly diminishes, the pressure on Iran to accede to American demands in relation to its nuclear program will further weaken.  Chinese and Russian economic ties to Iran will pose increasingly powerful buffers against counter-proliferation efforts.  Its hard to imagine Kim Jong Il won't find some way of scoring points off this as well; he's already benefitted from the consensus that a military response to N. Korea's nuclear program is off the table.

Adios, Au Revoir, Auf Wiedersehen Posted by David Adesnik

How the time does fly when you're having so much fun.  Once again, I would like to thank Michael Signer for generously inviting me to be a guest blogger here on Democracy Arsenal, as well as the rest of the DA crew for welcoming an outsider into the inner sanctum.

But perhaps above all, I would like to thank all of you who read Democracy Arsenal, since having an such an intelligent and engaged audience is what makes blogging really worth it.

Sincerely,
David