Live-Tweeting the Brookings US-Islamic World Forum in Doha Posted by Shadi Hamid

We're currently holding our 7th annual Brookings US-Islamic World Forum in Doha, Qatar. I will be live-tweeting parts of the conference. You can follow me here.

This year's forum is shaping up to be a particularly interesting one. Earlier today, President Obama addressed the audience through an exclusive taped address. Senator John Kerry and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan then gave the keynote addresses. And tomorrow night, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will be giving a major speech, which some are billing as the "sequel" to the Cairo Address. Stay tuned.

I'm excited that, this year, there's significant representation from Islamist parties. I'm part of a working group that features one of the most interesting assortments of Islamists I've ever seen in one room, including from Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, Iraq, and the Philippines. The working groups are under Chatham House rules, but I hope to write more about our areas of consensus and disagreement soon.

Rockets, and rodents, and uranium! Oh, my! Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

During the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, Ahmadinejad boasted of Iran’s enrichment program and nuclear capability. From the NY Times:

In the address in Azadi Square in Tehran, Mr. Ahmadinejad relied on familiar nationalist and anti-Western themes, accusing the United States and Europe of trying to hold Iran down and challenging them by saying that Iran had already succeeded in enriching uranium to 20 percent and could do even more.

“We have the capability to enrich uranium more than 20 percent or 80 percent, but we don’t enrich because we don’t need it,” Mr. Ahmadinejad said.

But he added a warning to the West. “Please pay attention and understand that the people of Iran are brave enough that if it wants to build a bomb it will clearly announce it and build it and not be afraid of you,” he said. “When we say we won’t build it that means we won’t.”

The president also repeated his declaration that Iran was a “nuclear state,” adding that it had the capacity to enrich uranium to weapons grade if it chose to.

While events that took place in the days before the rally—launching a rocket filled with little critters, increasing enrichment levels to the HEU threshold, and ticking off the IAEA— might alter the context of Ahmadinejad’s comments, this isn’t the first time Iran has declared itself a “nuclear state.”  Over at ArmsControlWonk, Jeffrey Lewis rattles off at least seven other instances where Iran proclaimed itself a “nuclear power.” If Iran was categorizing itself as a nuclear state in December of 2006, it seems fair to say this is more of a rhetorical ruse aimed at ruffling feathers and scoring domestic political points. As White House press secretary, Robert Gibbs, explained, “Iran has made a series of statements that are…based on politics, not on physics.”

Iran’s enrichment program has indeed experienced several setbacks and technological hiccups. David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security, has conducted extensive research on Iran’s program and has detailed the areas where things have not gone according to plan:

Iranian officials have steadfastly maintained that Natanz operates successfully and do not admit to any serious problems at the plant.  However, the relatively low LEU output suggests otherwise. Iran tries to focus on the positive; its officials periodically trumpet the growth in the number of centrifuges installed at the plant…although it reportedly said in August 2009 that it shut down a few cascades for maintenance.  According to a senior official close to the IAEA, the IAEA does not know the reason for the decrease [in the number of centrifuges said to be enriching uranium—a number that has actually been decreasing since June 2009].  Iran did acknowledge some technical problems in its centrifuges to the IAEA, but it did not volunteer why it reduced the numbers said to be enriching. 

Despite these issues, Iran’s announcement that it plans to enrich uranium to 20 percent—the bright line between low-enriched uranium and highly enriched uranium—is serious.  As Albright further explains, Iran’s program is likely to improve:

The problems at the FEP, particularly during the last year, appear to involve complications in deploying thousands of reliable centrifuges.  But despite these problems, it is important to remember that a centrifuge program is not unchanging or static; centrifuge development is intrinsically about improving the separative capacity of the centrifuges.  Iran will continue to improve its enrichment performance at Natanz and elsewhere.

This does not mean that Iran is going to develop a nuclear weapon tomorrow, or in a week, or even in a month.  Iran’s rhetoric is ahead of its actual capabilities. Thus, there is still time for the international community to work toward a multi-pronged solution and strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. As it currently stands, it is politically advantageous for Ahmadinejad to continue to hype Iran’s nuclear program—even if it is stalled by poor performance and reliability. By domestically presenting the nuclear issue in an “us versus them” context as he did during Thursday’s rally, Ahmadinejad can harness any hasty or unilateral action by an outside actor and attempt to unite a divided population and stifle the domestic opposition.  This is precisely the reason why the John Boltons of the world need to shut up.  Military action would only make the situation worse.  That administration should continue working with international partners to coordinate a multinational response.  Smart, targeted sanctions—coupled with further negotiations will not solve the situation overnight, but at this point, it seems to be the best option.

Friday Round-up Posted by Michael Cohen

• On his Twitter feed Brian Katulis linked to this amazing poll result from the NYT. When asked about the most important issues facing the country, war got 3%, terrorism got 1% and Afghanistan didn't even rate. In fact, as near I can tell the poll doesn't even ask a single question about Afghanistan.

I understand the economy stinks and people are worried about their jobs (I know the feeling) but my gosh, we're going to have 100,000 troops on the ground there and Americans are blithely unconcerned. The extent to which Afghanistan has fallen off the map over the last two months is both stunning and depressing.

• Bernard Finel has an interesting article about COIN in the latest issue of Armed Forces Journal; as a critique of the military's COIN infatuation it's spot on. Although the Zen Pundit offers an interesting rejoinder.  

• Former NSN alum Moira Whelan who is now at AID flagged this piece in HuffPo from new AID administrator Rajiv Shah on ongoing relief efforts in Haiti.   

• As is his wont, Marc Lynch has a really smart take on Iran

• Finally, the indomitable Slim Charles perhaps best captures my thoughts about the imminent attack on Marjah: "Don't matter who did what to who at this point. Fact is, we went to war, and now there ain't no going back. I mean, shit, it's what war is, you know? Once you in it, you in it. If it's a lie, then we fight on that lie. But we gotta fight." 

One More On Tribal Militias Posted by Michael Cohen

Just when you thought we had pretty much exhausted this topic at DA, there are two recent articles that add some complexity to the question of Afghan tribal engagement. First is this piece from Josh Foust in the National where he makes the argument that engaging Afghan "tribes" is not a effective means of stabilizing Afghanistan.

The current structure of the Taliban, as a de-tribalised Islamist resistance movement, means that normal methods of working within the tribal system are far less effective, if at all. It is why these initiatives to bribe tribes to fight for America fail so reliably – they just don’t apply to how and why people are choosing affiliations and making decisions. Since the Taliban is a movement that is inclusive of traditionally rivalrous tribes, even rivalrous ethnicities, that rivalry cannot be exploited to undo the movement.

You should read the whole piece here. Next we have Gilles Dorronsorro, who makes the argument that trying to pick and choose which tribes to support will have a destabilizing impact on the country:

Washington's gravest error, however, is its manifest lack of interest in shoring up the Afghan central government. Whatever the official word about fighting corruption, the international coalition is bypassing Kabul in favor of local strong-men, on whom it is growing more and more dependent for protection and logistics, especially in the south. Worse, the population rejects the militias, which are often brutal toward civilians, and do little to increase support for Karzai or the coalition. 

Even inside the Afghan legal system, the coalition is choosing its partners at a local level, skirting the political center. NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams act with total independence from Kabul, which is often not even informed of their actions. 

Dorronsorro argues that the biggest problem with US policy is that it's undercutting the Karzai regime and risks leaving "nothing behind in Afghanistan but warring factions - a mess not unlike the one that precipitated the Taliban's rise to power in the first place."

I think here Dorrronsorro gets to the nub of the issue. Michael Hanna has argued here that we need these sort of band-aids in Afghanistan so that we can get closer to a withdrawal point from Afghanistan:

We overestimate our ability to craft long-term, sustainable solutions to the many ills that plague Afghanistan. In short, I don’t believe that these types of short-term efforts are irreparably damaging the coherent nation-building strategy that would simply take its place. When coupled with the difficult security situation then I think that band-aids are not such a bad idea − we need all the help we can get.

But the problem here - as Dorronsorro argues - is that we are basically choosing a short-term solution at a serious cost to Afghanistan's long-term viability. In fact, I would actually make the argument that Afghanistan's long-term stability may well be a more important issue to US interests than even defeating al Qaeda (which we've already done in Afghanistan) or the Taliban (who were likely not going to defeat militarily). Band-aids are just that; a temporary fix - and while they might serve US interests in the near term they risk being disastrous to the region (and ourselves) over the long-term.

Ultimately if we leave Afghanistan a fractured mess, riven by empowered tribes, a militarily and politically viable Taliban and a weak, emasculated central government this is a recipe for a return to civil war and regional instability. 

Indeed, one could argue that our goal in Afghanistan should be not necessarily to defeat the Taliban, but weaken it enough and strengthen the government in Kabul so that we achieve some level of stasis - and prevent the possibility of a Taliban takeover of the country. But it does seems like an agenda focused on tribal engagement risks weakening the central government so significantly that when we do leave they will be unable to stand up to the Taliban.  

It's not that this sort of "tribal" outreach is necessarily bad it's that it needs to be coordinated with the government in Kabul so that these arrangements, while localized in nature, are providing indirect support to the central government. So brazenly going around Kabul undercuts the same government that we are nominally supporting.

Of course, this means that we are then reliant on a corrupt Karzai government and it likely precludes us from being able to leave Afghanistan any time soon. Ultimately, we are going to have to live and die with Hamid Karzai and make amends with his corrupt leadership. Granted, that's not much of a solution - and all of our Afghan options are a combination of bad and worse - but it seems a smarter way to go than supporting a number of independent and unconnected factions to the ultimate detriment of Afghanistan's long-term stability. 

Three-Dimensional Chess With Iran (In Which I Agree, Mostly, With Peter Feaver) Posted by David Shorr

In a very cogent post on Shadow Government, Peter Feaver lays out the basic policy and geopolitical challenges of dealing with Iran. At the heart of his analysis is a point I view as a basis for bipartisan consensus. Feaver critiques a certain attitude toward diplomacy that places a lot of hope in Iranian cooperativeness ("if only we gave them a chance"). He's right that unless it is confronted with incentives and disincentives from the outside, Iran will continue on a straight line toward (at least) virtual nuclear weapon capability. In other words, policy and diplomacy must take into account that Tehran's game is to run out the clock. As I say, this is a reasonable basis for bipartisanship.

Accordingly, Feaver calls out China for the pretense that a non-nuclear capable Iran can be attained free of any political or strategic cost to itself. You can find an even more pointed dissection of Chinese free-riding from Bill Powell in Time. I remain optimistic about Chinese support for new sanctions against Iran. Russia's backing of sanctions will shine a white-hot spotlight on China as the obstacle, and forced with the choice, I don't think they'll want to be Iran's sole defender -- or the United States' primary source of resistance on a top foreign policy priority.

A couple of Feaver's criticisms of Obama administration policy warrant response. I don't know whether the administration was "slow to capitalize on the domestic turmoil inside Iran" after last summer's fraudulent elections, but I do know that there were trade-offs associated with America offering itself as the target of demonization. I'm quite certain that the administration's "profound misstep" (as Feaver calls it) of delaying the pressure track until last fall was no such thing. In saying that sticks must come before carrots, Feaver has it backwards. The United States' ability to exert pressure and rally international support was strengthened by showing a degree of patience rather than haste. When Feaver claims that we're no further along than six months ago, he ignores the important October success of reaching an agreed plan to move Iranian uranium out of the country. That agreement was the result of the engagement approach and now, crucially, serves as the basis of the current pressure track.

Given that time is on Iran's side, the key thing now is to maintain some diplomatic momentum and a steady tempo of pressure. I assume that is the driving purpose of current administration efforts. Speaking of which, Josh Rogin's scorecard of Iran policy players in the administration is a good companion post to Feaver's.

The state of Israel Posted by Joel Rubin

During my recent week-long trip to Israel, I visited family and attended the Herzliya conference, which is Israel’s premier security conference. During the trip, one of my hip, 30-something Israeli cousins told me that they supported Israel’s toxic foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman.

This is a sad commentary on Israel’s current state of affairs.

It turns out that Lieberman didn’t attend the Herzliya conference, which did attract Israel’s most prominent political leaders, as well as military, diplomatic, business and political leaders from across the globe.

Lieberman’s absence didn’t weaken the tough talk at the conference. Iran, the Palestinians and jihadist terrorism were all central topics. Speakers shared their views about the dilemmas facing Israel, more often depressing, rather than inspiring the audience.

But that should not have come as a surprise, as these are very dark times in the Middle East.

There was a sense of impending doom hovering over the conference. Subtle digs were made about President Obama’s leadership, with even some, such as Mort Zuckerman, reveling in his difficulties and rooting for his demise. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke about how Israeli youth were disconnected from their country’s past. These were not inspiring speeches.

There were also acknowledgements by Israeli leaders, many of whom have political roots in the conservative Likud party, about the need to achieve a two-state solution with the Palestinians. But this argument was rooted in the fear that demography would overtake Israel, with the Palestinians holding the long-term advantage in this regard. The talk was not about peace, but instead about survival.

It was clear, after attending this conference, that the weight of a decade of American neoconservative failure in the Middle East had brought Israelis neither security nor peace of mind.

This situation is problematic for Israeli political elites, who are also concerned that President Obama, unlike his predecessor, will not indulge conservative Israeli politicians in their greatest self-destructive behaviors anymore, especially when it comes to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Compounding this dilemma is the irony that the population supports a hard-line government, despite being frustrated by the policies that it is advancing.

For example, the citizens of Tel Aviv loathe settlers, whose representatives hold sway over the Netanyahu government. While settlers hold on to their vision of maintaining control over the West Bank and the Palestinians that live there, Tel Avivis understand that they are being sucked in to their dangerous, apocalyptic views. 

My Tel Aviv cousins, for example, pay more than half their income to national taxes, with a significant portion dedicated to supporting these settlers. They are infuriated by the reality that they are subsidizing the lifestyle of a group of people that has no interest in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a two-state solution, relegating Israelis to unending conflict.

Worse, while the people of Tel Aviv know that the settlers are holding the country’s politics hostage, they have no idea how to change this.

As for the political elites, despite repeated calls at Herzliya by prominent Israeli politicians, such as Tzipi Livni, Ehud Barak, Shaul Mofaz and Dan Meridor, for a two-state solution, it is becoming clear that the Israeli political system is incapable of getting there.

Compounding this dysfunction, there is a fear in Israel that the United States is a waning power. Israelis have thrown in their lot with America, and they are now beginning to worry about whether the U.S. will still be able to carry them on its back.

I left feeling that I had never seen such a demoralized Israel. Both the elites and the population looked tired, frustrated and uncertain.

From an American perspective, this is not surprising. A decade of ruinous neoconservative policies toward the Middle East, which are slowly being rolled back, contributed directly to this malaise. Neoconservative policies, such as promoting regime change in Iraq, creating settlements in the West Bank, terminating diplomacy with Syria and advocating for military action against Iran have clearly not worked either for Israel or the United States.

Is it any wonder then that Israelis support a man like Avigdor Lieberman and the current hard-line government? Israelis want peace. They want security. They also want a government that will protect them in these turbulent times. And so they have sought the warm embrace of the most hawkish government in recent memory.

It is both sad and ironic then that Israelis are nostalgic for the comfort of Bush-era neoconservative tough talk, despite the fact that they are most fond of an American president whose policies were diametrically opposed to those of Bush: Bill Clinton.

Perhaps this fact, that Israelis loved Clinton and his policies, can give us some hope, as Obama’s policies very closely reflect those of Clinton. And right now, the State of Israel needs a little bit of hope, because right now, the state of Israel is not good.

This column was originally published in the Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle here.

The Protecting Civilians Myth Posted by Michael Cohen

First things first. I have broken down and finally gone on Twitter surrendering to the forces of digital overload. My handle is speechboy71 (surprisingly most variations of Michael Cohen were taken). Please follow me because right now I have 21 followers and that is kind of pathetic - that and I'm intensely curious to know who all the DA readers are out there. Ok, on to the news.

Fascinating read in today's Wall Street Journal about how US troops feel about the counter-insurgency mission they are being asked to perform in Southern Afghanistan. 

Among front-line troops, many of them used to more liberal rules of engagement in Iraq, frustration is boiling over. "It's like fighting with two hands behind your back," says Sgt. First Class Samuel Frantz, a platoon sergeant in Capt. Reim's unit, the Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment. "We're so worried about not hurting the population's feelings that we're not doing our jobs."

"It doesn't matter if we get killed—we're here to die," says Lt. Mark Morrison, 24 years old, the leader of the second platoon. "Our lives are not valuable enough to protect."

As Lt. Morrison's platoon gathered for a patrol, his soldiers traded gallows humor about losing limbs in coming hours. "Look at it this way—if you get prosthetic legs, you get to be taller," one told a shorter comrade-in-arms.

To be sure, this is not the first or last time that soldiers on the frontlines have complained about a mission or engaged in gallows humor, but it does speak to the frustration one has to imagine exists among soldiers who've been taught to be fighters - and are now asked to be armed social workers.

But here's the part of the story that is really concerning:

Capt. Duke Reim, commander of the American unit responsible for Pashmul, estimates that about 95% of the locals are Taliban or aid the militants. District Gov. Niyaz Mohammad Serhadi agrees. "People here are on the side of the insurgency and have no trust in the government," he says. "Insurgents are in their villages 24 hours." 

Now Pashmul isn't in Helmand, it's in Kandahar province, but this gets to an issue I raised yesterday - if our overarching goal in Afghanistan is to protect civilians then why are we waging offensives in places where a strong segment of the population doesn't want us to be there? 

Allow me to answer my own question; because our goal is NOT to protect civilians it's to defeat the Taliban . . . and further US interests. This is hardly a surprise; after all isn't this why most countries go to war - to further their interests. But this fiction that we are in Afghanistan to help the Afghan people is just that: fiction. If tomorrow, the residents of Helmand and Kandahar said "we'd rather live under Taliban rule, US troops get out" do you think we'd actually leave? I don't and the reason is simple; we think it's in our interests to stay.  Long ago we decided that defeating the Taliban - and protecting the lives of US citizens - was more important than protecting the lives of Afghan citizens. Otherwise we wouldn't be sending more troops to Afghanistan because no matter how well we play it, as long as 100,000 US troops are on the ground, Afghan civilians are gong to die.

If our goal was to "win the people's trust," the perhaps easiest course would be to leave places like Pasmul or Marjah, but instead we're going to spend blood and treasure to convince them to trust a government and occupying force that they appear to be quite wary of. And that wariness is only likely to grow if Marjah ends up like Fallujah. 

I'm sorry but this is no way to fight a war. Either we're in places like Helmand and Kandahar to defeat the insurgency or we're there to protect the civilians. I'm not sure that it's possible to do both. In fact, right now it doesn't seem like we're doing a very good job at either.

The Contradictions of Marjah - pt.2 Posted by Michael Cohen

As DA readers are no doubt aware, the US counter-insurgency mission in Afghanistan is focused, above all else, on protecting the lives of Afghan civilians and providing them with security. The people are the center of gravity we are told. In fact, General McChrystal has put in place rules of engagement in Afghanistan that restrict the use of airstrikes in order to limit civilian deaths and McChrystal has made clear that if protecting civilians means letting enemy fighter escape - then so be it.

Clearly that's why the US and ISAF has for several weeks now been telling civilian to get out of the town of Marjah before they attack it. And tens of thousands have fled their homes and many others are trapped in the town. 

Forgive me for asking, though, if the goal was to protect civilians . . . shouldn't we not be attacking Marjah in the first place?  Take a look at how some of this is playing out on the ground. According to Nasima Niazi, an MP for Helmand:

“We do not have the facilities to cope with war. The plans are good, but the civilians are farmers and we cannot keep their lives safe or protect their agriculture and fields, and we cannot care for the refugees or those who stay inside Marjah.”

Beyond that the article notes that "Hundreds of refugees from southern Afghanistan already inhabit a squalid camp on the outskirts of Kabul. They often accuse both the Taliban and foreign troops of showing little regard for civilian life and complain that nothing has been done to improve their miserable living conditions."

And here are the calming words of the spokesman for Helmand's governor. 

Speaking via telephone, Daoud Ahmadi acknowledged that civilians could suffer in the short-term. “It’s a war, and war is war,” he said. However, he added that those fleeing Operation Moshtarak would be offered adequate temporary shelter and would benefit in the long run.“We will have some fighting, but we will bring opportunities and chances to the people of Marjah with our reconstruction programs.”

So you see, we have to destroy Marjah to save it. 

But there's more; this according to the AP:

The U.S. goal is to quickly retake control of Marjah, a farming community and major opium-production center, from Taliban forces. That would enable the Afghan government to re-establish a presence, bringing security, electricity, clean water and other public services to the estimated 80,000 inhabitants.

Over time, American commanders believe such services will undermine the appeal of the Taliban among their fellow Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in the country and the base of the insurgents' support.

Calling his hometown of Marjah a "ghost village," resident Mohammad Hakim said he tried to leave with his family this week before the military offensive began but he was stopped by a group of 30 to 40 Taliban fighters who were patrolling the area.

"I already packed. My family was ready. It was difficult to find a car but I got one," he said in a phone interview. "But the Taliban stopped me and told me not to come out because they had already planted mines on the road. 'It's safer for you to stay in your houses.'"

Does any of this make sense? How will "supplying services" undermine the appeal of the Taliban when American forces are forcing Afghan civilians to leave their home and bringing violence to a town that is today relatively peaceful.  Add that to the fact that the Taliban have, according to this report, trapped much of the population in a war zone marked by "belts of improvised bombs, which have rendered the road network impassable."  This is not to mention the fact that there is precious little evidence to suggest that the Afghan government is up to the task of supplying services to Marjah or anywhere else in Southern Afghanistan.

Look, if the US believes that it must attack Marjah to undermine the Taliban in Helmand that's one thing; but the notion that we are doing this to "protect civilians" is a completely bizarre.  How is what we are doing not, in the near term, driving more Afghans into the Taliban's arms? We're causing civilians in Marjah untold suffering . . . in the name of protecting them from the Taliban. This is nothing more than an absolute contradiction of our declared mission in Afghanistan.

Why So Serious? Posted by Patrick Barry

One irritating aspect of Iran adopting a diplomatic style marked by the alternating use of concessions\provocations is that it does little to tamp down alarmism about its nuclear program. Take yesterday’s reports that Iran will move to enrich its LEU stockpile (enriched to 3.5%) to medical levels (enriched to 20%.)  Before going on, I should make clear that I think this is a serious step by the Iranians, for reasons David Albright lays out in this Washington Post story (though the piece requires some help translation from Jeffrey Lewis). Basically, according to Albright, it’s much easier to go from uranium enriched for medical purposes to uranium enriched for weapon’s purposes. This plan would bring Iran closer to nuclear breakout capacity, and so at some level, it should be concerning.   

But announcing an action is not the same as actually doing it.  That’s why my housemates and I don’t react very strongly when one of us declares something like, “this is the week when we get serious about cleaning the living room.”   So while Glenn Kessler may have a point that its very scary to imagine that Iran could make the “significant step” toward “possessing the raw material needed to build a nuclear bomb,” the less-frightening reality is that enriching uranium to levels consistent with medical use is a rather complicated and lengthy process. According to the Associated Press, “enriching to 20 percent would take about one year and require up to 2,000 centrifuges.”  And as Reza Aslan points out, “not only has Iran thus far barely managed to enrich uranium to 5 percent, it can hardly keep its one enrichment plant in Natanz—which took many years to build—up and running full time.”    All in all, it's not clear whether Iran has the ability to see its plan through to fruition, making its somewhat troubling declaration rather hollow.

A more accurate analysis of the announcement would read something like “Iran takes step in the direction of year-long process, which, if successful, would result in the uranium necessary for further enrichment to weaponization levels.”  But no, instead Iran is “one step closer to a bomb.”  

How to Talk to Islamists (Without Getting Frightened) Posted by Shadi Hamid

If you've ever wondered whether we've engaged with Islamists, whether we can, and, perhaps more importantly, whether we should, then you're in luck. I've co-authored with Amanda Kadlec a new policy paper on "Strategies for Engaging Political Islam," published by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. You can read it here.

In the paper, we assess existing polices toward political Islam and argue that engaging with mainstream Islamist groups is in the national security interest of the US and EU countries (yes, really). We look at three levels of Western engagement - low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership - and consider the advantages and disadvantages of each.

The paper has an interesting genesis. We thought that instead of talking about Islamists, why don't we talk to them, and let them talk to us. Yea, I know - it's a pretty weird idea. Anyhow, the paper draws on discussions held in Washington last year with Ruheil Gharaibeh - Deputy Secretary-General of the Islamic Action Front and leading member of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. During his time in Washington, Gharaibeh met with members of the policy community to discuss the relationship between Islamists and the West.

In any case, you probably should read the whole thing.