The Pakistan Dance Posted by Patrick Barry

Earlier, General Petraeus expressed his view that in spite of Pakistan's domestic political turmoil, he saw no prospect for a military coup.  Here's Spencer's coverage:

“I don’t think that the current challenges imperil civilian rule,” Petraeus said. He praised the efforts of Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has performed shuttle diplomacy with senior Pakistani generals for years. It appears, Petraeus said, that the U.S. desire for continued democratic rule in Pakistan has Pakistani uniformed partners: “I don’t see the prospect or desire for anyone to change civilian rule.”

Hillary Clinton made a similar point in an interview last week, saying:

"I think that in my talking with the military, I didn't have any indication that they have any intention of doing anything other than supporting the democratically elected government," she said. "Now I know that there are all kinds of challenges to the current government. That is for the people of Pakistan and for your political process to work out. But of course, we want to see a strong, vibrant democracy, and that is what we are going to continue to support."

While I think it's very important to avoid sounding alarmist or patronizing when speaking with the Pakistanis about their domestic politics, statements like these underscore the bind we're in when it comes communicating expectations.  For while it's probably true that the military doesn't want a coup, and has no plans to revolt, there is evidence that at least some elements have been working to undermine the civilian leadership in ways the U.S. would probably deem inappropriate, the kerfuffle over the the civilian aid package being the clearest example.  So saying that we have no expectation that there will be a coup, doesn't really get at what is an actual concern: the military's intrusion on civilian turf.

I am the Law Posted by Patrick Barry

A little while ago, Ambassador Eikenberry had an exchange with Senator Wicker over an important, but somewhat under-scrutinized obstacle to better governance in Afghanistan: widespread perceptions of a lack of justice.  Caroline made the point last week that the President's West Point speech was noticeably devoid of any reference to the issue of justice, despite it being a "mobilizing tool" for insurgents.  By swooping into spaces where no justice is dispensed, or where that justice is seen as illegitimate, the Taliban has been able to set itself up as a reliable arbiter for disputes.

Eikenberry stressed that while the Taliban have a predictable form of justice, their brand is "feudal." But the second part of what he said was really much more illuminating: that when you have a "rapacious" government, it allows a window for Taliban justice to reign unchallenged.  This seems to me to be the key.  The Taliban is definitely brutal, but in contrast to an either absent or corrupt Afghan government, they're really the only game in town. 

Cardin is on Fire Posted by Patrick Barry

My senator, Ben Cardin, gets tough on Deputy Secretary Jack Lew on just how exactly the U.S. will hold the Afghan government accountable on corruption, asking whether anything short of threatening to "pull the troops out" would have the desired effect.

Lew responded by focusing on the money channeled to Afghan ministries, saying that if they underperform, or continue to be corrupt, then that money will be re-directed to other channels. 

Frankly, I don't see how that gets to the issue of the kinds of corruption encountered by average Afghans on a daily basis, something Andrew Wilder has written about extensively. Re-directing money might do something to reduce corrupt behavior by ministers charged with disbursing it, but that money still flows downstream, where it can still have a pernicious effect. 

Is Obama a "Weak" President or is America a Weaker Country? Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at World Politics Review I offer a preview of Obama's Oslo speech - and confront the growing political meme that Obama's diplomatic efforts to date show evidence of political weakness. As I try to argue in the piece it's not that Obama is a weak leader, but instead he helms a country that is seeing its political influence and leverage decline:

Even as it remains the most powerful nation in the world, the United States is becoming, as the Bush-era National Intelligence Council suggested last year, just one of several important actors on the global stage. In such a crowded landscape, the United States no longer has the leverage to shape international affairs to its liking.

The Bush years' obsessive focus on the threat of jihadist terror masked these changes. As globalization continued its uninterrupted march, new power centers were created, along with an emerging crop of transnational and non-state actors, all vying for global influence and leadership. Now that the U.S. is emerging from the diplomatic wreckage of the past eight years, it is discovering that things are not simply returning to "normal." While Obama's election has undoubtedly opened up more opportunities for U.S. diplomacy, there remains a frustrating gap between America's capabilities and the broad manner in which it defines its national interests.

Read the whole thing here

How can we improve our relationship with the Pakistan? Posted by The Editors

This post is by NSN Executive Assistant Luis Vertiz

Chairman John Kerry opened his the question portion of the SFRC hearing by asking the panelists to elaborate on our relationship and efforts with Pakistan. General David Petraeus said that the history of distrust between the United States and Pakistan, particularly from the Pakistani side, should not be underestimated. But what  was needed from Petraeus' answer was more elaboration on the concrete, confidence-building measures that are being discuss or being implemented that will help improve our mil-mil relationship with the Pakistani government.

It's important that the Pakistan military and its security forces [the ISI included], have a closer working relationship with the United States in order to build more confidence between nation that seek to question each other's policy for the region. However, improving our relationship with Pakistan should start with cooperation against Taliban and Al Qaeda extremists, but it shouldn't stop there. Perhaps it's this need for a new, creative policy towards Pakistan that was a bit beyond the reach of General Petraeus' answer. 

The Middle East and the Problem of Overblown Rhetoric Posted by Shadi Hamid

Marc Lynch:

Obama has largely foregone the grand rhetoric which the Bush administration preferred.And good for him. It's not like the Bush administration's support for democracy actually created much democracy, after all. Instead, it raised expectations which were quickly dashed as the U.S. failed to follow through on its rhetoric (sound familiar?).

So is the problem the “grand rhetoric” or that the rhetoric failed to match reality? It sounds here like the latter. Let’s say that Bush had employed the same grand rhetoric but followed through with his promises to get serious about Arab democracy? Then, presumably, rhetoric would be a good thing. Rhetoric can be positive precisely because it raises expectations. The greater the expectations, the greater the pressure to meet them. One might call this the binding effect of overblown rhetoric: the more grandiose our rhetoric, the greater the cost that will be incurred if our rhetoric bears little resemblance to reality. And, during the Bush administration, the costs were indeed great.

There is, of course, a solution to the problem of inspiring rhetoric, and that is to bring our policies closer in line with our words, rather than the inverse.

Live blogging of SFRC hearings to continue Posted by The Editors

The bloggers of Democracy Arsenal will be following this morning's hearing with Central Command's General David Petraeus, Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry  and Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Jacob Lew. So stay tuned for today's commentary.

Iran Sanctions -- Let's Hope Life Doesn't Imitate Simulation Posted by David Shorr

Via Matt Duss and M.J. Rosenberg, it seems momentum may be building for Congressional legislation to pave the way for strengthened unilateral sanctions against Iran, though reports of a Senate vote Tuesday evening may end up being a false alarm. Meanwhile, stories have emerged of a role-playing simulation of the confrontation over Iran's nuclear program conducted by senior experts -- Politico's Laura Rozen gives excerpts from accounts by Gary Sick (a participant) and David Ignatius, whose WaPo column is available in its entirety. One finding: congressional support for unilateral sanctions could undermine current diplomatic efforts, which are focused on multilateral sanctions.

The key passage from the Ignatius column:

The Obama team was confounded by congressional demands for unilateral U.S. sanctions against companies involved in Iran's energy sector. This shot at Iran ended up backfiring, since some of the key companies were from Russia and China -- the very nations whose support the United States needs for strong U.N. sanctions. The Russians and Chinese were so offended that they began negotiating with Tehran behind America's back.

Talk about unintended consequences, yikes. A united front with Russia and China is the key to keeping pressure on Iran, and losing their support at this critical juncture would be a big step backwards. In the debate over sanctions, the questions of whether, when, how, and by whom are worth untangling.

The ANSF: Where State-Building & Nation-Building Meet Posted by Patrick Barry

A little while ago, Sen. Sessions asked a very good question about whether "we are overly committed to a centralized authority," seeing local militias a security alternative to the Afghan National Security Forces.General McChrystal cautioned against thinking of local militias as a better security off-ramp than the Afghan army. 

This indirectly gets at the conversation Michael and Spencer were having over whether the U.S. is nation-building in Afghanistan.  Part of McChrystal's concern is that Afghanistan's history of conflict is related to support - either internally based or externally based - for armed security forces un-tethered to any kind of central authority. McChrystal is understandably apprehensive about feeding  such conflict drivers.  In his view, training the ANSF represents a way to address the country's security deficit, while reinforcing, not undermining, a sense of national unity. 

Putting it this way makes it tough to figure out where training Afghanistan's security forces slides into the state-building\nation-building continuum.  A case could be made for either classification. Increasing an Army's size and professionalism could easily be described as a capacity-building, or state-building activity.  But as McChrystal said, it's not enough for security forces to be skilled.  They also have to share a bond or an allegiance that keeps 'them from moving around the battlefield,' becoming 'something predatory.'  If the U.S. is reinforcing Afghan national identity as a check against faction, that seems like the place where state-building could pretty quickly turn into nation-building.

You Talking about Re-integration? Posted by Patrick Barry

In response to a question from Senator Udall, Ambassador Eikenberry clarifies what role the U.S. will play in facilitating the re-integration\reconciliation of elements of the insurgency into Afghan society.  According to Eikenberry, once the Afghan government fully establishes a mission devoted to that process, then the U.S. and ISAF will begin more active involvement